AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 

THE  STUDY  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


THE  CENTURY 
POLITICAL  SCIENCE  SERIES 

EDITED  BY 
FBEDEEIC  A.  OGG, 

University  of  Wisconsin. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  AMERICAN  GOVERNMENT.  By  Frederic 
A.  Ogg,  University  of  Wisconsin,  and  P.  Orman 
Bay,  Northwestern  University. 

AMERICAN  PARTIES  AND  ELECTIONS.  By  Edward  M. 
Sait,  University  of  California. 

STATE  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  Walter 
F.  Dodd,  Chicago,  Illinois. 

MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT.  By  Thomas  H.  Heed,  Uni- 
versity of  California. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  Ed- 
ward S.  Corwin,  Princeton  University. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  HISTORY  or  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By 
Andrew  C.  McLaughlin,  University  of  Chicago. 

THE  CONDUCT  OF  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  BELATIONS.  By 
John  M.  Mathews,  University  of  Illinois. 

OUTLINES  or  WORLD  POLITICS.  By  Herbert  Adams  Gib- 
bons, Princeton,  New  Jersey. 

EUROPEAN  DIPLOMACY,  1914-1921.  By  Charles  Seymour, 
Yale  University. 

INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANI- 
ZATION. By  Pitman  B.  Potter,  University  of  Wiscon- 
sin. 

AMERICAN  INTERESTS  AND  POLICIES  IN  THE  FAR  EAST. 
By  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  Washington,  D.  C. 

LATIN  AMERICA  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES.  By  Graham 
H.  Stuart,  University  of  Wisconsin. 

EECENT  AND  CONTEMPORARY  POLITICAL  THEORY.  By 
Francis  W.  Coker,  Ohio  State  University. 

ELEMENTS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW.  By  Charles  G.  Fen- 
wick,  Bryn  Mawr  College. 

Other  volumes  to  ~be  arranged. 


AN   INTRODUCTION   TO 

THE  STUDY  OF 

INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


BY 

PITMAN  B.  POTTER,  PH.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR   OF  POLITICAL   SCIENCE, 
UNIVERSITY   OF  WISCONSIN 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1922 


Copyright,  1922,  by 
THE  CENTUET  Co. 


Printed  In  U.  8.  A. 


To 

MY  MOTHER 

LOUISA  A.  POTTER 

GRATITUDE  AND   BESPECT 


'REFACE 


In  the  pages  which  follow  I  have  attempted  to  do  three 
distinct  things.  First,  I  have  tried  to  show  that  inter- 
national organization  is  not  a  new  thing  in  world  history, — 
nor  a  reform  proposed  for  the  future, — but  a  political  sys- 
tem of  long  standing  which  deserves  to  be  studied  as  such. 
Second,  I  have  tried  to  show  how  this  standing  system  of 
international  organization  has  expanded  and  developed, 
particularly  in  the  past  century,  and  to  set  forth  the  causes 
which  will  probably  lead  to  a  continuation  and  intensifica- 
tion of  that  process  in  the  future.  Finally,  I  have  ex- 
pressed the  conviction  that  such  a  process  is  salutary,  in 
that  it  meets  a  real  need  of  the  world  today,  and  have 
attempted  to  make  some  suggestions  regarding  steps  which 
might  profitably  be  taken  in  the  improvement  and  develop- 
ment of  the  existing  institutions  of  international  govern- 
ment. 

The  task  of  recording  and  explaining  existing  interna- 
tional institutions  and  practices  becomes  daily  more  diffi- 
cult, because  of  the  rapidity  with  which  activities  in  this 
field  are  being  expanded.  In  every  branch  of  international 
organization  dealt  with  in  this  volume,  particularly  in 
Parts  V,  VI,  and  VII,  new  steps  are  constantly  being  taken, 
and  it  is  almost  impossible  for  the  student  to  keep  himself 
informed  of  these  advances,  to  say  nothing  of  digesting  and  / 
recording  all  the  information  relating  to  these  matters  v 
which  comes  pouring  in  through  official  documents,  cur- 
rent newspapers  and  periodicals,  and  private  writings. 

For  this  reason  I  hope  that  where  the  account  given 
appears  to  be  inaccurate  or  out  of  date  the  reader  will 
remember  that  my  object  is  not  to  describe  exhaustively 

vii 


viii  PEEFACE 

and  finally  the  international  organization  of  the  world,  but 
to  provide  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  that  subject, 
by  describing  basic  institutions  and  analysing  the  princi- 
ples underlying  them.  For  this  reason  also  I  have  not 
tried  to  bring  the  record  in  Part  VIII  down  to  the  last 
minute,  but  have  left  it  at  a  juncture  where  one  movement 
— that  of  the  League — reached  a  definite  point  in  its  devel- 
opment, and  a  new  one — the  "Washington  Conference — 
began. 

The  League  of  Nations  has  been  taken  as  the  culmina- 
tion of  international  constitutional  growth  in  the  past,  and 
the  treatment  of  certain  subjects  in  various  chapters  has 
been  arranged  with  this  in  mind.  Thus,  the  development 
of  international  organization  has  been  carried  down  only 
to  1918  in  Parts  I- VI,  with  the  exception  of  certain  mate- 
rials in  the  later  portions  of  Chapters  IV,  XVI,  and  XXI ; 
the  League  is  presented  as  the  last  stage  in  the  proc- 
ess of  creating  world  government;  and  the  events  of 
1920-21  have  been  treated  mainly  in  their  relations  to 
the  League.  For  this  there  seems  to  be  ample  justification. 
In  its  essential  character,  and  in  the  magnitude  of  the  effort 
which  it  represents,  the  institution  of  the  League  of  Nations 
is  comparable  in  world  history  only  with  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  the  history  of  the 
American  nation.  Defective  it  is,  and  final  in  its  present 
form  it  most  certainly  is  not;  but  whatever  is  done  in  the 
future  in  the  direction  of  general  international  organization 
will  be  done  by  way  of  modification  of,  or  additions  to,  the 
present  League.  If  the  importance  of  the  League  is  to 
be  minimized  at  all,  it  is  not  because  of  anything  directly 
connected  with  its  own  organization  and  methods,  but  only 
by  recalling  the  great  amount  of  international  organiza- 
tion of  the  simpler  types,  such  as  diplomacy,  treaties,  and 
conferences,  which  exists  apart  from  the  League. 

My  object  being  to  provide  a  volume  useful  to  college 
students  and  to  general  readers,  I  have,  with  a  view  to 


PREFACE  ix 

making  reference  work  simpler  for  the  student,  confined 
my  references  to  general  and  secondary  materials;  refer- 
ences to  relatively  inaccessible  materials  and  to  works  in 
languages  other  than  English  have  been  reduced  to  a  min- 
imum. I  am  particularly  indebted  to  certain  writers — 
for  example,  Hershey,  Phillipson,  and  Satow, — because  of 
the  serviceableness  of  their  works  as  reference  books.  Am- 
ple introduction  to  the  more  highly  specialized  materials 
will  be  found  in  the  books  cited  in  the  special  sections  in 
Appendix  B. 

The  frequent  references  to  works  on  international  law, 
as  well  as  the  professional  feeling  of  some  persons  who 
are  interested  in  that  subject,  may  raise  a  question  con- 
cerning the  propriety  of  such  a  work  as  this,  distinct  from 
a  treatise  on  international  law.  To  such  a  question  my 
reply  would  be  as  follows :  Two  distinct  types  of  material 
are  included  in  the  ordinary  treatises  on  international  law, 
namely,  material  descriptive  of  the  institutions  for  regulat- 
ing and  conducting  international  relations,  and  of  their 
methods  of  operation  in  practice,  and  material  stating  the 
recognized  rights  and  duties  of  states.  The  latter,  and  only 
the  latter,  is  international  law  proper.  The  former  is 
political  science,  descriptive  and  analytical.  International 
law  proper  should  be  handled  by  lawyers  as  law ;  it  should 
be  purified  of  non-legal  materials.  When  that  is  done  it 
will  not  be  so  likely  to  appear  to  the  legal  profession  as 
near-law,  or  imitation  law.  International  organization  will 
also  profit  in  its  turn  by  receiving  due  attention  in  its  own 
name.  The  vast  stretches  of  material  in  the  works  of  in- 
ternational law  descriptive  of  the  machinery  of  world  gov- 
ernment are  no  more  in  place  in  such  works  than  would 
be  a  description  of  the  courts  in  a  treatise  on  private  law. 
These  materials  should,  however,  be  brought  together  in 
a  work  such  as  I  have  here  tried  to  produce. 

I  am  happy  to  have  this  opportunity  to  express  to  Pro- 


x  PREFACE 

f  essor  James  Wilf  ord  Garner,  of  the  University  of  Illinois, 
my  appreciation  of  the  opportunity  to  work  into  this  par- 
ticular field  of  study,  as  distinct  from  international  law, 
which  he  was  the  first  to  give  me,  and  to  Professor  Frederic 
Austin  Ogg,  the  editor  of  the  series  in  which  this  volume 
appears,  for  a  laborious  and  exceedingly  helpful  revision 
of  the  text.  I  am  glad,  also,  to  have  the  chance  to  record 
my  thanks  to  my  wife,  Jessie  Dalton  Potter,  for  the 
patience  with  which  she  has  served  as  audience  for  a  per- 
petual lecture  on  this  subject,  and  for  her  many  sympathetic 
suggestions  as  I  have  worked  out  the  subject  in  my  own 
mind,  during  the  past  few  years. 

PITMAN  B.  POTTEB. 
University  of  Wisconsin, 
Christmas,  1921. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    INTRODUCTORY:      TERMS   AND   PRINCIPLES 3 


PAET  I.  OEIGIN  AND  NATUEE  OF  THE  MODEBN 

STATE-SYSTEM 21 

II    STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY 23 

III  MEDIEVAL   STATE-SYSTEMS 33 

IV  EISE  or  THE  SYSTEM  or  NATIONAL  STATES 42 

PAET  II.     MODEEN  DIPLOMACY 61 

V    ORIGIN  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CONSULAR  SYSTEM  ...  63 

VI    ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  CONSULAR  SERVICE      .  71 

VII    ORIGIN  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY  ....  84 

VIII    ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY       .     .     .    .«    m  100 

IX    CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY 123 

PAET  III.     TBEATIES  AND  INTEENATIONAL  LAW     .  139 

X    TREATY   NEGOTIATION 141 

XI    THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM 156 

XII    TREATIES  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT  or  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      .  172 

PAET  IV.     INTEENATIONAL  AEBITEATION       ...  191 

XIII  GOOD  OFFICES  AND  MEDIATION;  COMMISSIONS  OF  INQUIRY      .  193 

XIV  HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  BEFORE 
1899 210 

XV    THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM 228 

XVI    PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS       .           243 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 


HAPTER  PAGE 

PART  V.     INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION       .     .  267 

XVII    OFFICIAL  UNIONS,  COMMISSIONS,  AND  BUREAUS 269 

XVIII    PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS 289 

XIX    MODEEN   COSMOPOLITANISM 302 

PART  VI.  INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCES  AND  CON- 
GRESSES          315 

XX    INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE;  THE  HAGUE 

CONFERENCES         317 

XXI    PEACE  CONFERENCES;  THE  CONFERENCE  OF  PARIS     ....  336 

XXII    THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  INTERNATIONAL 

ORGANIZATION  357 


PART  VII.     INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION       ...  377 

XXIII  THE  JURISTIC  THEORY  or  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION      .     .379 

XXIV  EMPIRE,  DEFENSIVE  ALLIANCES,  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER  396 

XXV    THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE,  THE  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE,  AND  METHODS 

or  INTERNATIONAL  CONTROL 417 

XXVI    PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION 438 

XXVII    THE  LEAGUE  or  NATIONS,  1919 456 

PART    VIII.      INTERNATIONAL    ORGANIZATION    IN 

1920-1921          477 

XxVllI    THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  or  NATIONS  AND  THE 

RESUMPTION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 479 

XXIX    INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921 498 

APPENDIX  A:     DOCUMENTS  ILLUSTRATING  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTER- 
NATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 511 

1.  Consular  Convention  between  the  United  States  and  Sweden,  1910  511 

2.  Regulations  of  Vienna,  1815,  and  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1818,  Concern- 
ing Diplomatic  Rank 519 

3.  American  Foreign  Service  and  Foreign  Diplomatic  and  Consular 
Representatives  in  the  United  States  in  December,  1916     .      .      .  520 

a.  Diplomatic  Service  of  the  United  States 520 

b.  Foreign  Diplomatic  Representatives  in  the  United  States     .  522 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGB 

c.  Consular  Service  of  the  United  States     .     .- 523 

d.  Foreign  Consular  Officers  in  the  United  States     .     .     .     .531 

4.  Arbitration    Convention   between   the   United    States   and   Great 
Britain,  1908,  with  Marginal  Analysis  and  Supplementary  Docu- 
ments      534 

a.  Eesolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  Consenting  to 

the  Katification  of  a  Treaty  by  the  President 536 

b.  Act  of  Eatification  of  a  Treaty 536 

c.  Protocol  of  an  Exchange  of  Ratifications 537 

d.  Proclamation  of  a  Treaty  by  the  President 538 

5.  Treaty  of  Peace,  signed  at  Paris,  30  March,  1856,  and  Declaration 

of  Paris,  Adopted  by  Signatories  Thereto 538 

a.  Treaty  of  Paris,  30  March,  1856 538 

b.  Declaration  of  Paris,  1856 543 

6.  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes, 
Signed  at  The  Hague,  1907 544 

7.  Convention  for  the   Creation   of   an  International   Institute   of 
Agriculture,  1905 565 

8.  Proposals  for  The  Hague  Conference  of  1907 568 

a.  Memorandum   from  the   Russian   Embassy   in   Washington, 
Handed  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  13  September, 
1905,  Proposing  a  Second  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague     .     568 

b.  Note  from  the  Russian  Ambassador   to  the   Secretary   of 
State,  3  April,  1906 569 

c.  Note   from   the   Russian   Ambassador   to   the   Secretary   of 
State,  Proposing  the  Program  of  the  Second  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 12  April,  1906 569 

9.  Final  Act  of  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference,  1907     .      .      .     572 

10.  Regulations  Governing  the  Organization  and  Work  of  the  Peace 
Conference  of  Paris,  1919 575 

11.  Treaty  of  Alliance  for  the  Preservation  of  the  Balance  of  Power, 
1814 579 

12.  Act  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  26  September,  1815 581 

13.  Program  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  in  the  Greek  Question,  in  a 
Treaty  of  6  July,  1827 583 

14.  Convention  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  Providing  Guarantees  for 

the  Kingdom  of  Greece,  7  May,  1832 586 

15.  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  1919    ;.,    ,.,     .....     589 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

APPENDIX  B:  BIBLIOGRAPHY ,..,..  602 

GENERAL .•  .  .  603 

SPECIAL;  BEADING  REFERENCES 607 

INDEX  637 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  STUDY  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 

THE  STUDY  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTORY:    TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES 

DURING  the  past  twenty-five  years  a  new_phrase  has 
come  into  common  speech  and  into  the  formal  litera- 
ture  of  political  science :  international  organization.  The 
rise  of  the  idea  which  this  term  expresses  is  no  less  signifi- 
cant than  was  the  emergence  of  the  idea  of  "international 
law,"  or  a  "law  of  nations,"  at  an  earlier  time.  A  new  field 
of  study  has  been  opened  up  which  is  quite  as  definite  as  mu- 
nicipal government,  state  government  (in  the  United 
States),  or  national  government,  and  which  is  no  less  im- 
portant for  both  layman  and  professional  political  scientist. 
All  of  these  subjects  of  study  are  readily  designated  by 
reference  to  the  community  whose  institutions  are  to  be 
considered.  It  is  time  that  we  devoted  more  attention  to 
the  aggregate  of  institutions  and  usages  for  governing  the 
modern  wrorld,  in  so  far  as  the  world  is  governed  as  a  unit. 
However,  it  is  better,  for  various  reasons,  not  to  employ  the 
obvious  phrase  "world  government,"  but  to  use  a  title 
which  indicates,  to  some  extent,  the  nature  of  the  chief  proc- 
ess by  which  the  world  has  come  to  enjoy  some  measure  of 
unified  government,  namely,  "international  organization." 
The  materials  for  this  study  must  be  drawn  from  widely 
scattered  sources.  Moreover,  on  account  of  the  newness  of 
the  subject,  there  is  certain  to  be  a  good  deal  of  confusion 

3 


4  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

as  to  the  materials  which  do  and  those  which  do  not  prop- 
erly relate  to  the  subject  in  hand.  Nevertheless,  for  the 
very  reason  that  we  are  mapping  out  a  field  for  study  which 
is  new,  but  which  will  demand  increasing  attention  as  time 
goes  on,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  definitions  and  concepts 
with  some  care  at  the  beginning. 

<A  distinction  ought  to  be  made  at  once  between  interna- 
tional intercourse  and  international  organization.  The  for- 
mer term  denotes  the  whole  body  of  non-political  and  non- 
legal  activity  among  the  nations.  Such  activity  is  commer- 
cial and  financial  and  cultural,  in  a  very  general  sense,  and 
includes  the  many  activities  and  practices  in  the  develop- 
ment and  maintenance  of  trade  and  travel  and  communica- 
tion, and  in  the  exchange  of  information  and  of  artistic  and 
scientific  knowledge,  which  lie  outside  the  field  of  official 
legal  and  political  practice.  This  body  of  international 
intercourse  forms  the  foundation  upon  which  legal  and 
political  international  organization  is  built,  and  the  two 
systems  react  one  upon  another  in  many  ways.  But  they 
are  not  identical,  and  they  must  be  kept  distinct  in  one's 
thought. 

The  most  obvious  way  in  which  this  body  of  interna- 
tional intercourse  may  be  affected  by  legal  and  political 
action  is  by  the  formulation  of  rules  governing  it  by  people 
engaged  in  it.  This  has  been  done,  to  a  certain  extent,  during 
tlu»  past  three  centuries,  and  we  have  a  set  of  principles  and 
rules  adopted  by  common  consent  and  covering  more  or 
/less  directly  and  more  or  less  in  detail  the  whole  field  of  in- 
ternational life.  This  set  of  principles  and  rules  is  called 
international  law,  and  must  itself  be  distinguished  from 
international  organization.  The  rules  of  international  law 
are  abstract  formulae.  They  describe  and  prescribe  the  re- 
lations and  behavior  of  nations,  and  of  their  official  repre- 
sentatives, in  contact  one  with  another,  rather  than  the 
actions  of  private  individuals,  and  they  bear  upon  actual 
international  intercourse  in  the  economic  and  cultural 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES     5 

sphere  only  indirectly,  through  state  action  upon  the  indi- 
viduals participating  in  that  intercourse.  These  rules  are 
to  be  sought  in  unofficial  treatises  by  private  scholars,  in 
public  documents  of  various  sorts  (especially  treaties),  and 
in  judicial  and  arbitral  decisions  in  which  they  are  em- 
bodied. 

Rules  of  law,  however,  are  of  scant  effect  if  unsupported 
by  organs  of  government.  It  is  here  that  international 
organization  proper  comes  into  view.  The  system  of  insti- 
tutions and  practices  for  the  creation  and  enforcement  of 
these  rules  of  international  law  which  govern  the  body  of 
international  intercourse  constitutes  the  existing  interna- 
tional organization.  Various  institutions  have  grown  up 
among  the  nations,  having  certain  forms  and  following 
certain  regular  modes  of  operation,  for  the  execution,  ad- 
ministration, and  revision  of  the  rules  of  international  law 
and  the  regulation  of  international  life  by  reference  to 
these  rules  and  to  the  principles  of  equity.  The  structure 
of  these  institutions,  their  functions,  and  their  modes  of 
procedure  deserve  examination  and  careful  understanding. 

It  has  long  been  customary,  in  the  study  of  national 
government,  to  speak  of  legislative,  executive,  and  judi- 
cial organs  and  functions,  and  these  designations  and  the 
concepts  back  of  them  are  so  familiar  that  they  can  well 
be  employed  in  dealing  with  the  development  of  interna- 
tional governmental  institutions.  The  analysis,  however, 
will  not  come  out  as  sharply  in  this  field  as  in  that  of  do- 
mestic government,  for  various  reasons.  International  in- 
stitutions, moreover,  frequently  combine  in  one  organ  two 
or  more  of  these  functions,  perhaps  as  often  as  is  the  case 
with  national  governmental  institutions. 

It  may  be  said,  in  the  first  place,  the  international  sys- 
tem contains  organs  of  the  judicial  function.    These  appear  v 
very  early  in  the   history  of  international  government. 
Their  task  is  to  apply  rather  clearly  recognized  and  firmly 
accepted  legal  rules  and  principles  of  equity  to  specific  con- 


6  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

flicts  of  national  interests.  The  rules  so  applied  are  the 
rules  of  international  law  and  justice  already  worked  out 
more  or  less  unconsciously  in  international  life.  The  court 
is  interested,  first,  in  finding  and  setting  out  the  law 
applicable  to  the  case  in  hand,  turning  more  or  less  upon 
the  formal  rules  of  law  and  more  or  less  upon  equitable 
considerations  arising  out  of  the  particular  facts  of  the 
case  itself.  In  doing  this,  the  court  adds  to  the  existing 
law  by  interpreting  its  provisions  and  describing  their 
application  in  a  novel  set  of  circumstances.  Finally,  the 
tribunal  sometimes  acts  in  an  administrative  capacity  and 
issues  orders  for  the  execution  of  the  judgment  or  the 
working  out  of  the  solution  suggested  in  the  premises. 

Likewise,  there  are  found  international  executive  and 
administrative  organs,  which  act  upon  the  basis  of  existing 
international  law  and  carry  on  the  work  of  international 
intercourse  on  behalf  of  the  members  of  the  community  of 
nations.  These  bodies  make  judicial  decisions  of  a  minor 
character,  but  only  as  incidents  of  their  administrative 
work;  and  they  lay  down  rules  of  law  in  a  legislative  ca- 
pacity, though  only  within  the  discretion  granted  them  in 
their  executive  duties.  They  serve  in  a  humbler  capacity 
than  the  judicial  tribunals,  but  they  provide  a  mechanism 
for  doing  much  useful,  if  prosaic,  day-by-day  work  among 
the  nations. 

Just  as  the  administrative  organs  seem  to  develop  at 
a  stage  in  international  evolution  later  than  that  at  which 
the  judicial  organs  appear,  so  at  a  still  later  stage  certain 
international  legislative    organs    come    into    prominence. 
'These  legislative  organs  have  as  their  task  the  codification, 
j*  revision,  and  amendment  of  existing  international  law  and 
Sthe  creation  of  new  law.    This  is  done  by  a  process  of  con- 
tract in  the  earlier  stages,  and  by  a  process  of  legislation 
proper  at  a  later  stage.     The  law  of  nations,  applied  as 
found  by  tribunals  dealing  with  international  cases  in  the 
first  instance,  applied  largely  as  found  by  international  ad- 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES     7 

ministrative  bodies  in  the  second  instance,  is  here  revised  ) 
and  renewed  by  agreements  among  the  nations,  either  in  v 
the  form  of  bargains  one  with  another  or  in  the  form  of  \ 
general  rules  adopted  as  statements  of  legal  right. 

Thus  in  the  international  field  we  find  the  same  sort  of  N 
political  organization  and  operation  that  we  find  in  local  J 
and  national  life. 

For  the  appearance  and  growth  of  international  or- 
ganization, however,  favorable  conditions  are  necessary.1 
Certain  circumstances  have  powerfully  stimulated,  others 
have  equally  retarded,  development  in  this  direction.  In 
the  absence  of  some  very  simple  conditions,  indeed,  it  has 
been  quite  impossible  for  international  intercourse  itself  to 
spring  up,  for  a  legal  system  to  be  developed,  or,  finally, 
for  an  institutional  system  to  be  devised  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  that  intercourse.  Under  differing  conditions,  inter- 
national life  has  developed  a  richness  and  intensity  calling 
for  an  extensive  legal  system  and  a  complicated  set  of  gov- 
ernmental organs  to  take  care  of  it.  The  principal  pre- 
requisites of  international  organization  must,  therefore,  be  >^ 
noted  at  the  outset. 

First,  there  must  be  in  existence  certain  states  or  na- 
tions or  national  states.2  That  is,  there  must  be  available 
certain  potential  members  of  the  community  of  nations. 
There  could  be  no  international  intercourse,  law,  or  organi- 
zation if  and  whenever  there  should  cease  to  exist  in  the 
world  a  number  of  free  states.  The  existence  of  inde- 
pendent nations  is  indispensable. 

Two  nations  might  conceivably  develop  such  relations.3 
But  a  multiplicity  of  units  is  desirable,  rather  than  a  bare 
plurality,  for,  just  as  a  multiplicity  of  specimens  gives  op- 
portunity for  the  development  of  general  principles  of  law  * 

'Hershey,  §  16;  Hill,  I,  1;  II,  1;  III,  1;  Walker,  §  20.  For  full  titles  of 
all  references  see,  below,  Appendix  B. 

1  The  exact  relations  between  these  concepts  is  discussed  below,  p.  50, 
and  following. 

•Marriott,  27. 


^P 


, 

» 


jtJ^ 


8  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

in  the  field  of  natural  science,  so  the  multiplication  of  inde- 
pendent states,  resulting  in  decreased  size  of  the  individual 
states  and  in  an  inevitable  tendency  to  interstate  equality, 
is  conducive  to  a  rapid  and  equable  growth  of  the  law  of  na- 
J         tions.    The  body  of  the  law  is  enriched  with  new  and  rapid- 
ly increasing  materials,  while  a  more  urgent  demand  is 
;- created  for  some  international  organization  to  supervise 
and  foster,  on  governmental  lines,  the  increasing  bulk  of 
international  intercourse. 

One  of  the  most  beneficial  results  which  could  be  ex- 
pected from  the  reduction  of  the  existing  nations  to  some- 
thing like  a  condition  of  equality  would  be  the  removal 
^  of  the  difficulties  to  international  cooperation.    The  great- 
est obstacles  to  such  cooperation  now  are,  on  one  side, 
/   the  feeling  of  the  larger  states  that  they  have  more  to  gain 
by  "going  it  alone"  and  preserving  a  free  hand  than  by 
joining  in  a  world  federation  and  that,  if  any  organization 
is  to  be  created,  they  are  entitled  to  control  it,  and,  on 
the  other  side,  the  fear  of  the  smaller  states  that  any  inter- 
national organization  will  prove  merely  a  device  for  their 
,  enslavement,  seeing  that  they  cannot  control  it.    A  multi- 
/  plication,  and  consequent  equalization,  of  the  stafes  would 
I  tend  to  remedy  these  difficulties. 

This  conclusion,  it  is  true,  jruns  counter  to  recent  pro- 
tests against  the  "  Balkanization  "  of  central  Europe  and 
Western  Russia.1     Unquestionably,  the  multiplication  of 
states  makes  the  task  of  international  cooperation  more 
complicated,  and  to  that  extent  more   difficult;   and  the 
creation  of  artificial  states  by  the  powers  that  be,  if  for  ul- 
terior purposes,  is  to  be  condemned  on  all  grounds.    But  the 
-^protest  arises  chiefly  from  people  who  cling  to  the  old 
i  diplomacy  as  a  means  of  settling  international  questions 
^  and  do  not  wish  to  see  it  replaced  by  judicial  and  legalistic 
^  methods,  because  they  hope  to  profit  by  skillful  maneuver- 

1  New  York  Times,  14  December,  1919,  §  2,  p.  1,  column  8 ;  Mowrer,  entire, 
especially  Chap.  I ;  for  application  to  China  see  Dewey,  J.,  ' '  Balkanization  of 
China"  in  New  Eepublic,  XXVIII,  176,  178  (12  October,  1921). 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES     9 
ins;,  by  fishing  in  troubled  waters.     This  is  more  difficult 

C7/       «.    J^...    _     •      i    ..  •tJ  >..-..  .  •   ••  •  '  •   '  !•••••••  ^  .    •  .•.  ^—     .••• 

if  the  number  of  states  is  multiplied,  while  the  legalistic 
method  would  be  encouraged  thereby.  The  protest  springs 
also  from  a  realization  of  the  inadequacy  of  existing  inter- 
national governmental  machinery  as  a  means  of  holding  the 
many  new  states  in  order.  The  remedy  here,  obviously,  isN 
not  to  destroy  the  new  states,  but  to  provide  a  sufficient )  ''<< 

world  government. 

In  so  far  as  a  multiplication  of  states  involves  only  a 
subdivision  of  homogeneous  units,  the  increase  of  materials 
in  international  law  would  be  merely  quantitative.  To  divide 
the  British  Empire  into  a  dozen  units  for  the  purpose  of 
international  representation  would  assist  the  growth  of 
international  law  and  government,  from  a  qualitative  point 
of  view,  only  in  so  far  as  there  already  existed  a  substantial 
variety  of  conditions  among  the  component  parts.  Variety  ^ 
of  resources,  of  needs,  and  of  policies  among  the  states  in  -  , 

the  community  of  nations  is  conducive  to  the  rapid  and  ex- 
tensive internal  development  of  international  law  and  prac- 
tice. If  the  nations  become,  and  in  so_far_as  they  become, 
monotonously  identical  in  character,  the  law  produced 
will,  and  in  actual  fact  does,  become  common  law  rather 
than  anything  else. 

At  the  same  time,  a  certain  degree  of  homogeneity  is 
equally  necessary.  It  is  a  familiar  paradox  of  political 
science  that  homogeneity  is  indispensable  as  a  basis  for  - 
law  among  units  of  any  order,  while  perfect  homogeneity 
removes  the  occasion  for  any  law  except  a  system  of  com- 
mon law.  Some  common  denominators  among  the  nations 
must  be  found  in  the  intercourse  among  them.  If  there  are 
no  common  interests  and  standards  there  can  be  no  legal 
community.  General  recognition  of  this  principle  is  evi- 
denced by  the  idea  of  restricting  the  application  of  interna- 
tional law  to  the  European  nations,  to  the  "civilized"  na- 
tions, to  Christian  nations — a  thought  which  persisted  as  ^ 
long  as  it  seemed  that  the  differences  between  the  members  v 


10  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  these  groups  and  states  outside  were  so  profound  as  to 
render  impossible  a  common  life  between  them.  The  idea 
that  there  is  a  peculiar  "American"  international  law, 
testifies  to  the  same  thing.1 

The  foregoing  conditions  are  fundamental.2  There 
could  be  very  little  international  law  or  practice  in  a  world 
of  one  great  state,  of  a  restricted  number  of  states,  or  of 
states  either  monotonously  alike  or  immeasurably  at  vari- 
ance in  character.  Retardation  in  the  growth  of  inter- 
national law  and  organization  in  the  past  can  often  be 
y  traced  directly  to  the  suppression  of  independent  states, 
to  the  limited  number  of  precedents  available  on  a  given 
point,  to  the  fact  that  a  given  proposition  has  been  too 
generally  accepted  to  need  mention,  or,  more  often,  to  the 
fact  that  national  practices  and  views  have  differed  so 
widely  that  agreement  was  impossible. 

Beyond   these   fundamental   requirements   lie    certain 

others  of  less  importance,  which  nevertheless  have  a  con- 

-;  siderable  bearing  on  the  growth  of  international  law  and 

jgovernment.    Such  are  the  conditions  of  stability,  equality, 

/territorial  possessions,  and  political  character  in  the  states 

'  of  the  world. 

Thus,  if  the  rise  and  fall  of  states  in  the  world  is  too 
rapid,  it  is  clear  that  intercourse  and  the  elaboration  of 
legal  and  institutional  connections  among  the  states  will 
be  rendered  increasingly  difficult.  New  states  now  appear, 
in  the  ordinary  event,  only  by  the  modification  of  older 
ones.  If  this  process  of  modification  is  too  swift,  it  becomes 
difficult  to  determine  at  any  one  time  the  degree  of  inde- 
pendence, of  separable  existence,  enjoyed  by  a  given,  so- 
called,  state.  Too  much  of  flux  and  flow,  too  rapid  change 
in  the  political  map  of  the  world,  is  not  conducive  to  the 

»   *  Alvarez,  Droit  International  Americain. 

*  Compare  these  historical  conditions  with  the  so-called  fundamental  rights 
of  states  at  international  law  as  set  forth  in  Hershey,  §§  131-149.  All  these 
conditions  or  rights  are  logically  involved  in  the  simple  proposition  that  to  have 
international  law  and  organization  we  must  have  states  or  nations  to  start  with. 


C 

' 


INTRODUCTOEY:  TEEMS  AND  PEINCIPLES    11 

development  of  an  orderly  international  system.  As  in  all 
periods  of  great  revolutionary  disturbances,  international 
chaos  is  the  disastrous  result. 

Furthermore,  iHs  exceedingly  desirable  that  every  state 
shall  be  able  to  manage  its  own  affairs  in  its  own  way. 
If  the  peculiar  individuality  of  each  nation  is  to  find  due 
expression,  independent  action  is,  indeed,  essential.  For 
this  reason  such  an  equality  among  states  is  needed  as  will 
eliminate  domination  on  the  part  of  some  over  the  free 
actions  of  others.  When  powerful  empires  control  the  dis- 
cretion of  weaker  neighbors,  the  latter  contribute  little  to  ^ 
the  growth  of  the  law  of  nations.  Eecognition  of  the  un- 
wholesomeness  of  such  a  situation  has  led  to  the  adoption 
of  the  fiction  of  state  equality.  It  is  maintained  that,  irre-  v" 
spective  of  relative  areas,  populations,  resources,  and 
power,  the  nations  are,  as  concerns  the  law  of  nations,  equal  \ 
among  themselves.  The  smaller  nations  must  have  free-  1. 
dom  to  live  their  own  lives  and  to  receive  satisfaction  for 
their  national  rights  in  the  face  of  the  more  powerful  mem-  i 
bers  of  the  international  community. 

Commendable  as  this  fiction  may  be  as  a  means  of  obtain-  ' 
ing  by  an  artificial  ruling  something  which  is  felt  to  be 
desirable  but  not  actual  fact,  it  is  still  far  from  effective 
in  any  final  sense.  Equality  in  any  mere  physical  charac- 
teristics is,  of  course,  unimportant.  As  a  comparison  be- 
tween the  positions  occupied  by  Belgium  and  by  China  in 
recent  international  relations  will  show,  area,  population, 
natural  resources,  and  wealth,  as  such,  count  little  in  de- 
termining the  degree  and  quality  of  importance  and  power 
in  international  affairs.  But  equality  of  aggregate  power 
—  economic,  cultural,  and  political  —  is  certainly  to  be  de- 
sired. In  so  far  as  preponderant  empires  give  place  to  in- 
dependent national  states  theretofore  held  in  subjection  we 
shall  have  a  better  balanced  community  of  nations. 

That  a  nation  must  possess  a  certain  territorial  domain 
in  order  to  be  a  state  at  all  seems  to  be  generally  admitted.  / 


12 

Conceivably,  a  system  of  nomadic  or  non-territorial  states 
might  give  rise  to  a  body  of  international  law  and  a  set  of 
international  governmental  organs.     Throughout  all  his- 
tory, however,  states  or  other  organizations  of  people  lack- 
ing a  territorial  basis  have  failed  to  contribute  greatly  to 
international  life,  or,  indeed,  have  totally  failed  to  hold  a 
J   place  in  that  life.     To  deprive  a  state  of  its  territorial 
</**         basis,  and  of  the  population  sustained  by  that  territory, 
jj^,        means  to  deprive  it  of  existence,   ^iodern  international  law 
•    j        ••;.         and  diplomacy  are  the  products  of  a  system  of  territorial 
*  *  states,  in  contrast  to  an  earlier  system  of  personal  juris- 

*r  i  ni. 

dictions. 

Finally,  if  the  law  and  practice  of  the  nations  is  to  reach 
its  fullest  fruition,  the  states  must  be  political  in  character. 
That  is,  they  must  be  general,  or  comprehensive,  in  their 
activities  and  aims,  and  not  exclusively  religious,  industrial, 
scientific,  or  aesthetic.  In  so  far  as  states  have  only  special 
interests,  relations  with  other  states  are  more  difficult,  being 
dependent  on  the  chance  that  there  will  be  other  states  with 
like  special  interests.  The  path  is  not  long  to  a  condition 
of  direct  opposition  between  such  states.  What  could  a  pro- 
letarian state  find  in  common  with  a  capitalist  state  ?  Mem- 
bers of  the  family  of  nations  with  only  special  interests 
would  contribute  little  to  the  law  of  nations  outside  of  their 
own  interests;  Switzerland  has  not  contributed  to  the 
development  of  maritime  law  nor  Bolivia  to  that  of  the  law 
of  cable  control. 

Given  these  characteristics  on  the  part  of  the  potential 
members  of  the  society  of  nations  considered  within  them- 
selves, certain  external  historical  conditions  are  also  requi- 
site to  the  growth  of  any  considerable  system  of  interna- 
tional relations  and  government.  First,  there  must  be  a 
sufficient  degree  of  contact  among  the  existing  states,  and, 
second,  a  science  of  international  relations  must  be  de- 
veloped to  explain  existing  conditions  and  suggest  the  elab- 
oration of  new  legal  and  political  institutions. 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES    13 

Of  these,  the  first  is  more  fundamental.  Unless  two 
states  make  contact,  they  can  have  no  economic,  political,  or 
legal  relations  one  with  another.  National  isolation  results 
in  paralysis  of  international  growth.  In  proportion  as 
means  of  communication — commercial,  personal,  scientific — 
increase  among  the  nations,  the  intercourse  upon  which  the 
whole  system  is  founded  grows  in  quantity  and  complexity. 
More  needs  arise  for,  and  more  facilities  are  provided 
for  creating,  an  international  legal  and  governmental 
system. 

However,  the  importance  of  the  second  condition  ought 
not  to  be  underrated.  .For  want  of  a  mature  science  of  in- 
ternational relations,  the  Greek  state-system  went  down 
before  Macedon  and  Rome.  For  want  of  an  adequate 
science  and  art  of  international  government,  seven  million 
men  died  on  the  plains  of  Europe  in  the  years  1914-18. 
With  all  the  materials  for  international  organization  pres-*1) 
ent, — a  numerous  group  of  fully  developed  states,  with  a  L 
rich  international  intercourse  on  the  non-political  side, — 
the  world  still  lacked  a  statesmanship  equal  to  the  tasks 
of  ensuring  justice  and  keeping  peace. 

International  organization,  it  should  be  understood,  isv 
not  the  only  possible  type  of  world  government,  nor  the  only 
process  by  which  some  degree  of  unified  government  has 
been  attained  in  the  past.    Two  other  forms  of  world  gov- 
ernment are  always  to  be  reckoned  with,  namely,  empire  •- 
and  cosmopolitanism.     The  relations  among  these  several 
types  and  their  bearing  upon  the  concept  of  the  state  may 
be  briefly  stated. 

The  national  state  is  the  basic  unit  upon  which  all  discus-  - 
sion  must  proceed.  That  state  is  largely  the  product  of  the 
fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  although  the  list  of  such 
political  systems  has  been  steadily  growing  down  to  the 
present  time.  Its  salient  characteristic  is  the  binding  to- 
gether in  a  single  political  organization  of  a  group  of  peo- 
ple kindred  in  race,  ideals,  manners,  religion,  language,  or 


14  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

customs,  and  living  in  a  definite  territory,  under  a  formal 
constitution  and  government.1 

On  one  side  of  the  national  state  we  have  empire,  which 
is  the  forcible  union  and  subjection  in  one  state  of  the 
people  of  otherwise  independent  nations.  The  imperial 
unit  is  more  or  less  extensive,  more  or  less  world- wide.  The 
need  of  an  autocratic  government  to  dominate  the  structure 
usually  brings  into  being  a  monarch,  an  emperor;  and  at 
the  heart  of  the  empire  stands  the  master  nation  which  has 
subjugated  the  remainder.  The  logical  maximum  of  empire 
is  a  world  state  resting  on  conquest  and  domination. 

On  the  other  side  we  find  cosmopolitanism,  which  is  the 
merging  of  the  individuals  of  otherwise  distinct  nations  in 
one  state  on  the  basis  of  interests  common  to  them  apart 
from  nationality.  The  logical  outcome  of  this  process 
would  be  a  world  state  erected  by  voluntary  action ;  and  in 
its  form  of  government  it  would  tend  toward  anarchy,  be- 
cause of  its  emphasis  upon  the  individual,  and  because  of 
the  elimination  of  intermediate  authorities  between  the 
individual  and  a  possible  world  government.  We  thus  have 
here,  within  the  field  of  world  politics,  the  conflict  between 
authority  and  liberty  which  is  so  familiar  within  the  nation- 
al state. 

Standing  between  empire  and  cosmopolitanism,  we  have 
international  organization,  which  takes  the  national  state 
as  a  permanent  unit,  and  expects  neither  its  subjugation  nor 
its  disappearance  by  the  sublimation  of  its  elements.  In- 
ternational organization  proceeds  by  the  voluntary  coopera- 
Tion  of  separately  organized  nations.  The  result  is  a  unity 
similar  to  that  obtained  by  empire,  but  based  on  free  con- 
sent and  the  preservation  of  national  identity;  or  it  is  the 
unity  attained  under  cosmopolitanism,  but  based  on  the  con- 
scious action  of  national  groups.  Autocracy  and  anarchy 
lie  on  either  side;  but  national  liberty — positive  and  nega- 

1  On  nature  of  the  state  and  law  of  jurisdiction  see  Garner,  Introduction, 
38-85,  and  Wilson  and  Tucker,  §§  20,  34,  46-66,  68. 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES    15 

tive,  the  liberty  to  exist  and  to  resist, — may  be  secured 
only  under  the  legal  order  here  described. 

Examples  of  empire,  or  attempted  empire,  can  be  cited 
from  Alexander  to  William  II.  Examples  of  cosmopolitan- 
ism, or  of  tendencies  toward  it,  "extend  from  the  Greek  re- 
ligion to  the  modern  Roman  Catholic  Church.  Both  pro- 
grams are  more  or  less  discredited  today  as  plans  for  world 
organization.  But,  historically,  these  modes  of  world  order 
have  ruled  the  scene  with  fully  as  much  power  and  pres- 
tige and  over  periods  fully  as  extensive  as  has  international 
organization.  It  therefore,  might  seem  more  accurate  to 
regard  these  types  as  coordinate  with  international  organi- 
zation, as  permanent  forms  of  world  government,  available 
for  use  here  and  there  along  with  the  latter.  It  will  be  -s 
found,  however,  that  they  both  come  in  conflict  with  a  cer- 
tain modern  social  force,  and  that  this  conflict  dooms  them 
to  defeat  so  long  as  that  force  operates,  while  international 
organization  may  be  freely  promoted  without  any  conflict 
of  the  same  sort. 

The  rock  upon  which  both  empire  and  cosmopolitanism 
come  to  grief  is  nationality.  So  long  as  there  was  no 
Reeling  of  nationality,  conquest  and  empire,  on  one  side,  ^ti 

were  considered  perfectly  legitimate ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  / 

a  somewhat  amorphous  cosmopolitanism, — a  cosmopolitan- 
ism by  default, — was  widespread.  But  so  long  as  the  newer 
nationality  holds  sway,  neither  empire  nor  a  cosmopolitan 
world  will  be  easily  feasible.  If,  and  when,  nationality 
loses  its  grip  on  man,  both  cosmopolitanism  and  empire  will 
be  possibilities  to  be  reckoned  with.  As  things  now  stand, 
people  will  not,  if  they  have  the  power  to  prevent  it,  con- 
sent to  an  alien  domination;  and  they  cannot,  so  long  as 
human  psychology  and  culture  is  wmjTrTTstoday,  forget 
their  national  kinships  and  national  traditions  in  a  umver-  \ 
sal  brotherhood.  Whether  this  is  cause  for  rejoicing  or 
regret  is  irrelevant ;  the  point  at  present  is  simply  that  it  is 
true.  Resistance  to  international  organization  itself  springs 


16  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

chiefly  from  these  same  motives,  from  fear  of  foreign  domi- 
nation and  reluctance  to  mingle  with  the  world's  people  in- 
discriminately.    It  also  arises  from  the  apprehension  of 
plotters  of  empire  that  such  a  system  is  calculated  to  check 
their  schemes,  and  from  the  fear  of  cosmopolitan  enthu- 
,  siasts  that  it  will  be  accepted  as  a  substitute  for  their  creed. 
Both  are  right.     The  only  feasible  form  of  world  govern- 
\  ijsJ*  nient,  and  the  one*  which  is  at  once  feasible  and  safe,  is 

international  federation. 

The  possible  modes  of  world  organization  just  described 
are  not,  of  course,  entirely  incompatible  at  any  one  time. 
Cosmopolitan  society  may  develop  within  an  imperial  unit 
and  still  not  develop  so  far  as  to  threaten  the  stability  of 
the  empire  as  against  outside  influences.  Indeed,  the  de- 

{velopment  of  cosmopolitanism  within  an  imperial  state 
tends  to  remove  internal  sources  of  disruption.  Austria- 
Hungary  broke  up  because  this  process  had  not  taken 
place  within  her  territories.  Similarly,  cosmopolitanism 
may  develop  under  an  international  system  without  going 
so  far  as  to  threaten  to  obliterate  national  lines.  In  fact, 
the  cause  or  sanction  of  internationalism  is  the  previous 
development  of  a  certain  degree  of  cosmopolitan  unity, 
calling  for  some  measure  of  political  and  legal  accommo- 
dation. 

In  like  manner,  the  methods  of  imperialism  and  of  cos- 
mopolitanism— force  on  one  side  and  natural  growth  on 
JL,         the  other — are  not  wholly  absent  from  the  field  where  an 
w  international  federation  is  developing.     Even  in  the  case 
JCV    of  empire  there  may  be  voluntary  cooperation  of  distinct 
+•          national  units,  as  in  the  British  Empire  today;  although 
it  is  doubtful  whether  under  these  circumstances  the  con- 
cept of  "empire"  is  truly  applicable.    Such  development  is 
most  likely  to  take  place,  not  in  compact  continental  em- 
pires, but  in  transmarine  colonial  empires,  whose  geo- 
graphical structure  lends  itself  to  political  decentralization. 
A  more  perplexing  problem  is  encountered  on  the  his- 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES    17 

torical,  or  evolutionary,  side  of  the  subject.    On  one  hand, 
it  is  certain  that  a  condition  of  social  homogeneity  im- 
mediately preceded  the  present  condition  of  national  differ- 
entiations.   Medieval  Europe  knew  a  greater  degree  of  so- 
cial solidarity,  at  least  in  the  legal  and  political  aspects  of 
life,  than  does  contemporary  Europe.    On  the  other  hand, 
there  seems  to  be  evidence  today  that  cosmopolitanism — 
with  or  without  imperialism — is  developing,  by  a  natural 
evolutionary  process,  as  a  condition  to  follow  the  national- 
istic era;  and,  of  course,  Medieval  cosmopolitanism  was^ 
itself  preceded  by  a  period  of  nationalistic  rivalries  and  con-x 
flicts  which,  in  turn,  followed  the  cosmopolitanism  of  the  %• 
Roman  Empire,  even  as  the  latter  followed  a  previous  con-  * 
dition  of  national  independence  and  competition  in  Italy  x<- 
and  throughout  the  Mediterranean  basin.    There  has  been 
no  permanent  transition  from  one  of  these  forms  to  the 
othQr.    Neither  can  be  classed,  on  the  record  alone,  as  primi- 
tive, and  neither  as  ultimate.    They  would  appear  to  be  two 
modes  of  human  life  and  might  be  expected  to  persist  in-v 
definitely.    We  do  not  have  here  a  case  of  alternate  prog- 
ress and  reaction — which,  then,  would  be  the  progress  and 
which  the  reaction  ?   We  have,  rather,  a  case  of  more  or  less 
conflicting  impulses  toward  variety  and  uniformity  which 
arc  permanent  conditions  of  life.    And  for  their  reconcilia- 
tion, for  preventing  the  constant  oscillation  from  one  to 
the  other,  from  a  too  great  unity,  perhaps  a  forced  unity, 
of  the  nations,  to  a  too  great  degree  of  conflict,  even  to 
destructive  war,  international  organization  provides  the 
best  mechanical  device. 

An  effective  international  federation  would  neutralize 
the  more  active  tendencies  toward  either  empire  or  cosmo- 
politan unity.  The  case  of  empire  is  specially  clear.  In  spite 
of  the  easy  assumption  that  "there  have  always  been  em- 
pires and  there  will  always  be  empires,"  there  is  reason  for 
hoping,  and  tentatively  believing,  that  we  have  seen  the  end 
of  the  age  of  empire.  Since  1789  nationality  has  become 


18  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

an  unconquerable  force.  The  memories  of  St.  Helena  and 
Amerongen  are  not  reassuring  to  aspiring  imperialists. 
The  burdens — political  and  administrative — of  far-flung 
empire  are  unsupportable.  There  is,  indeed,  today,  no 
great,  powerful,  and  close-knit  empire.  The  future — the 
near  future,  at  least — belongs  to  the  national  state  of  me- 
dium size;  it  is  the  unit  in  the  present  problem  of  world 
order. 

This  leaves  the  future  of  cosmopolitanism  uncertain. 
Is  it  to  be  a  permanent  aspect  of  human  life  on  this  planet, 
existing  side  by  side  with  internationalism,  as  already 
suggested,  or  is  it,  like  empire,  to  pass  ?  Despite  a  certain 
suggested  parallelism  with  the  case  of  empire,  and  notwith- 
standing things  already  said  which  tend  to  suggest  the 
conclusion  that  cosmopolitanism  will  persist  but  that  na- 
tionalism will  persist  also,  it  seems  that  the  outcome  will 
be  still  different.  Cosmopolitanism  seems  likely  to  increase^ 
and  finally  supplant  internationalism.  Both  empire  and 
international  federation  are  forms  in  the  process  of  uni- 
fying the  human  race  in  one  state.  One  form  is  defective 
in  being  positively  repulsive  to  nationality.  The  other  is 
adequate  to  the  final  result  when,  but  only  when,  it  is  grad- 
ually transformed,  by  the  constant  modification  of  its  in- 
ternal structure,  so  as  to  leave  fewer  and  fewer  matters  to 
national  jurisdiction  and  to  expand  the  world  jurisdiction 
more  and  more. 

In  the  past  the  process  of  cosmopolitanization,  if  it 
may  be  so  called,  has  been  retarded  by  inadequate  means 
of  communication,  by  the  political  effects  of  sudden  shifts 
of  great  masses  of  people  from  one  section  of  the  earth  to 
another,  and  by  the  survival  of  primitive  instincts  of  com- 
bativeness  derived  from  tribal  experience.  Attempts  to 
create  a  world  state  by  voluntary  federation  or  imperial 
compulsion  have  failed  either  because  of  the  coercion  em- 
ployed or  because  the  cosmopolitan  basis  was  still  inade- 
quate. Within  the  past  hundred  years,  however,  the  factors 


INTRODUCTORY:  TERMS  AND  PRINCIPLES    19 

making  for  cosmopolitanization  have  multiplied  and  have 
been  developed  intensively  to  a  degree  never  before  known. 
Means  of  communication  have  increased  enormously ;  popu- 
lation has  became  more  mobile  and  at  the  same  time — and 
largely  for  this  very  reason — less  likely  to  shift  suddenly 
and  violently;  theories  and  ideals  of  cooperation  have 
tended  to  supplant  those  of  rivalry  and  dissension.  One 
might  almost  say  that  the  cosmopolitanizing  process  has 
become  conscious  and  deliberate.  The  modes  and  condi- 
tions of  international  life  and  relations  have  received  so 
much  attention  that  one  may  dare  hope  that  the  collapses 
of  earlier  days — the  disruption  of  the  Roman  empire,  the 
anarchy  of  the  fourteenth  century,  the  catastrophe  of  1914 — 
due  largely  to  sins  of  neglect  and  unconsciousness — will  be 
avoided  in  the  future. 

Whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  form  of  the  world  state, 
however,  and  as  we  look  back  to  the  past,  international 
federation  is  for  all  present  purposes  the  one  form  of 
world  order  demanding  study.  To  this  we  may  now  turn. 
Attention  must  be  given,  first,  to  the  economic  and  social 
basis  of  international  relations  in  modern  times  and  to  the 
nature  of  the  national  state-system,  and  afterwards  to  the 
institutions  and  methods  of  international  organization,  di- 
rectly considered.  Under  the  last  heading  are  to  be  studied 
the  institutions  of  modern  diplomacy,  treaties  and  inter- 
national law,  arbitration  and  judicial  settlement,  interna- 
tional administrative  bureaus  and  unions,  international 
congresses  and  conferences,  and,  finally,  attempts  to  bring 
together  all  of  these  partial  forms  of  international  govern- 
ment under  one  federal  league. 


PART  I 

ORIGIN  AND  NATURE 

OF  THE 
MODERN  STATE-SYSTEM 


CHAPTER  II 
STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY 

THE  form  which  international  organization  has  taken 
from  time  to  time  in  the  past  has  been  controlled 
partly  by  the  nature  of  the  state-system  upon  which  it  was        ,  ; 
based  and  partly  by  the  character  of  the  international  eco-          -far 
nomic  life  of  the  day.    Contemporary  international  organ- 
ization is  likewise  controlled  by  these  factors.    To  under- 
stand present  world  government  it  is  necessary  to  under- 
stand present  world  intercourse  and  the  nature  of  the 
modern  state-system. 

Regarded  by  itself  the  modern  state-system,  however,  ^ 
cannot  be  completely  understood ;  for  latent  within  it,  and 
determining  its  nature  and  behavior  in  many  critical  junc- 
tures, are  elements  derived  from  ancient  and  Medieval 
7 

political  systems.  In  order  to  obtain  a  full  understanding 
of  the  modern  state,  and  of  the  modern  system  of  national 
states,  it  is  necessary  to  study  the  life  history  of  the  modern 
national  state  as  such. 

/     In  recently  recovered  historical  materials  there  is  evi- 
i  dence  of  arbitration  and  treaty-negotiation  among  the  na- 
^tions  of  western  Asia  as  early  as  4000  B.  C.1    Both  oppo- 
nents of  the  League  of  Nations,  who  protest  against  rash 
adventures  upon  new  and  untried  paths,  and  enthusiastic 
supporters,  who  hail  the  League  as  opening  a  new  era  in 
international  life,  ought  to  be  sobered  by  the  reflection  that 
the  problem  of  international  federation  is  at  least  five 
thousand  years  old.    It  is  not,  however,  worth  our  while 
to  try  to  reconstruct  the  theory  of  things  international  as 

lTod,  170-71. 

23 


. 


y| 
J 


24  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

they  stood  prior  to  the  dawn  of  European  history.    Con- 
sidering  the  data  available,  the  results  achieved  in  their 
r*  v-          own  time,  and  their  contributions  to  the  problem  here  and 
JU    *r  *        now,  the  Greeks  were  the  first  to  develop  a  state-system 
'        commanding  our  serious  attention.     The  Mediterranean 
basin  was  the  cradle  of  our  system  of  independent  states 
l*and  international  organization. 

From  as  early  as  600  B.  C.,  the  Greek  world  was  made 
up  of  many  independent  states:  Athens,  Sparta,  Megara, 
and  Thebes,  on  the  mainland  of  the  Greek  peninsula;  Del- 
phi, Syros,  and  Naxos,  on  islands  in  the  Aegean  ;  Ephesus, 
Priene,  and  Miletus,  on  the  Asiatic  mainland;  Sinope, 
Gyrene,  Alonae,  Agathe,  and  Elea,  located  in  what  are  now 
the  Black  Sea  region,  Africa,  Spain,  France,  and  Italy. 
Literally  hundreds  of  independent  states  studded  the  shores 
of  these  inland  seas.  In  this  community  of  states  there 
were  at  least  ten  times  as  many  distinct  units  as  we  find 
in  the  modern  society  of  nations.1 

The  resources  and  needs  of  these  states  varied  greatly. 
On  flie  Greek  mainland  were  industrial  and  commercial  cen- 
ters  of  great  activity.    In  the  western  Mediterranean  were 
pastoral  towns  and  mining  settlements.     In  the  Levant 
were  centers  for  the  Oriental  trade.    The  Nile  valley  and 
the  Euxine  area  provided  cereal  exports,  and  the  states  of 
Attica  and  Bo3otia  offered  household  wares  in  exchange. 
*  Gold,  salt,  and  various  raw  materials  came  from  Iberia  and 
J  Gaul.2 

As  a  natural  result,  a  lively  maritime  trade  animated  the 
Greek  scene  from  Cilicia  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules.    Rug- 
ged hills  somewhat  obstructed  the  development  of  communi- 
^     cation  by  land.    But  the  sea,  with  its  thousands  of  estua- 
lfi»         ries  and  bays,  provided  ready  means  of  contact  and  united 
all  of  the  members  of  this  lusty  family  of  nations  in  active 
and  constant  commercial  intercourse.    Even  the  compara- 

1  Shepherd,  10-17;  Walker,  §§20,  23. 
•Zimmern,  39-51,  251-272,  391-396. 


STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY 


25 


lively  remote  states  beyond  the  Bosphorus  and  in  Southern 
Gaul  were  but  slightly  isolated.1 

Moreover,  these  many  states  were  of  a  measurable  equal-  . 
ity  one  with  another.  No  great  states  dominated  the  poli- 
tical  scene.  If  it  seems  somewhat  magniloquent  to  call  these 
independent  urban  communities  with  their  encircling  farm 
lands  "states"  —  if  it  appears  that  we  ought  to  call  them 
simply  "cities"  —  it  is  still  much  more  true  that  the  Athe- 
nian and  Spartan  "empires"  enjoy  in  that  term  a  glory 
and  importance  derived  in  part  from  modern  experience, 
not  from  their  own  character.  The  balance  of  power  was 
always  very  delicate  and  unstable.  National  safety  was 
sought  in  a  numerous  array  of  allies  rather  than  in  subjec- 
tion to  a  great  protector.  Each  state  could  hope  to  play  a 
substantial  part,  and  to  be  entitled  to  real  consideration,  in 
interstate  relations. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  relations  among  these  states  were 
made  the  more  cordial  by  participation  in  a  common  body 
of  culture  ;  their  cultural  homogeneity  was  as  marked  as  was 
the  variety  of  resources  and  capacities  among  them.  The 
Greek  religion,  the  mother  tongue,  and  community  of  race 
and  thought  and  feeling,  gave  Dorian  and  Ionian,  and,  i 
deed,  all  the  Greek  peoples,  a  bond  of  sympathy  and  under- 
standing which  provided  a  firm  foundation  for  more  formal 
political  and  legal  relations.  Already  the  world  could 
clearly  distinguish  the  characteristic  quality  of  Greek  cul- 
ture and  the  Greeks  themselves  were  conscious  of  their 
kinship.2 

Nothing  was  lacking  but  a  theory  of  international  rela- 
tions.  With  the  materials  for  such  relations  so  rich  and 
plentiful,  it  would  be  natural  to  expect  a  great  development 
in  the  science  and  art  of  international  government.  Noth- 
ing of  the  kind  happened.  There  grew  up,  it  is  true,  a  set 
of  institutions  and  practices  —  consular,  diplomatic,  and 

1Same,  308-318;   Francotte,  132-159;   Huet,  entire. 
8  Fairbanks,  13-29,  148-164;  Murray,  Part  I. 


V  26  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


X;  v          arbitral— £ 
complete,  i 


among  these  states,  which  was  extraordinarily 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  were  largely  naive 
and  unconscious.    But  there  was  no  deliberate  and  explicit 
theory  of  interstate  relations  to  explain  what  was  happen- 
ing, what  was  being  done,  what  might  take  place,  and  what 
might  be  done  in  the  future.    There  is  a  curious  absence  of 
any    deliberate   theory    of   interstate    relations    in    Greek 
thought.1 
\S  The  result  was,  in  the  end,  disastrous.    So  long  as  con- 

..... 

ditions  remained  constant  and  auspicious,  the  customary 
practices  could  go  forward,  albeit  not  by  deliberate  design 
but  as  a  natural  result  of  those  conditions.  If  the  expe- 
rience had  continued  long  enough  the  Greeks  might  have 
become  conscious  of  it  and  rationalized  it.  As  it  was,  they 
failed  to  do  so,  and  therefore  when  the  attack  of  imperial- 
ism came  they  succumbed.  The  potentialities  of  free  inter- 
national cooperation  had  not  been  explored  to  a  point  from 
which  steps  to  resist  the  conqueror  could  be  taken.  Not  hav- 
ing recognized  and  learned  the  art  of  international  organ- 
ization and  practice,  the  Greek  states  lost  their  statehood. 
There  had  been  warnings  in  ample  time.  Long  before 
the  rise  of  Macedon  and  Rome  there  had  appeared  intima- 
tions of  empire  to  threaten  the  free  life  of  the  Greek  states.2 
Sparta  and  Athens  had  been  tempted  to  convert  positions  of 
leadership,  which  they  enjoyed  among  allies  and  confeder- 
ates by  virtue  of  their  power  and  intelligence,  into  positions 
of  domination.  Sparta,  fearing  the  spread  of  democracy,3 
used  her  military  predominance  to  interfere  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  the  Peloponnesian  states  in  support  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  oligarchy  in  national  government.  Athens  em- 
ployed her  naval  power  and  the  funds  of  her  allies  to  estab- 
lish her  own  domination  over  certain  of  the  ^Egean  states.4 
The  Athenian  empire  was  maritime,  and  it  rested  on  democ- 


1  On  international  organization  in  ancient  Greece  and  Rome  see,  in  gen- 
eral, the  works  cited  in  this  chapter,  especially  Freeman,  Phillipson,  and  Tod, 
and  also  Egger,  Monceaux,  and  Raeclor,  as  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  1. 

'Ferguson,  1-5,  65-78,  79-97,  142-148. 

•Same,  21,  89;  Fowler,  290;  Greenidge,  114-115. 

*  Ferguson,  65-78;  Fowler,  287-289;  Greenidge,  190-204. 


STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY  27 

racy  at  home ;  but  for  the  dominions  it  was  a  true  empire. 
The  Thebans  sought  and  obtained  a  hegemony  which  de- 
veloped into  a  firm  control  of  the  Boeotian  states.1 

All  of  these  events  followed  from  attempts  to  erect  inter- 
state federations,  and  they  followed  because  those  attempts 
were  undertaken  without  adequate  knowledge  of,  or  skill 
in,  the  business  in  hand.2  The  attempt  to  do  more  than 
contemporary  political  science  justified  induced  the  abuses 
practiced  by  Athens  and  Sparta ;  once  those  abuses  began, 
the  same  cause  prevented  the  victims  from  making  an  effec- 
tive resistance.  In  view  of  the  inability  to  go  through  to 
a  complete  international  organization,  it  would  have  been 
better  to  preserve  the  primitive,  but  real  and  resistant, 
virtues  of  national  independence. 

The  result  was  to  put  a  blight  upon  the  free  life  of  the 
Greek  states.  They  seemed  never  to  regain  their  vitality. 
The  state-system  of  500  B.C.  had  begun  to  pass  into  some- 
thing unlike  itself.3 

The  characteristic  defect  of  the  Greek  state-system,  was 
not,  however,  that  the  individual  states  were,  on  the  whole, 
too  prone  to  schemes  for  combination,  but  that  they  were  too 
fond  of  their  independence.4  From  the  beginning  there 
had  been  a  keen,  and  often  fanatical,  spirit  of  jealousy 
among  them  which  prevented  any  lasting  and  effective  co-ov,A,«JLf>  u 
operation,  and  their  bitter  experiences  with  Athens  and 
Sparta  confirmed  their  feeling  of  opposition  to  interna- 
tional federations.  They  had  been  willing  to  combine  for 
defence  against  Persia  in  480  B.C.,  but  their  confidence  ' 

had  been  abused  and  imposed  upon.  Hejieej  when  a  new 
threat  of  invasion  and  conquest  came  from  the  North  there 
was  no  trusted  leadership  to  rally  them  into  an  effective 
league  of  defence.5 

Not  that  efforts  in  this  direction  were  lacking.    Sensing 

'Ferguson,  26-27;  Fowler,  292-293. 
'Phillipson,  II,  Chaps.  XVI,  XVII. 
"Fowler,  274-279. 
4  Phillipson,  I,  34,  38. 
•Fowler,  294-295,  300. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 
»*1 
the   impending   danger,    the   members    of    the    Athenian, 

Spartan,  and  Boeotian  leagues,  as  groups,  sought  to  draw 
closer  together.  The  independence  of  the  individual  state 
was  a  thing  of  the  past.1  But  the  effort  failed.  The  groups 
could  not  effect  a  cooperation,  just  as,  earlier,  individual 
states  had  failed  in  the  same  task;  and  resistance  was 
really  weaker  than  it  would  have  been  had  the  Macedonian 
been  compelled  to  deal  with  a  hundred  states  waging  de- 
fensive war  independently  against  him.2  As  it  was,  Philip 
and  Alexander  took  advantage  of  the  unstable  balance  of 

<         •  MOW" 

power  among  the  rival  leagues,  played  off  one  against 
another,  and  at  th  embattle  of  Chaeronea,  in  338  B.C.  put 
an  end  to  Greek  independence.  The  peninsula  was  con- 
quered and — appropriately  enough — the  leagues,  which  had 
failed  to  save  the  Greek  state-system  because  of  their  in- 
competence in  international  cooperation,  were  dissolved. 
This  included  the  Achaean  league,  the  most  effective  then 
existing.3  Empire  came  to  take  the  place  of  national  inde- 
pendence. Greece  was  henceforth  united,  but  united  in  sub- 
jection, along  with  Egypt  and  Syria  and  unheard  of  bar- 
barian regions  beyond,  in  the  empire  of  the  Macedonian — 
himself  a  barbarian.4  J 

Somewhat  the  same  course  of  events  followed  in  the 
338-146  B.C.    The  Macedonian  imperial  domination 
weakened  and  disintegrated  after  Alexander 's  death  in  323. 

P^ff  His  successors  in  Greece  were  not  able  to  maintain  ajini- 

fied  control  of  the  Greek  states,  and  during  the  third  cen- 
tury B.C.   the  individual  states  behaved  about  as  they 
pleased.5    Further,  the  practice  of  international  federation 
"^^T  ^  reached  its  highest  point  at  this  time.6     But  when  the  test 
*.jr  again  came  the  result  was  a  second  failure.  Rivalry  between 

/\t^     *J&          Bowler,  294,  301. 
'Same,  295. 
•Same,  302. 
*  Shepherd,  18-19. 
•Fowler,  302,  312. 

•Same,  302-305;   Ferguson,  33-34,  242-243;   Hart,  31-32;   Phillipson,  II, 
26-28. 


I 


STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY  29 

the  Achaean  League  and  Sparta  and  Athens  and  enmity 
between  the  Aetolian  League  and  its  neighbors  across  the  ^ 

Gulf  of  Corinth  made  Greece  an  easy  prey  for  Rome.1   Once    ..    : 
more  the  free  state-system  of  Greece  was  brought  into  sub- 
jection to  empire,2  and  for  the  same  reason  that  had  been 
operative  in  338.     The  states  could  not  organize  and  co-      **Wc    /  j\ 
operate,  even  in  self-defence.     Insisting  over  much  upon  . , 
independence,  they  lost  all  independence^    Refusing  or  fail- 
ing to  create  a  voluntary  union,  they  were  compelled  to     ^Jitf 
accept  empire.  -v 

J*The  experience  of  the  states  of  Italy  and  of  the  Mediter-  j  ^  *J 
ranean  world  in  general  had  not  been  dissimilar. 

In  the  beginning,  the  Italian  peninsula  was  divided 
among  Etruscan,  Umbrian,  Samnite,  and  other  tribal 
states.3  Carthage,  Phoenicia,  Macedon,  and  other  kingdoms 
were  arrayed  upon  the  coasts  of  Europe,  Africa,  and  Asia.4 
The  same  variety  of  economic  resources,  the  same  maritime 
means  of  communication,  and,  in  general,  the  same  homo- 
geneous Greco-Latin  culture  was  to  be  found  in  this  larger 
community  as  had  been  present  in  the  Greek  society  of 
states.5  In  addition,  the  Romans,  masters  of  law  and  polit-  /)  r**-*1 
ical  government,  might  have  been  expected  to  provide  an 
adequate  theory  of  international  law  and  relations.  With 
approximately  the  same  rich  materials  that  existed  in  the 
Greek  age,  there  were  now  present  the  greatest  jurists  of 
antiquity.6  A  science  of  international  government  of  great^\ 
moment  in  the  history  of  the  world  might  have  been  ex-y 
pected. 

The  course  of  events  did  not  fulfill  that  expectation.    T*1 
Rome  developed  a  motive  or  policy  which  prevented  any 
such  development.    Rome  chose  the  path  of  empire. 

1  Ferguson,  240  and  following,  246-248;  Fowler,  305;  Freeman,  339  and     />. 
following,  374;  Hart,  32-33. 

'Pelham,   153-154. 

1  Shepherd,  26-31. 

4  Same,  32-33;  Walker,  §  32,  at  44. 

•Resources:  Oliver,  9-14,  19-21,  41-51,  134-139;  commerce:  Davis.  80-95; 
culture:  Mahaffey,  Chaps.  V-VIII,  X-XVL 

"Muirhead,  §§61-63. 


30  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

To  begin  with,  the  Italian  states  did  not  develop  their 
system  of  international  relations  in  the  early  period  as  far 
as  did  the  Greeks.  The  Italian  states  were  much  more 
elementary.  They  attempted,  it  is  true,  to  combine  in  con- 
federations for  defense  against  attack.  Rome  herself  ap- 
pears as  a  member  of  the  Latin  League,  of  some  thirty 
cities,  united  on  a  semi-religious  basis.1  But  these  unions 
were  very  simple  in  comparison  with  the  Greek  leagues, 
and  they  did  not  succeed  in  resisting  Rome  herself  for  any 
length  of  time.2  Athens  and  Sparta  had  met  greater  resis- 
tance from  rival  leagues  and  confederations.  In  the  end 
the  Italian  states  were  conquered  and  subjected  to  Roman 
dominion. 

This  process  was  applied,  successively,  to  the  Latin 
;  League  itself,  to  other  coalitions  in  Italy,3  and  to  the  inde- 
pendent states  in  the  Western  Mediterranean  outside  of 
Italy.4  Rome  now — in  the  first  half  of  the  second  century 
B.C.5 — extended  her  sway  over  the  remnants  of  the  Mace- 
donian Empire  outside  of  Greece  proper.  Unable  to  assist 
each  other  in  any  way,  Italy,  Spain,  Carthage,  Egypt,  Syria, 
and  Macedonia  fell  into  the  new  empire.  Finally,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  Greek  states  constituted  a  fitting  sacrifice,  in 
146,  to  signalize  the  eclipse  of  independent  national  state- 
hood in  antiquity  and  the  advent  of  world  empire. 

For  five  hundred  years  the  Roman  Empire  stood  fast  in 
its  power  and  majesty,  and  for  that  period  the  state-system 
was  exceedingly  simple.  One  world  state  had  swallowed 
up  the  multitude  of  independent  states  and  blotted  out  the 
attempts  at  international  federation.  Gaul,  Asia  Minor, 

m  ~~>>''«n*>B*M**'MMBMMiBMAABIHHHBHBmiBinMNIMMMMHH'> 

I  Britain,  and  many  outlying  areas  were  added  to  the  Em- 
Jpire.6    From  Gibraltar  to  the  Syrian  desert,  from  the  hot 

1  Frank,  4,  13-17;  Hart,  §  22;  Phillipson,  II,  33-42. 
'Frank,  Chaps.  II,  III. 

•Date:  266  B.C.;  Hart,  §§  21,  23;  Shepherd,  29. 
4Spain:  205  B.C.;   Carthage:   238,  201,  146  B.C.;  Pelham,  114-139. 
•Syria:   190;   Egypt:   181;   Macedon:   168  B.C.;  Pelham,  140-152;  Shep- 
herd, 33. 

•Shepherd,   34-35;   42-43. 


STATE-SYSTEMS  OF  ANTIQUITY  31 

wastes  of  the  Sahara  to  the  ice  and  snow  of  the  Baltic 
there  prevailed  one  system  of  law  and  one  official  religion, 
there  was  felt  the  power  of  one  imperial  city.1  Governor 

and  priest  and  even  god,  the  Emperor  had  supplanted  free 
consent  as  the  basis  of  national  authority,  and  there  were 

j..    ;      -,--•>•  ••"<••  •-.•--••  •--  *•  -     -    •   -  ••*-'-  .  ,.  .,.»--,.  **  -  .:•  •-  •-        ' 

no  more  national  states,  but  a  world  empire.2    World  unity  ^^       * 

had  been  attained  by  the  suppression  of  state  independence. 

During  this  period  some  measure  of  authority  was  dele-  /-' 
gated  to  what  before  had  been  independent  nations.    But 
the  basis  of  authority  was  merely  the  discretion  of  the  im-    jf/f  .****>***** 
perial  master,3  and  mterstate  diplomacy  became  constitu- 
tional government,  not  international  practice.    Emissaries 
from  the  imperial  Senate  were  governmental  agents  as- 
suming diplomatic  guise  for  tactical  reasons.4    Free  inter- 
state life  was  dead. 

Likewise,  such  cosmopolitan  unity  as  was  attained  under 
Rome  was  largely  counterfeit.    The  unity  of  religion,  of       *\l* 
speech,  of  manners,  so  far  as  it  came  about  at  all,  was  not  ~  - 
altogether  a  spontaneous  growth,  gradual  and  slow,  and   /** 
taking  origin  in  the  life  of  the  people  itself,  but  was  in  large 


part  a  servile  imitation  of  the  capital  city  or  obedience  to 
imperial  commands.5  Peace  and  unity  obtained,  to  a  large 
extent  ;  but  it  was  the  peace  and  order  of  subjection,  not  of 
natural  repose.  It  was  the  peace  and  order  of  dishonor. 

For  these  very  reasons,  if  for  no  others,  the  maintenance    >  > 
of  the  fabric  of  empire  depended  upon  control  from  Rome.         ^ 
When,  therefore,  the  heart  and  mind  of  Rome  gave  way, 
toward  the  end  of  the  fourth  Christian  century,  the  nations 
tended  to  drop  out  of  the  picture  into  their  natural  places. 
The  stones  of  the  mosaic  stood  in  their  places  dissevered, 
as  the  substance  which  had  bound  them  dissolved  and  disap-  v 
peared.    Before  this  process  was  completed,  however,  those 

'Eryce,  5-7;  Fowler,  323-331;  Hill,  I,  1-3,  15. 
'Greenidge,  252;  Hill,  I,  3-7,  12-15;  Walker,  §836,  37. 
"Hart,  §§21,  23;  Tod,  179-182. 
*  Bouch6-Leclerq,  105,  196,  202. 
•Hill,  I,  18. 


32 

in  power  in  the  Empire  made  a  last  attempt  to  preserve  the 
structure  by  dividing  the  government  into  two  parts,  East- 
ern and  Western,  seated  at  Rome  and  Constantinople. 
What  could  not  be  saved  as  a  whole  was  to  be  saved  in  parts. 
In  so  far  as  this  step  was  successful,  the  condition  of  the 
state-system  was  not  changed  and  the  step  itself  would 
deserve  no  special  attention.  In  point  of  fact,  the  effort 
ultimately  failed.  The  Empire  was  finally  divided  in  395 
A.D.,  at  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Theodosius,  only  to  fall 
prey  to  still  greater  anarchy.  The  process  was  not  unlike 
that  which  took  place  in  the  Alexandrian  empire  after  323 
B.C.  And  once  more,  as  at  that  time,  it  seemed  possible 
that  independent  national  states  would  regain  the  stage. 
After  seven  centuries  of  submergence  in  empire,  the  nations 
might  reorganize  the  European  state-system  on  its  earlier 

lines. 

» 

Such  was  the  situation  when  the  ancient  period  closed. 
The  political  map  of  Europe  showed  the  result  of  a  thou- 
sand years  of  state  practice  at  least  in  this,  that  either 
independent  nations  or  autocratic  empire  might  then  rea- 

'  »*iWi^^^Bfc  -.  •*»•*  *^^ 

sonably  count  upon  mastery. 


CHAPTER   III 
MEDIEVAL  STATE-SYSTEMS 

THE  definitive  formation  of  the  European  sjfcate-system 
was,  however,  delayed  again,  after  the  disintegration 
of  the  Roman  Empire,  for  another  thousand  years.     Not      -'     - 
until  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  did  the  national 
state  regain  the  center  of  the  stage. 

For  this  there  were  two  principal  causes.  First,  power- 
ful attempts  were  made  to  renew  and  to  recreate  imperial 
states  on  the  plan  of  Macedon  and  Rome,  and,  second,  the 
political  organizations  which  actually  developed  in  the  vari- 
ous parts  of  Europe  were  not  able  to  act  as  free  and  inde- 
pendent states.  The  obstacles  to  the  formation  of  a  system 
of  national  states  were,  chiefly,  the  medieval  empire  on  one 
hand  and  the  feudal  state  on  the  other. 

As  a  result,  Europe  from  395  to  1453  displayed  not  so 
much  a  coherent  system  of  states  and  a  system  of  interna- 
tional organization  and  practice  as  the  lack  of  both.    The 
period  is  instructive  because  of  the  fact  that  in  its  recoros 
can  be  studied  all  of  the  elements  which  tend  to  destroy  or 
render  ineffectual  international  organization.    By  contrast,  Xi 
it  throws  light  on  the  character  of  the  state-system  of  our  » 
own  day.    And  out  of  it  actually  came,  at  the  end,  the  mod- J 
ern  national  state. 

The  break-up  of  the  Roman  Empire  was  attended  by  two 
sharply  contrasted  events.  On  the  one  hand,  new  national 
forces  invaded  the  Empire  from  the  North,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  Church  of  Rome  attempted  to  uphold  the  theory 
of  imperial  unity  throughout  Western  Europe.  The  bar-  ftj 

barian  invasions  led  to  feudalism  and  the  development  of 
the  feudal  states,  and  the  feudal  states  developed  later  into 

33 


34  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  national  states  of  modern  Europe.  But  before  that 
process  could  be  completed  the  other  force,  the  imperial 
idea,  the  heritage  of  Rome,  had  also  played  its  part.1 

From  the  fourth  to  the  fourteenth  century  the  idea  of 
universal  empire  almost  completely  dominated  formal 
European  political  thought.2  There  were  other  elements  in 
the  actual  experiences  of  men,  but  the  theory  of  the  state 
was  largely  a  theory  of  empire.  This  is  traceable  to  very 
definite  causes,  and  the  power  of  the  imperial  idea  in  Eu- 
rope to  the  time  of  the  Renaissance  must  be  sought  in  those 
causes. 

The  prestige  of  imperial  Rome  lingered  in  men's  minds. 
ftt  The  contemporary  situation  was  felt  to  be  an  interruption,  a 

/  ^temporary  accident  in  the  natural  course  or  condition  of 
(things.  Five  centuries  of  Roman  power  dominated  men's 
,memories.3 

Moreover,  the  Roman  imperial  religion,  now  Christian, 
remained  to  perpetuate  the  idea  of  world  unity.  Life  had 
disintegrated  and  collapsed  on  the  material  side,  but  the 
spiritual  realm  was  comparatively  untroubled.  The  idea 
of  unity  gained  power  as  the  physical  fact  of  unity  disap- 
peared. At  once  a  consolation  for  and  a  bold  defiance  of  the 
actual  world  roundabout,  the  evangel  of  the  unity  of  the 
faith  was  of  peculiar  power  in  the  troubled  times  after 
395.4 

Finally,  the  greatest  chaos  was  felt  in  the  realm  of 
politics  and  law,  and  the  doctrine  of  empire  attacked  this 
problem  on  its  own  ground.  The  nature  of  the  world's 
trouble  and  the  source  of  its  distress  was  felt  to  be  poli- 
tical disorganization.  Obviously,  the  remedy  lay  in  re- 
•  building  the  fabric  of  Augustus  and  the  Caesars.5 

These  forces  found  several  distinct  manifestations. 

1  Fisher,  I,  Chap.  I ;  Hartung,  entire. 

'Bryce,  Chap.  V;  Carlyle,  III,  170-171;  Hartung,  as  cited;  for  contrary 
view  see  Carlyle,  III,  178-180;  Thorndike,  v. 
•Bryce,  89-90,  102,  273-274. 

'Bryce,  31,  93-97,  100;  Hill,  I,  92;  Walker,  §  42. 
•Bryee,  96-97;  Gierke,  95-96. 


MEDIEVAL  STATE-SYSTEMS  35 

First,  there  was  an  attempt  to  carry  on  the  Roman  tra- 
dition at  Constantinople.  Comparatively  free  from  bar- 
barian invasions,  an  Eastern  Empire  rose  rapidly  on  the 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus.1  An  attempt  was  made  to  recon- 
quer Italy  and  Northern  Africa.2  The  Empire  was  to  be 
reunited.3  As  an  element  in  the  program  of  reconstruction 
and  restoration,  the  great  Justinian  issued  the  Corpus  Juris 
Civilis,  the  definitive  compilation  of  the  principles  and  rules 
of  the  law  of  Rome,  her  greatest  gift  to  posterity.4  And 
in  some  measure  these  efforts  succeeded.  In  Europe  East  ^ 
of  the  Adriatic  the  empire  of  Rome  was  carried  down  to  the  s  ^* 
invasion  of  the  Turks  in  1453.5 

Another  power  rose  in  the  East  to  make  a  bid  for  world 
empire.    In  622  the  Mohammedan  forces  began  their  con-     /< 
quest  of  nearer  Asia  and  Northern  Africa.    Stretching  out  -*  *&•$ 
to  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Africa,  they  crept  up  into  Europe 
and  held  control  of  enormous  portions  of  the  ancient  Roman 
dominions  down  to  the  period  of  the  Crusades.6 

In  the  heart  of  Europe  itself,  in  what  had  been  Roman 
Gaul,  there  rose,  beginning  early  in  the  eighth  century,  the 
new  Frankish  empire.7  The  secular  ruler  was  to  act  as  pro- 
tector  of  the  Church  of  Rome,  and  to  this  end  he  founded  a 
Papal  domain  in  the  center  of  Italy  in  751  and  took  the 
formal  Imperial  title  in  800  under  Papal  auspices.8  By 
the  end  of  the  ninth  century  the  empire  of  Charlemagne 
extended  over  all  Western  central  Europe  and  Northern 
Italy. 

Meanwhile  the  Church  itself,  waxing  strong  under  Im- 
perial protection  and  encouragement,  and  exerting  a  power- 


,  Chap.  XVII;  Thorndike,  71-72,  76-80,  86-87,  128-153;  Walker, 
§§43,  44,  54. 

•Thorndike,  135-138. 

•Same,  131,  and  map  at  137. 

*Same,  141-143. 

"Same,  553-559;  maps  in  Shepherd,  52,  59,  89. 

8  Thorndike,  Chap.  X,  and  map  at  180;  Shepherd,  53;  Walker,  §§45, 
46,  55-58. 

7  Thorndike,  Chap.  XI,  and  map  at  201  ;  Shepherd,  55  ;  Walker,  §  47. 

8  Thorndike,  147. 


36  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ful  sway  over  the  minds  of  men,  developed  a  temporal 
power  and  dominion  far  greater  than  that  of  the  Carolin- 
gian  emperor.  From  751  to  the  fourteenth  century,  and 
especially  from  the  eleventh  century  onward,  the  Papacy 
was  a  sturdy  rival  of  the  leading  secular  claimants  for  the 
imperial  legacy  of  Rome.1  In  one  way  the  Church  had  a 
great  advantage  in  this  struggle,  for  the  Pope  spoke  from 
the  imperial  city  itself  and  spoke  as  a  lineal  descendant  and 
legal  instrument  of  the  former  state.  In  a  special  sense, 
the  Church  was  "Rome"  to  Medieval  Europe.2 

Finally,  later  Germanic  emperors  built  more  or  less 
directly  and  completely  on  Frankish  foundations,  just  as 
Charlemagne  had  built  in  part  on  Papal  support,  and  reared 
the  most  pretentious  claim  of  all  to  European  empire.  ^The 
Holy  Roman  Empire  was  a  rival  of ,  and  at  the  same  time 
a  partner  with,  the  Papacy,  and  it  boldly  claimed  the  rights, 
titles  and  glories  of  the  Roman  Empire  as  it  was  in  the 
hands  of  Augustus  and  Diocletian.  It  constituted  at  once 

V 

the  most  vivid,  the  most  complete,  and  the  latest  attempt 
to  carry  the  Roman  world-state  down  into  modern  Europe.3 
In  these  successive  surges  of  empire  4  there  are  certain 
essential  ideas  which  determine  its  nature  and  constitute 
its  significance  for  the  history  of  the  European  state.5 
Surpassing  the  Greeks,  the  Romans  had  developed  a  theory 

1  Thorndike,  Chaps.  IX,  XV,  XXIII,  XXIV. 
•Hill,  I,  92. 

*Bryce,  entire,  especially  89-90,  and  Chaps.  VHI-XIII  and  map  at  180; 
Walker,  §  49. 

4 Chronological  tables: 

I.  Eastern  Eoman  (Byzantine)  Empire. 

395  Empire  established  at  Constantinople. 
1453  Constantinople  conquered  by  the  Turks. 
II.  Mohammedan  Empire. 

622  The  Hegira;  beginning  of  Mohammed's  career. 
1036  End  of  the  Caliphate  of  Cordova, 
IH.  Frankish   (Carolingian)    Empire. 

717  Accession  of  Charles  Martel. 
888  Death  of  Charles  III. 
IV.  The  Papacy. 

751  Foundation  of  the  States  of  the  Church. 
1309  Eemoval  to  Avignon. 
•Bryee,  Chaps.  VII,  XV,  especially  116  and  following. 


MEDIEVAL  STATE-SYSTEMS  37 

to  explain  their  state,  their  empire  and  its  activities;  the 
Medieval  imperialists  now  began  with  a  theory  and  tried  to 
carry  it  out  in  practice.  The  plan  was  so  pretentious  that 
the  attempt  was  bound  to  be  largely  unsuccessful.  Even 
though  the  Empire  was  chiefly  an  idea,  however,  it  did,  as 
an  idea,  undermine  for  the  time  being  that  other  idea,  the 
principle  of  national  independence,  which  was  indispensable 
for  a  rebuilding  of  the  European  state.  The  fact  that  it  was 
not  completely  realized  in  practice,  therefore,  is  of  less  im- 
portance than  the  content  of  the  idea  itself. 

There  was  to  be  a  universal  church  and  a  universal  state,      / 
and  the  two  were  to  cooperate  harmoniously — over  all  of 

TI_._   i        >iriir      n          "I  ~-  »»»M»M»IIIIII  i  i  ~  ^ 

the  temporal  life  of  men,  the  Emperor ;  over  all  of  their    —  x 
spiritual  life,  the  Pope.    No  local  independence,  ecclesiasti-v 
cal_  or  political,  was  contemplated.    Local  rulers,  such  as 
made  their  appearance  in  different  sections  of  Europe, 
were  to  be  subject  to  the  Emperor  and  the  Pope  in  matters 
legal,  political,  and  religious.1 

/-      The  result  was  a  paralysis  of  national  spirit.    The  cen-    2& 
/ter  and  final  resting  place  of  authority  was  not  the  na- 
/  tional  sovereign  but  the  Emperor  or  the  Pope.    The  peoples 


were  not  national  units  in  their  own  names,  but  members  in 

c> 


V  the  Church  and  the  Empire. 

A  further  result  was  to  stifle  and  discourage  interstate 
relations.  In  so  far  as  the  emperors  succeeded  in  the 
attempt  to  carry  on  the  tradition  of  empire,  which  had  now 
held  sway  since  the  time  of  Philip  of  Macedon,  and  which 
was  to  last  until  the  Renaissance,  the  nations  of  Europe 
were  submerged  and  denied  independent  life.  Such  inter- 
state action  as  existed  was,  as  in  Roman  times,  the  distorted 
activity  of  imperial  control  masquerading  as  international 
diplomacy,  or,  at  best,  international  diplomacy  prostituted 
to  the  service  of  imperial  domination. 

Most  of  this  imperial  activity,  be  it  noted,  was  carried  \ 
on  in  the  field  of  theory,  of  philosophy,  of  speculative  1 

»Bryce,  183-191  and  256-266;  Thorndike,  Chap.  XXIV. 


38 

thought.     Rome   had   been   a   mighty   physical   fact;   the 
-~  Medieval  empire  was  largely  an  idea.    The  actual  govern- 

V/£jU>        mental  condition  of  the  period,  tested  where  government 
must  always  be  examined  in  order  to  yield  reliable  conclu- 
sions, namely,  in  application  to  the  daily  life  of  society, 
was  a  matter  of  local  feudal  authority  rather  than  of  cen- 
tral control  by  the  Emperor  or  Pope.    Far  below  the  levels 
on  which  were  erected  the  doctrines  of  empire  the  real 
Medieval  state,  the  feudal  principality,  assumed  its  place.1 
However,  the  effect  of  the  development  of  the  feudal 
y,     £_      state  was  the  same  as  that  of  the  development  of  empire. 

/The  Empire  overshadowed  and  suppressed  the  national 

>_,'  »  •*•  •*• 

j state;  the  feudal  state  undermined  the  possible  national 
^organization  from  below.  In  the  end,  the  feudal  state, 
enlarged  and  developed  in  scope  and  power,  was  to  provide 
the  effective  substitute  for  the  imperial  state;  and,  on  the 
other  side,  it  reached  back  to  barbarian  invasions  which 
had  constituted  the  first  powerful  attack  upon  the  ancient 
imperialism  of  Rome.  But  from  the  eighth  century  to  the 
fourteenth  the  effect  of  feudalism  upon  the  state-system 
was  simply  to  intensify  the  effect  of  empire. 

When  the  Roman  defense  gave  way,  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  fourth  century  and  the  early  part  of  the  fifth,  sundry 
nations  of  barbarians  came  marching  into  the  imperial 
dominions.  Goths,  Franks,  Vandals,  and  Lombards  in- 
vaded Italy,  Spain,  and  Gaul,  and  established  more  or  less 
y  tr^n^itorv^Mngdonis^in  one  place  and  another.2  Europe 
seemed  about  to  be  occupied  by  these  new  nations  in  the 
place  of  the  Empire. 

Unfortunately,  these  peoples  lacked  political  experience 
and  skill.  Their_uigtinet8^were  those  of  nomads.  Destruc- 
tive and  not  constructive,  politically,  they  consumed  and 
did  not  produce,  and  they  built  no  enduring  political  struc- 
tures. The  Greeks  had  lacked  a  science  of  international 

1  Thorndike,  Chaps.  V-VII,  XIV. 

'Same,  especially  Chaps.  V,  VII;  map  in  Shepherd,  50;  Walker,  §40. 


MEDIEVAL  STATE-SYSTEMS  39 

relations  but  had  developed  government  within  the  indi- 
vidual state  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection;  the  Romans 
surpassed  the  Greeks  in  domestic  government  and  added 
a  fine  power  of  world  dominion ;  the  Germanic  nations  had 
neither  skill  at  self-government  nor  skill  in  international 
relations.  A  condition  of  mobility,  of  instability,  of  legal 
and  political  chaos,  lasted  until  the  rise  of  the  Papacy  and 
the  Frankish  empire  as  already  described.1  During  this 
period  there  could  hardly  be  said  to  exist  a  system  of  defi- 
nite and  independent  states.  At  the  collapse  of  the 
Frankish.  empire  in  the  ninth  century  another  series  of 
barbarian  invasions  took  place,  which  a  second  time  sug- 
gested the  appearance  of  a  group  of  independent  states.2 
But  here  again  the  promise  did  not  materialize,  and  no 
solution  of  the  problem  of  providing  Europe  with  a  per- 
manent state-system  was  forthcoming. 

In  such  a  period  there  could  be  little  regular  and  formal 
interstate  organization  or  activity.  Order  was  lacking, 
knowledge  was  deficient.  A  rude  diplomacy  was  practiced, 
it  is  true.3  Two  isolated  cases  of  arbitration  are  found.4  •/ 
Certain  rules  bearing  upon  interstate  relations  appear  in 
law  codes  compounded  by  the  barbarians  out  of  their  own 
customs  and  local  Roman  laws.5  On  the  whole,  the  bar- 
barian nations  contributed  nothing  to  the  development  of 
European  international  relations  in  their  own  time. 

One  thing,  however,  the  barbarians  accomplished :  they 
established  certain  political  units  which  eventually  helped >/ 
greatly  to  solve  the  problem.     The  violence  of  the  earlier 
inroads  of  Goths  and  Franks,  as  well  as  of  the  second  series 

1  Period  of  the  Barbarian  Kingdoms.  \ 

376  Admission  of  East  Goths  into  the  Empire.  J 
774  End  of  the  Lombard  Kingdom  in  Italy.      / 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  development  of  the  Frankish  and  Anglo-Saxon  \ 
kingdoms  in  Northern  Europe  are  excluded  from  consideration  here.  When  J 
these  cases  are  considered  we  are  in  a  distinct  period  and  a  distinct  historical  / 
movement. 

•Hill,  I,  135;  Thorndike,  Chap.  XII,  and  map  at  225. 

•Hill,  I,  36-41. 

*  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  202.  V^ 

6  Hill,  I,  39-40. 


^     *2* 
)r    oT 

]{** 


£0  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  invasions,  in  the  end  of  the  ninth  century,  in  conjunction 
with  the  economic  disorganization  of  the  time,  led  to  the 
formation  in  Southern  Europe  of  local  groups  of  people  of 
various  ranks  and  abilities  for  mutual  assistance,  military 
and  economic.  The  center  of  the  group  was  usually  a  land- 
holder, a  military  leader,  a  person  possessing  some  sort  of 
fc^  power  which  could  be  utilized  for  purposes  of  protection  in 
a  troubled  age.  In  the  eighth  and  ninth  centuries  (espe- 
cially in  the  latter),  upon  the  break-up  of  the  Frankish 
empire,  these  groups  developed  into  formal  feudal  states — 
duchies,  principalities,  and  fiefs  of  various  grades.  A 
congeries  of  such  units  covered  all  Western  and  Central 
Europe.1 

Here  is  to  be  found,  in  combination  with  the  barbarian 
kingdoms,  the  actual  particularity  of  conditions  in  Europe 
beneath  theldeaTunityof  the  empires.  Teutonic  pluralism 
underlay  the  Latin  monism.  The  feudal  units  were  con- 
nected more  or  less  completely  in  a  hierarchical  system, 
and  even  in  federal  systems,  in  the  kingdom  or  the  em- 
pire.2 But  the  hard  facts  of  the  situation  were  tjie  manor, 
the  parish,  the  village,  the  county.3 

The  result  was  anarchy.    Power  was  hideously  decen- 
tralized.   No  national  units  could  develop.    Local  armies, 
local  courts,  local  taxes,  local  laws,  and,  worst  of  all,  local 
)  spirit, — even  Greece  in  the  days  of  the  city-states  pre- 
(sented  no  such  picture  as  this.    The  authority  of  the  cen- 
>'  tral  ruler — king  or  emperor — was  a  myth.     And,  finally, 
the  weightiest  factor  in  the  situation  is  to  be  found  in  the 
nature  and  source  of  feudal  power.    The  local  prince  held 
his  power  by  a  grant  of  authority  from  a  superior.     He 
enjoyed  no  inherent  sovereignty,  nor  did  he  derive  his 
power  from  his  own  people  in  the  state  itself.    The  result 
was  that  relations  with  other  feudal  rulers  of  like  station 

1  Hill,  I,  135-136 ;  Thorndike,  232-233 ;  Walker,  §  48. 
"Carlyle,  III,  75-76;  Gierke,  20-21,  and  notes,  especially  note  64. 
'Davis,  87-100;   Thorndike,  Chap.  XIV,  and  map  at  271;   also  maps  in 
Shepherd,  62-63. 


MEDIEVAL  STATE-SYSTEMS  41 

were  legally  impossible  except  through  some  common 
superior.  The  defects  of  the  feudal  state-system,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  development  of  European  international 
relations,  were,  thus,  too  great  independence  and  at  the  , 
same  time  too  great  interdependence.  The  local  states 
were  too  numerous  and  too  petty;  they  were  too  closely 
fettered  in  the  gigantic  feudal  web.  The  interstate  life  of 
the  time  was,  accordingly,  barren,  impoverished,  and 
largely  confined  to  the  activities  of  feudal  superiors  in 
wielding  control  over  their  subject  princes.1 

The  Renaissance  and  the  dawn  of  the  modern  age  there- 
fore found  the  question  posed  at  the  close  of  the  ancient 
period  still  unanswered.  The  barbarian  nations  had  been 
unable  to  give  Europe  a  permanent  state-system;  the 
empires  were,  somehow,  unreal  and  unconvincing;  the 
feudal  states  did  not  promise  well.  The  long  interlude 
passed,  leaving  conditions  approximately  where  they  had 
been  in  the  fourth  century.  The  great  differences  were 
that  in  the  fourteenth  century  the  over-pretentious  and 
dangerous  character  of  imperialism  was  more  definitely 
suspected  than  when  the  prestige  of  Rome  still  dazzled  the 
minds  of  men,  and  that  the  materials  available  for  the 
building  of  local  states  of  independent  and  secure  power 
were  far  superior  to  those  existing  at  the  end  of  the  Roman 
age.  The  dream  of  empire  wavered  and  flickered ;  the  inde- 
pendent state  knocked  once  more  at  the  door  of  Europe. 

1Hill,  I,  365-366;  Thorndike,  as  cited,  especially  at  259. 


&-*&-^,+*£«#-rkj*£  &***+  »^y  . 
«<*/ 
^t~<%^C&r*- 

— •    V 
kv*•w^-^MX*^** 

J>       A  / 


CHAPTER  IV 
RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES 


p 


\ 

* 


ERHAPS  by  pure  coincidence,  perhaps  by  virtue  of 
a    common    cause,    the    decay    of    empire    and    the 
maturity  of  the  feudal  state  in  Europe  came  at  a  time 
when  conditions  in  the  world  of  commerce  and  science  were 
altering  in  such  a  way  as  to  encourage  a  radical  change  in 
the  existing  state-system.     By  a  dual  process  of  disinte- 
gration  on  the  one  hand  and  aggregation  on  the  other,  the 
Medieval  empires  and  the  feudal  principalities  gave  way 
tu*'    to  the  national  state;  and  the  process  was  facilitated  by  a 
change  in  the  conditions  of  European  intercourse  in  the 
A*  realms  of  trade  and  culture.    The  political  events  may  be 

regarded  as,  in  large  measure,  effe^ts^j^thejreyiyal  of 
commerce  and  learning  ;  the  former  encouraged  and  in  part 

~*^r~J3  -  f^  TT       d         „  i     i      i          *  *i    '         +^t^+~*~—*^*  .  •'       i  *-•  ••  •<M»^^_L      __  ^,,-       *"^        i-  -^-^  ••*•*-*-,_  ^"    - 

made  possible  the  latter.  The  fundamental  causes  of  the 
changes  which  came  over  the  Western  World  in  the  four- 
teenth century  are  to  be  found  in  tj^eyolution  of  JVtejiieval 
society  itself,  and  the  progress  of  those  changes  was 
largely  the  story  of  their  mutual  reactions  one  upon 
another.  Both  aspects  of  the  development  deserve  close 
scrutiny. 

Beginning  in  the  thirteenth  century,  Europe  witnessed 
a  complete  economic  revolution  in  the  disappearance  of 
Medieval  practices  and  the  revival  of  active  commerce  by 
land  and  by  sea.1  In  Greek  and  Roman  times  the  traffic 

•  ^"*i    _  0    __+  —  -       m"~*>J[~-   »~     *    m  >i     ~  "*      i_         i_  *n     i^^_       *.      ^»        ~»  ^.  —  "fc^^-*^***^-^^^"  '      "  "^^ 

of  the  Mediterranean  basin  formed  the  basis  for  interstate 
political  organization  and  practice.  The  succeeding  eight 
centuries  witnessed  a  gradual  decay  of  commerce  in  the 

1  Da7,  Chaps.  V-XIV. 

42 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     43 

South  of  Europe,  and  the  effect  of  the  imperial  efforts 

which  have  just  been  reviewed  was  thereby  intensified. 

In  an  age  when  political  practices  tended  to  discourage 

national  life  and  international  intercourse,  the  decay  of  y  .  ,    ~ 

commerce  had  been  quite  natural,  and  had  in  turn  con-'*  +f*.&  «***••* 

tributed  to  the  same  result.     Now  came  a  change  which 

was  to  last  in  its  original  form  for  three  centuries,  and 

which  was  to  be  continued  and  completed  by  the  industrial 

revolution  of  modern  times  and  by  the  enormous  develop- 

ment of  commerce  resulting  in  the  past  century  from  the 

use  of  steam  and  electricity.    The  revival  of  commerce  in 

the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  was  the  first  step         '".    .    . 

in  the  development  of  modern  world  intercourse. 

The  causes  of  this  revival  are  difficult  to  discover  and  *) 
to  measure.     The  Crusades  (1095-1270)  furnish  the  most  • 
obvious  explanation  of  the  new  life  in  the  traffic  of  South- 
ern Europe.1     Through  them  Western  European  traders  /3 
came  in  touch  with  new  wares  for  the  European  markets, 


which  were  obtainable  in  the  Levant,  —  fruits  and  spices 
and  silks  and  other  luxuries,  —  and  became  aware  of  new 
markets  for  the  products  of  the  European  guild  industries. 
Shipbuilding  and  the  art  of  travel  were  encouraged,  from 
Genoa  and  Venice  to  Alexandria  and  Syria. 

Another  fact,  however,  affords  a  still  fuller  explanation. 
After  a  long  period  of  decay,2  towns  were  reviving  and 
town-life  was  reappearing.  The  cities  of  ancient  Greece 
a*ncl  Rome  had  fallen  into  decline  with  the  barbarian  inva- 
sions,  and  the  barbarians  were  not  themselves  builders  of  <sJU^fx. 
cities.  The  result  was  the  absence  of  much  of  that  sort  of 
energy  and  activity  which  makes  for  vigorous  economic  and 
political  life.  Now  came  a  revival  of  the  older  cities  and  ^C<5>  •\jtil' 
the  emergence  of  new  towns  and  cities  in  all  parts  of 
Western  Europe,  and  with  this  a  quickening  of  the  pulse 
of  commercial  and  financial  life. 

^^  .-T,  .%|,  j^—  ••^^•^•^••^^••^••^••^^••••T-ffTT^r^»d»ia»«Mai^^^^aMMg^ 


'Day,  §§97-99. 

3 Day,  §§43-51;  Thorndike,  Chaps.  XVII-XIX. 


^A 


• 
inn 


44  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Obviously,  the  rise  of  the  towns  deserves  explanation 
in  its  own  turn.  While  it  contributed  to  the  growth  of 
commerce  in  the  end,  and  was  supported  and  promoted 
by  this  very  result,  the  original  cause  is  difficult  to  dis- 
cover. Perhaps  the  growth  of  handicraft  industries^in 
-'.."•  feudal  manors  and  monasteries  may  be  referred  to  with 
most  assurance  as  early  factors  leading  to  the  gathering 
together  of  new  masses  of  population  and  the  building_of 
new  towns  in  the  later  stages  of  the  Medieval  period.1  Of 
more  importance  for  us  is  the  mere  fact  of  the  urban 
revival  and  its  effect. 

(i  The  commercial  revival  of  the  period  of  the  Renaissance 
may  best  be  described  as  a  remedying  of  certain  defects 
in  the  Medieval  economy.2  In  the  preceding  centuries  the 
roads  of  Europe  had  been  unsafe  for  trade ;  they  were  now 
made  safe.  Rqads_were^  rjrgaired,  bridges  were  rebuilt  and 
maintained,  and  robbers  were  driven  from  the  highways. 

Cew  national  governments,   seeking  national  power  and 
rofit,  found  these  things  very  important.    To  make  trade 
feasible  over  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  country,  feudal 
tolls  we^e^rj.djmlly^ab^shed,  on  roads  and  bridges  and 
streams.     As  transportation  became  less  hazardous  and 
.cheaper  the  enforced  self-sufficiency  of  the  Medieval  village 
could  be  relaxed  in  favor  of  a  broader  system  of  exchange. 
/"Trade  became   continental  in   scope,   staple   copamodities 
(  being  added  to  luxuries  as  they  grew  able  to  stand  the 
*  lowered   costs    of   transport   to   distant   markets.      Tolls 
levied  by  individual  towns  on  goods  imported  for  local 
markets,    exported    to    distant    points,    or    transshipped 
within  the  town  in  the  course  of  a  longer  journey — tolls 
which  had  once  been  very  common — were  largely  abolished 
to  encourage  the  development  of  town  markets  and  the  use 
of  the  great  provincial  fairs.     The  latter  were  now  pro- 


i 


/ 
%/ 


}  370;  Tnorndike.>  327-328. 
'  For  an  excellent  description  of  the  transition  from  Medieval  to  early 
modern  economic  civilization  see  Day,  §§  33-37,  41,  54-85,  88-109,  114,  129-143, 
155,  159-170,  173-176,  Chaps.  XV,  XVIII. 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     45 

moted  by  various  means,  including  the  removal  of  price 
regulations  and  market  rules.    The  convenience  of  outside      "  v 
purchasers   and   of  travelers   was   considered,   and   local 

»  -.^H^-       -  •  •' 


merchants  were  given  means  of  trading  with   strangers 
through  the  development  of  national  currencies  providing    l^v't/t/ 
more   practicable  mediums   of  exchange   than   the   many      / 
feudal   currencies  "of   the   preceding   centuries.     And   to 


supply  this  expanding  trade,  and  as  a  factor  which  in 
itself  made  the  farther  expansion  of  trade  necessary,  the 
manorial  and  monastic  industries  continued  to  expand  and 
spread  into  individual  cottages  and  open  towns. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  on  land  similar 
processes  were  afoot  on  the  j>eas.    Certain  new  forces  made      A 
their  appearance  in  the  maritime  world,  certain  old  forces 
disappeared.    As  a  result,  the  land  traffic  of  Europe  was      Dst<j& 
supplemented  by  an  active  coasting  trade  and  by  maritime 
transport  outward  to  distant  shores.     The  compass  was 
introduced   into   western   Europe   about   1200   and  made 
longer  sea  voyages  possible.     New  sea  routes  had  been 
learned  during  the  Crusades,  old  routes  had  been  redis- 
covered, and  now  the  Oriental  trade  was  revived  to  cater  /*•*;;  / 

-!••       ..    i  ,..  —  —  '"»<*   |    'I  !"•'••  "•*.*,  W«",,;'t.<f  |    !(>>„;<  <Rv£ 

to  tastes  acquired  in  Byzantium  and  Palestine.    The  build- 
ing of  larger  and  better  vessels  was  encouraged.    Venice 
rose  to  her  height  as  a  commercial  empire   (1200-1400).   j/ 
Between  1400  and  1500  came  discoveries  and  explorations  t~Z/VLL<ZJL 
in  America,  Africa,  and  Asia  which_revealed  the  extent  of    _•?  v 
the  modern  world.    The  area  of  commercial  Ana  poiiiical 
activity  widened,  the  horizon  disappeared,  the   spirit  of 
adventure,  of  inquiry,  of  achievement  replaced  the  defeat- 
ism, preoccupation,  and  timidity  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  results  in  the  world  of  commercial  organization 
were  of  great  significance.  The  new  national  states  en- 
couraged industry  and  trade  for  fiscal  purposes,  whether 
for  royal  profit  or  for  public  prosperity.  Commercial 
organizations  of  various  sorts  made  their  appearance. 
Wholesalers,  commission  agents,  and  factors  became  fa- 


46  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

miliar  figures.  Postal  systems  were  created,  developed, 
and  finally  thrown  open  for  general  use.  Joint  stock  com- 
panies were  organized.  Credit  machinery  and  methods 
of  accounting  were  worked  out  by  the  Italians  and  taken 
over  by  Northern  Europe.  In  the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  bills  of  exchange  were  invented,  and  credit  ex- 
changes appeared  in  Antwerp,  Lyons,  Frankfort,  London, 
and  other  towns,  for  the  use  of  the  European  merchant 
community.  Thus  was  provided  a  transition  from  the 
older  system  to  the  new. 

This  was  the  origin  of  modern  Europe.  With  these 
forces  in  operation,  the  existing  political  system  must 
necessarily  have  proved  inadequate.  A  distant  Emperor 
could  not  control  or  properly  foster  the  growth  of  local 

/industry  and  trade;  local  feudal  princes  could  not  ade- 
quately support  the  national  economic  life  about  to  be 
realized.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  state-system  had  already 
changed,  or  begun  to  change,  to  keep  pace  with  the  eco- 

N/nomic  transformations.  Both  effects  were  products  of 
psychological  and  technological  evolution  too  subtle,  too 
obscure,  and  too  complex  to  be  easily  detected  or  set  out 
here ;  again  it  is  the  effect  with  which  we  are  chiefly  con- 
cerned. To  the  conversion  of  the  European  state-system, 

j  in  point  of  fact,  from  a  multitude  of  feudal  principalities 
and  a  hope  of  empire  to  a  system  of  national  states,  we 
therefore  turn.1 

When  the  gods  quarrel  the  demi-gods  profit  thereby.  In 
the  thirteenth  century  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the 
Papacy  fell  into  acrimonious  dispute  concerning  the  proper 
relations  to  be  maintained  between  the  secular  and  the 
sacred  powers,  and  sharply  contended  for  the  mastery  of 
Italy.  In  the  struggle  both  Emperor  and  Pope  found  it 
necessary  to  secure  support  from  lesser  kings,  nobles, 
cities,  ecclesiastics  of  high  degree,  and  the  rising  burgher 

'Rise  of  national  states:  Hill,  I,  Chap.  VIII;  II,  Chaps.  I,  VI  (Part  III), 
VII;  Muir,  57-64.  Disruption  of  Empire:  Bryce,  204-213,  and  Hill,  as 
cited.  Fall  of  Papal  Power:  Hill,  II,  27-44;  Walker,  §  52. 


°* 


EISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     47 

class.1    At  the  same  time,  they  were  led  to  put  forward  , 

excessive  claims  to  power  themselves.2     The  result  was  to 
strengthen  the  kings  and  to  weaken  both  the  Emperor  and 

o  „..  .•--.  W  ... i 

the  Poj3e,  and  to  provoke  the  national  rulers  to  resistance 
against  the  excessive  claims  of  Emperor  and  Pope  to  con-v" 
trol  them.     The   two  processes   interacted;   the   national 
rulers  were  incited  to  resist  imperial  domination  and 
able,   by  playing  Pope   against   Emperor,   and   Emperor 
against  Pope,  to  secure  the  means  of  resistance.  , -7 

0^^+ a^ ^ a^^a^*^**-*^*"*^^*^** *"^^*^*^*"^*»«««^I^^*M**«"^— *^**^^*  /  y^i^r*-  m 

This  process  may  be  studied  in  the  culminating  acts  of 
the  drama  which  led  to  the  final  break-down  of  both  Papacy 
and  Empire  and  the  emergence  of  the  first  national  states. 
Frederick  II,  Holy  Roman  Emperor  from  1210  to  1250, 

*  *  •*•  .^11  ,Bri0r~i"^i         i^r^iii_ii'    ,  ^  ^i^-^ni^r*  ^ 

vainly  tried  to  conquer  and  control  Lombardy  and  Sicily 
and  to  free  himself  and  his  possessions  from  Papal  oppo- 
sition and  interference.  He  was  met  with  repeated  ex- 
communications, in  1227,  1239,  and  1245.  To  outdo  the 
Pope  in  religious  zeal  and  win  his  favor,  Frederickeni- 
barked  on  the  JFourth  Crusade,  only  to  see  the  princes  of 
the  Empire,  on  whom  he  relied  to  keep  the  peace  in  hiss/* 
absence,  repudiate  his  claims  to  authority  over  them.  While 
he  was  still  in  Palestine  anarchy  and  rebellion  broke  out 
afresh  in  Lombardy  and  Sicily,  not  withontJifae  connivance  r 

*  *    '      **•  *        11  if  [•^•^^^•^^•^•••a      -i  II  ii"  i  Jff  1 

o£  Papal  agents  in  those  regions.     French  and   British 

forces  were  invited  by  the  Pope 
sjila.    Frederick  was  unable  to 

foes,  and  when  he  died  in  1250,  the  last  of  the  Hohen- 
stauffen,  he  left  his  sons  and  grandsons  to  be  killed  or 
captured,  in  1254,  1266,  and  1268,  and  the  Empire  to 
overwhelmed  by  its  enemies.3  The  revolt  of  the  feudal 
princes  went  on;  the  outside  powers  invoked  by  the  Pope 
intervened;  and  complete  confusion  resulted. 

The  Papacy,  in  its  turn,  broke  down  under  pressure     '.  ,   - 
from  the  same  forces.     Too  many  concessions  had  been 

irrhorndike,  471-472. 
»Hill,  I,  396-398. 
"Thorndike,  462-463,  467-471. 


im»ii^^^i^^a^»»a»     -,  a  n" 

French  and  British 
ej:i£J^ 


*+ 


7>    ..oJ^ 


48  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

made  with  a  view  to  securing  support  against  the  Empire, 
and  further  weakness  arose  from  excesses  resulting  from 
the  victory  over  the  Emperor.    Pushing  to  extremes  his  pre- 
£&*• "       tensions  to  international  authority,  the  Pope  encountered 
\  fatal  opposition  from  those  very  powers  which  he  had 
^helped  to  call  into  play  against  the  Emperor.    The  culmi- 
nation of  this  process  may  be  observed  in  events  at  the  end 
of  the  thirteenth,  and  in  the  early  fourteenth,  century. 

In  the  bull  "Clericis  laicos,"  of  1296,  Pope  Boniface 
VIII  presumed  to  deny  the  power  of  the  newly  arisen 
national  sovereign  of  France  to  tax  the  clergy  without 
Papal  consent.  Both  French  and  English  rulers  promptly 
put  forward  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  in 
opposition  to  such  a  contention.  Philip  IV  of  France  was 
sustained  in  his  attitude  by  the  French  people  in  Parlia- 
ment  assembled  and  was  thus  fortified  in  resisting  the 
Papal  encroachment  upon  his  jurisdiction.  Naturally,  he 
was  threatened  with  the  penalty  so  vigorously  used  by  the 
Pope  against  the  Emperor  Frederick,  namely,  excommuni- 
cation and  deposition,  involving  a  release  of  his  subjects 
from  their  allegiance.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  such  a  decree 
probably  would  not  have  had  much  effect  upon  Philip's 
£  position,  for  his  people  were  well  disposed  toward  him  in 
i**>  A  this  particular  situation  and  would  not,  probably,  have 
acted  upon  such  a  release.  Moreover,  Philip  had  already 
established  with  considerable  firmness  his  authority  over 
-»,  t*  the  people  of  France,  including — and  this  is  the  main  point, 

'&£&*'  J  /a  matter  to  receive  additional  attention  later — the  erst- 
>*  while  independent  feudal  nobility.     In  the  event,  Philip 
did  not  wait  on  the  Pope,  but  sent  his  agents  to  Italy ;  and 
these  agents  unceremoniously  took  Boniface  prisoner  at 
in  1303  and  held  him  until  he  was  rescued  by 
Friends.    He  returned  to  the  Vatican  only  to  die,  a  month 
later,  broken  and  vanquished.     Through  the  influence  of 
the  French  cardinals,  the  Archbishop   of  Bordeaux  was 
.elected,  in  1305,  to  succeed  the  beaten  pontiff,  and,  as 


Clement  V,  he  decided,  more  or  less  voluntarily,  not  to  go 
to  Borne,  but  to  remain  resident  at  Avignon,  in  France. 
This  was  the  end  of  Papal  imperialism  on  the  temporal     -•     .  « 
side.1     France,  and  to  a  lesser  degree,  England,  had  cap-.'        \ 
tured  Pope  and  Papacy,  and  had  broken  up  the  Papal 
system,   as   the   German   princes   and  Italian   cities   had 
broken  the  power  of  Frederick  II. 

On  the  purely  ecclesiastical  side  the  Papacy  met  the 
same  defeat  at  the  hands  of  nationalist  forces  after  the 
return  to  Rome  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  century.  The 
French  members  of  the  College  of  Cardinals  became  in- 
volved with  the  Italian  group  in  disputes  regarding  church 
management,  particularly  the  subject  of  Papal  elections. 
The  Great  Schism,  as  it  came  to  be  called,  dragged  on  for 
a  generation,  Italian  Pope  and  French  anti-Pope,  or  the  /^7_7$  f 
reverse,  contending  for  the  throne  of  Peter.  In  no  way 
could  harmony  in  the  Church  be  finally  restored  except  by 
reconciling  the  conflicting  national  groups,  which  met  to- 
gether  in  1417  in  the  Council  of  Constance.  Here  the  <•- 
schism  wras  formally  ended,  but  only  by  a  recognition,  in 
the  composition  of  the  Council  by  reference  to  ''national" 
delegations,  of  the  new  force  of  nationality  now  risen  to 
deny  the  hierarchical  unity  of  the  Church.  And,  though 
solidarity  once  more  formally  prevailed,  the  ancient  Papal 

^v*^. 

.. 


A  century  later  the  Protestant  Reformation  carried  the     .     -          . 


process  of  disruption  into  the  field  of  doctrine.  The  -' 
Hapsburg  monarchs  attempted  vainly  to  prevenf  the  result, 
which  was  more  or  less  clearly  foreseen.  Charles  V,  taking 
by  inheritance  from  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  the  Spanish 
domains,  acquired  the  Imperial  power  by  election  in  1519 
and  attempted  once  more  to  revive  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  and  to  fight  the  battle  of  the  Church  as  well.  In 
vain  did  he  and  his  successors  labor  at  this  anachronistic 


»Hill,  I,  398-404. 

'HiU,  II,  42-45;   Thorndike,  565-568. 


^r,|         50  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

to/'     lr          Vtask.1     Already  in  JL356^  Charley  IV  had  definitely  recog- 
*(    }y*  '       nized  the  new  powers  of  the  Imperial  princes  by  his  Golden 
*}*  *tf  Bull,2   and  the  national  kings   of!  western   and  northern 

*,o^  ^  Europe  were  in  no  mood  to  resume  their  former  positions 

of  subjection.     The  Peace   of  Westphalia,  in   1648,  con- 
firmed the  fact  that  universal  empire  in  Europe  was  a  thing 

**HMHa"M*M|M^M*^^MM|^*MVIM»aV«MMM«IMMtfOTM*«lBMM^ 

of  the  past.3 

In  vain,  likewise,  did  the  forces  of  Rome  attempt  to 
preserve  the  doctrinal  control  of  the  Pope  over  local  rulers, 
and  in  the  Peace  of  Augsburg  in  1555  local  religious 
autonomy  was  recognized  (cujus  regio,  ejus  religio). 
Similar  attempts  in  France  failed,  and  the  end  of  the  Wars 
of  Religion  saw  a  pretty  general  recognition  of  that  fact. 
One  last  struggle  was  made,  in  the  Thirty  Years  War,  to 
restore  the  Faith  in  Central  and  Western  Europe,  but 
quite  apart  from  the  natural  disintegration  of  the  issues 
which  came  about  in  the  course  of  the  war,  the  end  saw 
the  original  purpose  abandoned.  T^PeaceofWestphalia 
signalized  not  only  the  end  of  the  Empire^for  it^Iso^riegis- 
tered,  on  the  part  of  the  states  of  Europe,  the  end  of 
European  religious  unity  under  the  Pope.4 

Through  all  of  these  events  the  outstanding  political 
factor  was  the  new  national  state,  under  a  powerful  na- 
ional  sovereign.  In  the  promotion  of  commerce  and  in 
the  disruption  of  the  Empire  and  of  the  Papacy  the 
national  states  had  led  the_wav_,  and  in  some  cases  nation- 
alist feelings  operated  with  much  the  same  effect,  even  in 
the  absence  of  a  unified  state.  France,  England,  and 
Sweden  had  already  achieved  national  statehood.  Others 
were  passing  over  the  threshold.  From  one  point  of  view, 

'Hill,  II,  Chaps.  V-VII;  Walker,  §§  72,  76,  77,  79. 
X*  'Thorndike,  532-534;    also  Hill,  II,  38. 

X  •  Walker,  §  81.  All  of  the  various  other  attempts  at  empire  in  the  Middle 
Ages  as  reviewed  in  Chap.  Ill  had  come  to  eventual  failure,  as  indicated  in 
the  table,  note  4,  p.  36.  See  Thorndike,  187-189,  212-213,  554-558.  For  an 
extreme  view  regarding  the  early  supersession  of  the  imperial  idea  by  the 
national  principle  see  Carlyle,  III,  178,  179. 
>\  «Hill,  II,  Chap.  VI,  especially  602;  Walker,  §§  73-75,  77,  78. 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     51 

these  states  came  into  being  by  the  breaking  up  of  the  </ 
Empire.1    It  remains  to  note  how  they  had  come  to  inde- 
pendence by  the  amalgamation  of  many  formerly  indepen- 
dent feudal  units. 

There  had  long  been  growing  up,  beneath  the  figment 

of  empire  and  within  the  ecclesiastical  fold  of  Rome,  a 

group  of  national  unities  which  now  merely  burst  into 

plain  view.    In  England  and  France  this  might  be  traced 

back  even  to  the  ninth  and  tenth  centuries.    The  Frankish  yX 

Empire  was  divided  by  the  Treaty  of  Verdun  in  1843,2  and 

never  afterward  did  France  form  an  integral  part  of  the 

Holy  Roman  Empire.    England  was  in  some  degree  unified 

under  Canute  and,  more  significantly,  in  the  eleventh  cen- 

tury under  Alfred.    These,  however,  were  anticipations  of 

/later  evenfs,  and  it  is  to  the  twelfth,  thirteenth,  and  four- 

[  teenth  centuries  that  we  must  go  to  witness  the  birth  of 

\French  and  English  nationality. 

The  ultimate  or  original  causes  for  the  appearance  of 
nationalities  in  Europe  are  elusive  to  the  point  of  almost 
completely  evading  description.  Nationality  may  be  taken 
to  mean  a  certain  spiritual  uni|v  observable  among  a 
group  of  people,  usually  arising  from  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree  of  racial  unity  and  from  community  of  language, 
art,  religion,  economic  interests,  and  ethical  ideals, 
although  at  times  it  is  manifested  by  groups  not  very 
clearly  possessing  any  of  these  bases  for  their  apparent 
spiritual  unity.  This  factor  in  European  life  appeared 
slowly  after  the  fall  of  Rome.  There  had  been  some  feel- 
ing of  this  kind  in  antiquity,  and  the  barbarian  peoples  D  /U-4 
seem  to  have  had  some  degree  of  national  consciousness  at 


the  time  of  the^  Invasions.    But  nationality,  as  we  know  it, 
came  into  being  only  after  the  settling  down  of  the  peoples  '  f    '••..>     / 
in  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries.  *f\*.v*.  JtaeA 

After  the  wanderings  of  the  invaders  were  over,  the        •'          > 


1  Hill,  I,  366-380. 

1  Hill,  I,  132-134,  366-367,  and  Map  III  at  end. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ry 

/various  migrating  peoples  settled  down  in  definite  local 
areas  and  worked  out,  or,  as  we  might  say,  worked  up, 
from  their  own  customs  and  languages  and  those  of  tEe 
peoples  among  whom  they  settled  and  with  whom  they 
became  completely  mingled,  common  bodies  of  culture 
more  or  less  peculiar  to  the  different  areas  where  they 


I 


settled.1     With  the  growth  of  these   "national"  culture 


units  came  a  consciousness,  on  the  part  of  the_  peoples 
among  whom  they  developed,  of  their  actual  existence,  a 
self-consciousness,  a  realization  of  their  own  unity  and 
/P  <<TI'IL     °^  their  diversity  from   their  neighbors.     All   this   was 
-       .-  encouraged  by  the  awakening  of  the  human  consciousness 

-i&    which  came  with  the  Renaissance.2     Through  living   to- 
gether in  more  or  less  separated  sections  of  the  continent, 
the  peoples  of  Europe  came  gradually  to  feel  that  they 
\were  divided  into  groups  in  cultural  matters. 

It  hasbeen  the  habit  to  say  that  antiquity  knew  no  such 
thing  as  "nationality"  3  and  that  the  barbarian  "nations" 
constitute  the  earliest  prototypes  of  modern  nations.4 
To  a  degree  this  is  true.  But  such  statements  must  be 
made  with  a  great  deal  of  caution.  Certainly  the  Greeks 
and  Romans  and  Phoenicians  were,  and  felt  themselves  to 
be,  distinct  nationalities.5  No  little  pride  of  national  spirit 
was  manifest  among  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  bar- 
barian tribes,  even  when  they  were  of  different  racial 
stocks  and  had  distinct  political  organizations,  formed  no 
it  I'M. highly  distinctive  or  specially  developed  bodies  of  culture. 
When  the  field  is  carefully  surveyed,  it  appears  that 
there  was,  in  truth,  such  a  thing  as  "nationality"  before 
1789,  but  that  it  had  not  developed  very  far.  The  final 
divergence  between  ancient  and  modern  national  states  lies 
not  only  in  the  intensity  of  development  of  the  national 
spirit  but  particularly  in  the  correlation  set  up  between 

1  Hill,  I,  41-42. 
1  Muir,  33,  126-127. 
•Same,  37;  Rose,  2-5. 
*  Hill,  as  last  cited. 

I,  30-31,   40,   122,  123,   313,  230;   Walker,   §§24-29. 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     53 

national  cultural  unity  and  political  unity  and  independ- 
ence. The  latter,  the  correlation  of  nationality  and  state- 
hood, was  not  to  be  found  in  antiquity  except  by  accident. 
The  Greek  city  states  were  mainly  \subnational,  the  Roman 
Empire  was  supernational.  During  the  Medieval  period 
this  condition  persisfeajthe  feudal  states  were  morsels  of 
national  masses,  the  empires  conglomerate  superstates. 
In  the  collapse  of  feudalism  the  correlation  between  nation 
and  state  began  to  be  established  in  the  early  modern 
period.1 

The  concentration  of  political  power  in  the  hands  of 
national  sovereigns  began  with  the  Crusades,  which  put  a 
premium  on  the  relatively  greater  ability  of  the  kings  to 
raise  larger  forces  of  men  for  the  enterprize  tHan  could 
be  raised  by  the  lesser  nobles.  Professional  standing 
armies  could  be  maintained  by  them  and  set  over  *ft«STia^ 
the  temporary  and  amateur  feudal  levies  of  the  barons.8 

i —  —   r -" — ••— •  m^************+*tm*mmt*'i********»*>****l*mim**iim^*mm*f*+*mtB****m*HHt& 

/Under  such  conditions  the  titular  superiority  of  the 
I  supreme  over-lord,  of  no  great  importance  in  ordinary 
V  times,  became  important  and  significant.3  y^JLX )  &£  OWWA  / 

Meanwhile  there  were  developed  within  the  national 
kingdoms  certain  legal  and  political  institutions  which  in 
effect  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  national  sovereigns 
against  foreign  foes  and  helped  to  weld  the  nations  into 
compact  entities.4  In  the  first  place,  a  centralized  admin- 
istrative  machine  was  built  up  in  France  which  rendered 

1  This  correlation  is,  of  course,  not  yet  perfect.     Many  modern  states  have    ) 
diverged  widely  from  the  type  of  national  unity.    The  real  difference  between    / 
the  modern  and  the  Medieval  state  might  seem  to  be  merely  that  the  former   V 
is  independent  of  imperial  and  feudal  leading  strings  whereas  the  latter  was 
not.    However,  notwithstanding  all  the  exceptions,  the  test  of  nationality  seema     ] 
to  be  the  most  significant  one. 

On  the  other  hand,  Marriott  goes  too  far  in  denying  that  international  v 
diplomacy    existed    at    all    before   the    appearance    of   the    "national"    state        / 
(Marriott,  22-25).    As  Phillipson  says  (II,  122,  123)  such  a  contention  results  "s/ 
from  too  great  deference  to  words  and  names.     Before  1500  A.D.  there  were 
very  active   interstate   relations   between   the   existing   political  entities,   and  >-/. 
these  are  properly   studied,   even  prior  to   500   A.D.,   as   being  of   the  same  \/ 
character  as  the  "international"  relations  of  later  times. 

'Hill,  I,  373. 

•Same,  I,  367-368;  Thorndike,  491. 

*  Thorndike,  Chaps.  XXV,  XXVI. 


&»^ 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  royal  power  effective  in  all  corners  of  the  dominion.1 
In  England  the  legal  system  was  unified  by  judges  of  the 
Crown  who,  as  they  moved  about  on  circuit,  heard  appeals 
from  local  and  feudal  courts,  thus  cj^yjiig^h^^in^sj^istice^ 
".  to  all  sections  of  the  realm.2  Royal  power  and  the  central 
state  authority  were  everywhere  strengthened  by  new 
activity  in  the  study  and  teaching  of  the  law  of  Rome. 
Beginning  with  the  rediscovery  of  certain  texts  of  the 
classical  jurists,  and  the  dissemination  of  them  from  the 
now  flourishing  schools  of  law  in  northern  Italy,  the  science 
of  the  Roman  state  spread  through  Europe,  with  the  effect 
of  providing  everywhere  a  new  theoretical  justification  for 
the  authority  of  the  national  government.3  National  par- 
liaments were,  finally,  convened  in  England  and  France  and 
served  to  body  forth  the  state  as  a  political  whole.4  \ 

Powerful  personalities  in  royal  station  were  not  want- 
ing to  take  advantage  of  these  tides  in  the  affairs  of 
Europe.  Philip  Augustus  (1180-1223),  Louis  IX  (1226- 
70),  Philip  IV  (1285-1314),  and,  later,  Louis  XI  (1461- 
83),  in  France,  and  Hej]rv_n'(lJl.54-8^ 
1307),  and,  later,  the  Tudors  in  England,  made  strong 
and  largely  successful  efforts^oweid  their  subjects  into 
coherent  bodies  politic.5  The  royal  dynasties  took  advan- 
tage of  their  relatively  greater  continuity  in  the  face  of  the 
many  feudal  successions  to  gather  into  the  royal  domain 
by  escheat  various  pieces  of  feudal  territory  whenever  the 
person  holding  them  in  fief  died  without  heir.6  The  Crown 
also  found  allies  against  the  feudal  nobility  in  the  growing 
town  citizenry  which  desired  emancipation  and  protection 
from  the  nobles  and  could  be  persuaded  to  support  the 
king  politically  and  individually  against  the  barons  in 

^horndike,  491-492. 
"Same,  475-476. 
•Hill,  I,  374-375. 

'Thorndike,  483-484,  500-502,  519-521. 

"Same,   475-479,    483-485,    492-494,    495-496,    498-510,    623-627;    see   also 
Hershey,  §  52,  and  note  87. 

•Hill,  I,  368;  Thorndike,  491. 


55 

^xchange  for  increased  freedom  for  themselves.1     As  de- 

fenders  of  the  faith  in  crusades  against  the  infidels  and 


neretics,  the  national  sovereigns  found  added  prestige  and 

influence.2  The  doctrine  of  divine  right,  which  had  been 
invented  to  combat  the  Imperial  and  Papal  claims  to  con 
trol  over  national  affairs,  was  in  part  made  over  by  the  I 
lawyers,  working  always  with  the  Roman  law  in  mind,  into 
a  doctrine  of  absolute  sovereignty  within  the  state,  espe- 
cially against  noble  and  ecclesiastic.3  Jrv/JL  1 

Wars   between   the   newly   developing  national   states 


v»gfc 

-  •  ,  .  _ 


contributed  to  the  movement.    After  England  and  France      /    LfJ^ 
had  contended  with  one  another  in  the  long  struggle  called    A* 

the  Hundred  Years  War  the  peoples  of  the  two  countries  *^/ 

could  Tiardly  fail  to  realize  that  they  formed  distinct 
national  groups.  The  struggle  was  in  origin  purely  dynas- 
tic, but  in  each  country  it  went  Far  to  complete  the  process  ^p-***-  4 
of  unification  by  establishing  the  king  as  a  paramount  ^^  *•¥"* 
sovereign  over  all  the  feudal  nobles.4  For  France,  an  alien 
power  was  expelled  from  the  national  territory  ;  5  for 
England,  the  distracting  foreign  holdings  were  cut  off  and 
the  country  was  turned  back  on  itself.  In  both  cases  the 
familiar  effect  of  foreign  war  in  rousing  a  spirit  of 
national  unity  was  manifest.  Finally,  the  long  Italian 
wars  of  France  at  the  turn  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries  affected  that  state  in  a  similar  manner.6 

1Hill,  I,  371;  Walker,  90. 

•Walker,  89. 

'Hill,  I,  374-375;  Walker,  89,  end. 

4  Hill,  II,   20,   72;    Muir,   58;    Eose,   11,   13-15.     England   had   already 
achieved  a  measure  of  national  unity,  although  it  is  not  safe  to  declare,  as 
Mr.    Marriott   does    (27),    that   she   attained    national   unity    three    centuries  x^X 
before  France.     The  process  was  completed  in  the  fifteenth  century.    The  same 
process  in  France,  begun  more  recently,  was  not  completed  until  the  opening        s 
of  the  sixteenth  century;    after  the  expulsion  of   England  from  Gascony  it  v' 
remained   for   Charles   the   Bold   to  be   expelled   from   Burgundy   before   the 
monarchy  could   feel  safe   in  its  territorial  supremacy  in  France.     Marriott, 
23;  Thorndike,  616-621,  624-626.    Nevertheless,  because  of  her  position  on  the 
continent  amid  the  other  states,  France  stands  out  as  the  leading  figure  in 
this  movement. 

6  Thorndike,  Chap.  XXVII;   on  the  anti-alien  character  of  the  war  see 
Marriot,  23. 

8  Hill,  II,  372. 


tif 
+  ' 


more  stable. 

The  processes  just  described  have  gone  steadily  for- 


56  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Thus  were  the  first  modern  national  states  made  out  of 
the  fabric  of  imperial  and  feudal  Europe,  by  a  breaking 
down  of  the  greater  imperial  unity  and  an  aggregating  of 
the  lesser  feudal  states.1  These  states  were  incomplete  ful- 
fillments of  the  national  idea  as  it  was  to  work  itself  out 
later,  but  they  were  radically  different  from  anything  that 
had  gone  before,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  tran- 
sitory barbarian  kingdom.  They  were  not  weakly  gran- 
diose, as  were  the  Medieval  empires,  nor  meanly  petty, 
as  were  the  feudal  principalities.  Moreover  they  had  psy- 
I  L-—  chological,  social,  and  economic  foundations  that  were 

f     Q 

/4'f*  ward  to  the  present  day.    The  results  may  be  summed  up 

briefly  at  this  point. 

The  emergence  of  France  and  England  as  national  states 
was  followed  by  the  appearance  of  the  Portuguese,  Spanish, 
Swiss,  and  Dutch  national  states,  substantially  as  we  know 
them  today.  Before  1648  had  also  appeared  the  Danish, 

*—*f^**+-'~-''^^L^*'^t[S~*'**' 

Norwegian,  Swedish,  Polish,  and  Russian  nations,  inde- 
pendent of  the  processes  of  feudal  amalgamation  and  im- 
perial disintegration  just  studied.    During  the  last  three 
centuries  the  state-system  has  been  expanded  by  the  addi- 
tion of  other  European  national  states,  formed  either  by 
the  unification  of  scattered  national  elements  into  one  state 
or  by  the  disintegration  of  empires  holding  in  subjection 
diverse  national  groups.     Such  are  Germany,  Italy,  Hun- 
gary, Greece,  and  others.     In  addition,  there  have  been 
added  many  states  developed  from  transmarine  colonial 
settlements  made  by  the  European  states,  and  also  several 
|  non-European  states  of  independent  origin.     Such  are  all 
1  of  the  independent  American  nations  on  the  one  hand,  and 
*  China,  Japan,  and  Turkey  on  the  other.2 

As  new  states  emerge  from  the  preexisting  state-system 

1  Compare  the  sharp  statement  of  Nys  (Origines,  166)  who  says  that 
what  appeared  in  fourteenth-century  Europe  was  '  '  the  state  '  '  itself  (  lo  stato, 
I'etat). 

"For  other  nations  than  England  and  France  see  Muir,  59-64. 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     57 

through  the  stages  of  insurgency  and  civil  war,  they  de- 
mand, and,  under  proper  circumstances,  receive,  recognition 
from  the  existing  states.  The  new  state  must  possess  a  real 
existence  at  the  time,  must  be  prepared,  if  recognized,  to 
submit  to  the  accepted  rules  of  international  law,  and  must 
hold  out  some  prospect  of  permanence  or  stability.  Recog- 
nition may  be  accorded  by  each  state  for  itself  or  by  several 
states  acting  in  concert,  and  such  action  may  take  the  form 
of  either  a  direct  proclamation  or  steps  from  which  the  in- 
tention to  recognize  may  be  clearly  inferred.  Once  recog- 
nized the  new  state  succeeds  to  all  the  rights  and  duties  of  J 
states  at  common  international  law.1 

The  result  is  a  group  of  some  seventy  independent  polit- 
ical organizations  holding  in  their  jurisdiction  certain  por- 
tions of  the  earth's  surface  and  certain  portions  of  the 
earth's  peoples,  beasts  and  things.2  Most  of  them  exhibit 
a  fair  degree  of  national  unity;  and  among  them  has  de- 
veloped an  elaborate  system  of  international  organization 

*"       <J**^«^»J«^"'^  I  -  -  -'  "~ — — ~"^**~^-~-    :.  -       ,*~—~-'  S] 

and  cooperation.    In  recent  years  changes  haY_e  come  over  w 

tlie  commercial  relations  of  these  states  which  have  pro- 
folandry   mfluenceor  me"  development    Doth   of   the   state- 
system  itself  and  of  the  political  and  legal  relations  among 
the  members  thereof.    In  the  period  since  1648,  also,  the  old  N 
struggle  between  empire  and  nationality,  as  f ought "ouTm    ) 
Europe  between  1250  and  1450,  had  to  be  gone  through  / 
again.     But  the  upshot  was  merely  to  confirm  and  extend 
Hie  results  of  the  earlier  contest ;  jSt.  Helena  and  Ameron- 
geii  have  ratified  the  teachings  of  Canossa  and  Anagni.3 

1  For  law  and  politics  of  rebellion  and  recognition  see  Goebel,  entire,  and  \/ 
Wilson  and  Tucker,  §§  22,  28,  29. 

2  On  territorial  and  personal  jurisdiction  in  the  legal  sense  see  Wilson  and 
Tucker,  §§  46-68. 

8  Chronology  of  the  rise  of  the  national  state-system : 

1095-1270,  The  Crusades;  Clermont  to  death  of  Louis  IX 

1154-1189,  Eeign  of  Henry  II  in  England 

1180-1223,  Eeign  of  Philip  Augustus  in  France 

1250-1268,  End  of  the  Holy  Eoman  Empire  of  the  Hohenstauffen 

1226-1270,  Eeign  of  Louis  IX  in  France  ^  . 

1265, 1295,  National  Parliaments  called  in  England  \^)ju^»^  i\\  *» 

1272-1307,  Eeign  of  Edward  I  in  England 

1285-1314,  Eeign  of  Philip  IV  in  France 

1302,  1308,  Estates  General  called  in  France 


58  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

We  may,  therefore,  take  the  state-system  of  1648-1918,  with 
its  implications  for  the  institution  of  national  statehood 
and  international  relations  as  the  foundation  for  the  study 
of  modern  international  organization.1 

1303,  Capture  of  Pope  Boniface  VIII  at  Anagni 

1309,  Pope  Clement  V  installed  at  Avignon 

1337-1453,  Hundred  Years'  War  between  England  and  France 

1356,  Golden  Bull  of  Charles  IV 

1378-1417,  Great  Schism;  Council  of  Constance 

1461-1483,  Keign  of  Louis  XI  in  France 

1492-1519,  French  wars  in  Italy 

1519-1555,  Eeformation  in  Germany;  Peace  of  Augsburg 

1555-1648,  Religious  wars  in  France 

1618-1648,  Thirty  Years'  War 

1648,  Peace  of  Westphalia 

1  Disregarding,  at  this  stage  of  the  discussion,  the  questions  of  diplomatic 
<J     recognition  and  of  limited  sovereignty,  the  principal  members  of   the  inter- 
/V  national  state  system  of  the  world  as  of  1  January,  1922,  grouped  with  refer- 

ence to  their  modes  of  origin,  were  as  follows: 

A.  -States  formed  in  Europe  by  aggregation  of  feudal  units  or  several 
national  groups  and  by  disintegration  of  supernational  empires: 

Albania  Germany  Lithuania 

Austria  Great  Britain  Netherlands 

Belgium  Greece  Portugal 

Bulgaria  Hungary  Roumania 

Czechoslovakia  Italy  Spain 

Esthonia  Irish  Free  State  Switzerland 

Finland  Jugoslavia 

France  Latvia 

B.  North  European  states  formed  independently  of  such  processes: 

Denmark  Sweden  Russia 

Norway  Poland 

C.  States  developed  in  America,  Australasia,  Asia,  and  Africa  from  colo- 
nies of  European  states,  with  native  elements: 

Argentina  Dominican  Republic  Panama 

Australia  Ecuador  Paraguay 

Bolivia  Guatemala  Peru 

Brazil  Haiti  Salvador 

Canada  Honduras  South  Africa 

Chile  India  United  States 

Colombia  Mexico  Uruguay 

Costa  Rica  New  Zealand  Venezuela 

Cuba  Nicaragua 

D.  Native  states  in  Africa  and  Asia: 

Abyssinia  China  Liberia 

Afghanistan  Far  Eastern  Republic  Muscat 

Armenia  Georgia  Nepal 

Azerbaijan  Hedjaz  Persia 

Bhutan  Japan  Turkey 


RISE  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATIONAL  STATES     59 


E.  Surviving  feudal  principalities: 
Andorra  Luxembourg  San  Marino 


Liechtenstein 


Monaco 


In  addition  to  the  above,  there  are  some  thirty  autonomous  colonies, 
protectorates,  and  other  self-governing  dependencies,  which  are  not  states  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term  but  which  participate  more  or  less  directly  in 
international  relations.  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  matter  see  Willoughby 
and  Fenwick,  especially  5-13,  and  Fenwick,  Wardships,  entire. 


PART  n 

MODERN  DIPLOMACY 


CHAPTER  V 

ORIGIN  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CONSULAR 

SYSTEM 

A  STUDY  of  modern  international  institutions  and  prac- 
tices must  logicaH^begm  with  an  examination  of  the 
origins  and  development  and  the  present  status  of  the  con- 
sular and  diplomatic  systems.     The  classification  of  inter- 
national governmental  institutions  as  legislative,  executive, 
and  judicial  cannot  be  applied  with  any  success  until  a  com-       f 
paratively  late  stage  in  the  evolution  of  international  rela- 
tions.   Such  a  classification  depends  upon  the  idea  of  the 
regulation  of  international  relations  according  to  law.  This 
law  is  to  be  made  by  legislative  bodies,  administered  by  ex- 
ecutive agencies,  or  applied  in  litigation  by  judicial  organs. 
Nothing  of  that  character  is  found  in  seventeenth  century    - 
Europe ;  not  until  the  nineteenth  century  did  such  concepts 
outer  the  field  of  international  affairs.     Meanwhile  inter- 
national  relations,   not  to  be   conducted  by  a  legalistic 
method,  were  carried  on  by  the  method  of  personal  nego--^ 
tiation,  through  diplomatic  and  consular  officers.    And,  as        +£JL*,  « 
between  the  two  sets  of  agents,  diplomatic  and  consular,  the 
latter  must  take  precedence  in  the  history  of  the  growth  of 
international  organization.     In  this  early  epoch  of  gov-  / 

ernment  not  by  laws  but  by  men,  of  government  by  personal  j~f 
negotiation,  the  consul  was  the  pioneer. 

The  essential  cause  which  has  produced  the  modern 
consular  system  is  the  need  for  some  official  governmental 
assistance  to,  and  supervision  over,  the  jeonduct  of  inter-  •*/ 
national  commerce  by  the  private  citizens  of  the  various  na- 

63 


64  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tions.  The  Greek  city-states  found  it  necessary  to  secure 
/  representation  in  each  other's  ports  and  markets  for  the 
protection  and  assistance  of  their  merchants  abroad.  The 
representative  in  question  held  court  on  board  visiting 
vessels  of  the  state  which  he  represented,  and  settled  dis- 
putes between  the  master  and  members  of  the  crew,  on  one 
hand,  or,  on  the  other,  merchants  having  business  relations 
with  him  in  relation  to  the  cargo  of  the  vessel.  The  Greek 
consul  was  a  citizen  and  officer  of  the  state  in  which  he 
resided  and  constituted  a  much  more  important  figure  in 
international  relations  than  did  the  transient  and  fugitive 
diplomatic  agents  of  the  same  period.1  Rome  likewise  em- 
ployed a  system  of  commercial  representation  abroad,  and 
modern  nations,  in  working  out  their  consular  services,  are 
thus  merely  responding  to  a  natural  need  which  has  been 
felt  since  the  dawn  of  international  relations.  Indeed,  this 
need  is  the  most  elementary  and  unescapable  in  the  whole 
range  of  those  relations.  Consular  representation  is  the 
original  and  most  fundamental  form  of  official  international 
intercourse. 

When  overseas  commerce,  after  its  long  period  of  stag- 
nation during  the  centuries  from  400  to  1100  A.D.,  began 
to  revive  and  expand  once  more  in  the  twelfth  century,  the 
/  office  of  consular  representative  reappeared  also.  Or,  to 
state  the  result  entirely  afresh,  the  nations  which  aspired 
for  shares  in  the  new  commerce  found  it  advantageous  to 
adopt  the  device  of  foreign  consular  representatives.  Two 
centuries,  at  least,  before  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
representation  as  we  know  it,  the  states  along  the  Mediter- 
ranean were  led  .into  the  practice  of  sending  consular  offi- 
cers out  to  distant  parts  for  the  service  of  their  merchants 
abroad.  In  particular,  the  Western  Mediterranean 
city-states,  such  as  Genoa,  Valencia,  and  Amalfi,  began  to 
send  such  officers  into  Levantine  ports  in  connection  with 

1  On  the  consular  system  of  Greece  see  Monceaux,  entire ;   also  Phillip- 
son,  I,  154,  and  elsewhere. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CONSULAR  SYSTEM  65 

the  trade  growing  out  of  the  Crusades.    This  was  the  origin 
of  the  modern  consul.1 

It  is  still  difficult  to  trace  definitely  the  steps  by  which 
the  consular  office  was  created.  The  records  are  incomplete, 
confused,  and  contradictory.  Conditions  and  practices 
varied  greatly,  even  within  the  comparatively  limited  Med- 
iterranean world.  It  would  be  misleading  and  futile  to 
attempt  to  do  more  than  reconstruct  the  general  process, 
taking  note  of  all  the  important  steps  and  the  principal 
varieties  of  consular  activity.  The  account  must  be  inclu- 
sive, not  exclusive.2 

There  were  two  principal  currents  of  practice  leading 
to  the  final  result.3  French,  Spanish,  and  Italian  maritime 
city-states  had  long  been  in  the  habit  of  appointing  special 
judges  to  deal  with  commercial  matters,  especially  maritime 
disputes,  in  their  courts.4  These  judges,  who  took  the  name  >/ 
of  consules  maritimi  (signifying  magistrates  with  authority 
over  maritime  affairs),  or  their  deputies,  began  to  go  on 
board  the  vessels  of  citizens  of  the  state  for  which  they 
were  acting,  to  perform  their  functions  while  the  ship  lay 
in  the  home  port,  or  was  at  sea,  or  rested  in  a  foreign  har- 
bor.5 Soon  these  travelling  judges  found  it  convenient  to 
go  on  shore  during  the  stay  of  the  vessel  in  the  foreign 
port,  and  to  remain  there,  even  while  the  vessel  sailed  back 
for  other  cargoes,  performing  their  functions  for  the  bene- 
fit of  any  of  their  fellow-nationals  who  were  at  the  time 
present  in  the  foreign  city,  and  for  the  protection  of  their 

1  For  literature  on  the  origin  of  the  consular  service  see  works  cited  in 
Appendix  B,  §  5  especially  Ravndal.  For  .evidence  of  consular  practices  in 
China  and  nearer  Asia  as  early  as  the  eighth  century  see  Capello,  161. 

'For   a   treatment   seeking   to   find   a   single    all-sufficient  theory  of   the\/ 
origin  of  the  consul  see  Pradier-Fode're,  IV,  430. 

'Compare  the  version  in  Sheppard.  at  394,  with  that  in  Martens,  Trait&, 
II,  397. 

4Twiss,  Black  Book,  IV,  xcv.  This  official  resembled  the  Greek  "arbiter 
of  the  port";  Capello,  155. 

BTwiss,  as  cited,  III,  183  (text  of  Chapter  LXXIV  of  the  Consolato 
del  Mare,  and  note  I) :  also  Nys.  Droit,  II,  398. 


V 


66  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ships  and  property.1  The  prevailing  doctrine  that  an  alien 
was  subject  only  to  the  law  of  his  home  state,  and  not  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  foreign  state  where  he  happened  to 
be  located,  made  all  this  quite  natural  and  feasible.2 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  absence  of  any  judge  from 
the  home  city,3  groups  of  alien  traders,  living  in  "foreign 
quarters"  of  maritime  cities  in  the  Levant,  were  led  to 
elect  commercial  judges  from  their  own  numbers.  These 
commercial  judges  likewise  came  to  be  called  "consuls" 
and,  by  the  home  governments,  "consuls  in  foreign  parts." 
Later,  they  were  sent  out  by  the  home  governments,  on  the 
request  of  the  foreign  community,  to  maintain  the  law  of  the 
city  over  the  citizens  and  their  property  abroad.4 

These  two  lines  of  procedure  tended  to  coalesce.  One 
form  of  action  inevitably  became  mingled  with  the  other. 
Elected  consuls  and  consuls  sent  out  from  the  home  state 
alternated  with  one  another  from  place  to  place  and  from 
time  to  time.  The  common  factor  constituted  the  positive 
result  achieved:  foreign  consular  representation  became  a 
/Afact  in  Southern  Europe  in  the  twelfth  century;  and  during 
this  century  and  the  succeeding  one  the  practice  spread 
throughout  the  whole  Mediterranean  world. 

The  activities  of  these  consul-judges  resulted  in  the  pro- 
duction of  a  body  of  rules  of  commercial  law  more  or  less 
common  to  all  trading  cities.  The  laws  of  the  home  state 
were,  naturally,  respected  so  far  as  they  applied,  but  the 
consular  law  served  to  supplement  and  harmonize  the  local 
legal  systems  and  to  create  something  of  a  body  of  common 
law  up  and  down  the  commercial  world.  This  body  of  rules 
and  principles  as  found  in  practice  in  the  Mediterranean 

1  Twiss,  as  cited,  IV,  539  (Article  25  of  the  Maritime  Ordinances  of 
Irani) ;  also  Capello,  160. 

'Sheppard,  395. 

'Capello,  160;  Martens,  as  cited,  II,  97.  On  this  side  the  practice  may  be 
traced  back  to  the  sixth  century,  or  earlier;  Nys,  Droit,  II,  397;  Pradier- 
Fod6re,  IV,  432.  This  officer  resembled  the  elective  judges  of  the  guilds  in 
Greece;  Capello,  155. 

4  Capello,  156,  158,  160. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CONSULAR  SYSTEM  67 

area  was,  apparently,  compiled  at  some  time  near  1300  in 
what  is  known  as  the  Consolato  del  Mare,1  and  constituted     / 
in  its  day  the  most  important  legal  monument  since  Justin-  V 
ian,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  still  incompleted 
compilation  of  the  Canon  Law.  /» 

The  Consolato  del  Mare  marks  the  beginning  of  the  • 
modern  period  in  this  field,  just  as  the  Peace  of  Westphalia, 
over  three  centuries  later,  marks  the  recognition  of  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  modern  state-system  and  diplomatic 
representation.  The  first  book  of  the  Consolato  dealt  with 
consul  judges,  setting  forth  their  duties  and  powers,  and 
giving  a  full  description  of  the  judicial  office  from  which  the 
foreign  consular  representative  was  derived.2  By  this  time, 
in  other  words,  practice  in  this  field  had  reached  the  mature 
stage  of  codification. 

As  has  been  suggested,  the  consul-judges  were  carried 
into  the  Levant  by  the  Crusades.3  The  fact  that  the  regions  * 
visited  by  the  Crusacfers  were  ruled  by  Jews  and  Moham-  ^ 
medans  led  the  Christians  to  demand  the  right  to  establish 
consular  jurisdictions  in  Palestine  and  Syria.  The  Western 
merchants  demanded  this  right  also  from  the  kingdoms 
set  up  by  the  Christian  Crusaders  themselves.  Elaborate 
charter  permits  were  obtained  exempting  trading  factories 
and  shipping  from  local  laws  and  permitting  the  establish- 
ment of  local  consular  courts.  These  "capitulations"  were 
not  always  grants  by  Levantine  powers  to  Western  Eu- 
ropean states  for  the  benefit  of  their  citizens,  but  were  com- 
monly grants  to  private  corporations  of  quasi-public  rights. 
A  merchant  guild  or  foreign  colony  was  often  accorded,  in 
its  own  name,  the  right  to  elect  consul-judges  and,  in  gen- 

1  The  term  is  used  here  to  refer  to  the  first  part  of  the  Boole  of  the 
Consulate,  as  of  the  edition  of  1494;  see  Twiss,  as  cited,  II,  lix-lxx;  III, 
xxv-lxxxii;  also  Pardessus,  I,  21-34,  206,  209. 

*  For  text  of  the  Valencian  Regulations  which  form  the  first  treatise  or 
book  in  the  Consolato,  see  Twiss,  as  cited,  IV,  450-495. 

3  Capello,  161 ;  Sheppard,  399-400.  For  those  who  take  the  consuls  elected 
in  foreign  ports  as  the  source  of  the  consular  office,  as  does  Martens,  the  office 
originated  in  the  Orient  and  was  brought  to  the  West  later:  Martens,  as  cited. 
H.  397. 


68  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

eral,  to  govern  itself.1  By  1226  such  establishments  were 
to  be  found  not  only  in  Palestine  but  in  Asia  Minor,  Byzan- 
tium, and  Egypt.2  The  differences  of  religion  and  social 
customs  and  legal  practices  operated  in  all  these  regions  to 
expand  the  privileges  of  exterritoriality  granted  to  the 
alien  merchants. 

However,  similar  practices  sprang  up  in  the  North  of 
>/  Europe  where  the  same  religious  differences  did  not  exist. 
In  the  Hanseatic  cities  British,  Dutch,  Scandinavian,  and 
German  traders  were  led  to  the  establishment  of  such  con- 
sular magistrates  in  each  other's  territories.3    Semi-auton- 
omous merchant  " colonies"  were  to  be  found,  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  fifteenth  century,  at  many  points  on  the  North 
Sea  and  the  Baltic.    In  1438  Henry  VI  of  England  secured 
V      for  his  consular  judges  a  renewal  of  their  privileges  "for 
one  hundred  years  back,  to  do  justice  between  the  King's 
liege  subjects  and  merchants  at  all  Hanseatic  towns  beyond 
the  sea."4     The  game  treaty  in  which  this  privilege  was 
I  granted  recognized  the  authority  of  the  second  part  of  the 
1  Consolato  as  applicable  in  Northern  Europe.    This  part  of 
the  Consolato  dealt  with  the  substantive  rules  of  maritime 

Vi^  u_|--^i^^|^a^^^^»a^^^^^a»*»^aMi**^'^^"^^         '  i^*^^^'*^'-*      '    ^  - 1 ..,/ 

/  law.    Thus  the  consular  law  of  Europe  was  to  a  degree  uni- 
^   fiecT.    By  the  natural  process  of  development  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  commercial  community  the  office  of  consul  had 
not  only  come  into  being  but  had  secured  foHnal  rgcogni- 
tion  and  systematization  by  the  new  states  of  Europe. 
/•       Since  the  fifteenth  century  there  have  been  several  strik- 
j   ing  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  consular  office.    Of  these 
\  changes  three  deserve  notice  at  this  point. 

First,  selection  by  the  home  state,  always  the  more 

authoritative  method  of  choosing  consular  representatives, 

has  come  to  supplant  entirely  the  practice  of  election  by 

V    a  foreign  colony.    Consuls  are  now  almost  universally  sent 

1  Hershey,  §  51,  note  86. 
'Sheppard,  401. 
3  Same,  402-404. 
*Sheppard,  405. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THU  CONSULAR  SYSTEM  69 

out  from  the  state  securing  representation  abroad,  and 
where  the  consul  is  chosen  from  persons  residing  abroad — 
either  citizens  of  the  local  state  or  of  the  state  to  be  repre- 
sented— the  choice  is  made  by  the  latter  in  its  official 
capacity. 

Second,  the  doctrine  that  the  alien  carries  the  law  of 
his  home  state  with  him  has  given  place  in  all  Western 
statesTcTa  doctrine  that  when  abroad  the  alien  is  mainly 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state  in  whose  territory  >/ 
he  is  for  the  moment  domiciled.  There  is  still  a  large  meas- 
ure of  exterritorial  consular  jurisdiction  in  the  Orient. 
But  the  Western  world  has  adopted  the  feudal  concept  ftf 
exclusive  territorial  jurisdiction  in  its  full  import.  The 
result  is  that  national  sovereigns,  whether  royal  or  popular, 
have  refused  to  continue  to  allow  the  foreign  consul  to  ex-y 
ercise  any  considerable  jurisdiction  over  the  alien.  As  a 
further  result,  the  judicial  character  of  the  office  has  greatly 
diminished.1  During  the  sixteenth  century  this  effect  was 
very  important,  for  the  consul  was  not  at  that  time  charged 
with  the  collection  of  information  for  the  home  state  and  the 
performance  of  ministerial  functions  in  its  name,  as  he  now 
is.  As  a  result  of  this  fact,  and  under  the  influence  of  the 
continuous  wars  of  the  next  two  centuries,  the  office  declined 
greatly  in  importance.  The  present  consular  system  is, 
therefore,  largely  the  product  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Finally,  the  growth  of  a  complete  diplomatic  system, 
side  by  side  with  the  system  of  consular  representation,  has 
drawn  off  from  the  consular  service  many  of  the  diplomatic 

t^^^^M^»"»»*^^«^»^it«^MM^^M»iMa»M^^^M^«Myipffge**^ '  »[H«i^BiBiij»iife  9mw9*f*9fB*n&i*if*~nMBi~9rt*f*      ^^ 

functions  once  attached  to  it.2     The  external  prestige  of 
the  office  has  consequently  fallen.     These  changes,  how- 
ever, have  not  touched  the  essential  quality  of  the  consular  v* 
function:  the  promotion  and  control  of  international  com- 
merce.   Hence  they  have  not  destroyed  the  office,  but  have 

1  Hershey,  §  51;  Martens,  as  cited,  II,  100.  S 

1  For   diplomatic   qualities   of   the   consular   office  in  earlier   periods   see  »/ 

Sheppard,  392-402. 


70  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

merely  altered  the  circumstances  under  which  it  is  to  be 
conducted.  The  central  principle  of  the  consular  function 
has  remained  constant  from  the  time  when  it  first  appeared 
in  the  period  of  the  Crusades  and  the  commercial  revival 
V  of  the  Renaissance. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE 
CONSULAR  SERVICE 

ALL  sorts  of  variations  appear  among  the  forms  given 
by  modern  nations  to  their  consular  representation 
abroad.    The  organization  and  methods  of  operation  of  no 

<l_j«^jp»»^*f>^'*pir^"'''^i  i%i  i>_  n mini.  E'ILI  T"1  j>  T>^J  i>i«i'i»»i<»«»»^»^*i>»i^!B»*^*o»^^^^y^^u»«*»i<^^*lit^<fl** 

two  national  consular  services  are  exactly  alike.  There- 
fore, to  be  accurate  a  description  of  the  consular  system 
must  deal  only  in  those  fundamental  matters  where  there  is 
substantial  uniformity  among  the  nations.1  Moreover,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  give  anything  but  a  very  general 
survey  of  the  consular  system  except  by  setting  out  at  great 
length  a  mass  of  detailed  material  which  has  no  significance 
in  the  abstract,  and  which  could  mean  nothing  apart  from 
the  circumstances  and  actions  of  the  consular  representa- 
tives in  individual  cases.  Leaving  the  detailed  regulations 
of  the  different  national  consular  services  aside,  therefore, 
we  may  turn  to  the  principal  elements  in  modern  interna- 
tional consular  representation  as  we  know  it. 

It  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  every  nation  of 
political  and,  especially,  of  commercial,  importance,  main- 
tains consular  representatives  in  the  territories  of  the  other 
members  of  the  community  of  nations.  Under  normal  cir- 
cumstances there  is  no  state  or  quasi-state,  whether  it  be 
able  to  claim  and  exercise  diplomatic  representation  or 
not,  whose  business  interests  are  willing  to  see  it  go  with- 
out consular  representation  in  the  important  markets  and 

11  I?     XI  11  ~~ 

harbors  ot  the  world. 

1  On  the  consular  system  in  general  see  Stowell,  Le  Consul,  as  cited  in 
Appendix  B,  §  6;  there  is  no  equivalent  work  in  English.  For  literature  on 
the  consular  services  of  various  nations  see  references  in  same,  319-345;  on 
the  American  consular  service  see  the  references  in  Griffin,  Consular  Service. 

71 


72  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

These  consular  representatives  reside  in  the  various 
ports  and  other  commercial  centers  of  the  nations  to  which 
they  are  accredited.  Wherever  industry  and  trade  are 
active  there  are  to  be  found  representatives  from  all  other 
parts  of  the  world;  meanwhile,  representatives  have  gone 
out  from  that  state  to  the  regions  from  which  raw  materials 
are  to  be  obtained  or  where  finished  products  may  find  a 
market. 

Each  nation  decides  for  itself  upon  the  method  to  be 
followed  in  choosing  persons  to  exercise  consular  repre- 
sentation abroad  on  its  behalf,  and  some  mode  of  selection 
is  regularly  provided  for  by  law.  The  work  naturally  calls 
for  an  acquaintance  with  the  various  branches  of  interna- 
tional  commerce,  together  with  commercial  and  interna- 
tional law.  Command  of  the  language  in  common  commer- 
cial use  in  the  region  to  which  the  consul  is  to  be  sent  is 
indispensable.1  In  view  of  these  facts  it  has  been  found 
advisable  in  several  countries  to  establish  schools  for  the 
preparation  of  candidates  for  the  consular  service  or  to 
make  arrangements  with  private  educational  institutions 
for  this  work.2  The  suitable  candidates  are  then  selected 
more  or  less  by  means  of  a  series  of  technical  examinations 
determining  the  fitness  of  the  applicants  for  entrance  into 
the  lower  and  middle  ranks  of  the  service.3  The  recruit- 
ment of  the  higher  posts  is  generally  left  to  promotion  from 
the  lower  ranks,  or  to  selection,  on  grounds  not  readily  made 
the  subject  of  formal  examinations,  outside  of  the  exist- 
ing personnel. 

Consular  agents  are  grouped,  for  administrative  pur- 
poses, into  various  classes.  These  naturally  differ  from 
one  national  service  to  another,  yet,  on  the  whole,  there  is 
a  measure  of  uniformity  here  as  in  other  phases  of  the 
system.  Among  the  titles  most  frequently  used  are :  Consul 

*Eeport,  30;  Stowell,  Consul,  186. 
•Jones,  93-99. 

•Stowell,  188;  for  the  United  States  see  U.  S.  Consular  Eegulations, 
§  32,  and  Eeport,  21-31. 


CONSULAR  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS     73 

General,  Consul,  Vice  Consul,  Deputy  Consul,  and  Consular 
Agent.1  There  are  many  consular  clerks,  often  so  called, 
and  many  consular  representatives  of  no  special  title  and 
rank  or,  on  the  other  hand,  of  very  special  title  and  rank 
created  to  meet  special  circumstances.2 

Each  consular  office  abroad  has  its  proper  territorial 
jurisdiction,  which  results  in  a  districting  and  redistrict- 
ing  of  each  of  the  important  nations,  on  the  part  of  all  the 
others,  for  this  purpose.3  The  idea  that  the  United  States, 
for  example,  is  so  parcelled  out,  on  the  books  of  the  British 
French,  Italian,  and  Japanese  governments,  may  be  a  novel 
idea  to  an  American  citizen,  but  it  is  a  commonplace  of 
actual  practice.4  The  importance  of  the  consular  officer 
depends  to  a  greater  extent  upon  the  importance  of  the  dis- 
trict in  which  he  is  stationed  than  upon  his  rank  or  his 
relation  to  the  other  consular  representatives  from  his  own 
nation  who  are  stationed  in  the  same  country.  At  the 
same  time,  the  rank  of  the  consular  representative  in  charge 
will  correspond,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  consular  area.  Finally,  some  effort  is 
made  to  organize  the  consular  representatives  abroad  into 
a  more  or  less  complete  hierarchy  among  themselves  and  in 
relation  to  the  diplomatic  service.  The  several  districts 
and  their  representatives  are  not  left  to  depend  individually 
upon  the  home  office.5 

Ordinarily,  the  field  service  is  controlled  by  either  the 
department  of  the  national  government  dealing  with  foreign 
relations  or  the  department  of  commerce.6  At  one  time  or 
another,  in  one  or  another  nation,  the  national  consular 
agents  have,  however,  been  controlled  by  colonial  depart- 

1  Foster,  217-218;  Hershey,  §284  and  notes;  U.  S.  Consular  Regulations, 
Art.  I. 

*  Regulations,  §§23-29. 

*  Same,  §  30 ;  Register,  Table  XI. 

*  Register,  186-217. 

"Stowell,  194,  203;  for  United  States  see  U.  S.  Consular  Regulations, 
Arts.  VI-VIII. 

•Stowell,  197;  Hershey  (§284)  is  too  dogmatic  here;  cf.  Ferguson,  by 
title, 


74 

ments  or  departments  of  the  government  dealing  with  naval 
affairs.1  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  consuls  have  some- 
times been  regarded  by  the  country  sending  them  out  as 
colonial  agents, — especially  in  the  case  of  consuls  sent  into 
African  and  Oriental  countries, — or  as  naval  officers.  .Early 
Venetian  and  Genoese  consuls  were,  in  fact,  colonial  gov- 
ernors.2 The  control  of  the  consul  is  still  in  an  ambiguous 
position  for  the  reason  that  his  position  as  foreign  represen- 
tative of  his  national  government  would  imply  control  by 
one  department  of  that  government,  while  his  work  in  con- 
nection with  the  foreign  trade  of  his  country  would  make 
it  advantageous  for  him  to  be  controlled  by  another  depart- 
ment. 

In  like  manner,  the  degree  of  control  exercised  by  diplo- 
matic officials  over  the  consular  representatives  from  their 
own  country  who  are  stationed  in  the  territory  of  the  state 
to  which  the  former  are  accredited  varies  greatly.  In  gen- 
eral it  may  be  said  that  a  certain  amount  of  control  exists, 
having  been  conferred  upon  the  diplomatic  representatives 
by  the  home  government.3  On  the  other  hand,  no  diplo- 
matic representative,  at  all  events  none  but  the  very  high- 
est, and  then  only  under  instructions  from  the  home  govern- 
ment, could  dictate  to  consuls  in  the  same  country  the 
proper  action  for  them  to  take  on  matters  on  which  stand- 
ing instructions  have  been  provided.4 

Consular  representatives  are  coming  to  be  paid  mainly 
by  salary.5  In  earlier  times  they  were  frequently  regarded 
as  private  commercial  adventurers,  sojourning  abroad,  who 
could  be  utilised  and  prevailed  on  to  perform  certain  func- 
tions for  their  governments,  or  they  were  regarded  as 
agents  and  representatives  of  private  business  interests 
or  of  the  merchant  community  itself.  They  are  now  pretty 

18towell,  198. 
'Capello,  179. 
/V*For  United  States  see  Eegulations,  Arts.  I,  II,  VI -VIII. 

*  The  attempt  of  a  Mexican  confidential  agent  in  the  United   States  in 
1920  to  do  this  met  with  failure;  New  York  Times,  23  November,  1920,  p.  15. 
'Foster,  217;  Eegulations,  Art.  XXV, 


CONSULAR  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS     75 

generally  regarded  as  public  officers,  representatives  of 
the  state,  and  in  no  way  private  merchants.  As  a  result, 
they  are  not  required  to  perform  their  consular  services  out 
of  a  sense  of  honor  or  duty  while  supporting  themselves  by 
private  business.  Nor  are  they  dependent  for  their  pay,  as 
was  the  case  for  many  years,  upon  fees  collected  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties,  although  fees  are  still  collected 
and  go  in  part  to  the  consul  as  pay.  In  so  far  as  fees  are 
still  used,  the  government  provides,  for  the  convenience 
of  the  consul — and  his  clients, — tables  of  the  feeswhichmay 
be  legally  charged,  in  order  that  there  may  be  no  misunder- 
standing and  hard  feeling  between  the  consul  and  his  fel- 
low nationals  who  come  to  him  for  his  services.1  Similarly 
the  consul  is  provided  with  fee  stamps,  the  use  of  which 
prevents  misunderstandings  between  him  and  the  home 
government.  Even  with  all  precautions,  however,  the 
fee  system  is  a  source  of  constant  annoyance  to  those  who 
should  receive  nothing  but  help  from  the  consul.  It  would 
be  illogical  to  place  the  charge  for  consular  service  entirely 
upon  the  national  treasury  and  to  make  no  provision  for 
special  payments  by  those  who  in  actual  fact  receive  the 
special  services  of  the  consul.  But  the  regulation  and  ad- 
ministration of  the  charges  to  be  made  is  a  perplexing  prob- 
lem.2 

As  in  the  matter  of  recruitment,  so  in  the  matters  of  pro- 
motion, retirement,  and  pensions,  each  nation  follows  its 
own  bent.  Other  members  of  the  international  community 
are  not  interested  except  to  obtain  additional  light  on  the 
best  methods  of  managing  their  own  consular  services.3 
These  problems  are  wholly  within  the  field  of  administra- 
tive technology  and  impinge  upon  the  international  field 
only  indirectly. 

The  difficulty  of  securing  suitably  equipped  persons  to 
accept  consular  posts,  particularly  some  of  the  subordinate 

1Eegister,  Table  XII. 

a  Begulations,  Art.  XXVI;  also  Jones,  19-22. 

•Stowell,  192. 


76  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

posts  in  the  service,  has  led  various  nations  to  resort  to 
the  devices  of  merchant  consuls  and  native  consuls.1  The 
former  are  consuls  who  perform  their  official  functions 
while  engaging  at  the  same  time  in  trade  for  their  private 
interest.  As  has  been  seen,  this  practice  was  at  one  time 
the  normal  form  of  consular  representation.  Similarly, 
the  native  consul,  a  person  selected  by  a  foreign  state  to 
act  as  its  representative  in  the  territory  of  his  own  nation, 
was  a  familiar  figure  in  ancient  times  and  was  used,  ap- 
parently, in  the  Middle  Ages.  To  a  certain  extent  the  prac- 
tice constitutes  an  independent  historical  source  of  the 
modern  consular  office.2  However,  the  native  consul  was 
always  totally  inadequate  to  the  purpose  in  many  parts  of 
the  world,  as,  for  example,  the  Orient;  and,  even  with  all 
the  exceptions  to  the  doctrine  of  territorial  sovereignty 
which  modern  states  are  accustomed  to  make  in  the  interest 
of  international  cooperation,  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  a 
nation  will  be  content  to  entrust  the  protection  of  its  in- 
terests abroad  to  an  alien,  particularly  an  alien  who  is  a 
citizen  of  the  country  in  which  he  is  to  perform  that  service. 
Accordingly,  the  nations  are  willing  to  incur  the  additional 
expense  involved  in  sending  out  their  own  citizens  for  pur- 
poses of  consular  representation  abroad,  and  they  strive 
to  avoid  the  handicap  incident  to  the  employment  as  a  con- 
sul of  a  person  who  is  subject  to  all  the  local  regulations  of 
his  home  country  and  city  by  confining  their  slight  use  of 
the  native  consul  to  the  lowest  ministerial  and  clerical  posts 
in  the  service.  Similarly,  the  merchant  consul,  who  is 
likely  to  confuse  public  office  and  private  busniess,  or  to 
sacrifice  one  to  the  other,  or  to  utilize  official  position — un- 
consciously, perhaps, — for  personal  profit,  is  eliminated  as 
far  as  possible.  These  traces  of  more  primitive  forms  of 
consular  representation  are  gradually  disappearing.3 

1  Foster,  217;  Hershey,  §284,  notes  2  and  3;  Regulations,  §§28,  37,  42. 
'Schaube,  525,  526,  528,  531,  533,  536,  538,  542,  545,  553-556. 
•Foster,  219-220;  Jones,  91-93;  Moore  Digest,  §697;  Eeport,  66-69,  and 
elsewhere. 


CONSULAE  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS     77 

The  consul  is  concerned  in  his  daily  work  with  a  multi- 
tude of  affairs  relating  to  the  state  on  whose  behalf  he  acts. 
To  perform  this  work  he  is  given  a  certain  measure  of 
authority  by  the  state  which  appoints  him,  and  this  author- 
ity is  defined  in  a  commission  with  which  he  is  provided  at 
the  beginning  of  his  mission.1  On  the  other  hand,  the 
permission  to  exercise  the  powers  committed  to  him  by 

his  home  government  comes  from  the  government  of  the 

.  ,  .         ,  .     rvzsp*,.  •"•¥••  «»••"-  uMniyi*"          .       ,  . 

state  within  whose  lunsdiction  he  expects  to  exercise  his 
p       x-  j  "r""" ""    i,  j*T*?'  ' "  "T     •**•••* -,  •***>**•  •<****• 

functions  and  is  embodied  in  a  document  called  an  "ex- 
equatur." The  reception  of  individual  consular  represen- 
tatives from  other  states  is  a  purely  voluntary  matter  on 
the  part  of  each  nation.  However,  consular  intercourse 
has  been  so  generally  accepted  by  modern  nations  that  re- 
fusal to  participate  in  such  interchange  could  fairly  be  re- 
garded, and  could  only  be  explained,  as  a  manifestation  of 
an  unfriendly  disposition.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  use- 
ful, and  it  is  a  matter  of  common  practice,  for  the  nations 
to  agree  specifically  one  with  another  in  consular  conven- 
tions or  in  special  consular  clauses  in  general  commercial 
treaties  upon  the  terms  under  which  they  will  exchange 
consular  representatives.  The  consular  convention  is  thus  v 
the  immediate  foundation  and  legal  basis  of  all  consular  / 
intercourse.2 

Once  commissioned  by  the  home  state  and  officially  re- 
ceived by  the  foreign  state  the  consul  carries  on  his  work 
under  several  sets  of  rules.3  The  terms  of  his  commission 
and  his  exequatur,  together  with  the  instructions  from  his 
home  government  in  amplification  of  the  former,  are  of 
most  immediate  importance  to  him  in  defining  his  powers 
and  duties.  Back  of  these  stand  the  laws  of  the  two  na- 
tions concerned ;  these,  in  turn,  must  be  read  in  the  light  of 

'Hershey,  §285;  Stowell,  207-209;  Regulations,  §§35,  48. 

2  Regulations,    Appendix    III,    especially    552,    564,    570;    for    a    typical 
consular  convention   see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.   1. 

3  Regulations,  Arts.  IV  and  V  and  Appendices  II-IV. 


78  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

existing  treaty  agreements  between  the  two  states ;  in  case 
of  conflict  the  former  must  be  followed  by  the  individual 
consul  rather  than  the  latter.  Finally,  back  of  all  stands  the 
system  of  common  international  law  to  which  the  consul 
will  often  turn  for  information  regarding  his  rights  and 
obligations.  The  fact  that  the  consul  carries  on  his  activ- 
my  in  the  field  of  private  interests,  real  and  personal,  re- 
I  suits  in  his  being  subjected  to  minute  regulation  by  both 
|  the  sending  and  receiving  state.  In  practice,  as  can  well  be 
inferred,  the  individual  consul  is  largely  relieved  of  the 
necessity  of  referring  to  these  different  sets  of  legal  prin- 
ciples and  rules  by  having  such  matters  cared  for  by  the 
department  of  foreign  affairs  of  his  home  government.  He 
will  receive  from  that  source,  either  in  general  or  special 
instructions,  or  in  response  to  his  inquiries,  any  information 
on  these  questions  which  he  may  desire. 

The  activities  of  a  consul  may  be  variously  classified.1 
He  has  certain  duties  relating  to  the  persons  and  property 
of  his  clients,  his  fellow-nationals  who  happen  to  be  present 
within  his  consular  area.2  He  must  keep  a  record,  ordin- 
arily, of  such  as  are  permanently  resident  there,  and  of  tran- 
sients who  apply  for  services  at  the  consulate.  For  all  of 
these  he  must  endorse  or  "vise"  passports,  certify  to  births, 
marriages,  and  deaths,  and  even,  if  so  authorized,  perform 
marriages  and  draw  up  and  attest  wills.  He  may  extend 
assistance  to  travelers  who  are  out  of  funds,  to  the  sick, 
to  the  poor.  He  aids  in  securing  the  burial  of  deceased  fel- 
low-nationals or  in  having  their  remains  transported  to 
the  home  country.  He  assists  stranded  sailors  and  wan- 
derers of  all  sorts  to  return  home.  He  must  protect  his 

1  The  analysis  given  in  the  text  is  based  on  Stowell ;  for  a  detailed  state- 
ment of  the  duties  of  American  consular  representatives  abroad  see  Moore, 
Digest,  Chap.  XVI;  also  Carr,  W.  J.,  "What  Your  Consul  Does,"  in  American 
Consular  Bulletin,  IV,  1  (January,  1922),  and,  below,  appendix  A,  Document 
No.  1,  as  cited. 

'Stowell,  24-78;  also  Regulations,  Arts.  X-XIX.  "Fellow-national"  is 
used  here  to  mean  a  person  who,  by  virtue  of  citizenship  or  domicile,  is 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  consul. 


CONSULAR  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS     79 

clients,  individuals  or  business  concerns,  from  injustice  in 
the  local  courts,  in  respect  either  of  their  persons  or  their 
property.  This  function  is  the  modern  version  of  the  orig- 
inal power  of  the  consul  to  determine  litigation  between 
fellow-nationals  in  the  local  district,  a  power  of  which  a 
few  traces  remain  in  the  West,  and  considerable  portions 
in  the  East.  He  is  called  on  to  secure,  if  possible,  the  re- 
lease of  fellow-nationals  from  unjust  detention  or  com- 
pulsory military  service,  a  duty  which  has  fallen  with  spe- 
cial weight  upon  American  consuls  because  of  the  number 
of  returned  naturalized  Americans  resident  in  all  sec- 
tions of  Europe.1 

The  consul  is  also  of  much  service  to  fellow-nationals 
who  are  not  present  in  his  consular  area  but  resident  in  the 
home  country.2  Their  property  within  his  jurisdiction  is 
in  his  general  care ;  property  interests  acquired  by  inheri- 
tance will,  for  example,  likewise  be  protected  by  him.  The 
relevant  and  necessary  evidence,  both  documentary  and 
testimonial,  must  be  secured  by  him,  and,  if  need  be,  title 
must  be  proved  before  local  probate  courts.  In  all  sorts  of 
litigation  connected  with  the  local  interests  of  business  con- 
cerns at  home  the  consul  is  called  on  for  work  in  the  courts 
in  his  consular  district.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  im- 
portant of  all,  the  consul  collects,  compiles,  and  transmits 
to  the  home  government  all  possible  information  regarding 
local  export  and  import  markets  and,  working  with  and 
through  the  diplomatic  representative  of  his  nation  sta- 
tioned in  the  capital  of  the  country  to  which  he  is  accredited, 
information  regarding  political  events  and  conditions. 
This  service  of  information  is,  as  far  as  it  goes,  the  founda- 
tion for  international  commerce  as  fostered  by  the  official 
activities  of  the  nations.3 

On  behalf  of  the  home  government,  as  such,  the  consul 

1  Regulations,  §  168,  and  Appendix  IV,  669,  680. 
'Stowell,  90-96. 

•For  the  United  States  see  the  Commerce  Reports;  also  Regulations, 
Art.  XXVIII. 


80  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

performs  certain  quasi-diplomatic  duties.1  He  is  called  on 
to  watch  over  and  insist  upon  the  execution  of  commercial 
treaties  and  other  international  agreements  with  the  state 
to  which  he  is  accredited,  in  so  far  as  these  depend  for  their 
execution  upon  the  local  authorities.  He  is  called  on  to 
act  in  demands  by  his  government  for  the  extradition  of 
fugitives  from  justice,  under  existing  extradition  treaties. 
In  case  of  inability  on  the  part  of  the  diplomatic  represen- 
tative from  the  home  country  to  carry  on  his  work  a  con- 
sular officer  of  higher  rank  may  be  temporarily  and  speci- 
fically charged  with  such  work.2  Finally,  the  original  con- 
dition of  things,  where  the  consul  was  in  full  power  as  a 
diplomatic  representative,  is  reflected  in  a  few  cases  today 
where  diplomatic  and  consular  representation  is  united  in 
one  officer.3 

The  consul,  it  must  be  admitted,  is  a  national  official, 
commissioned  to  act  for  the  state,  not  accredited  to  another 
government,  but,  at  the  very  least,  the  consul  is  an  official 
of  the  state  from  which  he  is  sent,  in  spite  of  the  attempt 
still  made  in  some  quarters  to  interpret  his  position  as  that 
of  a  private  representative  of  the  national  business  inter- 
ests 4 — and  as  such  he  may  be  called  on  to  take  quasi-diplo- 
matic action  at  times. 

In  his  administrative  capacity  the  consul  has  a  very 
burdensome  list  of  duties.  He  must  endorse  cargo-mani- 
fests, crew  lists,  and  other  documents  for  merchant  vessels 
about  to  sail  for  ports  in  his  home  state.  He  must  inspect, 
often  at  great  labor,  emigrants  about  to  depart  from  their 
home  country  for  settlement  in  his  state,  enforcing  the  na- 
tional immigration  laws  as  far  as  possible  at  that  stage. 
Finally,  he  acts  as  a  judicial  officer  in  many  petty  maritime 
cases  and  commercial  disputes,  and  takes  depositions  of 

»StoweU,  111-129. 
1  Regulations,  §§  500,  501. 
•Same,  §§20,  21,  23. 

*  Jones,  87-89;  Sheppard,  444;  Stowell,  177-181;  and,  for  the  contrasting 
views,  Le  Deux  and  Patau. 


CONSULAR  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS     81 

evidence  for  use  in  the  courts  of  the  home  country.  Within 
limits  the  consul  performs  duties  in  this  connection  which 
seem  to  run  counter  to  the  principle  of  territorial  sover- 
eignty, and  which  go  straight  back  to  the  age  of  the  Cru- 
sades for  their  origin. 

To  enable  him  to  perform  his  duties  unhindered  the 
consul  is  accorded  certain  immunities  of  person  and  prop- 
erty.1 These  include  unrestricted  communication  with 
his  home  government  and  his  colleagues  in  the  consular  and 
diplomatic  services  of  his  country.  This  freedom  of  com- 
munications extends  to  the  right  to  have  access  to  his  fel- 
low-nationals at  the  time  in  the  country,  especially  when 
they  are  under  arrest.  He  is  frequently  held  to  be  immune 
from  taxes  on  his  person  and  his  personal  property  and 
from  detention  or  prosecution  for  either  civil  or  criminal 
offenses  except  criminal  acts  of  a  very  serious  nature.2 
He  may  maintain  an  office  and  archives  which  are  invio- 
lable, and  he  may  extend  this  inviolability  to  property  of 
deceased  nationals  by  sealing  it  up.  The  degree  of  im- 
munity enjoyed  by  the  consul,  in  such  matters  as  taxation 
and  military  and  jury  duty,  for  example,  depends  largely 
on  whether  he  is  a  merchant  and  a  native  or  a  bona  fide 
consul  with  no  local  interests  except  his  official  work.  In 
the  latter  case  he  is  free  from  control  by  the  local  authorities 
in  all  respects  pertinent  to  the  conduct  of  his  consular 
duties.  It  is,  however,  one  of  the  disadvantages  of  the 
merchant  consul  and  the  native  consul  that  such  immunities 
cannot  readily  be  secured  by  them.3 

To  guide  the  consular  representative  through  the  maze 
of  Taw  defining  his  powers  and  duties  and  also  his  official 
privileges  and  immunities  his  home  government  usually 
provides  him  with  certain  forms  of  consular  literature,  in 
addition  to  his  commission  and  instructions,4  although  he 

'Stowell,  139-168;  also  Regulations,  §§79-84. 

*  For  variant  treatments  see  Hershey,  §  289. 
"Stowell,  169-175;  also  Regulations,  §§83-84. 

*  Regulations,  ii. 


y 


82  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

may,  of  course,  provide  himself  with  this  material.  He 
should  have  a  working  library  on  the  various  subjects  of  in- 
ternational commerce  and  law,  commercial  law  and  general 
international  law,  and  the  law  of  the  nation  where  he  is 
\  stationed.  He  should  have  reliable  manuals  or  guides  upon 
consular  law,  or  those  portions  oFpublic  and  private  inter- 
national law  likely  to  be  of  special  service  to  consuls.1  He 
may  profitably  possess  published  collections  of  consular 
precedents  and  cases.  He  will  find  useful  a  formulary  for 
consular  officers,  in  addition  to  the  table  of  forms  given  in 
his  instructions.  He  should  have  a  set  of  the  general  in- 
structions issued  to  the  diplomatic  service  of  his  own  coun- 
try. Finally,  the  consulate,  which  should  be  maintained  per- 
manently by  the  state  whose  representative  is  to  occupy  it, 
and  maintained,  thereby,  on  a  higher  level  than  wyould  be 
possible  if  it  were  left  to  each  succeeding  representative  to 
provide  a  consular  establishment,  should  be  equipped  with 
the  ordinary  geographical  and  statistical  materials  such  as 
maps,  tables  of  values,  weights,  and  measures,  and  diction- 
aries and  encyclopedias  indispensable  to  effective  office 
work. 

The  tenure  of  office  of  the  consul  may  come  to  an  end 
in  various  ways.2  He  may  resign  and  his  resignation  be 
accepted.  Death  may  terminate  his  work.  On  the  other 
hand,  outside  causes  may  bring  his  stay  to  a  close,  tempo- 
rarily or  permanently.  Such,  for  example,  is  the  effect 
of  recall  by  his  home  government  or  the  cancellation 
of  his  exequatur  by  the  receiving  government.  The  out- 
break of  war  between  the  two  nations  will  ordinarily  lead 
to  one  or  both  of  these  steps,  although  it  is  conceivable 
that  neither  nation  might  move  to  terminate  consular  repre- 
sentation between  them.  Even  in  that  case  the  effect  of 
war  would  be  to  suspend  the  treaty  on  which  that  inter- 
course rested.  This  is  of  critical  importance.  International 
organization  in  the  form  of  consular  representation  is 

1  See  literature  cited,  below,  Appedix  B,  §  6. 
"Stowell,  217-222. 


CONSULAR  ORGANIZATION  AND  FUNCTIONS  83 

continuous  in  normal  times;  in  time  of  war  it  is  entirely 
suspended.  It  might  be  contended,  with  some  reason,  that 
the  very  time  when  official  international  communication  is 

i    -  __!_-  ^_»    _    > » r~imr*~t — ii'«ii%_^u,iijiji^juj^iM^rt«^«*»»nitt*r»<»p»**nplB«i^^^^iMOMB*M<r  <j  .. 

most  needed  is  in  a  period  when  disputes  arise  between       / 
nations,  and  that  in  time  of  war  there  are  many  subjects    *\4, 
which  need  settlement  between  the  belligerents  in  the  course 
of  the  war.    All  of  this  reasoning  will  be  found  to  apply 
with  greater  force  to  diplomatic  representation.    As  mat- 
ters   stand,    however,    and    particularly    in    the    consular 
field,  the  legal  nature  of  war,  with  its  stoppage  of  trade, 
is  held  to  preclude  the  continuation  of  international  com- 
munication of  this  type. 

Surveyed  as   a  whole,  the   consular  system   suggests 
several  conclusions.     Tfo  fr>fa]  rpsnlt  is  an  Pnnmn^ya  anj 
elaborate  web  of  official  representation  connecting  the  va- 
rious  members    of   the   international   community*1      That 
weT5~is  growing  in  complexity  and  in  toughness  with  eachv 
year.    Further,  the  basis  of  the  service  is  to  be  found  in 
the  quite  simple  desire  for  private  commercial  profit,  for 
personal  profit  and  convenience.    The  simple  and  plain  facts"\ 
of  international  commerce  and  international  travel  are  the  / 
reasons  for  consular  representation,  not  any  sophisticated7 
and  fine   spun  theories   of  international   relations.     The  "•/ 
creation,  maintenance,  and  improvement  of  the  consular 
service  is  a  result  of  the  demand  of  the  commercial  and 
travelling  public,  and  any  substantial  curtailment  of  it 
would  meet  emphatic  protest  from  that  quarter.     Since 
the  dawn  of  international  relations,  in  ancient,  Medieval, 
and  modern  times,  the  nations  have  found  it  useful  and 
even  indispensable  to  provide  themselves  with  some  such 
arrangements.    Any  system  of  international  organization 
to  be  established  in  the  future  must  take  care  of  the  inter- 
ests now  entrusted  to  the  consular  service  or  carry  the  pres- 
ent system  along  with  itself. 

1  Register,  Tables  XIV  and  XXXIX,  and,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document 
No.  3. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ORIGIN  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN 
DIPLOMACY 

FROM  time  to  time  in  the  course  of  international  rela- 
tions the  forms  and  methods  of  international  diplo- 
macy are  severely  criticized  by  intelligent  lay  observers 
and  are  evidently  the  cause  of  a  great  deal  of  indignant  per- 
plexity.    Some  of  the  criticisms  levelled  against  modern 
diplomacy  have  just  reasons  for  their  existence  and  de- 
serve a  respectful  hearing.    Much  of  this  perplexity  and 
hostility,  however,  is  due  to  a  failure  to  understand  the 
,  nature  of  the  diplomatic  office  and  the  character  of  diplo- 


smatic  representation.     These  matters  can  be  understood 
only  by  a  study  of  how  the  present  system  came  into  being, 
/p  Jtl**  '  i,   for  the_  nature  of  the  diplomatic  function  is  determined 
__  .J 

^> 


__  .JL          directly  by  the  way  in  which  it  has  been  worked  out  in 
f        immediate  connection  with  the  development  of  the  modern 
*^>  national  state. 

A  single  example  may  be  briefly  related.  In  the  end  of 
1920  the  Ambassador  of  the  United  States  in  Paris  refused 
to  meet  the  German  Ambassador  to  France  at  a  social  gath- 
"^Ssgp*  ering  attended  by  both.  To  the  layman  this  might  seem 
to  be  silly  nonsense  and  impractical  formalism  of  some  mys- 
4/f  terious  kind.  In  point  of  fact,  it  is  to  be  explained  by  the 
circumstance  that  as  diplomacy  originated  and  has  been 
carried  down  through  modern  times  it  has  been  universally 
confined  to  states  in  peaceful  relations.  To  resume  diplo- 
matic relations  with  a  nation  with  which  we  have  been  at 
war,  prior  to  the  conclusion  of  a  formal  treaty  of  peace, 
would,  under  the  historic  rules  of  international  law,  bring 

84 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     85 

into  operation  the  rule  of  uti  possidetis  as  applicable  to  the 
termination  of  war.    The  result  might  have  cost  this  country 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars.    What  appears,  viewed  only    - 
in  the  light  of  the  present,  as  impractical  formalism,  turns  "*  ri~'u- 

out,  in  the  light  of  the  standing  rules  of  international  rela-    C**4  4** 
tions  and  intercourse,  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  prac- 

•^i     ~^ni    ">    -i       ,i •*•         '•     i         •    — 4— ^ ^_,____^-j»^-lii * 

tical.  It  behooves  us,  therefore,  to  examine  the  historic 
nature  of  modern  diplomacy  by  means  of  a  brief  review  of 
the  status  of  international  diplomatic  intercourse  in  vari- 
ous historical  periods  in  the  past. 

The  Greeks  and  Romans  practiced  a  sort  of  diplomacy, 
semi-religious,  semi-commercial  in  character,  but  entirely y/" 
episodic  and  discontinuous.1 

With  the  fall  of  the  Empire  in  the  West  the  invading 
barbarian  nations  were  compelled  by  circumstances  to 
carry  on  certain  rather  elaborate  negotiations  with  one 
another  and  with  the  Eastern  Empire.  Roman  formulas 
were  taken  up  and  employed  as  far  as  possible.  It  also 
appears  that  persons  who  had  participated  in  imperial  di- 
plomacy before  the  collapse  of  Rome  were  pressed  into 
service.2  Missions  were  dispatched  to  the  courts  of  neigh- 

^(•MMl^ktftMiMBtfMBBBMMMh^MB 

boring  tribal  states   and  to  Byzantium,  as  occasion  de- 
manded.    There  was  much  display  and  ceremony  accom-v^ 
panying  all  this  activity,  and,  apparently,  the  messengers  v 
were  well  entertained  in  the  course  of  their  journey  and  y 
upon  their  arrival.    At  all  events,  the  principle  of  the  per- 
sonal inviolability  of  the  emissary  was  clearly  recognized.3 
It  was  not  for  lack  of  proper  forms  that  the  barbarian 
states  failed,  as  they  did  fail,  to  carry  the  development  of 
diplomacy  very  far.    It  was  because  they  did  not  themselves 
develop,  as  states,  to  the  point  of  stability  and  fullness  of  V" 
political  life  where  the  need  for  a  complete  diplomatic  sys- 
tem would  be  felt. 

1  On  diplomacy  in  the  ancient  period  see  Phillipson,  in  general. 
'Hill,  I,  36-41.  '    . 

8  Same,  39. 


86 

During  the  feudal  period,  likewise,  there  was  much 
going  to  and  fro  of  messengers  of  various  kinds.  These 
messengers  were  dealing  with  the  sorts  of  questions  which 
we  ordinarily  consider  as  diplomatic,  such  as  war  and 
peace,  princely  marriages,  and  succession  to  posts  of  poli- 
tical power.  They  employed  very  elaborate  diplomatic 
forms  and  were  careful  to  claim,  in  an  age  of  turmoil  and 
violence,  the  protection  of  the  law  of  embassy.1  However, 
these  agents  were  only  semi-public  in  character,  because  of 
the  dependent  legal  and  political  position  of  the  feudal 
princes  among  whom,  for  the  most  part,  they  moved.2 
/They  were  representatives  of  rulers  who  did  not  possess, 
/  in  strict  law,  or  in  actual  political  fact,  wherever  the 
suzerain  could  be  present  in  power,  the  right  to  deal  freely 
one  with  another  upon  any  important  matters  of  state. 
Likewise,  the  " diplomatic"  representatives  received  by 
the  feudal  rulers  from  the  Emperor  were  in  legal  theory 
and,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  actual  effect,  constitutional 
officials  within  the  Empire.3  They  carried  the  commands  or 
requests  of  the  supreme  feudal  authority  to  the  subject 
princes.  The  latter  were^  moreover,  under  a  generai^pbli- 
/  gation  to  refrain  from  alliances  alT3~Tirplof»e4itrrelations 
^  in  their  own  name.  Their  representatives  were  subjected 
to  interference  and  control  and  a  monopoly  of  the  power  of 
carrying  on  foreign  relations  was  claimed  by  the  Emperor 
as  against  subject  rulers  and  by  the  national  kings  as 
against  local  barons.4  Diplomacy  could  hardly  develop 
when  the  units  of  international  life  were  still  so  widely 
interlocked  and  when  independent  state  life  had  developed 
to  such  a  slight  degree. 

By  the  Emperor  himself  various  classes  of  agents  were 
sent  on  political  and  diplomatic  missions,  both  in  the  time 

1  Hill,  I,  365,  367 ;  on  Medieval  diplomacy  in  general  see  literature  cited, 
below,  Appendix  B,  §  7. 
» Hershey,  148,  note  11. 
1  Hill,  as  cited,  367. 
4  Same,  II,  155,  156. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     87 

of  Charlemagne  and  in  the  later  period  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  in  efforts  to  render  the  Emperor's  will  effective 
at  the  courts  of  feudal  princes  of  various  grades.1     The 
true  nature  of  these  missions  has  already  been  commented 
upon.    Of  more  importance  were  the  pretentious  missions 
dispatched  to  Rome,  to  Byzantium,  and  to  the  Saracenic 
capitals.2    These  embassies  moved  with  pomp  and  circum- 
stance; they  followed  definite  formulas  of  procedure;  and 
in  many  cases  they  took  up  matters  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance internationally.     Yet  the  development  of  Imperialv 
diplomacy  was  slight.    The  reasons  for  this  are  to  be  sought 
partly  in  the  fact  that  tJ^,interB^^^ma^  of  the  Empire, 
so  to  speak,  was  held_back  from  any  great  development  by 
the  feudal  character  of  the  Empire,  as  already  described. 
In  part  it  was  due  to  the  circumstances  that,  on  the  external 
side,  the  Empire  embraced  so  much  of  the  active  political 
world  of  the  day  that  there  were  few  important  neighbor- 
ing states  in  Europe  with  which  to  carry  on  relations.    As 
in  the  Roman  period,  the  extension  of  the  Empire  in  the 
Middle  Ages  caused  the  disappearance  of  states  with  which 
the   relations   of   diplomacy  might  have  been  developed. 
Finally,  the  Medieval  sovereign  was  given  to  much  personal 
diplomacy;  he  moved  about  his  dominions  and  about  the 
world  in  general — as  the  world  was  then  known — and  in 
many  cases  he  was  his  own  foreign  representative.3 

The  Papacy  developed  the  device  of  foreign  representa- 
tives more  fully,  for  it  was  engaged  in  continual  negotia->-  y 
tions  for  alliances  and  treaties  with  the  princes  and  cities  of j 
Italy  and  Western  Europe.4 

Cardinals,  often  close  friends  of  the  Pope,  were  sent 
on  the  more  important  special  missions.  Their  coming 
frequently  caused  resentment  on  the  part  of  those  rulers 
to  whom  they  were  sent.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.") 

'Hill,  I,  366,  367;   Thorndike,  Chap.  XXVI,  entire. 

•Hill,  I,  183-186;   Walker,   §  61. 

•Hill,  I,  177-179;  Walker,  §  60. 

*Hill,  I,  360,  note  1  to  p.  359. 


88 

These  agents  attempted  to  dictate  to  the  rulers  of  Europe 
the  will  of  the  Supreme  Pontiff  and  to  influence  them  in 
relation  to  what  were  to  all  appearances  purely  domestic 
questions,  such  as  church  regulation  and  the  taxation  of 
ecclesiastical  persons  and  property.  In  other  words,  they 
were  not  acting  upon  those  assumptions  regarding  state 
independence  upon  which  alone  any  elaborate  and  stable 
V  system  of  international  negotiations  can  be  built.  They 
also  were  attempting  to  claim  constitutional  authority  over 
subject  princes  on  behalf  of  the  Holy  See. 

The  highest  grades  of  standing  Papal  representatives 
were  the  legati  a  latere,  or  Cardinals  representing  the 
Pope  personally  in  a  given  court,  and  the  legati  missi  or 
nuntii,  special  messengers  dispatched  from  time  to  time 
on  definite  errands.1  From  the  last  we  have  today  the 
Papal  nuncio,  the  single  class  of  modern  Papal  diplomatic 
representative.  There  were  various  grades  of  Papal 
agents  traversing  Europe  in  the  later  Medieval  period  on 
all  sorts  of  errands.  There  were  local  ecclesiastical  officials 
who  had  been  given  representative  capacity  in  their  own 
jurisdictions,  the  so-called  legati  nati.  These  were  con- 
cerned largely,  of  course,  with  church  matters.  Yet  there 
was  to  be  observed  here  a  more  pretentious  and  stable 
system  of  interstate  negotiation  than  had  appeared  else- 
where. Of  particular  significance,  in  retrospect,  was  the 
use  by  the  Papacy  of  resident  ecclesiastics  with  diplomatic 
V  powers.  In  point  of  historic  continuity  the  present  Papal 
nuncio  descends  from  the  most  fugitive  and  transient  fig- 
ures in  the  Medieval  diplomatic  service  of  the  Holy  See,  the 
nuntii;"  but  the  Papacy  did  discover  the  need  for  per- 
manent diplomatic  representation  and  acted  upon  that  dis- 
l  covery.  Europe  was  on  the  verge  of  modern  diplomatic 
\organization. 

It  is  to  the  city  states  of  Italy  in  the  time  of  the  Renais- 

1  Hill,. I,  as  cited;  also  Satow,  §  265,  quoting  Ferraris. 


U 

'jrr. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     89 

sance  that  we  must  actually  turn  for  the  definite  beginnings 
of  the  present  diplomatic  system.1  The  state-system  exist- 
ing in  Italy  in  the  fourteenth  century  was  reminiscent  of 
that  of  classic  Greece.2  A  number  of  substantially  inde- 
pendent city  states  were  to  be  found  located  in  Northern 
Italy, — Sienna,  Florence,  Genoa,  Milan,  Venice,  and  others,V  * 
— all  striving  in  keen  competition  for  profit  and  advantage  / 
one  over  another.  Secretjcorrespondence,  alliances,  in-  -  /fA*1^ 
trigue,  espionage,  subtle  negotiation, — such  were  the  prac- 
tices in  vogue  in  that  age.3  The  term  ambaxiator  or 
ambasciator  made  its  appearance  to  supplant  the  old 
orator  which  had  been  carried  down  from  the  days  of 
ancient  Borne.4  Various  rules  of  procedure  and  practice 
were  worked  out,  especially  by  the  Venetians,  for  the  guid- 
ance of  diplomatic  agents  abroad.  It  was  required  that  the 
ambassador  should  take  no  wife  with  him  on  his  mission, 
lest  she  indulge  in  gossip  and  betray  his  cause ;  he  must  ' 
take  his  own  cook  with  him,  lest  he  be  poisoned  by  his  hosts ;  ^/c/i^4 
he  must  accept  no  ggJts  during  the  period  of  his  mandate. 
Venice  required  formal  detailed  reports  from  all  persons 
who  had  been  sent  on  official  missions.  Strict  limits  were 
set  upon  the  duration  of  a  stay  abroad,  lest  loyalty  to  the 
homeland  and  her  institutions  be  weakened — a  principle 
not  unfamiliar  to  students  of  the  American  and  British 
foreign  services.  Conversation  with  strangers  until  an 
official  report  had  been  made  was  forbidden.5 

As  the  system  of  independent  national  states  arose  in 
Northern  Europe  these  practices  spread  in  the  fifteenth 
century  into  France  and  other  countries.6  Italians  were 

••^M4M*HM^M^^^«^^v^^^**M'**M*1     ^^*MM*HM**MM'M>'*^M^VMMMMHmv^a^K  ^HMH^MMA^^^^H^^M^^^M     \  "**~J  i '"  "^      J 

frequently  employed  in  the  diplomatic  services  of  the  North-  • 

1  On  the  origin  of  modern  diplomacy  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appen-  / 
dix  B,  §7;  most  of  such  material  is  in  French  and  German.  For  briefs/ 
English  account  see  Hill,  II,  152-158,  308-311,  and  Walker,  §  94. 

1  Walker,  §§37,  87;   geography  in  Shepherd,  90. 

"Hill,  II,  152,  153;  Thorndike,  576-580. 

4  Satow,  §  264 ;  also  Hill,  I,  359,  note  1. 

•Hill,  I,  297,  360,  361;  also  Heatley,  9. 

•  Hill,  I,  361,  362,  and  II,  158. 


90  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

era  states,  especially  by  France.1  Diplomacy  was,  indeed, 
more  or  less  of  an  Italian  institution  and  product  at  this 
time.  The  new  national  monarchs  sought  to  make  use  of  the 
\X  fine  Italian  hand  of  the  countrymen  of  Machiavelli  in  the 
promotion  of  their  own  interests. 

Now  the  distinguishing  feature  of  modern  diplomatic 
intercourse, — the  feature  which  clearly  sets  it  off  from  the 
diplomacy  of  antiquity  and  the  Medieval  period, — is  the 
institution  of  the  permanent  resident  diplomatic  represen- 
tative. For  centuries  diplomatic  missions  were  special  and 
temporary  things,  moving  to  their  destination  and  terminat- 
ing with  the  performance  of  a  given  assignment.  Modern 
diplomatic  organization,  on  the  other  hand,  is  based  upon 
permanent  bonds  of  representation  among  the  nations. 
And  it  was  precisely  the  Italian  situation  here  described 
which  produced  the  permanent  embassy.  The  city  states 
of  Italy  were  sufficiently  numerous,  sufficiently  active  polit- 
ically, and  sufficiently  stable,  to  support  a  more  pretentious 
practice  of  diplomacy  than  Europe  had  ever  known  before. 
In  1450  Milan  and  Florence  each  established  resident  em- 
bassies in  the  territory  of  the  other.2  Ten  years  later  a 
similar  exchange  was  made  by  Milan,  Venice,  and  Naples.3 
In  the  last  quarter  of  the  century  began  the  Italian  resident 
embassies  to  France,  so  important  during  the  French  wars 
in  Italy.4  A  new  organ  of  government  had  appeared  in 
Europe. 

Several  aspects  of  this  movement  deserve  special  notice. 

The  resident  diplomat  was  not  unlike  the  resident  consul 
who  had  already  established  himself,  two  centuries  before, 
in  the  cities  of  the  Levant.  Indeed,  when  it  is  recalled  that 
the  consul  of  that  period  possessed  and  exercised  extensive 
diplomatic  privileges  it  might  appear  that  this  was  the 
origin  of  the  modern  diplomatic  office.5  In  point  of  fact, 

•Hill,  II,  152. 

•Same,  154. 

•Same;  also  Nys,  Diplomatic,  1,  15. 

4  Hill,  as  cited,  153;  Nys,  16. 

•  Nys,  20f 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     91 

however,  modern  diplomatic  representation  can  be  traced 
back  to  the^taly  of  the  fifteenth  century,  while  it  is  not  clear 
that  any  connections  can  be  made  with  the  consular  repre- 
sentation of  the  thirteenth  century.    The  Italian  diplomacy  \ 
may,  in  turn,  be  traced  in  a  vague  fashion  back  through    \ 
Venice  to  Byzantium  and  Rome,  but  in  those  remoter  pe-  J 
riods  no  permanent  embassies  are  found. 

The  establishment  of  permanent  representation  seems 
to  have  been  due  to  the  quite  understandable  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  governments  of  the  city  states  not  to  go  unrep- 
resented at  any  time  at  the  seats  of  government  of  each 
other.  There  was  such  a  continuous  involvement  of  inter- 
ests and  policies  among  them  that  nothing  but  continuous 
representation  could  serve  their  needs.  Part  of  the  task 
of  the  new  diplomat  was  to  act  as  an  observer  on  behalf  of 
his  master.  The  other  part  was  to  act  as  mouthpiece ;  it  was 
still  true  that  a  good  orator  made  a  good  ambassador.1 
For  both  purposes,  continuous  activity  was  greatly  superior 
to  temporary  missions. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  burden  of  expense  and  labor  con- 
nected with  the  constant  and  steadily  increasing  use  of 
special  diplomatic  missions  was  mounting  rapidly.  Dis- 
putes over  ceremonial  and  procedure  increased  in  proper- 

•*•  «•....„•  i»hui      •*•  A    ..„,  A  A 

tion.  Special  missions  must,  ordinarily,  be  entrusted  to  dis- 
tinguished citizens,  and  this  accentuated  these  inconvenient 
features.  It  appeared  better,  therefore,  to  cut  down  the 
expenses  of  diplomatic  representation,  to  simplify  the  pro- 
cedure and  ceremony  attending  such  representation,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  to  secure  a  greater  amount  of  representation 
in  point  of  quantity,  by  employing  less  elevated  person- 
ages in  a  less  pretentious  office  and  rank,  but  permanently  V^ 
stationed  at  a  neighboring  court.2  In  later  years  this  set 
of  forces  operated  simply  to  keep  down  diplomatic  rank  long 
after  permanent  diplomatic  representation  had  become  an 
established  fact. 

1  Theory  in  Nys,   1,   10.     Permanent  ministers  are  almost  always  spies, 
said  Bynkershoek;  Heatley,  17. 
2Satow,  §267. 


92  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Finally,  this  whole  movement  should  be  regarded  with 
7  /  #•  special  sympathy  and  understanding  by  American  students. 

•  Three  hundred  years  af terwTards  America  passed  through 
07^  this  same  series  of  stages  in  the  development  of  her  diplo- 

matic service.  The  United  States  made  use  of  special 
embassies  entirely  in  the  years  1776-89,  embassies  usually 
entrusted  to  distinguished  citizens,  and  surrounded  with  as 
much  pomp  and  circumstance  as  republican  tastes  and  funds 
would  permit.  These  tastes  were  not  very  highly  developed, 
however,  and  by  the  end  of  the  Revolution  our  people  were 
quite  ready  to  get  along  without  the  expense  and  the  show 
attendant  upon  this  activity.  Already  American  missions 
abroad  had  come  to  appear  to  be  all  too  permanent.  The 
reaction  went  to  the  point  where  Adams  was  about  ready  in 
[1783  to  " recall  every  minister  from  Europe"  and  rely  on 
\special  missions  to  be  sent  out  as  the  occasion  demanded. 
As  it  was  impractical  to  go  without  continuous  representa- 
tion, however,  permanent  posts  were  reluctantly  created 
by  the  government  under  the  new  Constitution.  At  the 
same  time,  the  rank  and  ceremony  employed  and  the  ex- 
pense incurred  were  kept  down  to  a  minimum.  This  Ameri- 
can experience  faithfully  recapitulated  the  gelneral  Euro- 
pean experience  on  the  same  point  three  centuries  earlier.1 

Meanwhile  there  had  developed  in  the  individual  na- 
tional states  certain  public  services  which  aided  materially 
in  the  practice  of  diplomacy.  Postal  facilities  were  created 
for  the  use  of  the  state.  The  king 's  couriers,  an  institution 
which  by  itself  was  as  old  as  ancient  Babylon,  were  em- 
ployed anew  in  constantly  increasing  numbers  to  carry 
dispatches  to  all  corners  of  the  kingdom.  They  were  now 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  diplomatic  service  and  were  sent 
upon  distant  journeys  with  dispatches  for  diplomatic 
representatives  abroad.2  Cipher  writing,  hitherto  largely  a 
pastime,  was  given  serious  attention  and  drawn  into  the 

1  Foster,  Century.  Chaps.  I-III,  V. 

*  Hill,  as  cited,  155-156,  especially  note  2  to  155. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     93 

service  of  the  state.  Under  the  political  circumstances 
of  the  age  this  mechanical  development  was  just  the  sort 
of  thing  needed  to  promote  the  spread  of  the  new  diplo- 
macy. The  national  languages,  first  used  by  national  sover- 
eigns in  correspondence  with  their  own  agents,  began  to 
make  their  appearance  in  international  negotiations  and 
to  present  a  serious  challenge  to  the  primacy  of  the  Latin.1 
All  of  these  factors  made  for  greater  mechanical  freedom 
and  ease  of  official  international  communication. 

With  all  due  credit  to  these  internal  developments,  how- 
ever, the  principal  causes  for  the  expansion  of  European 
diplomacy  are  to  found  in  the  changes  taking  place  in  the 
state-system  itself.  These  have  already  been  reviewed.  To 
them  are  to  be  attributed  the  steps  taken  in  Italy  and 
France  to  work  out  a  new  method  of  interstate  negotiation. 
With  Pope  and  Emperor  fallen  as  imperial  overlords,  the 
now  independent  states  began  to  employ  a  new  system  of 
political  organization  and  practice  in  their  relations  one 
with  another,  and  modern  diplomacy  was  born.2 

During  the  next  two  centuries,  from  1450  to  1650,  the  , 
new  practice  grew  apace.3    The  ambassadors  in  ordinary, 
permanently   stationed   near"  friendly   courts,^*we're   long  ' 
under  suspicion  as  spies.    For  what  other  purpose  could 
they  be  hovering  about?     Nevertheless,  they  met  a  real 
need,  and  hence  they  increased  steadily  and  soon  outnum- 
bered the  ambassadors  extraordinary  on  special  missions. 
A  whole  group  of  such  representatives  appeared  in  each 
capital.     The  ordinary  type  of  special  ambassador  under \ 
the  older  system  became  rarer,  and  the  new  type  became   1 
the   " ordinary"   representative,   so-called,   and   took   the/ 
stage  in  force.4  Q<  J? 

This  led  to  the  development  of  a  more  or  less  articulate    ,  *,, 
and  complete  code  of  (diplomatic  etiquette,  and  also  a  for-  OCca,-C 

•Hill,  157;  Satow,  §§  89,  90. 

'Hill,  158.  / 

•Nys,  as  cited,  21-32.  CxJlQ  &JjiQn 

*  Walker,  §  94 ;  also  Satow,  269.  / 


94  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

w  of  legation.  The  mere  multiplication  of  various 
\  classes  of  diplomatic  agents  made  necessary  not  only  a 
system  of  procedure  in  the  actual  conduct  of  negotiations 
but  a  set  of  rules  firmly  and  carefully  defining  the  legal 
rights  and  privileges  of  foreign  representatives. 

This  diplomatic  etiquette  was  visualized  almost  wholly 
in  terms  of  precedence.  Papal  agents,  being  veteran  diplo- 
mats and  possessed  of  a  peculiar  influence  and  prestige,  re- 
ceived precedence  over  the  representatives  of  secular  rul- 
ers. In  view  of  the  historical  and  theoretical  primacy  of 
the  Empire,  the  imperial  representatives  took  rank  above 
those  of  the  rising  national  kings.  Royal  representa- 
tives took  precedence  over  the  agents  o£  republican  states 
and  cities,  claiming  a  superior  dignity  and  prerogative.1 
Many  violent  disputes  inevitably  arose  in  these  matters, 
and  the  literature  of  early  diplomacy  abounds  in  anecdotes 
concerning  them.  The  classic  example  of  this  sort  of  thing 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  in  1648,  which 
was  the  work  of  a  conference  held  in  two  distinct  sections 
meeting  contemporaneously  in  two  distinct  cities,  partly 
because  it  was  impossible  to  reconcile  the  claims  to  prec- 
edence put  forward  by  France  and  by  Sweden. 

These  claims  and  pretensions  are  not,  however,  to  be 
regarded  as  entirely  lacking  all  substantial  foundation  or 
explanation.    The  age  was  an  age  of  awakening  spirits  and 
/  I  the  new  nations  were  keenly  sensitive  on  the  score  of  their 
\title  to  respect.    The  preceeding  period  had  been  character- 
ized by  too  much  confusion  and  doubt  regarding  national 
identity  and  state  independence;  it  was  wholly  desirable 

.  I  that  these  matters  should  now  be  dealt  with  vigorously  and 
carefully.  For  this  reason  the  external  marks  of  state  in- 
dependence and  national  authority  were  given  great  atten- 
tion and  the  details  of  reception  and  precedence  took  on  new 

v/  significance.2    It  was  natural  that  this  should  lead  to  silly 

1  Walker,  §  95. 

•Same,  §§95-96;  also  Bernard,  Lecture  I. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     95 

excesses.     But  the  exorbitant  claims  and  disputes  were 
silly  not  because  they  arose  over  matters  of  no  importance, 
but  because  they  distorted  the  realities  which  were  present  Sr 
behind  all  these  questions  of  diplomatic  etiquette.    Each 
state  was  entitled — as  had  not  been  true  in  another  age — \ 
to  due  consideration,  and  to  consideration  in  proportion 
not  to  mythical  imperial  authority  or  legendary  feudal  j 
titles  but  to  real  power  and  consequence  in  the  new  Europe.* 
This  remained  true  even  when  the  eager  ruler  tried  to  re- 
verse the  process  and  secure  added  political  power  and 
consequence  by  obtaining  some  formal  diplomatic  advantage 
over  his  rival.    The  new  states  were  with  difficulty  finding 
themselves  in  a  new  political  world. 

The  more  serious  problems  of  diplomatic  procedure  were 
being  worked  out  at  the  same  time  by  the  efforts  of  private 
scholars  to  arrive  at  a  just  definition  of  the  rights  and 
duties  of  diplomatic  representatives  in  the  territory  of  the 
state  to  which  they  were  accredited.1 

A  beginning  in  the  elaboration  of  the  law  of  legation  was 
made  by  an  Austrian  scholar,  Brunus,  who  had  once  been      f\ 
a  diplomatic  agent  of  Charles  V,  by  going  back  to  the  rules  ^ 
of  Roman  law  on  this  subject.    The  ancient  regulations  re- 
garding credentials,  instructions,  and  the  reception  of  diplo- 
matic representatives  were  revised  with  a  view  to  use  in 
the  sixteenth  century.2     There  followed  the  work  of  the    & 
Oxford  professor  Gentilis,  who  dwelt  upon  the  historical  ,   Q 

E _^^_^^^JBL^_  i —    •  ~      '  U^»a»»iJ^— •-••-  w_  •*•  Mfl^MMMfiflf' 

evolution  of  the  institution  of  embassies  as  a  preface  to  a 
thorough  examination  of  the  public  character  of  diplo- 
matic representation.  He  made  a  strong  case  against  the 
continuing  efforts  of  subject  feudal  princes  to  deny  in  prac- 
tice the  monopoly  of  the  national  sovereign  over  the  con-v^ 
trol  of  foreign  relations.  Gentilis  then  proceeded  to  clas- 
sify missions  with  reference  to  the  character  of  the  state 
represented,  and  to  define  the  legitimate  diplomatic  im- 

wfejMMfliMW^  *    "*•  • — i  m j^BBB^M>r "• — ^«*  '""'"""^^EJBBBBfc^nBn***""  >  "^fUJ^**^^  -•'•••  ^p^MMMfe 

1  Walker,  §§  131,  135,  143;  also  Nys,  33-55. 
'  Walker,  §  131. 


96  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

munities  for  each  class,  and  ^closed  his  brilliant  study  with 
a  critical  examination  of  the  right  to  send  and  receive 
ministers  and  ambassadors,  which  led  him  gradually  back 
to  his  principal  theme.1 

Finally,  Grotius  dealt  with  the  subject  in  his  great 
work  on  the  general  law  of  nations.  He  likewise  insisted 
upon  the  principle  that  only  independent  states  possessed 
the  right  to  send  and  receive  diplomatic  representatives, 
and  upheld  the  right  of  rulers  to  refuse  to  receive  as  the 
representatives  of  foreign  states  individuals  not  personally 
acceptable  to  them,2  Grotius,  however,  went  even  further, 
and  was  led  by  his  caution  in  the  rapidly  moving  events 
of  his  time  to  ascribe  the  same  right  to  the  national  rulers 
in  regard  to  all  the  distasteful  "permanent  legations" 
which  were  "now  in  use."  For  the  greater  part  of  the 
time  these  agents  had  no  negotiations  to  carry  on.  Why, 
then,  should  they  be  entertained  in  the  state?  The 
great  jurist  also  defined  the  basis  and  extent  of  diplomatic 
immunities  by  reference  to  the  quality  of  the  sovereign 
represented,  thus  following  the  opinion  of  his  age.  Not 
until  two  centuries  later  was  the  true  standard  found  in 
the  purpose  and  function  of  embassy  as  such. 

The  close  of  the  Thirty  Years  War  thus  found  both  a 
diplomatic  ceremonial  and  a  law  of  legation  ready  at  hand 
to  serve  the  needs  of  the  new  independent  states  emerging 
in  the  Peace  of  Westphalia.3  Brunus  and  Gentilis  and 
Grotius  were  followed  by  other  scholars,  such  as  Wicque- 
fort,  Callieres,  and  Bynkershoek,  to  mention  only  the 
greater  ones  among  the  host  of  writers  on  diplomacy  prior 
to  the  French  Revolution.4  The  territorial  state,  authori- 
tatively recognized  by  the  great  mid-century  settlement, 
adopted  the  Italian  diplomatic  institution  as  its  own, 

1  Walker,  §135. 
•Same,  p.  302. 
•  Same,  §  81. 

«Heatley,  151-160,  and  Appendix  I  (extracts);  Satow,  I,  x,  and  II. 
363-379. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     97 

worked  out  its  implications,  called  into  life  historic  prac- 
tices and  legal  rules  to  amplify  the  same,  and  set  out  on        • 
a  career  of  competitive  international  relations  which  is 
only  now  being  slowly  closed  and  converted  into  some- 
thing else. 

Since  1650  there  have  been  few  vital  changes  in  the 
system  of  diplomacy  as  then  recognized.  The  consular 
system  has  changed  far  more.  However,  certain  develop- 
ments must  be  reviewed  briefly  at  this  point.1  /j\/)?J/fJ 

-Vw  rf^f/ 


During  the  period  of  Louis  XIV  the  French 
dancy  set  a  stamp  upon  the  still  plastic  diplomacy  of  V  )  \s 
Europe  which  has  never  completely  disappeared.2  The  ' 
Grand  Monarque  inherited  an  already  well  developed  sys- 
tem of  diplomatic  representation  from  Richelieu  and 
Mazarin,  and  he  proceeded  to  expand  and  to  employ  this 
service  to  the  utmost.  In  personal  interviews  he  gave  the 
French  agents  abroad  detailed  instructions  before  they  set 
out  on  their  missions.  These  priests  of  the  Most  Christian 
King  —  true  missionaries  of  Gallic  culture  —  were  fired  with 
a  zeal  to  carry  French  prestige  to  the  ends  of  Europe. 
Under  constant  and  careful  supervision,  they  made  de- 
tailed reports  on  political  and  social  events  and  conditions 
in  all  quarters  of  the  diplomatic  field,  and,  as  a  result,  Louis 
was  in  touch  with  every  faction  in  every  high  intrigue  in 
all  the  capitals  of  Europe.  These  French  agents  were 
indeed  indefatigable.  They  travelled  night  and  day,  and 
they  amassed  enormous  stores  of  documentary  material. 
From  a  pecuniary  point  of  view  they  were  poorly  paid, 
but  they  were  devoted  apostles  of  the  Sun  King,  and  they 
found  in  the  royal  approval  and  the  reflected  glory  of 
France  ample  recompense  for  their  labors.  Through  their 
efforts  mainly,  Paris  became  the  political  center  of  Europe 
and  diplomacy  a  French  institution. 

1  There  is  no  history  of  modern  diplomacy  as  such.  Fragmentary  mate- 
rials for  such  a  history  are  to  be  found  in  Hill,  Satow,  and  the  other  works 
cited  in  this  and  the  succeeding  chapter. 

•Hill,  III,  52-55. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  following  century  was  a  time  of  colonial  rivalry, 
alliances,  and  wars.1  Diplomacy  was  consequently  em- 
ployed for  all  sorts  of  devious  purposes  and  in  all  sorts 
of  ugly  situations.  The  culmination  came  in  the  partitions 
of  Poland  in  the  later  part  of  the  century — actions  which 
were  brought  on  by  causes  deeply  embedded  in  the  Euro- 
pean state-system  itself,  but  carried  through  in  character- 
istic fashion  by  the  diplomats  of  the  day.  It  would  be 
grossly  inaccurate  to  attribute  the  evil  transactions  of  this 
period  to  the  institutions  and  methods  of  diplomacy  in  use 
at  the  time.  The  system,  as  it  had  grown  up  since  the 
Renaissance,  was  greatly  enlarged  in  point  of  numbers  and 
extent,  and  this  tended  to  make  it  weak  in  principle  and 
ideal.  But,  after  all,  the  determining  factors  are  to  be 
sought  in  the  vicious  policies  of  the  rival  sovereigns  who 
employed  personal  diplomacy  in  the  pursuit  of  their  per- 
sonal satisfaction  and  aggrandizement.2  At  the  same  time, 
it  would  be  futile  to  deny  that  the  accomplishment  of  their 
sinister  purposes  was  facilitated  by  the  existence  and  em- 
ployment of  a  method  of  international  negotiations  which 
lent  itself  readily  to  these  purposes. 

The  great  expansion  of  diplomacy  in  the  eighteenth 
century  was  followed  by  the  tremendous  international 
disturbances  of  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  periods. 
As  a  result,  the  rulers  participating  in  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  found  it  necessary  to  attempt  to  reorganize,  in 
part,  the  diplomatic  system  of  Europe  and  to  standardize 
the  ranks  of  diplomatic  representatives.3  An  official  re- 
classification  of  diplomatic  agents  wras  adopted  which,  as 
amplified  in  1818,  is  still  in  use  today.4  Despite  the  latent 
growth  of  forces  which  may  soon  supplant  the  historic 
institutions  of  diplomatic  representation  with  newer  forms 
of  national  representation  in  international  bodies  of  one 

'Hill,  III,  Chaps.  V-VIII,  especially  673-676. 
'Satow,  II,  360-362;  see  also  Bernard,  Lecture  III,  entire. 
"Satow    §§  263,  271;  see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  2. 
4  Hershey,  §  261. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY     99 

sort  or  another,  there  have  been  during  the  past  century 
almost  no  changes  in  the  diplomatic  system  as  it  stood  in 
1815,  except  a  further  cutting  down  of  the  use  of  form  and 
etiquette,  a  weakening  of  the  force  of  procedure  and  cus- 
tom._  Diplomacy  has  now  become  very  much  more  business- 
like and  unceremonial,  and  perhaps  we  are  to  see  jgJaJl 
farther  steps  in  that  direction.  Notwithstanding  all  the 
changes  in  manners,  however,  the  fundamentals  of  diplo- 
matic intercourse  are  essentially  what  they  were  during, 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries;  what  we  have 
to  deal  with  is  a  long  established,  and,  in  a  measure,  a  fixed, 
international  institution. 


CHAPTER 
ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY 

THE  term  " diplomacy"  is  employed  by  many  writers 
to  mean  many  different  things.  So  diverse  are  the 
ideas  back  of  this  common  term  that  no  possible  progress 
can  be  made  in  the  present  discussion  until  some  under- 
standing has  been  reached  upon  the  sense  in  which  we  shall 
use  it. 

Sir  Ernest  Satow,  a  leading  authority  on  the  subject, 
goes  so  far  as  to  include  in  his  treatise  on  "Diplomatic 
Practice,"  in  addition  to  his  consideration  of  the  simpler 
forms  of  diplomacy,  a  description  of  the  forms  and  pro- 
cedure of  international  congresses  and  arbitral  tribunals, 
much  international  law  pure  and  simple,  and  the  subject 
of  treaty  negotiation  proper.1  At  the  same  time  he  omits 
all  mention  of  the  consular  system.  It  does  not  seem  best 
to  follow  such  a  plan  here.  The  last  topic  has,  indeed, 
already  been  studied  in  its  own  name  and  may  now  be  left 
out  of  further  account.  Furthermore,  we  shall  consider 
international  courts,  commissions,  and  conferences  sepa- 
rately at  a  later  point,  as  institutions  standing  by  them- 
selves. For  our  purposes,  therefore,  the  field  is  narrowed 
to  the  subject  of  negotiation  by  diplomats  acting  individu- 
ally. This  is  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  term  "diplo- 
macy," and  might  be  called  diplomacy  proper,  in  contrast 
to  various  forms  of  diplomatic  activity  which,  by  reason 
of  their  complexity  and  formality,  become  something  dis- 
tinct from  simple  diplomacy,  deserving  attention  in  their 
own  names. 

Even  with  this  affirmative  definition  of  the  subject,  it 

1  Satow,   Bk.   IIL 

100 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  101 

is  well  to  take  notice  of  two  or  three  things  which  ought 
to  be  carefully  set  off  from  diplomacy  proper.  One  is  for- 
eign policy  and  another  is  foreign  relations  or  foreign 
affairs.  The  former  phrase  refers  to  national  programs 
of  action  in  international  relations,  to  national  purposes 
or  objectives  or  motives  to  be  carried  out  through  the 
existing  framework  and  procedure  of  the  national  foreign 
service.  In  formal  terms  it  is,  as  has  been  said  by  a  recent 
writer,  the  application  of  mind  and  means  to  current  con- 
ditions for  an  object  more  or  less  distant.  The  phrase 
1  'foreign  relations,"  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  -the  to- 
tality of  events  and  actions  transpiring  among  nations  or 
between  one  nation  and  the  other  members  of  the  existing 
state-system.  Neither  of  these  things  is  diplomacy  proper ; 
the  phrases  diplomatic  policy  or  diplomatic  relations  may 
be  used  in  the  place  of  ' 'foreign  policy"  and  ' 'foreign  rela- 
tions." but  the  simple  term  "diplomacy"  should  be  re- 

-    -         -  J      £  f  '  J.         it  J  J.' 

served  tor  use  in  referring  to  the  organs  and  practices 
whereby  the  nations  carry  on  their  political  affairs  one 
with  another. 

There  is  one  topic,  however,  which  is  commonly  omitted 
from  discussions  of  the  general  subject  of  diplomacy,  but 
which  should  be  noted  in  this  connection.  This  is  the  For- 
eign Office,  or  that  department  of  the  national  government 
which  has  control  of  the  nation's  foreign  service,  consular 
and  diplomatic.1  The  department  of  foreign  affairs  ordi- 
narily has  the  control  of  the  consular  service,  although  this 
may  be  shared  with  the  department  of  commerce  or  some 
other  department  of  the  central  government.  Invariably 
it  has  control  of  the  diplomatic  service,  and  as  such  it  de- 
serves to  Be  included  in  any  review  of  the  machinery  of 
diplomacy.  Foster,  a  leading  American  writer  on  diplo- 

1  Commonly  called  the  "Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,"  or  "Ministry  of 
Foreign  Relations,"  or  the  "Foreign  Office";  in  the  United  States  the  "De- 
partment of  State. ' '  The  old  term  ' '  chancellory  "  or  "  chancellories ' '  is  occa- 
sionally used  for  literary  effect,  as  in  a  news  item  by  Barry,  B.  T.,  in  Milwaukee 
Journal,  26  November,  1921,  p.  4. 


/• 


102  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

matic  practice,  does  not  include  the  Department  of  State 
in  his  treatment  of  American  diplomacy,  as  Satow  insists 
should  be  done ; 1  on  the  other  hand,  Foster  does  devote  a 
chapter  to  the  consular  service.2  Both  topics  deserve  to  be 
treated  under  the  general  head  of  ''diplomacy." 

It  is  the  function  of  the  department  of  the  national 
government  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  to  recruit,  classify, 
instruct,  and  control  the  field  force  of  the  foreign  service ; 
and  a  monopoly  of  this  control  is  ordinarily  created  on  its 
behalf  by  national  law.  Thus  the  Logan  Act,  in  the  statutes 
of  the  United  States,  forbids  unauthorized  American  citi- 
zens to  consult  with  foreign  governments  or  their  repre- 
sentatives regarding  any  question  in  which  the  United 
States  is  interested.3  Similarly,  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  in  1921  disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  utterances 
of  military  officials  in  Korea  relating  to  foreign  affairs,  and 
4  held  that  they  did  not  bind  the  Government.4 

Moreover,  it  is  the  task  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  provide 
such  a  mechanism  of  administrative  divisions  or  sections 
or  bureaus  at  the  capital  of  the  nation  as  can  take  care  of 
the  various  sorts  of  business  arising  in  the  course  of  a 
nation's  foreign  relations.5  The  members  of  the  field  force 
must  rely  very  largely,  for  the  success  of  their  efforts,  upon 
the  equipment  and  ability  of  the  department  of  foreign 
affairs.  The  field  force  depends  for  its  original  compo- 
sition and  the  constant  maintenance  of  its  personnel  and 
equipment  upon  this  (JePartment  of  the  home  government. 
As  the  standard  rises  or  falls  in  the  department,  so  will  the 
.standard  of  ability  and  service  rise  or  fall  in  the  field. 
Defective  organization  and  defective  administration  at 

^^'MMMMHMMa^MlilKMMIMMABHMMiMHMHIMMMaMMggBr 

home  mean  ineffectiveness  and  failure  abroad.  Many  of 
the  failures  and  blunders  and  positive  sins  in  diplomacy 

1  Satow,  §§4,  13-20. 

2  Foster,  Chap.  XL 
t'Bevised  Statutes,  §  5335. 

*New  York  Times,  28  January.  1921,  p.  15. 
•Satow,  §20, 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  103 

which  are  attributed  to  diplomatic  representatives  abroad^  A^ 
are  really  due  to  causes  beyond  their  control,  in  the  Foreign  J 
Office  at  home. 

To  go  into  a  study  of  the  department  of  foreign  affairs 
here,  however,  is  both  unnecessary  and  impossible.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that  the  standard  principles  of  administrative 
organization  and  practice  are  defied  only  at  the  peril  of  the 
national  interest.  There  must  be  unity  of  control  over,  and 
consistency  of  action  among,  the  various  bureaus  of  the 
department.  There  must  be  ample  provision  of  distinct 
administrative  units  to  care  for  the  distinct  varieties  of  t 
work  to  be  done.  There  must  be  a  clear  demarkation  be- 
tween the  determination  of  policy  and  routine  administra- 
tive work,  and  unqualified  employees  must  be  prevented 
from  interfering  in  discretionary  business  of  the  former 
variety.  In  short,  the  national  government  must  provide 
an  adequate  administrative  machine  to  support  the  consul 
and  the  diplomat  abroad. 

The  task  of  recruitment  likewise  belongs  entirely  to 
the  national  authorities.  Each  nation  adopts  the  means 
which  it  prefers  to  secure  competent  diplomatic  representa- 
tives.1 The  diplomats  form  part  of  the  national  civil  serv- 
ice and  may  be  regulated  as  all  other  parts  of  the  civil 
service  are  regulated  with  respect  to  methods  of  selection, 
treatment, — including  salary  and  pension, — and  retirement. 
Whether  an  examination  system  is  to  be  used  in  judging 
candidates  for  admission  to  the  diplomatic  service  is  to 
be  decided  by  each  nation  for  itself.  Whether  adequate 
salaries  are  to  be  paid,  and  whether  any  provisions  are  to 
be  made  for  retirement  and  pensions,  is  likewise  to  be 
decided  by  the  national  governments.  The  nations  observe 
the  experiences  of  one  another  as  various  methods  are 
tried  from  time  to  time,  and  a  process  of  imitation  is  going 
on  whereby  the  procedure  followed  in  all  countries  tends 

foster,  Chap.  Ill;  Satow,  §221. 


104 

to  become  the  same.  But  in  all  cases  the  source  of  changes 
is  the  national  policy  of  each  state. 

Certain  general  reflections,  however,  may  well  be  set 
forth  here. 

It  is  obvious,  for  example,  that  the  principal  diplo- 
matic representatives  of  a  nation  must  be  in  political  sym- 
pathy with  the  officials  in  control  of  the  national  foreign 
policy  at  home.  The  diplomatic  representative  abroad 
largely  determines  the  success  or  failure  of  the  national 
policy.  No  set  of  instructions  can  possibly  be  so  com- 
plete as  to  dispense  with  the  need  for  discretion  and  judg- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  representative  in  the  foreign  capi- 
tal; and  in  the  exercise  of  this  discretion  and  judgment  it 
is  essential  that  the  diplomat  be  in  harmony  with  his 
uperior  officer  as  to  the  foreign  policy  to  be  pursued. 
The  success  of  the  national  policy  for  the  time  being,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  requires  consistency  and  unity  above  and 
below  in  the  foreign  service,  for  it  is  an  elementary  rule 
of  administrative  science  that  control  must  be  effective 
from  above.  Nothing  can  insure  that  result  in  the  field  of 
personal  diplomatic  negotiations  except  subtle  and  delicate 
personal  and  political  sympathy  between  the  foreign  office 
chief  and  the  diplomatic  representative  abroad.  It  would 
be  disastrous  for  the  United  States  to  have  an  Ariglophobe 
President  in  Washington  and  an  Anglophile  Ambassador 
in  London.  Whether  the  desired  result  is  to  be  attained 
more  readily  by  a  system  of  appointments  at  discretion  or 
by  appointment  as  a  result  of  technical  examinations  is 
another  matter.1 

It  is  none  the  less  desirable  that  heads  of  missions 
should  possess  those  qualities  of  tact  and  manner  which  are 
conducive  to  smooth  diplomatic  negotiations.2  The  bear- 
ings of  a  machine  are  not  improved  by  being  rough  and 

y1  There  is  also  the  question  whether  it  is  desirable  to  create  an  entirely 
professional   diplomatic   service   or   to   retain   a   number   of    popular,  leaders, 
amateurs,  in  posts  of  importance.     Beport,  50. 
'Satow,  §§  223-226. 


unpolished.  The  appearance  of  strength  and  integrity  is 
superficial,  and  the  smooth  and  effective  operation  of  the 
machine  is  retarded.  Diplomatic  representatives  who  have 
the  task  of  actually  conducting  conversations  and  negotia- 
tions of  various  sorts  are  engaged  in  a  form  of  personal 
intercourse,  and  certain  personal  qualifications  are  tnere- 
f  ore  pertinent  in  their  selection.  The  ability  to  subordinate 
feelings  and  prejudices  and  personalities  to  considerate- 
ness  and  reasonableness  and  common  decency  is  indis- 
pensable. We  do  not  _want  weak  or  insincere  or  dishonest 
diplomats,  however  polished  they  may  be.  Equally,  we  do 
not  want  egregious  boors  for  diplomats  (sic)  however 
strong  and  sincere  and  honest  they  may  be.  Honesty  andN  ^^ 
sincerity  can  be  found  in  combination  with  decent  manners^  * 
and  considerateness. 

Below  the  grade  of  the  principal  diplomatic  representa- 
tives personally  engaged  in  negotiations  there  are,  how- 
ever, large  numbers  of  diplomatic  agents  to  whom  rules 
almost  the  opposite  of  those  just  stated  apply.  Personal 
manners  and  political  beliefs  are  of  little  consequence  in  a 
mere  secretary  or  a  law  clerk  in  an  embassy.  The  task  of 
the  memBers  of  the  staff  in  a  diplomatic  establishment  is 
to  supply  information  to  the  head  of  the  mission  and  to 
carry  out  administrative  details.  They  are  engaged  in 
impersonal  work,  and  have  no  political  or  discretionary- 
power.  Expert  training  in  history,  law,  economics,  and,v 
above  all,  the  technique  of  government  and  diplomacy,  is 
the  thing  required  in  such  persons.  Candidates  for  these 
posts  may  best  be  selected  by  a  system  of  technical  exami- 
nations,1 a  procedure  which  would  be  intolerable  for  heads 
of  missions.2  Likewise,  it  is  in  regard  to  such  positions 
that  permanence  of  tenure,  experience  in  the  service,  pro- 
motion for  merit,  and  other  salutary  administrative  prac- 

1  Register,  1919,  188-192. 

1  Compare  Satow,  §  224,  with  Report,  18,  and  a  quotation  in  latter,  at  262, 
from  minority  report  of  British  Commission  on  the  Civil  Service. 


106  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tices  may  be,  and  ought  to  be,  adopted.1  With  respect  to 
heads  of  missions,  these  practices  have  little  or  no  value, 
and  under  certain  circumstances  would  be  clearly  injurious. 
When  questions  of  policy  and  of  discretion  no  longer  arise 
in  the  work  of  the  diplomat  he  may  be  made  a  purely  tech- 
nical administrative  officer ;  that  is  not  the  condition  today 
and  the  diplomat  at  the  head  of  a  mission  must  continue 
to  be  a  personal  political  representative.  For  technical 
members  of  the  establishment,  however,  the  opposite  is 
true. 

The  future  may  see  a  considerable  change  in  the  rela- 
tions between  these  two  classes  of  diplomatic  representa- 
tives. This  depends  upon  what  happens  to  international 
relations  in  general.  If  international  organization  devel- 
ops very  far,  so  that  international  assemblies  or  councils 
for  the  regulation  of  international  relations  are  created, 
in  which  the  nations  are  represented  by  persons  who  are 
sent  there  to  debate  and  vote  rather  than  to  negotiate,  then 
only  routine  administrative  details  will  be  left  to  the  resi- 
dent diplomat,  In  that  case  he  might  well  be  merely  a  legal 
clerk  or  agent.  Furthermore,  if  and  in  so  far  as  the  devel- 
opment of  telegraphic  communication  narrows  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  foreign  representative  and  gives  the  home 
office  control  over  him,  the  same  result  .will  follow.  National 
representatives  in  the  new  infernational  legislative  bodies 
would  enjoy  the  national  confidence  such  as  is  accorded 
to  elected  representatives,  and  in  the  second  case  legal 
and  business  ability  would  be  desirable.  But  in  neither 
case  would  political  attachment  to  a  personal  superior  be 
in  point.  Thus  it  is  required  that  members  of  the  Perma- 
nent Court  of  Arbitration  at  the  Hague  shall  be  "persons 
of  known  competence  in  questions  of  international  law, ' ' 2 
and  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  was  inclined  in  1919 
to  require  that  any  American  representatives  in  the  Assem- 

*Beport,  58-59,  61,  288-294. 

"Below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  5,  Art.  44. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  107 

bly  or  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  be  elected  by  the 
Senate,  in  the  event  that  the  United  States  should  join  the 
League.      Such    requirements    are    thoroughly    consistent  "\ 
with  the  nature  of  the  situations  in  which  they  are  invoked,   / 
but  they  leave  little  room  for  the  diplomat  of  the  old  style.  / 

A  purely  international  aspect  of  the  question  of  the 
selection  of  diplomats  arises  in  the  requirement  that  diplo- 
matic representatives  must  be  personally  acceptable  to  the 
governments  to  which  they  are  to  be  accredited.1  This 
leads  to  the  practice  of  obtaining  the  consent  of  a  foreign 
government  to  the  appointment  of  a  certain  individual  as 
diplomatic  agent  to  that  power  before  making  the  selection 
definitive  and  before  dispatching  him  upon  his  mission.2 
The  United  States  did  not  always  follow  this  practice, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  contended  that  any  American  citizen 
must  be  acceptable  to  any  foreign  power  which  consented 
to  enter  into  diplomatic  relations  with  us.  In  part,  that 
attitude  was  an  expression  of  national  pride  and  sensitive- 
ness which  was  not  entirely  dignified  and  considerate;  in 
part,  however,  it  was  a  premature  attempt  to  minimize  the 
personal  element  in  diplomacy.3  It  has  been  largely  aban- 
doned now,  because  it  is  seen  that  the  rule  of  personal 
acceptability  is  in  harmony  with  the  actual  nature  of 
diplomacy,  whether  we  like  it  so  or  not,  and  because  the 
equalitarianism  and  excessive  nationalism  of  an  earlier 
day  has  yielded  to  common  sense.  Here,  as  in  the  problems 
just  discussed,  the  future  of  the  rule  depends  upon  the 
course  of  events  in  general  international  relations.  In  the 
case  of  national  representatives  in  the  Assembly  of  the 
League  of  Nations  personal  acceptability  is  an  irrelevant 
consideration. 

Just  as  a  state  will  at  times  employ  natives  or  citizens 
of  a  foreign  country  for  consular  representation  on  its 
behalf  in  the  territories  of  their  own  country,  so  various 

foster,  36-45;  Satow,  Chap.  XIV. 

a  Satow,  §230. 

•Foster,  as  cited,  especially  37,  38,  40-43;  Satow,  §§232-234. 


108  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

nations  have  from  time  to  time  employed  foreigners  as  dip- 
/  lomatic  representatives  either  in  the  foreigners'  own 
country  or  in  a  third  country.  The  latter  case  raises  only 
one  question,  namely,  the  ability  of  an  alien  to  act  loyally 
and  effectively  on  behalf  of  the  state.  The  former  practice 
raises,  further,  and  in  an  acute  form,  the  question  of  con- 
flicting loyalties  to  native  land  and  client  state.  Most  states 
now  refuse  to  receive  their  citizens  as  diplomatic  represen- 
tatives of  foreign  powers,  and  except  for  backward  states 
with  a  dearth  of  diplomatic  talent,  the  practice  has  gener- 
ally gone  out  of  use.1 

After  the  foreign  service  force  has  been  recruited  the 
next  task  is  that  of  classifying  the  members. 

Broadly  speaking,  the  foreign  service  as  a  whole  must 
itself  be  subdivided  and  the  first  step  is  the  establishment 
of  separate  consular  and  diplomatic  services.  This  sepa- 
ration is  not  wholly  logical  or  satisfactory,  and  presents 
many  difficulties.  The  line  between  the  commercial  and 
legal  work  entrusted  to  the  consul  and  the  political  work 
of  the  diplomat  is  hard  to  locate  in  the  abstract  and  is  in 
practice  rather  vague  and  imaginary.  In  the  result,  con- 
suls, as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  participate  in  quasi- 
diplomatic  work  in  connection  with  treaties  and  extradition 
proceedings,  while  diplomats  are  deeply  concerned  with 
commercial  and  financial  relations  among  the  nations. 
Further,  we  find  cases  where  the  consular  and  diplomatic 
offices  are  combined,  as  in  the  instance  of  the  American 
/Minister  Resident  and  Consul  General  to  Liberia.2  There 
exists  just  enough  confusion  between  the  two  branches  of 
the  foreign  service  to  show  its  latent  unity,  and  indications 
are  not  wanting  to  suggest  that  the  two  branches  may  in 
the  future  be  brought  together  in  one  service.3 

The  diplomatic  service  proper,  like  the  consular  service, 

1  Foster,  49;  Satow,  §236. 

'  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Service  of  the  United  States,  1920,  Table  I. 

•Grew,  J.  C.,  "Danish  Foreign  Service  Reorganized,"  in  American  Con- 
sular Bulletin,  III,  2-4  (October,  1921),  and  speech  of  Hon.  J.  J.  Rogers 
in  (U.  S.)  House  of  Representatives,  27  January,  1921. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PEACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  109 

is  classified  into  several  ranks  corresponding  roughly  to  ^3 
the  regulations  adopted  by  the  European  nations  in  1815  /t 
and  1818  at  Vienna  and  Aix-la-Chapelle.1  The  principal 
ranks  are  those  of  Ambassador  (with  which  are  to  be 
classed  the  nuncios  and  legates  of  the  Pope),  Envoys 
Extraordinary  and  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  Ministers 
Eesident,  and  Charges  d 'Affaires.2  In  addition,  there  are 
various  special  diplomatic  representatives  called  Agents, 
Attaches,  Secretaries,  Counsellors,  and  what  not.  The 
typical  diplomatic  establishment  consists  of  a  chief  of 
mission  holding  one  of  the  four  principal  ranks,  together 
with  a  varying  number  oFSecretaries,  Attaches,  and  clerks. 
There  is  more  freedom  in  the  use  of  titles  and  styles  for 
the  subordinate  positions  than  for  the  principal  offices,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  nation  from  inventing  its  own 
nomenclature  for  its  subordinate  diplomatic  agents. 

The  respective  rank  of  the  principal  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives formerly  had  an  important  bearing  upon  their 
powers  and  upon  their  ability  to  conduct  their  business; 
rights  of  representation  and  of  negotiation  hinged  upon  the 
formal  status  of  the  foreign  representative.  At  present 
this  is  still  true  but  to  only  a  very  limited  extent.  Ambas- 
sadors and  Ministers  are  accredited  to  heads  of  states,  \ 
while  Charges  are  accredited  to  the  Secretary  of  Foreign/ 
Affairs.  AmDass^Hors^Ioneare  held  to  represent  the 
sovereign  personally.  But^  all^ this_signlfie8  little  in  prac-  *N 
lice.  The  rank  of  a  diplomat  relates  chiefly  nowadays  to 
ceremony  and  precedence.3  Indirectly,  the  effect  on  the 
real  business  of  diplomacy  since  priori|y^in_  precedence 
often  means  an  advantage  in  negotiations.  The  surface 
effect  and  appearance  also  in  matters  of  ceremony  and 
precedence  is  not  without  importance  also. 

Furthermore,  the  relative  rank  of  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives residentfin  a  given  capital  depends  in  part  upon 

'Foster,  Chap.  II. 

2  Text  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  2. 

"Foster,  22,  23,  25,  26. 


110  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  standing  of  the  states  which  they  represent.  This  is 
largely  a  result  of  the  rule  of  reciprocity  in  rank  whereby 
two  states  entering  into  diplomatic  relations — and  the 
establishment  of  such  relations  is  always  the  result  of  a 
bilateral  international  agreement — arrange  to  exchange 
diplomatic  representatives  of  equal  rank.1  Thus  in  Wash- 
ington the  Great  Powers  are  represented  by  Ambassadors, 
generally  speaking,  and  the  smaller  powers  by  Ministers. 
The  effect  of  this  rule  or  procedure  is,  however,  sometimes 
curiously  adverse  to  its  intention.  The  Great  Powers  will 
not  send  diplomats  of  first  rank  to  the  very  small  nations 
and  therefore  accept  merely  Ministers  or  Envoys  from 
hem  in  return.  It  is  a  case  of  reducing  the  rank  of  the 
representatives  exchanged  to  correspond  to  the  level  of 
the  lower  of  the  two  powers.  But  the  small  nation  may  be 
exchanging  diplomats  of  first  rank  with  another  small 
nation  which  regards  it  as  an  equal.  The  result  is  to  place 
the  Great  Powers  in  a  position  of  equality  with  the  secon- 
dary powers,  in  the  capitals  of  many  small  states,  a  result 
precisely  the  opposite  from  that  aimed  at  by  the  rule.2 

AVhat  this  means  is  evident.     Rank  alone  tells  little 
about  the  significance  of  the  representative  to  the  govern- 

/ment  to  which  he  is  accredited.    The  power  behind  the  rep- 

l  resentative,  not  his  official  title,  determines  his  influence. 
On  the  other  hand,  rank,  having  lost  groun,d  as  a  factor  in 
determining  the  legal  powers  and  political  influence  of 
diplomats,  has  come  to  mean  more  in  a  ceremonial  way  as 
the  doctrijie  of  state  equality  has  gained  ground.  If  the 

'states  themselves  are  to  be  considered  formally  as  equals, 
the  only  ground  for  precedence  among  their  representa- 

'  tives  is  the  relative  rank  of  the  latter.3  It  is  not  surprising 
to  find  that  salutes  and  all  sorts  of  social  privileges  are 
standardized  on  this  basis.4 

1  Foster,  20 ;  Satow,  §  §  218,  219. 

8  See,  below,  p.  122,  note  2. 

•Foster,  as  cited;  Satow,  Chap.  IV,  especially  88  32,  40.  and  273,  371. 

*  Satow,  §§  81,  88. 


The  present  tendency  is  to  get  away  from  these  dis- 
criminations as  far  as  practicable.  To  avoid  disputes  over 
precedence,  rather  than  to  work  out  a  system  of  precedence 
accurately  reflecting  some  scale  of  real  power  and  influ-  % 
ence,1  seems  to  have  been  the  principal  object  of  the  nations 
since  1815.  The  most  important  step  in  that  direction 
is  the  adoption  and  spreacToTtne  twin  devices  of  the  alpha- 
bet and  the  alternat  in  actions  involving  several  nations  or 
their  representatives.  According  to  these  forms  of  pro- 
cedure, the  nations  involved  take  their  places  in  a  roll  call, 
a  seating  plan,  or  a  table  of  signatures  by  virtue  of  the 
position  occupied  in  the  alphabet  by  the  initial  letters  of 

^^•MvM0INPVMttBM^vbl^MIM**QMiqMMgB^H|B^^0^^ig|fl0B(h  ****"'**»*S***BWO^»fWllK«PB^P> 

their  names.2  In  the  case  of  a  signed  document  it  is 
arranged  that  each  power  shall  retain  that  copy  on  which 
it  appears  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  signatories,  the  various 
copies  having  been  signed  in  such  manner  that  each  power 
signs  once  in  the  first  position,  once  in  the  second  position, 
and  so  on.3  The  order  of  signing  may  be  settled  by  lot 
equally  well,  and  the  alternat  employed  in  connection  there- 
with. The  motive  and  the  net  result  of  all  this  is,  of  course, 
to  eliminate  considerations  of  rank  among  representatives 
and  among  nations,  so  far  as  any  effective  application  of 
it  goes.  The  world  seems  to  be  tending  toward  the  goal 
marked  out  by  America,  namely,  the  abolition  of  discrimi- 
nations in  rank  among  nations  and  diplomatic  representa- 
tives and  the  employment  of  one  uniform  diplomatic  title 
or  office  by  all  nations.4  It  need  hardly  be  pointed  out  that 

1  Opening    words    of    the    declaration    made    at    Aix-la-Chapelle,    below, 
Appendix  A,  Document  No.  2 ;  Satow,  §  39. 

2  Same,  §§32,  33,  273. 

*  If  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Denmark  were  to  sign  a  document  in 
English  by  alphabet  and  alternat,  the  result  would  be  as  follows: 

Copy  retained  Copy  retained  Copy  retained  Copy  retained 

by  Argentina:  by  Brazil:  by  Chile:  by  Denmark: 

Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Denmark 

Brazil  Chile  Denmark  Argentina 

Chile  Denmark  Argentina  Brazil 

Denmark  Argentina  Brazil  Chile 

*  Foster,  Chap.  II,  end. 


,  C 


*r  112  *       INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

(<-^    +Lr 
S-L*  J/m  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  this  result  is 

already  actually  achieved.1 

The  diplomatic  representative  receives  his  authority 
from  his  appointment  by  the  home  government,  anc^  his 
reception  by  the  government  to  which  he  is  accredited.  His 
letter  of  credence  is  the  formal  evidence  of  his  appoint- 
ment to  the  representative  office  at  a  certain  capital.  In 
addition,  a  " full-power"  may  be  provided  for  the  ordinary 
work  of  the  office  or  for  special  tasks  committed  to  his 
charge.  These  documents  are  for  the  information  of  the 
j  foreign  government  and^form  the  basis  for  the  relations 

which  are  to  be  set  up  with  the  newly  arrived  diplomat.2 

^       ^ — i  ^ — -  —  *"~ — — — ^ * j^»— •. nffTTM-^r — ~~~1 in — lryJJ~"J"^J^ 

flf  all  is  agreeable  to  the  power  in  question  he  will  be  for- 
j>  mally  received  by  the  sovereign,  the  chief  executive,  or  the 
)  Foreign  Minister,  and  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two 
(states  will  be  thus  established.3 

The  diplomat  receives  oral  instructions  from  his  home 
government  before  setting  out  on  his  mission,  and  he  car- 
Jjg*^    ries  with  him  general  regulations  and  special  instructions 
in  writing.     Furthermore,  he  receives   from  his   foreign 
-*^*  office  a  constant  stream  of  advice  and  instructions  which 

control  his  actions  in  the  conduct  of  his  office.  These  docu- 
ments constitute  his  version  of  the  credentials  handed  to 
the  foreign  government,  and  correspond  to  the  latter  in 
scope  and  authority.  Needless  to  say,  perhaps,  they  are 
fuller  and  more  precise  than  the  latter. 

The  work  of  the  diplomat  at  his  post  defies  precise  or 
compiete^djegjjjtiftB*.  He  must  conduct'^e'^oliations  with 
the  gUVe"Liwienl  to  which  he  is  accredited ;  he  must  observe 
Fv^  ^t*  anc*  reP°r^  wna^  is  going  on  about  him;  and  he  must  per- 
form certain  functions  on  behalf  of  his  own  state  toward 
fellow-nationals  who  apply  to  him  for  passports,  for  the 
inspection  and  endorsement  of  passports  which  they  al- 
ready hold  and,  in  general,  for  services  not  unlike  those 
performed  by  the  consul.  This  is  all  that  can  be  said,  and  it 

1  Covenant,  Art.  Ill,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  15. 
•Examples  in  Satow,  §§  119,  126-128. 
'Foster,  Chap.  IV;  Satow,  §§  244-262. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  113 

leaves  the  main  work  of  the  diplomat  to  be  covered  by  those 
vague  phrases  "diplomatic  negotiations"  and  "observa-/?.  Jt^ 
tions ' '  which  are  filled  out  by  each  observer  of  international 
relations  according  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  imagination. 

(What  is  to  be  negotiated  and  what  is  to  be  observed  cannot  A 
be  defined  in  advance,  yet  they  constitute  the  heart  of  the  J 
problem. 

I  In  the  actual  conduct  of  negotiations  the  diplomat 
enters  _  a....£Qmplic&ted  and  delicate  field  of  action.  Some 
efforts  may  be  made  to  instrucT^fflrc^ncerningtiie  "man- 
ner of  negotiating,"  but  the  business  is  too  complicated 
and  too  subtle  to  be  completely  reduced  to  formal  rules,  j/.  yi-  yt. 
The  diplomat  must  rely  upon  his  own  tact,  his  own  feeling, 
nTs  own  common  sense  to  help  him  in  his  work.  Much  has 
been  written  cautioning  the  young  diplomat  against  haste,  ^^tc 
against  the  use  of  flattery  and  bribery  and  talseliood  and  £»/> 
other  cheap  and  therefore  ineffective  methods  of  action. 
Such  advice  is  sound  enough.  The  difficulty  is  to  apply  the 
principles  when  needed,  and  to  recognize  the  exigencies 
when  they  are  needed;  in  this  nothing  but  the  sound  judg- 
ment and  instinctive  wisdom  gained  by  experience  in  deal- 
ing with  persons  and  politics  can  serve.  So  long  as  inter- 
national relations  are  conducted  by  personal  representa- 
tion this  is  bound  to  be  true.1 

The  same  must  be  said  concerning  the  whole  matter  of 
style  and  ceremony.  Not  all  of  the  mannerisms  and  rules 
of  the  etiojjette  of  diplomacy  are  essential.  Not  all  of  them 
are,  on  the  other  hand,  superfluous  or  irrelevant.2  The 
amount  of  such  formalism  has  greatly  decreased  in  the 
past  century,  and  particularly  in  the  past  generation. 
With  the  advent  of  republican  states  and  civilian  diplomats  -p, 
the  use  of  ceremonial  costume,  long  deprecated  by  the 
United  States,  has  declined  perceptibly;  there  were  practi- 
cally no  ceremonial  costumes  visible  among  the  members 

'Satow,    §§139-146,    150-167,    225,   226;    also    Callieres,   for   example   of 
older  treatment. 

'Foster,  Chap.  VII,  especially  130-141. 


I/   t 
«/  * 


114  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  when  that  body 
met  in  Geneva  in  1919,  and  no  military  uniforms  at  all,  in 
,i  striking   contrast   to   things'"  as    they  used   to   be.1     The 

greater  part  of  the  punctiliousness  and  formality  which 
does  remain  is  due  to  an  effort  for  precision  and  accuracy 
in  a  field  where  the  materials  dealt  with  and  the  issues  in- 
volved are  very  complex  and  indeterminate  and  where  the 
competitive  national  interests  involved  are  great  in  magni- 
tude and  at  the  same  time  ill-defined.  At  the  Conference 
of  Paris  President  Wilson  merely  neglected  to  put  on 
record  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  reserve  certain 
rights  of  discussion  concerning  the  disposal  of  the  island 
of  Yap  in  the  Caroline  group  ;  the  ultimate  result  in  1920- 
1921  was  a  very  bad  situation  all  around  and  particularly 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States.2  Propriety  and 
/form  are  an  integral  part  of  substantive  right  especially 
I  where  procedure  is  still  in  the  stage  of  personal  negotia- 

I  M.  .-  — 

\tipn. 

The  matter  of  written  documents  is  similarly  impor- 
tant  ;  the  art  of  literary  composition  constitutes  an  intimate 
ii.  part  of  diplomacy.    Indeed,  the  term  diplomacy  is  derived 

from  dwloma^Fhicb  was  a  document  in  the  form  of  a  sheet 
of  papeTfolaea  into  two  leaves  ;  a  certain  famous  collection 
of  early  treaties  has  the  phrase  "containing  diplomas 
(continens  diplomataY'  in  its  title.  The  written  record 
reinSilHlfflfflE^^  and  it  behooves  the  signers  of  a 

document  to  exercise  the  most  scrupulous  care  about  its 
V^fi  wording.     To  say  that  two  powers  "are  not  prepared  to 
.    Ajf^    l  a°t"  (now)  is  n°t  to  Sa7  that  they  "will  not  act"  (next 
II  **  ff  vear)>  and  many  apparent  euphemisms  and  circumlocutions 

in  diplomatic  documents  reflect  what  are  often  very  labori- 
LLnO^  <>us  attempts  to  say  just  what  is  meant,  and  no  more  and 

no  less.3  It  is  undeniable  that  diplomatic  writing  contains 
much  bombast,  and  is  often  guilty  of  evasion,  and  worse. 

1  New  York  Times,  17  November,  1920,  p.  12,  column  1. 

9  Same,  24  February,  1921,  p.  1. 

•Satow,  §§89-95;  compare  also  de  Clercq  et  Vallat,  Formulaire,  entire. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PRACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  115 

But  it  is  equally  true  that  much  of  the  criticism  of  diplo-  \ 
matic  diction  is  due  to  shallow  inattentiveness  to  exactness  \ 
in  detail  and  to  childish  lack  of  thought  upon  the  subject.  / 

Some  part  of  the  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  compo- 
sition of  satisfactory  documents  in  diplomacy  is  due  to  the     /" 
quejtmn_ofj.aiiguage.    So  long  as  Latin  could  be  used  by  O(  <v-»y»t*^* 
all  diplomats   the   situation  was   relatively   simple.1     To 
some  extent  this  situation  was  perpetuated  by  the  general  jj 

adoption  of  French  in  the  seventeenth  century  in  the  place  /  *}  ^^ 
of  Latin  as  the  international  diplomatic  language.  French 
possesses  qualities  of  range,  accuracy,  and  flexibility  or 
delicacy  which  make  it  valuable  on  its  intrinsic  merits  as 
a  diplomatic  medium,  and  the  language  of  Louis  XIV  has 
therefore  never  lost  its  position  in  the  world  of  interna- 
tional relations.  Matters  of  this  sort  change,  however,  in 
response  to  considerations  of  what  appear  to  be  practical 
utility.  The  French  is  now  being  ahandmied  hy  efai.f\\r\ 

4^^^^^i^^^^Btf0VM'IM'''MM^HBMMHMIMNMMMM'  MMMMHMMI 

nations  and  English  or  Spanish  or  some  other  common 


Spaniali  a*tr*ttOtr  native  tongues.2  Thus  Germany  and 
Austl'ia1  eiifplc/y  ^fetnll^^n^^aiing  one  with  another,  Japan 
and  Russia  employed  English  at  Portsmouth  in  1905,  and 
the  South  American  states  commonly  employ  Spanish  in 
negotiations  among  themselves.  Documents  are  sometimes 
drawn  up  in  two  or  more  languages  in  parallel  columns. 

__    ^        _    *    ~   i  H      __        _      "  i  •  "    !•  "nji  •M^Mi^iiinTt^^aiiiui  ^tfMMfAM^ttMUBm^Bhg^^NMMq**  , 

In  such  cases  one  of  the  versions  may  be  regarded  as  the  j      ~t  * 
standard  text  or,  indeed,  two  texts  may  be  accorded  equal 
authority  and  potential  discrepancies  left  for  adjustment 
as  they  appear.3    In  many  cases  the  merits  of  the  French 
have  been  foresworn  without  commensurate  convenience 
and  benefit.     It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  produce  two\    / 
texts  of  a  given  document,   one  in   Spanish  and  "brie  in/  * 

1  Some  use  is  still  made  of  Latin,  of  course,  as  in  Papal  documents,  but 
the  chief  reminder  of  its  once  universal  sway  is  to  be  found  in  the  retention  of 
certain  words  or  phrases  in  use  in  diplomacy,  such  as  ultimatum,  casus  belli, 
casus  faederis,  and  others;  Satow,  §§  168-193. 

"See  the  amusing  Bismarck  story  in  Satow,   §  96. 
V\  *  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Art.  440,  in  Sen.  Doc.  49,  66  Cong.,  1  Sess. 


116  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

English,  with  identical  meanings.    Even  single  texts  yield 
ito  varying  interpretations ;  how  much  greater  the  difficulty 
^when  two  or  more  national  tongues  are  used! 

The  outcome  of  this  question  of  language  cannot  be 
foretold,  but  the  solution  may  partake  of  three  elements. 
The  leading  national  languages  are  likely  to  continue  to 
compete  one  with  another  for  preference  in  international 
dealings  and  to  be  recognized  by  different  nations  at  differ- 
ent times  according  to  present  practice.  By  the  generous 
use  of  translators  and  interpreters  this  way  of  doing  busi- 
ness may  be  made  to  yield  results  which,  if  not  wholly 
satisfactory,  will  at  least  be  tolerable.  Secondly,  the  study 
and  use  of  foreign  languages  by  people  in  general  is  likely 
to  increase  with  the  increase  of  international  travel  and 
communication.  Along  with  this,  we  may  see  important 
changes  as  a  result  of  the  incorporation  into  one  language 
of  words  and  phrases  in  use  in  another;  a  process  of 
amalgamation  is  steadily  going  on  which  tends  to  make 
the  different  languages  more  nearly  alike.  Finally,  we  may 
well  see  some  serious  effort  to  develop  an  artificial  inter- 
national language.  To  historically-minded  persons  such  a 
suggestion  seems  ridiculous  and  in  some  way  or  other  weak 
and  futile.  It  bears  on  its  face  the  appearance  of  arti- 
ficiality. Notwithstanding  all  this,  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  seem  to  justify  the  conclusion.  If  telegraphic  codes, 
scales  of  weights  and  measures,  signal  systems,  and  other 
artificial  media  of  communication  have  been  successfully 
devised  and  put  into  use  under  similar  circumstances  the 
course  of  events  is  not  likely  to  be  different  in  the  field  of 
diplomacy. 

The  in^vidnaLdiDlDmat  jjfi  n^f.  fl]one  in  the  foreign  capi- 
tai;  he  is  a  member  of  a  gronpof  representatives  from  all 
countries  who,  collectively,  form  the  "diplomatic  corps"  at 
that  capital.1  His  relations  with  his  colleagues  will  depeno! 

MwMM^MHB|BHMMlM* 

1  Satow,  Chap.  XXIII.  The  term  is  sometimes  used  to  refer  to  the  diplo- 
matic representatives  of  one  state,  as,  for  example,  "the  diplomatic  corpp  of 


somewhat  upon  his  position  in  the  corps;  if  he  is  a  new-  ,/ 

comer  he  will  be  expected  to  d|j|er,  socially  and  diplomat- 
ically, to  his  colleagues;  if  he  is  an  older  member  he  will 
enjoy  some  influence  in  matters  properly  of  concern  to  the 
corps  as  such. 

The  standing  and  powers  of  this  somewhat  amorphous 
body  depend  upon  local  court  or  governmental  regula- 
tions.1  The  diplomat  of  highest  rank  and  longest  tenure 
is  commonly  the  "dean"  of  the  corps;  but  he  does  not 
exercise  any  substantial  authority  over  the  other  members.2 
Questions  of  diplomatic  privilege  form  the  chief  concern 
of  the  corps  as  such,  and  its  dean  and.  the  members  would 
protest  as  a  unit  against  any  mistreatment  of  one  of  their 
number.  At  times,  joint  action  is  taken  by  the  ministers 
present  in  a  certain  capital  on  some  substantive  point  in 
international  relations,  as  when  the  diplomatic  agents  in 
Peking  protested  in  1921  against  any  interference  by  the  \ 
Chinese  Government  in  the  administration  of  the  customs  / 
revenues  in  China  according  to  the  standing  agreements 
between  China  and  the  Powers.3  In  such  a  case,  however, 
it  is  not  the  diplomatic  corps  which  is  acting  but  the  nations  V 
there  represented.  The  Council  of  Ambassadors  which  sat 
in  Paris  in  1919-20  and  dealt  with  various  questions  con- 
nected with  the  peace  was  not  acting  as  the  diplomatic 
corps  proper.  The  chief  concern  of  the  corps,  in  other 
words,  is  diplomatic  procedure,  etiquette,  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  its  members,  and  social  intercourse.4 

In  certain  important  commercial  cities  the  foreign  con- 
suls act  together  from  time  to  time  as  a  "consular  body" 
in  a  manner  similar  to  that  of  the  diplomatic  corps.    Thus  v/ 
the  consular  body  at  Vladivostok  in  1920-21  took  counsel 
concerning  the  maintenance  of  local  order  and  safety  for 

the  United  States. ' '  This  is  bad  usage ;  th«  expression  should  be  ' '  the 
diplomatic  service  of  the  United  States."  •"*" 

"*Sato\v;  ^377.    2Same,  §369.   '  New  York  Times,  4  February,  1921,  p.  1. 
4  For  lists  of  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  in  all  capitals  in  1921  see 
Annuaire   General,  1920-1921,   740,   759,   767,  etc.     For  example  of   a  small 
corps  see,  below,  p.  122,  note  2. 


118  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

foreigners.1     There  exists  in  Madrid  an  Association  of 
American  Consuls,  comprising  the  entire  consular  service 
of  North,  Central,  and  South  American  states  in  that  capi- 
tal,  and  engaged  in  promoting   Spanish-  American  trade 
"        generally.2    This  is,  however,  rare.    The  whole  subject  of 
J>'   the^diplomatic  corps  is  rather  fugitive  and  formal.     The 
^f*         corps  is  so  loosely  organized  that  it  hardly  deserves  to  be 
regarded  as  an  international  governing  body. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  consular  system,  the  result  of  this 

practice  of  international  exchange  of  representatives  is  to 

cover  the  world  with  a  web  of  bilateral  bonds  running 

among  the  capitals  of  all  the  nations.    These  bonds  are  less 

numerous  than  in  the  case  of  the  consular  system,  but  they 

are  of  greater^  kgal^amljDoti^  They  have 

for  centuries  in  the  past  constituted  the  main  form  of  ex- 

)  isting  international  organization,  and  for  some  time  to  come 

;  they  will  remain  the  principal  avenues  of  international 

*•  intercourse.3 

Given  this  diplomatic  system,  it  remains  to  be  noted  that 
international  law  attempts  to  define  in  some  measure  the 
powers  and  privileges  attaching  to  the  members  thereof. 
The  rules  already  reviewed,  relating  to  diplomatic  ameni- 
ties  and  the  forms  of  diplomatic  procedure,  are  part  of 
what  might  be  called  the  technique  of  diplomacy.    The  law 
of  legation,  on  the  other  hand,  deals  with  the  right  to 
send  diplomatic  representatives  in  the  first  place,  and  with 
the  very  practical  question  of  the  rights   of  diplomatic 
representatives  in  relation  to  the  law  and  officials  of  the 
state  where  they  are  stationed.     The  law  of  legation  is 
principally  international  law,  though  national  laws,  statu- 
V  tory  and  administrative,  deal  with  the  subject  also. 
/     $Y  The  primary  rule  to  be  noted  is  that,  as  a  general  thing, 
*)**     only  an  independent  state  may  send  or  receive  diplomatic 

1New  York  Times,  21  January,  1921,  p.  15;   29  January,  1921,  p.  4;   17 
February,  1921,  p.  15. 

zSame,  11  November,  1921,  p.  4. 

"See  the  tables,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  3. 


agents ; l  indeed,  the  right  of  legation  is  frequently  used  as 
the  supreme  test  of  a  state's  independence.2  There  are, 
however,  many  cases  which  are  difficult  to  deal  with  on  this 
assumption.  Certain  states  of  the  German  Empire  held 
a  limited  right  of  legation  previous  to  1918.3  Bavaria  even 
attempted  to  deal  with  Berlin  by  diplomatic  note  as  with>/ 
a  foreign  power  at  one  time  in  1920-21.4  Canada  has  been 
accorded  the  privilege  of  sending  a  Minister  to  Washington 
if  matters  can  be  arranged  between  Ottawa  and  Washing- 
ton and  between  Washington  and  London.5  The  Pope  exer- 
cises a  right  of  legation  in  certain  states  of  Europe  and 
Latin  America,  and  in  February,  1921,  there  appeared  the  t  .  . 
novel  spectacle  of  the  Papacy  appealing  diplomatically  to 
the  League  of  Nations  on  certain  international  questions ! 6 
Yet  on  the  whole  the  principle  is  sound,  and  what  we  should 
do  in  the  above  cases  is  to  admit  that  the  German  states, 
Canada,  the  Papacy,  and  the  League  are  independent  mem- 
bers of  the  existing  state-system  to  the  degree  in  which 
they  act  freely  in  international  relations. 

The  members  of  the  community  of  nations,  however, 
do  not  exchange  diplomatic  representatives  upon  the  basis 
of  the  principles  of  common  international  law  alone.  Each  -  f 

exchange  is  based  upon  express  consent  in  the  form  either 
of  a  treaty  or  some  simpler  agreement.7    The  reception  of 
diplomatic  representatives   from  other  states  is   a  legal 
obligation  resting  upon  each  member  of  the  community  of    ^Jf^a 
nations,  and  refusal  would  constitute  a  valid  ground  for 
complaint  and  a  demand  for  commensurate   reparation.  / 
But  the  manner,  and  even  the  simple  fact,  of  discharging 
that  obligation  is  commonly  decided  by  special  agreement 

'Satow,  §§  207,  208,  211,  212. 

2  So  in  the  Anglo-Egyptian  negotiations  of  1920-1921:  New  YorTc  Times, 
22  November,  1921,  p.  8. 
/•  S0gg,  627. 

4  New  YorTc  Times,  17  February,  1921,  p.  1. 

6  Same,  27  April,  1920,  p.  15,  and  26  October,  1920,  p.  2. 

6  Same,  3  February,  1921,  p.  6. 

T  Foster,  38;  Satow,  §  220. 


120 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


X 


between  the  interested  parties.  The  further  step  of  agree- 
ment upon  the  individual  diplomat  to  be  sent  and  received 
has  already  been  noted. 

Once  received  by  the  foreign  power,  the  diplomat  is 
accorded  certain  concessions  of  jurisdiction  in  view  of  his 
position  and  functions.1  International  law  defines  the  im- 
munities which  the  receiving  state  is  bound  to  accord  to  the 
foreign  representative,  and  the  national  laws  set  forth  these 
rules  with  a  view  to  their  application  in  the  courts  of  the 
nation.  These  immunities  include  the  ancient  privileges 
of  personal  inviolability  and  independence  of  personal 
action,  including  freedom  from  arrest  for  acts  under  civil 
or  criminal  law.2  The  diplomat  enjoys  the  same  relief 
from  customs  duties  and  personal  taxes,  witness  duty  and 
other  similar  burdens,  as  does  his  colleague,  the  consul, 
but  in  a  more  definite  manner  and  to  a  greater  extent.3 

The  original  view  of  these  immunities  seems  to  have 
been  that  they  were  necessary  in  view  of  the  impropriety 
and  discourtesy  of  enforcing  upon  a  foreign  sovereign  or 
his  agent  the  local  law,  and  to  the  factjthat  no  state  was 
entitled  to  enforce  its  own  will  upon  another  state,  equally 
sovereign,  or  its  head  or  diplomatic  representative.  It  is 
now  seen  that  these  privileges  are  essential  to  the  effective 
operation  of  the  system  of  diplomatic  representation,  and 
that  they  must  be  supported  and  defined  with  a  view  to  that 
desirable  end,  irrespective  of  any  theory  of  sovereignty. 

One  result  of  this  change  of  view  as  to  the  foundation 
of  diplomatic  immunities  is  seen  in  the  alteration  of  the 
rules  of  the  law  of  nations  on  the  subject  of  asylum  in  lega- 
tions and  embassies.  The  right  of  extending  asylum  to 
fugitives,  formerly  claimed  by  foreign  representatives  and 
reluctantly  conceded  to  them  in  view  of  the  doctrine  that 
the  embassy  was  foreign  territory  enjoying  exterritorial 

*On  immunities  in  general  see  Hershey,  Diplomatic  Agents,  Part  II. 
*  Foster,  Chap.  VIII;  Satow,  Chap.  XVIII,  §§279-300   (inviolability  and 
independence),  and  Chap.  XXII   (passage  through  third  states). 
"Satow,  §§  308-311,  and  Chap.  XIX. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  PBACTICE  OF  DIPLOMACY  121 

status,  has  been  curtailed  in  various  ways.  Particularly 
significant  is  the  principle  that  a  foreign  representative 
must  not  receive  and  accord  asylum  to  fugitives  from  jus- 
tice, coupled  with  the  rule  that  the  grounds  and  buildings 
of  the  embassy  are  inviolable,  even  when  so  used.1  The 
reasons  for  this  ambiguous  position  are  found  in  the  con- 
flict between  the  desire  to  accord  as  much  immunity  to  the 
diplomatic  establishment  as  is  necessary  for  its  effective 
operation  and  the  unwillingness  to  accord  any  unnecessary 
immunity  to  it.  Likewise,  the  diplomat  may  worship  his 
own  God  in  his  own  way  in  his  own  chapel,  and  fellow 
nationals  may  join  him  in  this  worship;  but  he  must  not 
make  this  a  cause  of  disturbing  the  public  peace.2 

All  these  privileges  are  regulated,  as  has  been  said,  by 
local  law.  The  home  government  of  the  diplomat  will  in- 
struct  him  regarding  the  immunities  which  he  is  to  claim 
for  himself  and  these  will  correspond  to  the  privileges 
accorded  by  his  own  government  to  foreign  representatives 
in  its  territory,  including  those  from  the  state  to  which  he 
is  accredited.  By  this  process  of  reciprocity,  practice  on 
diplomatic  immunities  is  generalized  until  the  common  rules 
of  international  law  on  the  subject  appear  as  a  summary  of 
the  practices  of  all  the  nations.  Meanwhile  the  diplomat  is 
controlled  exclusively  by  his  own  government  in  respect  to 
thes^ecial  costume  which  he  shall  wear,  if  any,  the  way 
in  which  he  shall  conduct  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
embassy,  and  the  reception  of  gifts  and  decorations  at  the 
hands  of  the  government  to  which  he  is  accredited.3  The 
result  is  that  the  rules  governing  the  operations  of  the 
diplomatic  system  are  found  in  general  international  law, 
written  and  unwritten,  and  in  the  national  legal  systems 
of  all  the  states,  including  in  the  last  the  various  codes  of 
administrative  regulations  issued  for  the  guidance  of  the 
national  civil  servants.  The  diplomat,  hardly  less  than 

'Satow,  Chap.  XX. 

2  Same,  Chap.  XXI. 

3  He  is  commonly  prohibited  from  receiving  such  gifts.     Foster,  141-155; 
Satow,  §§  386-406. 


122  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  consul,  needs  to  be  provided  with  manuals  and  guides 
wherewith  to  inform  himself  on  the  vast  amount  of  law 
and  procedure  connected  with  the  conduct  of  his  office.1 

Finally,  a  diplomatic  mission  may  be  terminated  in 
several  ways.  The  person  holding  the  mission  may  die, 
retire  automatically  by  virtue  of  age,  resign,  or  be  recalled 
to  make  way  for  a  new  appointee.  These  are  entirely  mat- 
ters of  national  law  and  have  no  bearing  on  international 
relations.  Of  real  importance  in  the  international  field, 
however,  is  the  recall  of  the  head  of  thejmssion,  leaving 
affairs  in  charge  of  a  su6or3inate — Here  the  mfssion  is  not 
interrupted — or  a  discontinuance  of  the  mission  entirely 
by  withdrawal  of  all  diplomatic  representatives.  So  much 
a  part  of  normal  international  relations  is  the  excTiange  of 
diplomatic  representation  that  such  action  is  construed  as 
unfriendly  and  is  the  usual  prelude  to  war.  More  striking 
and  emphatic  in  tone,  but  of  less  consequence  inter- 
nationally, is  dismissal  of  a  diplomat  by  the  receiving 
state.  In  such  a  case,  although  continuance  of  diplomatic 
representation  between  the  two  countries  is  not  inter- 
rupted, diplomatic  relations  between  them  is  bound  to  be 
gravely  disturbed.  It  is  of  some  significance  that  the  insti- 

|  tution  of  international  representation  is  stable  enough  to 

V  persist  through  an  episode  of  this  kind.2 

1  For  example :  Martens,  Guide,  entire. 

"Diplomatic  corps  at  Warsaw  in  1921  (Annuaire  General,  1058;  for 
abbreviations  see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  3,  note  2)  : 

Germany:    Ch.  Oberndorff. 

America:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  Gibson. 

Belgium:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  van  Ypersele. 

Spain:  Ch.  Contreras. 

Finland:    Ch.  Gyllcnbogel. 

France:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  de  Panafieu. 

Great  Britain:     E.  E.  &  M.  P.  Eumbold. 

Hungary:    Ch.  de  Zsombolya. 

Italy:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  Tommassini. 

Norway:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  Eyde. 

Eoumania:    E.  E.  &  M.  P.  Frorescu. 

Holy  See:    Nuncio  Batti. 

Jugoslavia :     Ch.   Taditch. 

Sweden:    Ch.  Danielson. 

Czechoslovakia:    Ch.  Eadinsky. 


CHAPTER  IX 
CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY 

IT  is  impossible  to  give  any  attention  to  the  conduct  of 
modern  diplomacy  without  realizing  that  there  has 
developed  in  recent  years  a  very  serious  body  of  criticism 
directed  against  the  historic  diplomatic  institutions.  That 
criticism  dates  back  at  least  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  but  it  has  increased  in  recent  years,  especially 
since  1870  and,  further  still,  since  1914.  J^^jcoJO^,gse_of 
international  comity  in  1914  is  attributed  to  the  failure  of 
the  diplomats,  when  it  is  not  attributed  to  their  positive 
machinations.  The  appalling  sorrows  and  burdens  of  the 
past  six  or  seven  years  are  ascribed  to  the  incapacity  and 
the  peculiarly  vicious  character,  as  it  is  felt,  of  modern 
diplomacy.1 

Such  a  school  of  thought, — if  anything  so  popular  and 
spontaneous  can  be  so  formally  described, — deserves  at- 
tention and  a  considered  reply.  To  have  deliberately 
brought  on  the  events  of  1914-18,  or  the  lesser  events  of 
1870-71,  or  even  to  have  allowed  them  to  transpire  by 
ineptitude,  would  be  too  serious  a  crime  to  be  excused  or 
defended  merely  by  ignoring  the  accusation.  The  circum- 
stances are  such  as  to  demand  some  defense  or  explanation 
of  the  relations  between  the  diplomacy  of  the  past  century 
and  the  results  in  the  field  of  international  relations  proper. 

One  reason  for  the  current  feeling  of  hostility  and  crit- 
ical suspicion  toward  diplomacy  will  be  discovered  when 
one  contrasts  the  practice  of  diplomacy  with  consular 
practice.  The  external  style  and  manner  of  the  consul  is 

1  See  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  9. 

123 


j 


124 

of  much  less  importance  and  attracts  much  less  attention 
than  the  substance  of  his  work.  On  the  contrary,  the  style 
and  manner  of  the  diplomat  are  striking  and  spectacular, 
and  in  many  ways  they  are  characterized  by  traits  found 
outside  of  diplomacy  only  in  a  bygone  age;  while  the  sub- 
stance of  the  work  of  diplomacy  is  not  apparent  on  the 
surface  and  is  sometimes  carefully  hidden.1  In  any  case, 
tlio  major  work  of  the  diplomat  eventuates  in  the  field  of 
international  political  relations,  not  in  the  ordinary  affairs 
of  daily  life.  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  practically  impossible 
to  give  a  statement  of  the  work  of  a  diplomat  comparable 
to  the  analysis  which  can  be  made  of  the  work  of  the  consul. 
This  is  to  be  considered  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  the 
effects  of  the  activity  of  the  diplomat,  although  less  in 
quantity  than  the  work  of  the  consul,  are  often  far  greater 
in  magnitude  and  more  significant  in  kind.  An  alliance 
x\  concluded  by  diplomatic  representatives  outweighs  in  im- 
portance and  consequence  the  work  of  many  consuls  for 
years.  The  effect  of  all  this  is  to  disturb  public  confidence 
in  diplomacy.  What  is  this  thing  which  is  so  ceremonious, 
so  pn-ti'iitious,  so  powerful,  and  yet  so  elusive  in  its  real 
operations?  And  are  its  inherent  capabilities,  and  the 
capabilities  of  those  engaged  in  it,  equal  to  its  pretensions  I 
i  Closely  allied  to  this,  of  course, — if,  indeed,  it  is  not  the 

iJLc         principal  factor  in  the  case, — is  the  question  of  secrecy  in 
iP  diplomacy.     Much  of  the  criticism  of  diplomacy  is  based 

upon  ignorance  of  what  the  diplomat  is  really  doing.  More 
is  based  upon  resentment  at  being  compelled  to  remain  in 
ignorance.  Still  more  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  defense 
of  secrecy  on  the  part  of  the  diplomats  has  been  notably 
incomplete.  As  in  the  consideration  of  so  many  of  these 
questions,  it  has  seemed  to  the  accused  sufficient  to  shrug 
the  shoulders  and — remain  silent.  That  may  conceivably 

1  Attempted  statements  in  Foster,  Chaps.  V,  VI,  and  Satow,  §§  147,  148. 
It  will  be  noted  that  these  statements  relate  more  to  the  manner  and  form 
of  diplomatic  work  than  to  its  substance. 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY         125 

be  justified,  all  things  considered ;  but  it  does  not  allay  sus- 
picion or  meet  criticism  or  instil  confidence. 

It  must  be  noted,  at  the  start,  that  much  of  the  criti- 
cism of  diplomacy  is  a  reflection  of  opposition  to  the  sub- 
stance of  certain  policies  which  certain  diplomats  happen  Jffls'  ' 
to  be  pursuing  at  a  given  time.  Diplomacy  is  criticized  J 
because  of  the  purposes  of  the  heads  of  states  who  are 
represented  by  the  diplomats.  Yet  in  the  main  these  pur- 
poses  are  decided  upon  at  home,  by  those  who  control  the 
diplomatic  agents  abroad.  The  pernicious  policy  which  is 
the  real  cause  of  complaint  is  formed  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
in  the  Cabinet,  in  the  Court.  The  principal  responsibility 
does  not  lie  at  the  feet  of  the  representative  abroad;  in 
many  cases  he  is  compelled  to  carry  out  a  policy  with  which 
he  radically  disagrees.  Not  infrequently  the  behavior  of 
the  home  government  nullifies  the  best  that  the  diplomat 
can  do  in  the  cause  of  international  friendship  and  justice. 

It  may  be  objected  here  that  diplomatic  agents  are 
ordinarily  in  sympathy  with  their  home  governments  by 
reason  of  their  spirit  of  loyalty  to  the  nation  which  they 
represent,  by  reason  of  their  dependence  upon  these  gov- 
ernments for  retention  in  office  and  for  good  treatment  as 
to  salary,  advancement,  and  perquisites.  It  is  said  also 
that  the  diplomatic  representative  is  not  infrequently 
chosen  precisely  because  he  is  in  sympathy  with  the  ideas 
and  purposes  of  the  government  in  power  and  can  be  relied 
on  to  carry  on  the  policies  of  this  government  in  good  faith. 
This  is  all  true  to  the  extent  that,  even  where  there  is  no 
special  prior  agreement  between  the  home  government  and 
its  foreign  representative  on  a  given  question  of  policy,  .the 
diplomat  in  the  field  may  make  or  mar  the  success  of  that 
policy  by  his  behavior  in  carrying  it  out.  Beyond  this  it 
can  be  maintained  up  to  a  certain  point  that  the  diplomat, 
by  remaining  in  office  and  carrying  on  a  policy  with  which 
he  disagrees,  becomes  a  participant  in  the  crime.  But  it 
should  be  noted  that  even  in  these  situations, — even  where 


126 

the  diplomat  and  the  home  government  are  hand  in  glove 
as  to  policies  to  be  pursued, — the  question  of  policy  is  dis- 
tinct from  the  question  of  diplomatic  practice.  What  we 
object  to  in  many  cases  is  a  certain  foreign  policy,  not  the 

I  manner  of  organizing  and  conducting  the  diplomatic  serv- 
ice. And  yet  it  is  the  latter  institution  as  such  that  is  criti- 

\cized  in  the  result.  It  is  as  if  a  man  should  criticize  a 
motor  vehicle  because  it  carried  him  into  a  ditch.  The 
driver  and  the  driving  would  more  likely  be  the  proper 
objects  of  criticism,  not  the  vehicle. 

Turning  to  the  mechanism  of  diplomacy,  there  are  still 
various  criticisms  to  be  made,  and  criticisms  which  are,  in 
practice,  actually  made,  against  the  service.  It  can  be, 
and  is,  said,  for  example,  that  diplomats  are  frequently 

Vktl9l^^V*MMfcHMBIM**4f*nMBtfQflH0>fMl^MPMffll0Mhv 

unrepresentative.  That  is,  they  are  personal  friends  or 
political  supporters  of  the  official  holding  the  appointing 
power,  not  persons  enjoying  any  measure  of  public  confi- 
dence. There  were  few  evidences  of  any  marked  public 
appeal  or  influence  on  the  part  of  Davis,  Wallace,  or  John- 
~*  son,  prior  to  the  time  when  these  gentlemen  were  sent  from 
Washington  to  London,  Paris,  and  Eome.  If  these  repre- 
sentatives were  to  act  merely  in  an  administrative  capacity, 
this  might  make  little  difference.  But,  entrusted  as  they 
are  with  the  work  of  political  representation, — work  which 
it  is  mechanically  impossible  to  control  completely  by  in- 
structions,— they  should  be  persons  in  whom  the  public 
confidence  has  been  clearly  placed  for  the  purposes  of  their 

^*W***l**aiMHMtfM0IWPM'l 

missions. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  members  of  the  service  in  the 
lower  grades  are  frequently  drawn  from  the  ranks  of 
"society"  with  little  else  to  recommend  them.  The  man- 
ners of  the  salon  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  of  the 
drawing  room  of  the  nineteenth,  seem  of  such  importance  in 
diplomacy  that  dilettantes  in  silk  hose  and  top  hats  are 
preferred  to  lawyers  or  clerks.  People  who  are  in  actual 
fact  triflers  and  incompetents  are  sent  out  in  place  of  men 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY        127 

with  real  ability  and  enterprise.  Now  this  sort  of  person 
may  be  useful  in  one  position,  that  of  secretary,  where  he 
will  be  entrusted  with  the  ceremonial  business  of  the  lega- 
tion  or  embassy,  and  where  he  will  be  called  on  to  take  up, 
as  charge,  the  business  of  personal  negotiations  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  head  of  the  mission,  without,  however,  being 
entrusted  with  the  power  of  making  decisions  on  questions 
of  policy.  In  such  a  position  there  is  no  need  of  a  repre- 
sentative character  and  no  great  need  for  legal  or  executive 
ability.  The  remaining  members  of  the  staff,  however, 
while  not  requiring  representative  credentials,  do  need  to 
possess  some  of  the  sterner  talents  and.should  not  be  "pink 
tea  fellows,"  as  General  Dawes  said,  and  nothing  more.1 
Complaint  has  likewise  been  directed  against  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  service  is  organized  or,  rather,  is  left 
unorganized.  Diplomats  themselves  have  lamented  the 
extent  to  which  one  legation  is  out  of  touch  with  another 

*MM^M^MllM|MMIMfHaMllM«M|)*lMM*MI'MM«*Ai*l*«rtHaiMCMBMP** 

and  with  the  home  office.2    It  is  often  a  case  of  one  diplomat 
not  knowing  what  another  is  doing  or  what  the  home  gov- 
ernment  is  doing.    In  an  earlier  day  that  was  inevitable, 
and  the  individual  representative  of  his  sovereign  was  ex- 
pected  to  stand  alone,  but  in  view  of  the  possibilities  of          / 
communication  today,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  true  repre- 
sentative character  in  the  diplomat,  such  a  condition  ought 
not  to  be  tolerated.     The  chief  effect  upon  diplomacy  of         /  l 
the  development  of  telegraphic  communication  ought  to     //  Jfif^" 
be  a  diminution  of  the  element  of  personal  discretion  on  the  - 
part  of  the  many  distant  agents  and  a  stabilization  and 
standardization  of  national  policy.    That  effect  is  largely 
lost  by  failure  to  take  complete  advantage  of  modern  means/ 
of  communication. 

Furthermore,   the   individual  legation   office   is   badly 
equipped  in  comparison  with  government  offices  at  home    V 
and   with   private   business   agencies    abroad.    Hardly   a 

1  On  criticisms  of  recruitment:    Ponsonby,  Chap.  VI  and  Appendix  III. 
»  Brailsf  ord,  152,  153,  215. 


TUuf 

ftD~K 

/VM 


128 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


*ACH    *-J 


nation  has  realized  the  need  for  adequate  equipment  for 
its  diplomatic  establishments  abroad,  and  the  result  is  that 
the  staff  has  to  struggle  with  equipment  entirely  inferior 
to  that  enjoyed  by  the  bureaus  of  the  national  government 
with  which  it  is  dealing  and  by  local  private  concerns. 
Clerical  assistance,  filing  apparatus,  maps,  and  tables  of 
statistics,  commercial  and  legal  literature  are  wanting. 
In  the  case  of  the  consul  this  is  particularly  unfortunate, 
in  the  competition  with  local  business  houses. 

Finally,  the  consular  and  diplomatic  arms  of  the  service 
are"not  closely  coordinated.    Both  deal  more  or  less  with 


commercial  and  economic  questions,  and  both  deal  with 
legal  and  political  questions  and  often  with  the  same  com- 
mercial and  political  questions.  Yet  they  are  not  com- 
pletely unified  except  through  the  home  government.  The 

i    ,  ;**«7<F      mudi^r  ? 

consul  does  not  always  report  to  the  diplomat,  nor  does 

the  latter  have  all  the  help  he  might  derive  from  the 
former.  Indeed,  as  things  are  organized  now,  the  diplo- 
jmatic  offices  would  be  physically  unable  adequately  to 
'supervise  and  control  the  consular  establishments  in  the 
•territory  where  they  are  stationed,  even  if  they  had  that 
legal  power.1 

Coming  to  the  foreign  office,  it  is  said  that  the  cus- 
todians of  national  foreign  policy  are,  like  the  diplomats, 
out  of  touch  with  the  people  who  must  in  all  common  sense 
be  regarded  as  their  constituents.  There  is  a  dogma,  very 
popular  in  some  quarters,  to  the  effect  that  "the  conduct 
of  foreign  affairs  is  essentially  executive  in  character." 
To  this  no  one  can  object,  inasmuch  as  the  conduct  or  actual 
administration  of  any  business  is  executive  in  character. 
'When,  however,  this  formula  is  made  a  basis  for  conferring 
upon  the  executive, — or,  worse,  the  administrative, — offi- 
cials of  the  government  the  power  to  determine  foreign 
policies  it  cannot  command  hearty  assent.  It  must  be 


1On  conditions  in  the  American  foreign  service:  Regulations,  Art.  VII. 
Instructions,  §§189-199. 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY        129 

recognized  that  the  formulation  offoj*eignj:x>li^  is 
more  vital  tfyan  its  ^iS^yj|JTQn  andTKa^m^Tormer  ought 
not  to  be  entrusted  to  bureau  chiefs  or  appointive  depart- 
ment heads.  These  men  may  love  tFeir  country,  feel  re- 
sponsible for  what  they  do,  desire  to  leave  a  successful 
reputation  behind,  and  all  the  rest.  But  the  long  and  the 
short  of  it  is  that  only  representative  officials  possess  the 
requisite  authority  to  formulate  pubHe  opinion "" 
policy  ancHawT^ 

u?he  phenomenon  just  described  would  not  cause  such 
great  evil  as  it  does  were  it  not  for  two  incidental  causes. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  are  those  specially  interested  in 
questions  of  foreign  affairs  who  do  not'  fail  to  bring  influ- 
enceTo  bear  in  the  offices  of  the  foreign  affairs r  (department       70  S 
to  controTthe  formulation  of  poficy  tnere.    The  reserve  of  ttrts*-* 
the  Foreign  Office  is  not  impenetrable  to  Mexican  oil  inter- 
ests nor  to  Russian  concessionaires.1    On  the  other  hand, 
the  public  pays  little  or  no  attention  to  the  whole  business, 
once  a  sefTTf  officials  is  installed  in  the  Foreign  Office. 

*«•••••*  MNMk  q0p|b, 

The  bureau  chiefs  and  department  heads  areleft  pretty^ 
much  alone  by  the  people  of  the  state  at  large.2    The  result 


is  not  only  an  absence  of  public  control  but  also  a  persist- 
out  private  control  over  non-representative  officials  in  the 

— _    MMHiMBttflfe>**>'4HIHMiflflh**9MtfMtt^MliVlM>M^JMMttM^^^^^^^*MM**.  VMMUMMhto*-*. 

rt  ^^^^^J*  '  11'  1  •  •••••^•Wfc- 

tormulation  01  public  policy. 

Finally,  so  far  as  the  Foreign  Office  goes,  there  is  a 
well-founded  belief  that  the  head  of  that  office  is  commonly 
out  of  touch  with  the  other  members  of  the  government.3 
These  latter  are  concerned  with  affairs  within  the  national    />      ikfr* 
territory,  he  with  things  preponderantly  outside  the  na-  '  '  v 
tional  frontiers.    The  effects  of  foreign  policy  and  foreign 
affairs   on  home   conditions   are   not   obvious   enough   to        ;  -    :  ' 
change  this  to  any  marked  degree.     The  Treasury,  the 
Army,  and  the  Navy  departments  are  in  measurable  degree 

'Brailsford,  208  and  following. 

a  Ponsonby,  Chap.  II,  especially  47;  Young,  Chap.  I,  beginning. 

8  Ponsonby,  46. 


W 


130  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ignorant  of  the  course  of  events  which  may  cause  them  to 
be  called  on  for  support  later.  The  benefit  of  criticism 

x^-from  persons  who  have  a  collateral  interest  in  the  subject 
is  lost.  And  the  Foreign  Office  comes  to  expect  the  continu- 
ation of  this  treatment,  and  to  resent  scrutiny,  critical  ex- 
amination, and  any  attempt  to  control  it.  The  department 
is  a  region  of  mystery,  silence,  and  awe  —  or,  at  least,  it 
x  tries  to  be.1 

—  —  '  k  Much  of  the  responsibility  for  this  situation  lies  with 
the  representative  bodies  in  the  state  and  the  members 
thereof.  The  members  of  national  legislative  bodies  coni- 
monly  know  little  of  international  relations,  care  less,  and 
make  no  effort  to  learn.2  When  such  topics  come  up  for 
debate  the  seats  in  the  legislative  chamber  empty  and  the 
smoking  rooms  fill  up.  Foreign  politics,  international  rela- 
tions, and  diplomatic  policy  suffer  at  the  hands  of  local 
politics  in  competition  for  the  attention  and  time  and 
efforts  of  representatives.  The  local  post  office  is  of  more 
importance  politically  to  the~representative  from  the  thir- 
teenth district  than  is  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  The 
reason  for  all  this,  of  course,  is  lack  of  interest  on  the  part 
of  the  constituents.  It  is  not  only  the  representative  who 
is  more  interested  in  the  local  post  office  than  in  the  various 
questions  of  foreign  relations  before  the  country;  the 
folks  at  home  are  not  interested  in  the  latter  at  all!  If 
they  were,  the  representative  would  change  his  views  re- 
garding the  relative  importance  of  "  abroad"  and  "back 
.  home."  And,  sojlong  as  peace  is  maintained,  it  may  be 
admitted  that  there  is  mucE  reason  "Tor  the~view  that  the 
welfare  of  the  individual  citizen  depends  infinitely  more 
upon  domestic  economic  and  political  questions  than  upon 
events  in  the  field  of  foreign  relations.  "Whatever  the  ex- 

1  Summary  view,  extremely  denunciatory,  in  Ponsonby,  10-21,  45-48,  made 
up  from  utterances  of  famous  men. 

'Kemarks  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  House  of  Commons  on  16  April,  1919, 
in  New  York  Times,  17  April,  1919;  Ponsonby.  Chap.  V,  extracts:  Young, 
15-16. 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY        131 

planation,  however,  this  situation  is  the  source  of  all  the 
results  just  reviewed.1 

It  is  not  certain  that  any  change  could  be  made  imme- 
diately in  tiiis  matter  of  public  control  of  public  policy,  ^  °£ 
even  if  there  should  occur  a  change  in  public  interest.    Not 
many  national   legislative   bodies   are   so   organized   and 
equipped  with  committees  and  rules  of  procedure  as  to  be 
able  to   study  foreign  affairs  adequately  or  review  the 
actions  of  those  in  charge  of  foreign  policy.    It  was  true 
until  very  recently  that  neither  the  House  of  Commons 
nor  the  Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies  possessed  any  com- 
mittee to  deal  with  foreign  affairs.2    In  addition,  the  indi- 
vidual  members   refrain,   in   practice,   from   exerting  an 
effective  scrutiny  over  the  action  of  the  Foreign  Office  and 
the  diplomatic  service.    They  yield  with  apparent  willing- 
ness to  the  view  that  foreign  affairs  are  to  be  treated  with     /f. 
fear  and  trembling  and  as  far  as  possible  left  alone.    The         "Vfv 
divine  right  to  ask  questions  is  surrendered  in  awe  belore   £/- 
the  "official  statement."    Public  debate  is  onerous  in  any 
case;  here  there  is  a  tradition  which  advises  against  it; 
the  net  effect  is  a  deep  silence,  having  the  appearance  of 
being  sanctioned  by  most  profound  reasons  of  state. 

Improvement  could  more  readily  be  made  in  the  field 
force  of  the  diplomatic  service.  The  selection  of  the  chief 
diplomatic  representatives  might  well  be  made  dependent 
upon  approval  by  national  representative  bodies,  as  is 
done  in  the  United  States  at  present.  That  would  at  "East 
provide  an  opportunity  for  an  alert  legislative  body 
anxious  and  competent  to  use  its  constitutional  power  to 
control  the  character  of  the  national  representation  abroad 
On  the  other  hand,  the  lower  and  middle  ranks  of  the  serv- 
ice should  be  filled  by  competitive  technical  examinations 
and  a  system  of  automatic  selection  Tnd  promotion  for 


-t 

'Ponsonby,  Appendix  II. 


132  INTEKNATIONAL  OKGANIZATION 

merit.1  Persons  designed  for  such  positions  as  clerks,  or 
members  of  the  research  and  administrative  staffs,  need 
none  of  those  elusive  personal  qualities  which  make  the  use 
of  formal  examinations  difficult  or  undesirable  for  the 
higher  posts.  It  is  stoutly  maintained  in  some  quarters 
that  even  chiefs  of  missions  ought  to  be  so  chosen.  Such 
a  view  goes  upon  the  assumption  that  it  is  possible  to  exert 
a  complete  control  over  foreign  policy  from  the  Foreign 
Office  itself  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  rely  upon  the 
individual  diplomat  for  a  loyal  and  sympathetic  support 
of  the  policy  with  the  execution  of  which  he  is  entrusted 
by  the  foreign  secretary,  or,  if  it  is  necessary,  that  repre- 
sentatives chosen  apart  from  personal  or  political  beliefs 
are  more  reliable  than  others.  The  former  view  simply 
does  not  meet  the  facts  of  the  case ;  the  latter  seems  to 
^depend  on  an  artificially  impersonal  idea  of  the  way  men 
work  in  public  office. 

Changes  in  the  mechanism  of  diplomacy,  however,  are 
of  less  importance  than  changes  in  its  spirit;  changes  in 
the  larger  features  of  structural  organization  are  of  less 
importance  than  changes  in  practice,  in  the  manner  of 
carrying  on  foreign  relations,  and  in  foreign  policy  itself. 
And  this  brings  us  back  to  the  national  legislature.  After 
all,  the  origin  of  all  improvement  must  be  found  there,  if 
£•  anywhere.  The  character  of  the  diplomatic  representatives 
chosen — both  in  subordinate  and  superior  ranks — may  be 
subjected  to  control  by  the  elected  representatives  in  point 
of  legal  fact.  But  if  such  a  control  is  established,  it  must 
be  exercised  actively  and  intelligently  to  be  of  any  effect. 
That  is,  the  choices  for  chiefs  of  missions  would  have  to 
be  made  with  care  and  discrimination,  and  the  system  es- 
tablished for  the  selection  of  subordinates  would  have  to 
be  constructed  and  operated  with  care  and  infinite  patience. 
So  for  the  internal  organization  of  the  legislative  body: 
the  success  of  any  effort  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  to 

*  Report.  11,  19. 


133  V 

control  foreign  policy  and  the  conduct  of  diplomacy  must 
depend  upon  whether  the  representative  bodies  take  the 
pains  to  provide  themselves  with  adequate  committees  and 
bureaus  and  commissions  and  rules  of  procedure  to  make 
such  work  possible. 


* 

Back  of  all  of  this,  of  course,  the  question  rests  with  the  * 

constituents  for  final  solution.    So  long  as  the  people  neg-  * 

lect  foreTgn  relations  and  tolerate  ignorance  and  neglect  of 
them  by  their  representatives,  just  so  long  will  the  latter 
ignore  and  neglect  this  group  of  public  questions,  and  fail 
to  exert  any  supervision  and  control  over  the  Foreign  Office 
and  the  diplomatic  service.  Such  changes  as  have  come 
about  in  the  extent  to  which  national  representative  bodies 
interest  themselves  in  foreign  affairs  in  recent  years  are 
due  to  the  fact  that,  with  war  and  international  maladjust- 
ment bearing  as  they  do  more  widely  upon  all  people  in 
society  than  ever  before,  more  people  are  insisting  upon 
some  greater  control  of  foreign  policy  than  has  hitherto 
been  exerted  by  their  representatives.1 

Behind  this  movement  lies  still  another  question, 
namely,  how  far,  as  a  matter  of  practicality,  could  such  a 
change  be  carried  out  if  people  really  wished  to  bring  it  - 
about  ?  How  far  could  public  control  of  foreign  policy  be 
carried,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case?  This  question  is 
not,  strictly,  equivalent  to  the  question  as  to  how  far  pub- 
licity is  possible  in  the  control  of  foreign  policy,  for  re- 
sponsibility might  be  exacted  and  enforced  in  various  ways 
without  public  debate  upon  the  substance  of  questions  at 
issue  in  foreign  relations.  Nevertheless,  the  two  questions 
come  veiy  close  together  and  may  be  so  treated  here,  espe- 
cially as  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  constituents 
themselves  are  not  loath  to  participate  in  this  process  of 
supervision  and  control,  and  in  many  cases  desire  to  con- 
trol the  controllers,  the  committees  on  foreign  relations. 

Much  time  might  be   spent  in  speculating  abstractly 

'Ponsonby,  Chap.  VIII;   Young,  48-76. 


134  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

upon  the  feasibility  of  publicly  conducted  diplomatic  nego- 
tiations. Such  speculation  is  of  no  great  value  in  such  a 
case.  We  shall  never  know  what  can  be  done  until  we  try, 
and  the  two  most  important  conclusions  to  be  drawn  in  this 
matter  as  it  now  stands  are  that,  whatever  we  think  or 
prefer,  the  days  of  secrecy  are  vanishing,  in  actual  prac- 
tice, and  that,  after  all,  it  does  not  appear  to  make  much 
difference  in  the  result. 

In  the  circumstances  of  today,  with  the  multiplication 
of  the  number  of  parties  interested  in  every  international 
question  and  the  number  and  activity  of  newspaper  corre- 
spondents serving  publics  who  are  increasingly  eager  for 
international  political  news,  the  possibility  of  maintaining 
secrecy  simply  does  not  exist.  Add  to  this  the  fact  that 
the  spread  of  popular  government  has  led  the  statesman 
and  politician  to  a  position  where  he  also  desires  to  utilize 
public  interest  in  these  questions  to  secure  support  for 
himself,  and  the  plea  for  secrecy  is  hopeless.  Diplomatic 
representatives  recognize  this  and,  by  means  qf_"  press 
/  f  Qonferences, ' '  arrange  to  divulge  everything  that  transpires 
V.  in  the  secret  conference.1  All  this  may  be  good  or  evil, 
but  inevitably  it  is  so.2 

In  actual  observation  the  results  do  not  seem  to  be  very 
decisive  one  way  or  the  other.  Great  danger  has  been 

H   &,          predicted  from  open  discussion  of  international  political 
ftjJ^    h/"^  questions.    When  tried  extensively  in  the  United  States  in 

jr         ^1919-20,  no  such  results  followed.    The  discussion  became 

X^i  i  " 

\a  terrible  bore.    For  one  thing,  people  did  not  know  enough 
•i       about  the  background  of  the  various  topics  discussed  to 
have  any  interest  in  them.    Teschen  and  Fiume  meant  little 

*New  York  Times,  22  November,  1921,  p.  8. 

'See  resolutions  of  representatives  of  the  press  in  Paris,  as  handed  to 
the  Supreme  Inter- Allied  Council,  17  January,  1919,  and  reply  of  18  January, 
1919;  New  York  Times,  18-19  January,  1919.  There  is  a  striking  discussion 
of  this  matter,  in  connection  with  the  Adriatic  problem,  in  same,  16-20  Feb- 
ruary, 1920.  See  also  accounts  of  conditions  in  Washington  in  November  and 
December,  1921,  in  same,  17  November,  1921,  p.  1,  and  editorial  comment  in 
New  Republic,  XXVIII,  332  (16  November,  1921). 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY        135 

to  people  with  no  special  interest  in  Central  Europe  and 
the  Adriatic.  This,  indeed,  is  the  safeguard  contained 
within  the  procedure  in  question:  so  long  as  people  know 
little  about  foreign  affairs  they  will  not  be  dangerously 
excited  by  the  news  which  means  little  to  them,  and  as  they 
begin  to  learn  more  the  capacity  to  discount  and  assess 
sensational  items  at  their  true  value  increases.1 

This  phenomenon  should  be  examined  further,  in  the 
light  of  possible  future  developments.  Let  us  suppose  for 
a  moment  that  diplomatic  conferences  were  held  in  public, 
or  that  verbatim  reports  were  published  daily  as,  indeed, 
was  done  in  Washington  in  November  and  December,  1921. 
The  conferees  would  expect,  and  fear,  great  excitement  and 
annoyance  and  interference  with  their  work.  In  reality 
most  people  would  lack  both  time  and  interest  to  read 
steadily  the  verbatim  reports,  and  the  conference  would  be 
less  the  object  of  excited  attention  than  at  present,  when, 
in  speculation,  the  outsider  imagines  that  all  sorts  of  sen- 
sational things  are  going  on  behind  the  closed  doors.  But 
this  also  means  that,  even  with  full  publicity,  the  task  of 
securing  public  control  would  still  have  to  be  met,  for 
unless  people  read  the  reports  no  results  would  come  from 
their  publication.  Thus  we  get  back,  as  before,  to  the  real 
difficulty  and  the  real  problem,  namely,  the  failure  of  the 
public  to  interest  itself  in  international  affairs.  Until 
that  condition  changes  no  great  results  can  be  expected 
either  in  opening  up  the  procedure  of  diplomacy  or,  more 
important  still,  in  taking  advantage  of  such  open  methods 
to  exert  a  public  control  over  national  foreign  policies. 

One  of  the  chief  difficulties  encountered  here  is  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  it  is  not  with  conditions  of  perfect 
secrecy  or  perfect  knowledge  that  we  have  to  deal.  If  it 

1  Again  in  1921  a  public  conference  was  held  in  which  representatives  of 
two  Balkan  states  actually  engaged  in  hostilities  were  called  on  to  state  their        s 
cases  to  the  world,  in  order  that  European  public  opinion  might  be  brought  V' 
to  bear  on  the  subject,  yet  no  great  attention  was  given  to  the  case;    New 
York  Times,  17  and  18  November,  1921,  pp.  5  and  17. 


136  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

were  possible  to  preserve  a  condition  of  perfect  secrecy 
about  the  discussions  of  international  affairs  the  result 
might  be  tranquillity,  at  all  events, — at  least  until  diplomacy 
broke  down  and  war  came  upon  us, — unless,  indeed,  that  too 
could  be  kept  secret.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  complete  secrecy 
is  simply  not  possible  today,  and  what  results  from  an 
attempt  to  preserve  secrecy  is  a  series  of  intermittent  and 
spasmodic  revelations  than  which  there  is  nothing  better 
calculated  to  excite  speculation  and  high  feelings  and  to  give 
a  false  basis  for  conclusions.1  Moreover,  here  as  in  other 
cases  of  a  similar  kind,  the  restrictions  bear  unequally  upon 
different  people,  and  what  public  representatives  are  pre- 
vented from  discussing  in  parliament  is  discussed  freely  in 
the  smoking  room  of  the  club  and  at  the  directors '  meeting ; 
again  it  is  a  question  not  between  no  secrecy  or  total 
secrecy,  Tjut  between  public  knowledge  of  public  affairs  and 
private  knowledge,  the  public  remaining  ignoranTT^ 

Finally,  the  danger  or  inconvenience  of  public  control 
of  foreign  policy  depends  largely  upon  the  character  of 
•the  policy  to  be  followed.    If  a  fair  and  honest  policy  is 

I i^mmtf~        «»»*«<MM».--«M*>*v'WMk 

pursued,  it  can  stand — and  will  profit  by — exposition  and 
revelation;  the  policy  that  will  not  stand  discussion  is  the 

ipolicy  of  rascality  and  greed.  In  a  similar  way,  politicians 
who  resent  scrutiny  in  this  field  of  politics  do  so  almost 
invariably  because  of  political  or  personal  prestige,  not 
national  interest.  Therein  they  do  not  differ,  of  course, 
from  politicians  in  other  fields  of  public  life ;  but  here  the 
argument  is  raised  into  the  front  rank  and  made  one  of 
principle,  just  as  it  was  formerly  maintained  that  public 
discussion  of  any  sort  of  state  questions  would  be  disas- 
trous.2 

1  Compare  excellent  statement  in  editorial  in  same,  25  February,  1921; 
^      also  episode  in  Washington   conference   in  same,   29   November,    1921,  p.   2, 
column  7. 

/        '"Strangers"   (the  public — !)  were  formerly  rigidly  excluded  from  the 

~  Halls  of  Parliament  and  publication  of  debates  was  held  to  be  a  crime;   and 

these  rules  are  still  in  effect  and  may  be  invoked  at  any  time;  May,  T4,  IH'.J. 

**     tfj<J>          The  Congress  of  the  United  States  has,  in  times  past,  and  still  might,  legally, 

meet  and  legislate  in  secret;  Miller,  Secret  Statutes. 


CRITICISM  OF  MODERN  DIPLOMACY        137 

As  for  partisanship  in  foreign  affairs,  the  same  group 
of  criticisms  is  to  be  applied  to  the  current  dogmas.  In 
actual  fact  artificial  Li-partisan  unity  on  such  questions  is 
breaking  down  as  people  become  more  interested,  and  inter- 
ested to  the  point  of  disagreement,  in  such  problems.  And 
there  are  no  catastrophic  results.  Inconvenience  and  delay 
and  bother  ensue;  but  inconvenience  and  delay  are  the 
results  of  all  lack  of  perfect  accord  among  men.  Parti- 
sanship is  inexpedient  in  these  matters,  but  so  it  is  in 
domestic  matters.  On  the  other  hand,  sincere  opposition 
and  debate  are  as  useful  in  one  field  as  in  the  other.  If  '^ 

possible,  by  all  means  let  there  be  unity  within  the  nation 
among  all  factions  on  foreign  policy;  likewise,  unity  or 
continuity  among  successive  governments  in  power.  But 
let  this~not  be  obtained  at  the  expense  of  honesty.  To  hold 
that  a  nation  must  go  on  making  a  mistake  because  a  mis- 
take has  been  begun  is  hardly  politics, — it  is  some  subtle 
form  of  superstition.  After  all,  the  curse  of  international  >  , 
politics  in  the  past  has  been  too  Iiffle  discussion,  too  little 
investigation,  too  little  competition  in  ideas  and  policies, 
too  much  monopoly  of  public  power  by  private  interest  or, 
at^ieast,  too  much  neglect  of  public  interest  by  official 
representatives.1 

As  has  already  been  said,  the  reason  for  this  is  the  lack 
of  public  interest;  when  people  insist  on  a  different  way  of 
doing  things  that  different  way  will  be  adopted!  And  the  jA. 
sum  of  the  whole  thing  is  that  such  a  change  is  now  being 
brought  about.  It  is  not  now  a  question  whether  such  a 
thing  sTiaTTbe  done,  but  what  is  being  done  and  why.  For 
the  results  we  shall  have  to  "wait  and  see."  They  are  not 
likely  to  be  cataclysmic,  although  doubtless  they  will  mark 
considerable  changes  over  the  conditions  of  a  century  ago.2 

1  Further  materials  in  Heatley,  52-76 ;  Young,  Chap.  III. 
1 A   careful   study   of   the  mechanical   aspects   of   this   problem   is   badly 
needed.     In  tlic  text  the  attempt  has  been  made  merely  to  point  out  some  of    ; 


nx>Iogy  of  politics,  as  a  problefnTf  engineering. 


PAET  in 

TEEATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


CHAPTEB  X 
TREATY  NEGOTIATION 

THE  ordinary  work  of  the  diplomatic  representative 
consists  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations  relating  to 
'•  1 1»»-^«"  •••••••.••..,*•     t^f^ikmim  tJ 

current  questions  at  issue  between  his  own  state  and  the 
state  to  which  he  is  accredited.  These  negotiations  may  be 
conducted  orally,  in  conversations  with  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary of  the  state  to  which  the  representative  is  sent,  or  in 
writing,  by  exchanges  of  diplomatic  notes.  In  the  former 
case  the  element  of  personal  intercourse  is  predominant, 
and  the  action  is  transitory  and  leaves  little  trace  of  itself 
behind,  unless  a  memorandum  of  the  agreement  reached  in 
the  negotiations  is  drawn  up  and  signed  by  the  partici- 
pants. In  the  latter  case  the  correspondence  remains  to 
serve  as  a  record  of  the  transaction;  though  here  also,  in 
the  absence  of  a  signed  statement  summarizing  the  ex- 
change of  views,  the  chance  for  disagreement  as  to  the  real 
results  of  the  negotiation  is  great,  and  the  degree  of  incon- 
clusiveness  and  impermanence  in  this  form  of  action  is 
therefore  also  considerable.  This  is  all  the  more  inconven- 
ient when  the  negotiations  have  concerned,  not  some  special 
case,  as,  for  example,  the  citizenship  of  a  certain  individual, 
but  a  general  question,  such  as  the  principles  which  the  two 
states  agree  to  follow  in  the  future  in  settling  disputed 
cases  of  citizenship. 

For  these  reasons — namely,  the  unstable  and  imperma- 
nent character  of  purely  personal  diplomatic  negotiations 
— this  primitive  form  of  international  government  was  sup- 
plemented at  a  very  early  stage  of  international  develop- 
ment with  the  device  of  the  formal  written  agreement. 

141 


142  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

An  elaborate  practice  of  treaty-negotiation  sprang  up 
among  the  Greek  and  Roman  states  of  Antiquity.1  Such 
a  result  followed  naturally  from  the  desire  and  effort  to 
leave  a  permanent  record  of  diplomatic  agreements  behind, 
and,  in  its  simplest  form,  constituted  merely  a  final  stage 
of  personal  diplomacy.  Indeed,  the  noun  " treaty"  seems 
to  have  been  formed  on  the  basis  of  the  verb  "to  treat," 
used  to  describe  diplomatic  negotiations;  when  diplomats 
treat  with  one  another  for  peace  a  treaty  of  peace  is  the 
result.  The  treaty  is  of  such  a  distinctive  character,  how- 
ever, and  has  developed  to  such  an  extent  on  its  own  ac- 
count, apart  from  its  parent  practice,  that  it  deserves 
study  by  itself.  The  negotiation  of  treaties  and  their 
analysis  and  generalization  among  the  states  is  a  distinct 
branch  of  modern  international  government.2 

It  is  to  be  noted,  first,  that  the  usual  object  of  the  for- 
mal treaty  today  is  to  provide  for  certain  and  definite 
action  in  the  future  whenever  a  given  type  of  question 
shall  arise — a  question  of  citizenship,  of  commercial  privi- 
leges, of  extradition — without  the  necessity  for  special 
diplomatic  agreement  every  time  upon  the  merits  of  the 
case.  So  far  as  the  process  of  treaty  negotiation  is  suc- 
cessfully extended,  therefore,  the  practice  of  personal 
diplomacy  is  rendered  superfluous.  The  greater  the  num- 
ber of  questions  which  are  settled  in  advance  by  treaties, 
the  fewer  will  be  left  for  settlement  by  diplomacy  as  they 
arise,  assuming,  of  course,  that  the  treaty  is  faithfully 
executed  on  both  sides. 

This  elaborate  extension  of  treaty  negotiation  is  pre- 
ceded by  a  much  simpler  stage  where  the  treaty  itself  has 
for  its  object  merely  the  settlement  of  a  concrete  case. 
Such,  for  example,  is  the  treaty  providing  for  the  sale  of  a 
given  piece  of  territory.  This  simplest  type  of  treaty  is 
hardly  more  than  a  compact  ad  hoc,  or  a  contract  promis- 

. 'On  treaties  in  Antiquity,  see,  beside  Phillipson,  Egger,  entire. 
1  For  literature  on  treaty  negotiation  see,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  10. 


TEEATY  NEGOTIATION  143 

ing  a  specific  performance,  in  contrast  to  the  treaty  nego- 
tiated upon  a  general  subject  to  operate  continuously  into 
the  future.  The  latter  treaty  approaches  legislation  in  its 
nature,  especially  when  it  is  concluded  among  several  states 
and  deals  with  subjects  in  a  general  and  comprehensive 
way.  Thus  the  treaty,  which  begins  within  the  range  of 
simple  personal  diplomacy,  ends  in  the  most  advanced  and 
final  stage  of  international  government. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  treaties  are  negotiated 
by  the  regular  diplomatic  representatives  permanently 
accredited  between  or  among  the  states  concerned.1  For 
such  a  purpose  the  standing  powers  and  instructions  of  the 
diplomatic  representatives  are  often  adequate;  a  regular 
diplomatic  representative  would  not  hesitate,  if  a  sufficient 
occasion  demanded,  to  enter  into  treaty  negotiations  with 
the  Foreign  Secretary  even  if  his  standing  instructions 
said  nothing  upon  the  matter.  In  most  cases,  however, 
special  authorization  and  instructions  are  needed  by  the 
representative  abroad ;  and,  even  if  he  enters  into  negotia- 
tions for  a  treaty  with  the  state  to  which  he  is  accredited, 
he  will  communicate  with  his  home  government  for  author- 
ity and  instructions  to  continue  the  discussion,  and  he  will 
be  able  to  sign  an  agreement,  in  the  absence  of  such  special 
authority,  only  ad  referendum,  that  is,  upon  the  under- 
standing that  the  agreement  is  to  be  referred  to  the  home 
government  for  approval.2  In  these  days  of  swift  com- 
munication and  when  treaties  must  commonly  be  submitted 
for  approval  to  representative  bodies  before  being  effec- 
tive, the  diplomat  finds  few  occasions  for  such  unauthor- 
ized action,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  all  treaties  are,  in 
actual  fact,  signed  ad  referendum. 

When  special  "powers"  are  issued  to  diplomats  for  the 
negotiation  of  treaties,  these  documents  perform  the  func- 
tion performed  by  the  credentials  of  the  diplomatic  repre- 

»U.  8.  Diplomatic  Instructions,  §§  242,  243.  \/ 
•Satow,  §189. 


144  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

sentative  in  ordinary  cases.  The  " full-power"  serves  to 
identify  the  diplomat  personally,  and  to  describe  the  scope 
of  his  authority  for  the  current  negotiation.1  It  ordinarily 
authorizes  him  to  sign  on  behalf  of  his  state.  Indeed,  it 
is  of  little  value  if  it  does  not  do  so,  as  was  evidenced  at 
one  time  in  1920  when  Russian  representatives  refused  to 
enter  into  peace  discussions  with  the  Poles  so  long  as  the 
latter  had  no  powers  to  sign  a  treaty  of  peace.2  The  full- 
power  pledges  ratification  by  the  state,  provided  the  agree- 
ment made  does  not  exceed  the  limits  of  discretion  en- 
trusted to  the  agent.3  But  there  would  be  no  obligation 
resting  upon  a  state  which  had  given  authority  to  its  agent 
merely  to  arrange  for  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  to  ratify 
an  agreement  for,  let  us  say,  the  exchange  of  territory. 

While  the  negotiation  of  ordinary  treaties  may  be  left 
to  members  of  the  regular  diplomatic  service,  special  treat- 
ies of  great  importance,  such  as  treaties  of  peace  and  gen- 
eral international  conventions  among  more  than  two 
powers,  are  ordinarily  concluded  by  delegates  or  commis- 
sioners specially  chosen  for  the  negotiations  in  hand  or 
for  representation  at  the  conference  where  the  convention 
is  to  be  drawn  up.  The  press  of  business  upon  the  regular 
diplomatic  service  and  the  fact  that  specially  qualified 
agents  are,  or  are  not,  available,  are  considerations  which 
determine  whether  or  not  special  agents  shall  be  utilized 
for  the  purpose.  Thus,  on  one  hand,  the  American  Am- 
bassador in  Paris  was  left  entirely  aside  in  1918-19  when 
it  came  to  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  peace  at  the  close 
of  the  World  War,  while  several  smaller  powers  made  use 
of  their  representatives  in  Paris  rather  than  send  special 
agents  from  Asia  or  South  America.  Where  special 
agents  are  used  they  are  given  diplomatic  rank  for  the 
time  being  to  facilitate  their  work,  and  are  provided  with 

1  Examples  in  Crandall,  635,  and  Satow,  §8126-138;  see  also  Moore, 
Digest,  §  739. 

J  Crandall,  §  3 ;  Moore,  as  cited,  §  743. 
3  Moore,  §  744. 


TREATY  NEGOTIATION  145 

credentials  and  instructions  in  diplomatic  form.  They 
become,  for  the  time  and  the  purpose,  diplomatic  agents, 
even  where  they  are  acting  as  delegates  to  an  international 
conference  or  congress. 

The  term  " negotiation"  should  properly  be  confined  to 
the  first  stage  in  the  making  of  a  treaty.  In  this  stage  of 
the  proceedings  the  proposals  of  the  negotiating  parties 
are  put  forward,  discussed,  harmonized,  and  tentatively 
agreed  upon.  The  next  step,  and  a  crucial  one,  is  to  draft 
a  treaty  or  convention  embodying  the  agreements  in  sub- 
stance already  reached,  and  to  do  this  in  such  manner  that 
the  text  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  parties.  Finally,  the 
treaty  must  be  signed.  This  completes  the  preliminary 
work  of  the  diplomats  and  includes  everything  that  can 
possibly  be  considered  part  of  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty ; 
even  the  drafting  and  signing  of  the  agreement  might  well 
be  excluded  from  the  concept  of  negotiation.  The  treaty 
now  passes  to  the  home  government  for  further  dispo- 
sition. 

Treaties  negotiated  by  diplomatic  representatives  are 
now  almost  universally  submitted  to  representative  bodies 
for  approval  before  becoming  effective.1  Whether  this 
needs  to  be  done  is  purely  a  matter  of  national  constitu- 
tional law  in  each  state,  although  things  are  in  such  a 
position  now  that  states  are  not  likely  to  feel  great  confi- 
dence in  the  binding  effectiveness  of  treaties  not  so  sub- 
mitted ;  and  in  the  near  future  international  law  may  hold 
that  such  action  is  necessary,  just  as  it  now  holds  that 
treaties  may  be  concluded  on  behalf  of  the  states  only  by 
duly  authorized  persons,  and  just  as  ratification  by  the 
formal  head  of  the  state  is  held  to  be  necessary,  whether 
based  on  the  consent  of  a  representative  body  or  not.  Few 
treaties  fail  to  provide,  in  one  of  their  articles  or  clauses, 
for  ratification  within  a  given  period  of  time. 

1  Satow,  §  606 ;  also  Ratification  of  Treaties,  a  compilation  in  Sen.  Doc. 
SG,  66  Cong.,  1  Sess. 


146  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  original  object  of  this  ancient  rule  requiring  rati- 
fication by  the  head  of  the  state  was  to  protect  the  latter 
against  the  errors  of  a  diplomatic  agent,  primarily  as  to 
action  in  excess  of  the  legal  power  conferred  upon  the 
agent,  but  also  as  to  mistakes  of  policy.1  Hence  this  power 
of  ratification,  like  the  power  to  select  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives on  behalf  of  the  state  in  the  first  place,  and  the 
power  to  consent  to  ratification,  if  such  a  step  is  required 
by  the  national  constitutional  law,  is  conferred  by  the  pro- 
visions of  national  law  upon  one  of  the  national  organs  of 
government.2 

Finally,  limits  are  ordinarily  set  by  national  laws  and 
constitutions  upon  the  range  of  subjects  upon  which 
treaties  may  be  concluded  by  the  government,  or  upon  the 
disposition  which  may  be  made  of  certain  subjects  by  the 
government  in  treaty  agreements.  Thus  the  government 
may  be  forbidden  to  alienate  national  territory  by  treaty, 
or  to  change  the  form  of  national  government,  or  to  con- 
tract liens  upon  the  national  revenue  without  consent  of 
the  popular  chamber.3  This  whole  matter — the  range  of 
the  powers  enjoyed  by  the  government  and  the  permissible 
modes  of  exercising  these  powers,  the  so-called  "  treaty- 
making  power" — is  ordinarily  dealt  with  quite  fully  in  the 
national  constitution.  In  addition,  it  is  the  subject  of  a 
vast  deal  of  scientific — and  pseudo-scientific — speculation 
and  writing.4 

The  step  of  ratification  has  taken  on  a  new  significance 
in  recent  times  as  a  result  of  the  action  of  public  repre- 
sentative bodies  in  seizing  upon  that  occasion  as  an  oppor- 
tunity to  exercise  control  over  the  Foreign  Secretary  and 
the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  state.  For  such  ac- 
tion raises  immediately  the  question  of  the  duty  to  ratify. 

1  Moore,  as  cited,  185,  quoting  Vattel  and  Martens. 
•For  United  States  see  Foster,  Chap.  XIII,  Moore,   §§743-758. 
•Crandall,  §§33-46,  116,  124,  133-135;   Moore,   §§737,  738. 
4  See  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  10,  especially  Treaty  Power, 
ntire. 


TREATY  NEGOTIATION  147 

The  utterances  of  certain  recent  Presidents  and  Secre- 
taries of  State  of  the  United  States,  criticizing  the  Senate 
for  refusing  to  consent  to  the  ratification  of  treaties  which 
had  been  negotiated  by  them,  may  be  recalled.  .Secretary 
Hay  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  only  certainty  in  the/ 
matter  was  that  once  a  treaty  was  sent  into  the  Senate  it 
would  not  come  out  alive.  Switzerland  has  recently 
adopted  a  constitutional  amendment  whereby  all  treaties 
concluded  with  foreign  powers  for  a  period  of  more  than  - 
fifteen  years  shall  be  submitted  to  public  referendum  upon 
the  demand  of  a  certain  number  of  voters.1 

It  may  be  stated  definitely  at  once  that  there  is  no 
obligation  of  ratification  where  the  agreement  actually 
signed  exceeds  the  powers  of  those  who  signed  it,  be 
they  diplomatic  representatives  or  Secretaries  of  State  or 
Presidents.  More  than  that,  there  is  a  constitutional  ina- 
bility and  a  duty  not  to  ratify  in  such  circumstances.  Where 
there  has  been  no  excess  of  power  in  a  legal  sense  there 
is  some  room  to  maintain  that  a  state,  in  selecting  a  diplo- 
matic agent  commits  its  advantage  or  disadvantage  to  his 
judgment,  discretion,  and  skill.  In  actual  practice,  all 
states,  having  this  second  opportunity  to  reflect  upon  the 
policy  involved  in  the  proposed  agreement,  do  not  hesitate 
to  take  it  and  to  reject  treaties  on  grounds  of  policy.  This 
most  frequently  happens,  of  course,  when  the  Executive 
who  negotiated  the  treaty  and  the  Legislature  or  represen- 
tative body  to  which  the  treaty  is  submitted  for  approval 
have  divergent  views  as  to  the  desirable  national  policy. 
In  such  cases  the  only  thing  to  be  said  is  that  the  ordinary 
rules  of  representation  in  government  must  be  applied. 
If  the  Executive  is  not  at  the  time  representative  in  theory 
or  in  fact  or  neither,  while  the  Legislature  is  so,  no  one 
can  complain  if  the  latter  will  not  accept  treaties  drawn 
by  the  former,  unless  the  principle  of  public  responsibility  \f 


s,  E.  0.,  "Swiss  Treaty  Initiative."  in  Amer.  Pol.  Set.  Bev.,  XV, 
423-425    (August,  1921). 


148  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

f  in  government  is  to  be  given  up.    If  both  arms  of  the  gov- 

/  ernment  are  in  theory  representative,  yet  disagree  in 
policy,  it  is  evidently  a  case  where  the  mechanism  of  rep- 

\  resentation  is  defective,  leaving  divergent  mandates  stand- 
>  ing  to  conflict  with  one  another.  If  the  conflict  be  due  to 
changes  of  public  opinion  in  the  passage  of  time,  the  case 
is  the  same,  but  it  must  also  be  recognized,  in  such  cases, 
that  reconsideration  of  policy  is  not,  by  itself,  a  procedure 
which  can  be  condemned.  In  none  of  these  cases  can  it 
reasonably  be  argued  that  the  action  of  the  representative 
body  deserves  to  be  ignored,  or  that  it  would  be  better  if 
that  were  possible. 

In  view  of  the  very  real  difficulty  of  this  problem, 
whatever  the  cause  of  that  difficulty  may  be  and  however 
natural  the  cause  of  events  leading  up  to  it,  attempts  are 
made  to  take  care  of  the  situation  in  advance.  The  agents 
chosen  to  negotiate  the  treaty  are  at  times  selected  with  the 
advice  or  consent — tacit  and  implied  or  explicit — of  the 
•v  body  which  is  later  to  be  called  upon  to  ratify  the  treaty. 
Thus  some  degree  of  accord  between  the  home  government 
and  its  agents  is  assured,  not  only  in  point  of  law,  but  in 
point  of  policy.  Such  a  procedure  is  wholly  desirable. 
Second  thoughts  are  useful,  and  the  value  of  two  independ- 
ent judgments  upon  a  treaty  is  unquestioned,  but  this 
gain  must  not  be  sought  at  the  expense  of  consistency  and 
effectiveness  in  state  action.  If  the  public  assembly  is  to 
have  the  final  word  on  the  treaty,  the  first  word  ought  not  to 
be  said  in  indifference  to  or  defiance  of  the  policy  of  that 
body.  And  the  whole  situation  is  greatly  alleviated  by  the 
insertion  in  the  text  of  the  treaty  of  a  provision  stipulat- 

y/  ing  ratification  at  discretion  by  the  hpine  government.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  ratifying  body  can  hardly  hope  to 
control  foreign  representatives  in  practice,  even  though 
their  appointment  be  subject  to  its  approval,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  their  instructions  must  naturally  come  from  the 
executive,  such  a  solution  seems  to  be  inevitable.1  Control 

'CJorwin,  58-70;  Crandall,  §§37-38. 


TEEATY  NEGOTIATION  149 

by  the  legislature  of  the  selection  of  representatives  to  ne- 
gotiate treaties  would  undoubtedly  have  some  effect,  but  not 
a  great  deal.  The  practice  of  subjecting  international 
agreements  to  public  approval  is  not  going  to  decrease ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  going  to  increase ;  and  it  remains  to  ad- 
just matters  in  view  of  that  movement  by  a  device  in  the 
mechanism  of  treaty  negotiation  to  take  care  of  it.1 

A  similar  line  of  reasoning  is  to  be  applied  to  '  'reserva- 
tions "  to  treaties  on  the  stage  of  ratification.2  Reserva- 
tions which  merely  interpret  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
text  present  no  difficulties;  but  this  is  merely  to  raise  the 
question  whether  a  given  reservation  is  merely  interpre- 
tative, that  is,  whether  it  serves  merely  to  bring  out  the 
agreed  meaning  of  the  text,  or  whether  it  constitutes  a 
change  in  the  agreement  as  understood  at  the  time  by  one 
or  more  of  the  parties.3  The  net  result  is  that  if  a  state 
desires  to  make  reservations  it  does  so  at  its  peril,  while, 
if  the  consignatory  allows  the  reservation  made  to  stand, 
it,  in  turn,  may  suffer  thereby.  It  is  impossible  to  say\ 
either  that  a  reservation  made  has  no  effect  unless  explicitly  \ 
agreed  to  by  the  other  parties  or  that,  if  allowed  to  stand  * 
unchallenged,  it  has  the  effect  of  altering  the  obligations  of  / 
the  treaty  for  the  state  making  the  reservations.  The 
law  of  nations  has  not  reached  a  point  where  these  detailed 
problems  are  settled.  The  test  to  be  applied  is  the  test  of 
Joint  agreement  or  mutual  consent  between  or  among  the 
parties  to  the  treaty;  just  what  will  constitute  evidence 
of  consent  in  the  matter  of  ratifications  with  reservations 
remains  to  be  settled  in  the  special  circumstances  ofthe 
case,  checked  and  reenforced  by  the  risk  of  counterclaims 
and  refusals  to  perform  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  in  the 
future.  Where  reservations  or  amendments,  including 
changes  in  the  text  and  essential  modifications  of  meaning,  \ 

1Crandall,   §49;    Moore,  work  cited,   §743,  p.   185;    example,  below,  in  v 
Appendix  A,  Document  No.  4,  a  and  b. 
1  Wright,  Amendments,  16-17. 
8  Moore,  §  750. 


150  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

are  stated  by  one  party  and  accepted  by  the  other,  all 
\/     difficulty  is  removed. 

After  ratification  by  the  parties  severally.1  evidences 

..  ,,—  —  ^. 

of  this  action  are  exchanged.2  This  exchange  ofratifica- 
tions  is  the  definitive  step  in  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
and  gives  it  binding  force  upon  the  contracting  states.3 
A  publication  or  promulgation  of  the  treaty  usually  fol- 
lows and  renders  it  binding,  subject  to  the  constitutional 
law  of  each  state  and  common  international  law,  upon  the 
citizens  of  each  of  the  contracting  states  and,  so  far  as  may 
be  by  international  law,  upon  third  states.4  It  will  be 
J^t^-  noted  that  the  range  of  binding  effect  of  the  treaty  increases 

at  each  stage,  from  signature  through  ratification  and  ex- 
change to  promulgation.  Signature  binds  the  government, 
ratification  and  exchange  01  ratification  binds  the  state, 
promulgation  binds  the  people  of  the  state  incuvidualjy. 

*—  —  ^ff^  *«M*  *•••**  UMiniir 

The  effect  of  treaties  upon  third  states  or  states  not 
parties  to  the  agreement  varies  with  the  nature  of  the 
treaty  and  the  action  or  inaction  of  these  states.  On  the 
one  hand  the  doctrine  of  the  legal  independence  of  states 
forbids  any  two  states  to  impose  legal  obligations  upon  a 

\/      third  state  without  its  consent.     On  the  other  hand,  out- 

.- 

side  states  may  become  parties  to  a  treaty  by  giving  such 
consent.  Between  the  two  extremes,  and  especially  in  the 
binding  effect  of  these  acts,  there  are  many  variations. 

States  not  parties  to  a  treaty  may  be  asked  to  adhere 
to  the  agreement  or  to  accede  to  its  terms,5  and  this  invita- 
tion may  be  extended  by  separate  diplomatic  action  or  in 
the  text  of  the  treaty  or  in  both  ways.6  The  distinction  be- 
tween accession  and  adhesion  is  slight,  aiio!  tKe  two  terms 

•_  M.     4HMH"..  .«M«HM«»  °       ' 

are  often  confused.    So  far  as  there  is  any  distinction,  it 


KS 


;\ 

12*  *J</ 
~JJ2^ 


*  Examples  in  Crandall,  636,  and  Satow,  §§  607-612,  and,  below,  Appendix 
A,  Document  No.  4. 

'  Example  in  Crandall,  637,  and,  below,  Appendix  A,  as  cited. 

•  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Arts.  438-440,  in  Sen.  Doc.  49,  66  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

*  Crandall,   §50. 
'Satow,  §§613-618. 

•  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Art.  1,  as  cited. 


TREATY  NEGOTIATION  151 

lies  in  the  fact  that  by  accession  a  state  becomes  a  party 
to  the  treaty,  while  by  adhesion  it  simply  recognizes  ihe 
terms  as  agreed  to  by  others  and  pledges  to  respect  them.1 
This  distinction  is  of  importance  where  the  treatyis  of  such 
character  that  accession  would  involve  the  new  state  in  obli- 
gations to  do  certain  things,  as,  for  example,  to  participate 
in  an  exchange  of  military  or  economic  statistics  among  the 
signatories.  Where  a  cession  of  territory  by  one  state 
to  another  is  involved,  third  states  could  hardly,  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  do  more  than  adhere  to  the  treaty. 

In  the  absence  of  accession  or  adhesion,  third  states  are 
merely  under  obligation  to  take  notice  of  the  existence  and 
effect  of  the  treaty  between"  the  contracting  powers.    The 
results,  in  point  of  fact,  are  the  same  in  the  end,  in  the 
case  of  treaties  such  as  those  for  the  cession  of  territory, 
as  though  the  state  had  formally  adhered  thereto.    Like-v 
wise  for  treaties  embodying  and  declaring  rules  or  codes 
of  international  law;   third   states  may  be  compelled  to   j 
accept  them  as  evidences  of  the  common  law  of  nations  in  / 
spite  of  the  fact  of  not  being  signatory  thereto,  as  in  the/ 
case  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856.     Further,  non- 
signatories  may  bxigdependent  action  adopt  the  rules  of 
law  embodied  in  such  treaties  without  joining  in  the  signa- 
ture of  the  treaty  itself,  as  did  the  United  States,  in  part, 
with  respect  to  that  same  Declaration  of  Paris.    It  is  hardly 
too  much  to  say  that  the  effect  of  treaties  upon  non-signa- 
tory states  depends  more  upon  the  contents  of  the  treaty 
in  question  than  upon  the  formal  action  or  inaction  of 
these  states.     With  the  great  increase  of  the  number  of 
treaties  of  a  law-making  character,  this  is  doubly  true. 
Treaty-making  is  becoming  increasingly  legislative  in  char- 
acter, both  within  the  individual  states  and  in  their  relations 
to  one  another.    It  is  a  far  cry  to  the  age  when  treaties  \ 
were  merely  contracts  between  personal  sovereigns  nego-     - 

*Satow,  §614;  specimens  in  §§615-618. 


5  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tiated  on  their  behalf  by  personal  agents,  and  could  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  bind  only  the  signatory  parties. 

Several  questions  arise  in  connection  with  international 
treaties  which  are  of  an  essentially  legal  nature,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  rights  of  states  signatory  to  the  treaty  by  virtue 
of  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  These  questions  lie  in  the 
field  of  abstract  or  pure  law,  rather  than  in  that  of  inter- 
national governmental  practice.  Nevertheless,  certain  ques- 
(tions  of  this  sort  arise  directly  out  of  the  process  of  treaty 
negotiation,  and  these  problems  cannot  therefore  be  over- 
looked in  any  study  of  that  process. 

As  has  already  been  suggested,  the  scope  of  the  treaty 
signed  by  the  agents  of  the  states  must  conform  to  the  scope 
of  the  powers  entrusted  to  them.  Any  agreement  in  ex- 
cess of  the  powers  conferred  upon  them  can  have  no  bind- 
ing force  unless  it  is  conferred  by  some  additional  action 
^  of  the  state,  such  as  ratification  in  spite  of  the  extended 
scope  of  the  agreement.  The  agent  cannot  commit  his 
principal  to  obligations  which  are  beyond  his  powers,  al- 
though the  latter  may  make  good  the  defect  by  himself 
accepting  those  obligations.1 

Again,  the  principal  cannot  be  held  bound  by  agreements 
^jr-       made  by  his  diplomatic  agent  where  the  latter  has,  in  the 
course   of  the  negotiations,  been   subjected  to   fraud  p_r 
_\        duress  to  compel  him  to  sign.2     The  state  as  such  may 

\     ^k.  ~^*^ 

J*    #*  be  "compelled"  to  accept  a  treaty  at  great  disadvantage 

to  itself  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  only  alternatives 
open^to  it  are  still  greater  disadvantages  or  sufferings. 
But  in  such  a  case  the  state  has  lost  its  freedom  of  choice 
as  a  matter  of  fact  at  an  earlier  point  of  time,  by  allowing 
itself  to  be  put  in  such  a  position  that  it  can  be  confronted 
with  the  alternatives  of  conquest  or  agreement  to  pay  an 
indemnity;  as  a  matter  of  law,  its  choice  is  still  free  as  be- 
tween the  alternatives  presented.  In  the  case  of  the  agent, 

1  Hall,  §  108. 
"Same. 


^ 


TREATY  NEGOTIATION  153 

he  has  no  choice  when  confronted  with  fraud  or  a  threat  of 
death;  or,  even  if  it  is  insisted  that  the  same  freedom  to 
choose  exists  in  his  case  as  it  exists  in  the  case  of  the  state 
whose  territory  and  capital  have  been  occupied,  the  only  . 
choice  that  he  actually  has  is  between  his  own  interests  and 
those  of  the  state.  For  this  reason  he  is  not  capable  of 
binding  the  state  by  such  a  choice. 

Finally,  the  treaty  as  negotiated  cannot  violate  the  \f 
accepted  rules  of  international  law.  Treaties  may  be  con- 
eluded  with  the  direct  purpose  of  revising  the  accepted 
rules  of  international  law,  and  two  states  may  agree  to  act 
in  their  relations  with  one  another  in  a  manner  at  variance 
with  these  rules.  But  such  a  treaty  can  have  no  binding 
effect  in  the  eyes  of  third  states,  nor  will  the  rules  of  inter-  J^M^Jkg^ 
national  law  be  revised  for  them  without  their  consent  as  a 
result  of  that  treaty.  The  utmost  to  be  gained  in  such  cases 
is  that  third  states  will  recognize  that  its  obligations  exist 
as  between  the  signatories.  This  they  need  not  do,  but  may, 
on  the  contrary,  enter  a  legitimate  protest  where  their 
rights  are  adversely  affected  by  a  treaty  contrary  to  com- 
monly accepted  international  law.1 

The  validity  of  treaties  is  affected  not  only  by  the  man- 
ner and  conditions  under  which  they  are  negotiated,  but 
also  by  the  course  of  subsequent  events.    And  these  may 
easily  lead  to  the  total  disappearance  of  the  treaty  or  its      1 
replacement  in  whole  or  in  part  by  a  new  agreement. 

The  simplest  mode  in  which  a  treaty  may  pass  out  of 
the  system  of  effective  international  agreements  is  by  the 
fulfillment  of  its  terms  or  expiration  according  to  a  time 
limit  set  in  those  terms.2  By  such  a  process  treaties  are 
lapsing  continually,  and  if  this  were  the  only  force  operat- 
ing in  the  field  the  existing  treaty  system  would  be  seriously 
depleted  with  the  passage  of  time,  and  only  such  treaties 
would  remain  as  stipulated  obligations  which  were  still 

'Hall,  §108;  Roxburgh,  §824,  25,  71. 
*  Hall,  §  116. 


154  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

unperformed  or  were  permanent  and  continuous  in  their 
nature. 

Such  a  result  is  forestalled  by  the  constant  replacement 
of  expiring  treaties  by  new  agreements.1  Old  treaties  are 
constantly  revised,  in  whole  or  in  part,  and  thus  the  treaty 
nexus  is  carried  along  continuously.  The  multiplication 
of  state  rights  and  obligations  as  a  result  of  the  repeated 
negotiation  of  single  treaties  leads  to  a  condition  of  con- 
fusion and  complexity  which  in  itself  calls  for  a  process  of 
lonstant  revision  and  consolidation.2  States  are  from  time 
to  time  compelled  by  this  factor  to  pause,  take  stock  of  their 
outstanding  treaties  and  treaty  rights  and  obligations,  and 
attempt  to  consolidate  these  rights  and  obligations  and  ren- 
der them  uniform  and  consistent.  Such,  in  part,  was  the 
motive  which  led  Japan,  in  1894-96  to  undertake  a  wholesale 
revision  and  simplification  of  her  treaties  granting  exterri- 
torial privileges  to  Western  Powers  on  behalf  of  their 
nationals  residing  in  Japan.  This  leads  to  a  renewal  or 
revision  of  old  treaties;  and  it  may  also  lead  to  the  aban- 
donment of  old  treaties  by  mutual  agreement  without  any 
further  steps,  as  well  as  to  the  replacement  of  old  treaties 
by  entirely  new  ones. 

Treaties  or  parts  of  treaties  may  likewise  come  to  an  end 
by  the  action  of  the  beneficiary  in  renouncing  rights  ac- 
corded by  the  terms  thereof.  This  would  not  of  itself  give 
a  right  to  release  from  obligations  incurred  by  the  treaty 
and  could  only  take  place  under  ordinary  circumstances  in 
connection  with  unilateral  treaties.  These  are  rare,  and 
the  case  where  a  state  is  willing  to  renounce  treaty  rights 
while  not  securing  a  release  from  the  corresponding  obli- 
gations is  rare.  Hence  this  mode  of  terminating  treaties 
or  treaty  obligations  is  unusual.  A  recent  example  is  to 
be  found  in  the  surrender  by  Great  Britain  of  certain  rights 

1  Hall,  §  117. 

1  Compare  situation  in  which  China  found  herself  at  the  end  of  1921 : 
New  York  Times,  18  November,  1921,  p.  3. 


TREATY  NEGOTIATION  155 

over   German  property  in  British  territory  under  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles. 

Finally,  treaties  may  be  terminated  by  a  process  of  lf**w**<* 
denunciation.1  One  of  the  parties  may  denounce  a  treaty 
according  to  provisions  made  in  the  text  of  the  instrument 
itself.  Or  one  of  the  parties  may  denounce  the  treaty  ae- 
cording  to  the  rules  of  common  international  law.  This 
may  take  place  when  it  is  discovered  that  there  are  de- 
fects in  its  original  validity  due  to  action  by  the  negotiators 
in  excess  of  their  powers  or  due  to  duress  applied  to  the 
negotiators.  The  proper  stage  at  which  to  act  upon  such 
facts  is  that  of  ratification,  and  ratification  may  be  taken 
to  cover  any  such  facts  as  these  which  are  known  at  the 
time.  But  newly  discovered  facts  of  this  nature  will  prob- 
ably justify  and — what  is  more  important  for  our  purposes 
—probably  lead  to  denunciation  later.  Beyond  this,  de- 
nunciation will  be  likely  to  follow  upon  the  failure  of  one 
party  to  perform  its  obligations  under  the  treaty,  and 
also  such  a  change  in  circumstances  in  either  of  the  states 
parties  to  the  agreement  or  in  general  international  rela- 
tions as  to  make  the  treaty  dangerous  to  the  existence  of 
one  of  the  parties  or  to  invalidate  the  exchange  of  bene- 
fits upon  which  it  is  based.  The  denunciation  in  such  a 
case  will  give  a  right  to  compensation  to  the  other  party 
for  benefits  actually  conferred  and  for  loss  of  compensat-  jP 
ing  benefits,  but  no  state  can  hope  to  hold  another  to  treaty 
obligations  apart  from  some  substantial  degree  of  mutual 
benefit  or  in  circumstances  endangering  the  safety  of  the 
state.  Indeed,  it  is  this  very  reason,  turned  in  the  other -7 
direction,  that  entitles  the  second  party  to  compensation  v 
upon  denunciation  by  the  first. 

By  these  processes  treaties  are  made,  revised,  aban- 
doned, replaced,  and  extended,  and  the  web  of  international 
treaty  obligations  is  kept  in  constant  repair  and  effective- 
ness. 

I  116. 


*\ 

9 


f-  . 


•V 


^ 
^f\  J> 

a^- 

$. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM 

THE  negotiation  of  treaties  according  to  the  processes 
just  described  has  gone  on  steadily  and  with  an  ever 
accelerating  frequency  during  the  past  four  or  five  cen- 
turies. The  results  appear  in  the  enormous  mass  of  treaties 
and  treaty  obligations  existing  at  any  one  time,  a  body 
of  material  which  is  constantly  renewed,  constantly  re- 
vised, and  which  is  constantly  increasing  in  extent  and  in 
its~internal  complexity.  Each  decade  sees  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  treaties  concluded,  the  number  of  sub- 
jects taken  up  for  settlement  by  the  process  of  treaty 
negotiation,  and  the  degree  to  which  the  states  are  involved 
in  this  system  of  relations. 

The  treaty  nexus  may  be  studied  as  it  stands  at  any 
given  point  in  time;  and  an  analysis  of  existing  treaty 
rights  at  any  given  point  in  the  past  gives  a  fairly  adequate 
understanding  of  the  existing  state  system  and  the  existing 
system  of  international  practice  at  that  time.  Moreover, 
despite  the  fact  that,  witE  each  advancing  decade,  and  al- 
most with  each  new  treaty  made,  some  old  treaty  passes  out 
of  effective  existence  as  a  statute  of  binding  obligation, — 
so  that  the  vast  majority  of  all  the  treaties  on  record  are 
now  obsolete,  and  only  the  more  recent  ones,  such  as  have 
not  expired  and  have  not  been  superseded  or  abrogated  by 
succeeding  compacts,  are  directly  effective, — these  older 
treaties  are  not  of  merely  historical  interest.  For  the  pro- 
visions which  they  contain  furnish  evidence  regarding  the 
principles  upon  which  the  nations  may  be  presumed  to  de- 
sire to  regulate  their  relations,  in  the  absence  of  any  con- 
ventional agreements  in  effect  to  the  contrary.  In  other 

L  J.  OO 


THE  MODEEN  TEEATY  SYSTEM     157 

xya        • 

words,  they  provide  the  materials  from  which  tlio  rules  of 

^t*  a-w«a* 


the  historic  common  international  law  may  be  inferred  by 
a  process  of  induction.     Finally,  it  is  with  the  external   " 
aspects  of  this  net-work  of  treaties  in  which  the  modern 
suites  of  the  world  are  and  JtftJ^hggn  constantly  enlaced 

that  we  are  chiefly  concerned,  and  not  with  the  contents 

—  —  *"~  "  J—  MMMMpVO0MM«V>«ll»  **•*  ^fk  *^BPi^*  "~ 

of  those  treaties;  for  this  purpose  the  treaty  system  of  a 
decade  ago  is  as  useful  for  study  as  that  of  today. 

Probably  the  best  way  to  realize  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  treaty  system  is  to  examine  some  of  the  greater 
treaty  collections  which  have  been  made  in  the  past,  and 
some  of  which  are  maintained  continuously  at  the  present 

time.    These  collections  are  either  official  or  unofficial;  they 
"  . 

are  made,  that  is,  either  by  the  states  themselves  or  by  pri- 

vate scholars.    Each  state,  of  course,  keeps  a  record  of  the 
treaties  to  which  it  is  a  party  and  which  are  still  in  effect.1 
Very  few  states,  if  any,  however,  maintain  systematic  col- 
lections of  old  treaties.    When  a  treaty  becomes  obsolete    ^ 
ft  is  relegated  to  "the  archives,"  and  in  many  cases  to    ' 
oblivion.    It  remains  for  private  scholars,  assisted,  at  times, 
by  public  aid,  to  collect  and  edit  and  publish  complete  col- 
lections of  international  treaties.    And  the  relative  rapidity  y 
with  which  treaties  accumulate,  are  rendered  obsolete,  or\ 
are  revised  or  amended  makes  the  task  a  gigantic  one.  v 
All  sorts  of  physical,  legal,  and  personal  difficulties  are  in- 
volved.2   Nevertheless,  such  collections  are  made,  and  they 
provide  the  best  exhibits  of  the  treaty  system  that  are  avail- 
able.3 

In  a  collection  of  treaties  published  at  Amsterdam  in 
the  years  1726-39  Jean  Dn  Mont  assembled  several  hun- 
dreds  of  international  agreements  contracted  by  European 
states  between  800  A.D.  and  the  eighteenth  century.4  The 
collection  fills  thirteen  huge  volumes,  in  one  or  two  parts 

1  Outline,  77. 

•'Am.  Hist.  Eev.,  V,  436  (April,  1900);  VI,  395  (January,  1901);  IX, 
452  (April,  1904). 

"Kliiber,  Supplement,   §§6-23;   Tentative  List,  7-12. 

*  Kliiher,  as  cited,  §  6  ;   List,  8  ;   full  title  :   Corps  Universal  Diplomatique  \S 
du  Droit  des  Gens,  8  vols.  1726-1731,  5  vols.  1739. 


158  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

each,  and  bears  testimony  to  the  manner  in  which  the  prac- 
tice of  treaty  negotiation  grew  with  the  appearance  and 
early  development  of  the  modern  state-system. 

The  collection  of  Du  Mont  was  later  supplemented  by  a 
collection  of  the  European  treaties  concluded  in  the  eight- 
eenth century  prior  to  1772,  which  was  published  at  Leipsic 
in  the  years  1781-95  by  Friedrich  A.  W.  Wenck.1  The 
number  of  treaties  for  these  three  quarters  of  a  century  is 
greater  than  that  of  the  treaties  in  Du  Mont  for  any  pre- 
ceding century,  just  as,  in  Du  Mont,  the  earlier  centuries 
are  surpassed  by  the  later  ones.  These  two  great  collec- 
tions provide  a  very  satisfactory  introduction  to  the  modern 
treaty  system. 

The  true  measure  of  the  body  of  treaties  concluded 
among  modern  states  is  to  be  found,  however,  in  the  monu- 
mental collection  begun  by  G.  F.  de  Martens  and  bearing  his 
name  in  its  entirety.2  This  series  has  been  continued  to 
date  since  1791  and  in  1920  numbered  just  over  one  hun- 
dred volumes.  The  series  has  been  published  in  Gottingen 
and  Leipsic  in  French,  and  is  divided  into  the  Receuil, 
Supplement,  Nouveau  Receuil,  Nouveaux  Supplemens,  and 
other  parts.3  It  is,  for  this  reason,  and  for  other  mechani- 
cal reasons,  somewhat  difficult  to  use;  but  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  realizing  the  significance  of  its  contents,  even 
from  an  inspection  of  the  Tables  Generates  published  from 
time  to  time.4  The  treaties  included  date  mainly  from  1761, 
although  one  group  of  volumes  in  the  series  includes 

1Kliiber,  as  cited;  List,  12;  full  title:  Frid.  Aug.  Guil.  WencTcii  .  .  . 
Codex  juris  gentium  recentissimi. 

'Kliiber,  as  cited;  List,  10-11;  full  title  of  first  group:  Eeceuil  des 
v/  principaux  traites  d' alliance,  de  paix,  de  treve  .  .  .  conclus  par  les  puissances 
de  I' Europe. 

a  Eeceuil,  7  vols.,  1791-1801;    Supplement,   10  vols.t  1802-1828;    Eeceuil, 

2'.  ed.,  rev.  et  aug.,  8  vols.,  1817-1835;  Nouveau  Eeceuil,  16  vols.,  1817-1841; 

Nouveaux  Supplemens,  3  vols.,  1839-1842;  Nouveau  Eeceuil  General,  20  vols., 

~M  1843-1875 ;    Nouveau  Eeceuil  General,  2*     se>.,  35  vols.,  1876-1908;  Nouveau 

Eeceuil  General,  3e  se>.,  vols.  1-8,  etc.,  1909-1915,  etc. 

4  In  1837-1843,  2  vols.,  covering  the  materials  published  prior  to  1843; 
in  1875,  2  vols.,  covering  all  materials  published  prior  to  1875;  in  1900  and 
1910,  2  vols.,  covering  the  "2"  s&rie." 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM 


159      / 


treaties  dating  between  1494  and  1760  which  do  not  appear 
in  Du  Mont  or  Wenck.1 

The  treaties  in  Martens  prior  to  1920  number  over  five 
thousand.  These  treaties  involve  over  one  hundred  hide- 
pendent  states,  some  of  which,  like  most  of  the  treaties 
recorded  in  these  volumes,  have  passed  into  history.  They 
deal  with  all  possible  subjects  of  international  negotiation. 

Finally,  the  treaties  of  American  states  are  to  be  in- 
cluded in  this  review.    The  treaties  concluded  up  to  1913   _.  , 
by  the  United  States  with  other  states  have  been  collected    (/L<j  Jf 
and  edited  by  W.  M.  Malloy  and  Garfield  Charles,  and  were 
published  in  three  volumes  in  1910  and  1913.2    There  are  on 
record  about  six  hundred  treaties  and  other  international 
agreements  between  the  United  States  and  other  Powers 
prior  to  1920.    Carlos  Calvo  has  performed  the  same  ser- 
vice, in  part,  for  Latin  America,  by  publishing  a  collection 
of  all  treaties  concluded  by  Latin  American  states  from      / 
1493  to  1822. 3    This  collection  runs  to  sixteen  volumes  and  "         .•.•>. 
must  be  supplemented  by  collections  of  treaties  concluded 
by  Latin  American  states  in  the  past  century.4 

In  addition  to  these  five  great  collections,  which  are 
duplicated  in  part  by  collections  of  other  scholars,  such  as 
Garden,  Koch,  Lamberty,  and  others,5  there  are  many  col- 
lections for  individual  nations  and  for  individual  confer- 
ences where  treaties  have  been  produced.  Such  are  the 
collections  of  De  Clercq  for  France,  of  Rymer  and  of 
Hertslet  and  others  for  Great  Britain,  of  Lagemans  for 
the  Netherlands,  on  one  hand,6  and  the  many  collections 
of  the  conventions  signed  at  the  Peace  Conference  at  the 
Hague  in  1899  and  1907.7 

*  The  first  volumes  of  the  Supplement. 

2  Sen.  Doc.  357,  61  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  and  Sen.  Doc.  106.  62  Cona.,  3  Sess. 

3  List,  7. 

*Colecci6n  de  tratados  celebrados  por  la  Eepublica  Argentina,  Publica- 
ci6n  oficial,  1863,  List,  22;  Coleccion  de  tratados  celebrados  por  la  Eepublica 
de  Chile,  1853-1875;  List,  26,  et  cetera, 

6  List,  8,  9. 

8  Same,  34,  44,  45,  66. 

'Same,  13-19. 


160  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Jo  %/  *4~b          Fr<»ni  an  inspection  of  these  collections  l  it  appears  that 
J~  modern  states  have  concluded  somewhat  over  ten  thousand 

treaties  witn  one  another  since  the  dawn  of  international 
relations.2  In  view  of  the  nature  of  the  material,  it  is,  of 
course,  impossible  to  render  such  data  precise  within  two, 
or  even  three,  figures.  All  of  the  collections  contain  many 
national  statutes,  decrees,  and  other  acts  besides  treaties 
proper.  There  are  many  duplications,  and  doubtless  not 
a  few  treaties  have  been  entirely  lost  from  their  pages. 
Nevertheless,  the  general  result  is  sufficiency  reliable  to 
be  dependable  for  the  simple  inferences  which  may  be  made 
from  it.  And  the  mere  fact  of  bulk  deserves  attention  if 
nothing  else  could  be  said.  Here  is  a  vast  body  of  treaty 
y  practice  and  treaty  law  which  forms  a  solid  element  of  in- 
ternational organization  on  its  own  account. 

The  existing  body  of  international  conventions  may  be 
analyzed  in  several  ways.  The  agreements  among  the  na- 
tions may  be  classified  according  to  form  and  also  accord- 


ing to  subject  matter,  and  each  method  yields  its  own  pecu- 
liar results.  Of  the  two,  the  former  classification  is  simpler 
and  reveals  more  regarding  the^mechanics  of  international 
practice.3 

The  "treaty"  proper  is  the  basic  type  of  international 
agreement  and  is  an  agreement  in  full  form  and  style  be- 
tween two  or  more  states,  independent  at  least  for  the  pur- 
poses of  that  particular  treaty.4 

There  is,  however,  great  confusion  in  actual  practice  in 
the  descriptive  terms  used  to  refer  to  various  international 
compacts.  Thus  the  agreement  between  Venezuela  and  the 
Powers  in  1903  providing  for  the  arbitration  of  claims  held 
against  Venezuela  by  the  latter  is  in  form  a  treaty  proper  ; 

1  And  the  finding  lists  of  T6tot  and  Eibier  for  the  collections  of  Dumont, 
Wenck,  Martens  et  cetera. 

1  Over  three  thousand  international  agreements  concluded  between  1814 
aQd  1918  are  listed  in  the  Catalogue  of  Treaties  published  in  1919  by  the 
U.  S.  Department  of  State,  3-445. 

•Satow,  Chaps.  XXVII-XXXI. 

*  Specimens  in  same,  §§  503-527;  and,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  4. 


161 

in  the  text  it  is  called  an  Agreement ;  in  the  acts  of  acces- 
sion a  Protocol;  we  should  be  inclined,  along  with  Profes- 
sor Wilson,  to  call  it  a  conrpromis  for  arbitration.1  The 

•    •»  -  .  — . 

usage  of  daily  practice  cannot  be  accepted  uncritically.  The 
term  treaty  may  be  used  either  generically,  to  refer  to  all 
sorts  of  international  agreements,  or,  more  specifically, 
to  denote  the  typical,  formal,  international  compact.  It 
is  in  the  latter  sense  that  it  is  used  here. 

A  treaty,  or,  rather,  the  text  of  a  treaty, — although  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  an  unwritten  treaty,  and  the  term  refers 
to  the  document  in  which  the  agreement  is  recorded  rather 
than  to  the  agreement  itself — may  be  analyzed  into  various 
parts.2  First  comes  the  preamble,  which  declares  that  the 
parties  named  have,  through  their  agents,  as  named, 
agreed  to  the  following  articles  for  a  certain  purpose,  also 
named.  Then  follows  the  body  or  text  of  the  treaty,  usually 
divided  into  articles,  and  even,  on  occasion,  into  chapters, 
sections,  clauses,  paragraphs,  and  so  on,  giving  the  sub- 
stance of  the  agreement.  Articles  dealing  with  the  general 
principles  of  the  agreement  come  first,  followed  by  special 
articles  which  apply  these  principles.  At  the  end  are  often 
found  articles  dealing  with  the  way  in  which  the  agreement 
is  to  be  carried  out,  and,  perhaps,  articles  providing  for 
guarantees  of  execution.  At  the  end  also  come  provisions 
concerning  ratification  and  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
and  the  date  when  the  agreement  shall  be_effective.  This 
completes  the  body  of  the  treaty,  and  the  statement  follows 
that  this  agreement  has  been  made  at  a  certain  place  and 
on  a  certain  date  and  has  been  signed  by  the  participants. 
Finally  come  the  signatures  and  seals  of  the  agents.  There 
may  be  annexed  to  the  treaty  any  number  of  appendices  or 
schedules  containing  details  of  rates  or  similar  material 
which  operate  in  execution  of  the  principles  of  the  treaty, 

1  See  text  in  Wilson,  Cases,  12. 

3  Satow,  §  500 ;  see  marginal  analysis  of  Document  No.  4  in  Appendix  A, 
below. 


> 

^JST 

* 


162  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

but  which  it  has  not  been  thought  best  to  include  even  among 
the  special  articles. 

Much  labor  has  been  spent  upon  the  art  or  science  of 
interpreting  treaties.  But  such  work  is  part  of  the  science 
of  logic  rather  than  of  international  relations  and,  in  any 
case,  refers  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  treaty  rather  than 
to  the  form.  Regarding  the  latter,  as  just  described,  the 
chief  difficulty  concerns  the  act  of  signing  and  sealing  the 
document.  The  giving  of  guarantees  is  rapidly  disappear- 
ing now,1  but  the  problems  connected  with  the  powers  of  the 
signers  are  not  diminishing  in  numbers  or  in  complexity. 
As  greater  care  is  now  taken  in  the  assumption  of  inter- 
national obligations  by  treaty,  and  as  opposition  to  secret 
'treaties  increases  and  likewise  the  demand  for  public  rati- 
(  fication  of  treaties  concluded  by  the  executive  arm  of  the 
/  government,  this  question  is  rendered  more  difficult  than 
ever.  The  rules  regarding  the  power  to  sign  are  partially 
principles  of  constitutional  law  and  partially  principles  of 
international  law  pure  and  simple.  What  we  have  to  note 
is  the  procedure  in  the  case. 

The  negotiators  are  identified  and  their  powers  defined 
by  their  credentials  and  full-powers.  The  identification 
and  declaration  of  powers  in  the  preamble  must  lie  within 
the  limits  of  the  former.  Further,  the  treaty  itself  must 
lie  within  the  limits  of  these  full-powers.  And,  finally, 
the  signatures  and  seals  must  correspond  with  the  declara- 
tions  of  personal  identity  contained  in  the  credentials. 
The  seals  used  by  the  signers  are  not  state  seals,  but  pri- 
vate  personal  seals  used  for  purposes  of  identification.2 
Needless  to  say,  they  are  not  necessary  in  a  day  when 
personal  signatures  are  adequate  for  these  purposes,  but 
they  repay  attention  because  they  reveal  the  fact  that  the 
negotiators  sign  primarily  as  individual  persons,  and  only 

-    &  V-  -J"  m  - 


1  Crandall,  §  7. 

1  See  amusing  discussion  as  to  the  use  by  President  Wilson  of  his  per- 
sonal signet  ring  as  a  seal  in  signing  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  New  York 
Times,  29  June,  1919,  pp.  3,  5. 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM      163 

Q*v* 
-  -  *""" 

may,  therefore,  always  be  raised,  and  if  raised  must  be  I 

settled  by  reference  to  the  credentials   and  full  powers! 
just  described. 

There  are  many  varieties  of  international  agreements 
beyond  the  "treaty"  proper.1  The  term  "convention"  has 
been  used  in  various  ways  in  modern  treaty  practice  to 
describe  international  agreements.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has 
been  used  in  reference  to  international  agreements  of  minor 
importance,  such  as  postal  conventions,  and  therefore  of 
somewhat  informal  style — sub-treaties,  if  they  may  be  so 
termed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  term  has  been  used  to  re- 
fer to  great  international  agreements  signed  by  several 
nations,  in  full  form,  such  as  the  Hague  Conventions.2 
Evidently  there  is  some  confusion  here.  The  real  distinc-  x 
tion  seems  to  run  between  agreements  upon  subjects  of  a  y^ 
political  character  and  agreements  upon  subjects  of  a  gov-  V" 
ernmental  or  administrative  character.  Thus  we  always 
have  "treaties"  of  peace,  of  alliance,  of  cession,  but  "con- 
ventions" regarding  postal  service,  and  "conventions"  for 
the  exchange  of  consular  representatives.  Even  that  dis- 
tinction is  not  consistently  followed,  and  the  two  terms  are 
often  used  interchangeably. 

Various  other  forms  of  international  compact  are  in  use. 
A  "declaration"  is  a  joint  statement  of  international  law 
as  it  is  understood  by  the  parties  or  a  statement  of  the 
policy  which  they  intend  to  pursue  on  a  given  subject,  or  a 
mixture  of  both.3  Such  was  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of 
1856  relating  to  the  rules  of  naval  warfare.  A  "conrpro- 
mis  "  is  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  on  certain  terms  a  certain 
aispute  which  has  arisen  between  the  parties ; 4  it  is  to  be 
contrasted  with  the  ' '  treaty  of  arbitration ' '  which  provides 
for  the  use  of  arbitration  by  the  parties  in  disputes  which  \/ 

1  See  the  examples  in  Catalogue  of  Treaties,  3-445,  as  cited. 

2  Satow,  §  499. 
'Same,  §§  535-544. 

*  Properly  a  "  compromis  d'arMtrage"  ;  same,  §§597,  598.     K 


164  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

shall  arise  in  the  future.1  The  term  " protocol"  is  used  to 
describe  either  memoranda  or  records  of  discussions,  ar- 
ticles drawn  up  in  explanation  of  the  terms  of  the  main  body 
of  the  treaty,  or  records  of  an  exchange  of  ratifications  to  a 
treaty.2 

It  will  appear  that  some  of  these  distinctions  are  dis- 
tinctions of  substance  as  well  as  of  form.  Other  classes  of 
international  agreements  are  definable  in  the  same  way. 
Thus  a  "  capitulation "  is  a  military  agreement  for  sur- 
render of  one  of  the  parties,  and  "the  capitulations"  are, 
or  were,  treaties  between  Western  Powers  and  Turkey  and 
other  Eastern  states  relative  to  privileges  of  citizens  of  the 
former  while  in  the  East.3  The  connection  between  the 
substance  and  the  form  of  international  agreements  is  not 
arbitrary,  even  including  the  distinction  between  treaties 
and  conventions.  The  more  important  subjects  are  dealt 
with  in  formal  treaties  and  conventions,  while  agreements 
upon  questions  of  minor  importance  are  embodied  in  less 
formal  pacts  called  by  various  names,  such  as  "agreement," 
"arrangement,"  "exchange  of  notes,"  proces  verbal,  "ad- 
ditional article,"  and  modus  vivendi* 

One  important  aspect  of  this  practice  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  such  informal  agreements,  where  the  participants 
feel  free  to  rely  on  them,  may  be  concluded  by  executive 
officials,  even  subordinate  executive  officials,  with  less  osten- 
tation than  would  be  involved  in  the  conclusion  of  a  full 
treaty,  and  even,  perhaps,  without  that  process  of  parlia- 
mentary ratification  which  is  necessary  in  the  latter  case. 
Thus,  the  Postmaster-General  of  the  United  States  may 
enter  an  "agreement"  with  the  British  Post  Office  relating 
/  to  Money  Orders  between  the  two  countries.^  Presidents 

1  Example,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  4. 

•Same,  4c,  and  Satow,  §§559-578. 

•Foster,  Chaps.  XII,  XIII. 

4  Same,  and  Satow,  §§  530-534,  545-558,  579-596,  599-605.  The  "exchange 
of  notes"  and  the  "modus  vivendi"  are  hardly  more  than  written  memoranda 
of  simple  diplomatic  negotiations. 

"Crandall,  §§56-61;  Moore,  Digest,  §752. 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM      165 

and  Secretaries  of  State  of  the  United  States  have  not  failed 
to  take  notice  of  this  and  to  act  upon  it,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
''preliminaries  of  peace"  concluded  with  Spain  in  1898 
and  the  ''protocol"  at  the  end  of  the  Boxer  affair  in  1901.1 
The  Senate  has  protested  against  such  a  practice,  but  to 
no  great  effect.2  Where  legislation  is  necessary  for  the 
execution  of  the  agreement  the  check  of  the  representative 
body  exists  in  that  form,  of  course.  Still,  the  loophole  is 
and  must  be  very  large  under  the  circumstances.3 

Two  other  forms  of  international  agreements  remain 
to  be  noted,  one  a  very  minor  form  and  one  a  very  signifi- 

— ,^,1  ^  ,  .  ^•*M»«I          |  ^jftHt&im^lBBumii^gRm^titWi^ff^jtmi^Sffff* 

cant  form. 

The  executive  agreement  without  posterior  ratification 
deserves  to  be  compared  with  the  executive  agreement 
based  upon  prior  national  statute.4  In  all  states  today 
there  has  grown  up  a  practice  of  enacting  statutes  dealing 
with  matters  arising  in  international  relations,  such  as 
tariff  laws  and  postal  service  legislation,  while  providing 
in  the  text  of  such  legislation  for  discretion  by  the  execu- 
tive authorities  in  applying  the  law  to  goods  or  mail  coming 
from  other  states.  Agreements  are  thereupon  made  with 
other  states  for  reciprocal  remission  of  tariff  duties  or  the 
division  of  postal  charges  by  the  parties.  This  practice 
constitutes  a  fertile  source  of  international  agreements. 

Lastly,  the  "final  act"  is  the  supreme  treaty  form.5 
This  term  refers  to  the  concluding  agreemenFreached  in 
an  international  conference  where  several  treaties  or  con- 
ventions have  been  signed  and  which  recites  the  circum- 
stances and  objects  of  the  conference,  indicates  the  course 
of  events  in  the  conference,  and  lists  the  results  achieved  in 
the  form  of  separate  conventions.  The  final  act  does  not 

1  Crandall,  §  56 ;   Malloy,  2006. 

'Corwin,  116-125,  168-204. 

"Same,   120,  note  47;   Crandall,   §§70-104. 

4  Crandall,  §§62-65;  Moore,  as  cited,  §§753-755;  also  Copyright  Proc- 
lamation of  President  Harrison,  1894,  in  Malloy,  105. 

6  Final  Act  of  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference,  below,  Appendix  A, 
Document  No.  9. 


166  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

contain  a  minute  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  confer- 
ence and  merely  lists  by  name  the  agreements  concluded, 
and  it  does  not  add  anything  in  substance  to  what  has  al- 
ready been  accomplished,  but,  in  point  of  form  it  is  the 
most  striking  and  solemn  international  agreement. 

Before  reviewing  the  various  classes  of  international 
/treaties  by  reference  to  the  subjects  with  which  they  deal, 
it  will  be  well  to  set  aside  entirely  two  great  classes  of 
"treaties,"  so-called. 

All  of  the  leading  European  and  American  states  have 
concluded  agreements  with  native  tribes  or  semi-civilized 
people  dealing  chiefly  with  the  cession  of  territory,  but 
also  with  such  matters  as  the  payment  of  tribute,  the  render- 
ing of  services  of  one  sort  or  another,  and  commercial 
j  -jj*^  relations.    The  United  States  concluded  some  five  hundred 
"treaties"  of  this  kind  with  the  Indian  nations  prior  to 
1871,  when  the  practice  came  to  an  end.1    These  compacts 
deserve  to  be  called  treaties  only  in  a  formal  sense.2    They 
have  been  so  regarded  in  our  jurisprudence  and  constitu- 
tional government,  but  clearly  they  do  not  rest  upon  the  es- 
sential assumption  of  treaty  negotiation,  namely,  the  in- 
dependence of  the  contracting  parties.     The  treaty  form 
was  used  for  tactical  purposes,  to  save  the  faces  and  con- 
sciences of  the  European  settlers  and  to  assimilate  the  proc- 
ess of  dispossessing  the  Indian  nations  to  the  accepted 
system  of  the  European  law  of  nations,  and  also  for  the 
superior  moral  and  psychological  effect  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Indian  of  this  form  of  action  in  contrast  to  a  simple  notice 
tojhim  to  vacate.    The  pretense  of  free  consent  was  consid- 
ered, apparently,  to  have  a  certain  argumentative  value  and 
*    the  question   of  constitutional  jurisdiction  was   avoided, 
while  placing  the  immediate  burden  of  enforcement  upon 
the  Indian  chiefs  who  had  signed  the  "treaty." 

1  Crandall,  §  66;    Moore,  as  cited,  §  756. 

'Last  of  such  treaties,  between  the  United  States  and  the  Klamath  and 
other  Indian  nations,  dated  1870,  in  17  Statutes  at  Large  (Treaties),  383. 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM  167 

In  the  second  place,  notice  should  be  taken  of  the  "Con- 
cordats ' '  concluded  by  the  Papacy  with  various  states  with 
the  purpose  of  protecting  the  interests  of  the  Catholic 
Church  in  the  territories  of  those  states.  While  these 
agreements  take  the  form  of  treaties  or  conventions  they 
deal  almost  exclusively  with  religious  and  ecclesiastical 
matters  and  hence  do  not  relate  to  the  normal  subject 
matter  of  international  relations.  And  we  cannot,  in  view 
of  all  the  facts  of  the  case,  regard  the  Papacy  as  a  state  in 
the  full  meaning  of  the  term;  such  agreements  are  to  be 
regarded  rather  as  agreements  between  states  and  a  pri- 
vate, or,  at  most,  a_  quasi-public  organization  than  as 
treaties  in  international  law.1 

With  the  subject  matter  of  the  great  majority  of  indi- 
vidual treaties  neither  the  student  of  diplomacy  nor  of  law 
has  much  concern.  The  cession  of  this  piece  of  land,  the 
granting  of  this  or  that  commercial  privilege,  the  settle- 
ment of  this  or  that  claim  are  not,  in  themselves,  of  more 
importance  for  common  international  law  or  the  elabora- 
tion of  international  governemnt  than  are  the  contents  of 
private  contracts  for  the  private  or  public  law  of  the  state 
where  they  are  made.  Given  the  methods  of  diplomatic 
negotiation  and  the  legal  rules  concerning  consent,  inter- 
pretation, and  termination,  and  the  nations  may  agree  with 
one  another  upon  tariffs  or  territories  at  their  pleasure. 
Of  course,  the  student  of  law  is  interested  in  the  classifica- 
tion of  treaties  as  executory,  executed,  declarative,  and  so 

,.  •/ 1  i  .  » 

on,  according  as  they  provide  for  future  performance, 
create  a  new  legal  status,  or  declare  a  given  rule  of  law  or 
line  of  policy.2  This,  however,  relates  rather  to  legal  form 
than  to  subject  matter,  and  does  not  alter  the  conclusion 
stated.  This  is  all  the  more  true  because  of  the  fact  that  as 
yet  there  seem  to  be  no  bars  to  the  conclusion  of  individual 
treaties  between  the  members  of  individual  pairs  of  states 

'On  concordats  see  Calvo,  §§1605-1615. 
2  Hershey,  §  296. 


. 

ttA 


168 

contrary  to  common  international  law.  In  only  two  famil- 
iar cases  have  the  nations  pledged  themselves  not  to  con- 
clude new  treaties  at  a  later  date  in  conflict  with  earlier 
agreements,  namely  in  the  negotiations  of  1856  at  Paris 
and  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  in  1919. 

While  not  interested  in  the  specific  content  of  given 
treaties,  however,  the  student  of  law  and  diplomacy  finds 
it  convenient  to  classify  treaties  according  to  the  general 
nature  of  the  subjects  dealt  with.1  They  may  be  classified 
1  as  treaties  of  peace,  treaties  of  alliance,  treaties  of  cession, 
^  boundary  treaties,  treaties  of  commerce,  consular  conven- 
tions, and  so  on  through  dozens  of  titles,  covering  all  con- 
ceivable aspects  of  international  relations.2  For  few  ques- 
tions arise  among  the  nations  which  have  not  been  the  sub- 
jects of  international  treaty  agreement.  Or,  on  the  other 
hand,  treaties  may  be  grouped  into  two  great  classes, 
namely,  treaties  dealing  with  legal  and  governmental  sub- 
jects and  those  dealing  with  concrete  topics  having  no 
implications  for  international  law  or  organization.  Of 
the  former  class  are  treaties  declaring  rules  of  international 
law  and  conventions  establishing  international  courts  or 
commissions  or  conferences  ;  3  of  the  latter  class  are  those 
ceding  a  piece  of  territory  for  a  certain  purchase  price.4 
The  former  are  of  vital  significance  for  the  student  of  inter- 
Anational  government,  the  latter  have  little  more  to  do  with 

1  Catalogue  of  Treaties,  as  cited. 

1  Treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  1848,  in 
Malloy,  1107;  treaty  of  alliance  between  the  United  States  and  France,  1778, 
in  same,  479;  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  for  the  cession 
of  Florida  to  the  United  States  by  Spain,  1819,  in  same,  1651;  treaty  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  regarding  boundaries,  1846,  in  same,  656; 
treaty  of  commerce  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  1888,  in  same,  1685; 
consular  convention  between  the  United  States  and  Colombia,  1850,  in  same, 
314.  Text  of  one  of  the  most  important  of  modern  treaties  of  peace  is  given, 
below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  5a.  \  J*j(o  3/v*.f&\  «^  ?«JV*A  . 

1  Declaration  of  Paris,  of  1856,  below,  in  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  5a. 
Hague  Conventions  of  1907  setting  forth  the  rules  of  war  and  establishing 
^/    courts  for  arbitration  and  commissions  of  inquiry,  and  providing  for  further 
international  conferences  on  these  subjects,  in  Malloy,  2220,  2269,  2389. 

*  Treaty  between  the  United  States  and  France  for  cession  of  Louisiana, 
j    1803,  in  same,  508;  treaty  between  these  states,  for  payment  of  money,  of 
v     even  date,  in  same,  511. 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM     169 

that  subject  than  a  private  horse  trade  has  with  national  y 
constitutionaOaw. 

It  is,  of  course,  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  these 
two  classes  of  treaties  with  complete  precision.  It  is  still 
more  difficult,  in  many  cases,  to  classify  a  given  treaty, 
because  of  the  mixture  of  elements  to  be  found  in  its  pro- 
visions. The  treaty  of  arbitration  is  easy  to  classify,  and 
likewise  the  treaty  agreeing  to  the  cession  of  a  given  piece 
of  territory.  The  treaty  of  commerce,  however,  may  in- 
clude provisions  for  the  remission  of  tariff  duties  and 
also  provisions  for  the  exchange  of  consular  representa- 
tives, and  while  the  former  have  no  special  significance  for  t^*" 
international  law  or  government,  the  latter  have.1  Even 
the  treaty  of  cession,  the  purest  type  of  non-governmental 
or  non-legal  treaty,  may  contain  statements  of  the  grounds 
for  the  cession  in  point  and  thereby  take  on  an  added  sig- 
nificance.2 

- 

It  would  be  of  no  special  service  to  recite  here  a  list  of 
the  different  varieties  of  treaties  by  subject  matter.  Among 
the  more  important,  beside  those  already  named,  are 
treaties  of  guarantee,  treaties  of  navigation,  treaties  deal- 
ing with  laws  of  copyright  and  patent,  the  settlement  of 
claims,  the  protection  of  property,  and  jurisdiction  over 
aliens,  including  the  related  subjects  of  naturalization  and 
citizenship  and  extradition.3  In  the  past  century  and  a 
quarter  there  has,  however,  been  a  notable  change  in  the 
predominating  character  of  treaties,  so  far  as  their  subject 
matter  is  concerned.  A  collection  of  treaties  of  the  early 


1  Treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  between  United  States  and  France, 
1800,  Arts.  VI,  IX,  X,  in  same,  498,  499. 

*  Treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  for  cession  of  territory    . 
and  payment  therefor,  Art.  IV,  in  same,  1123. 

1  Treaty  of  guarantee  between  the  United  States  and  Panama,  1903,  in  \ 
same,  1349 ;  treaty  of  navigation  between  United  States  and  Denmark,  1857, 
380;  treaties  on  patent  and  copyright  between  the  United  States  and  Japan,    / 
in  same,  1037;  treaty  on  settlement  of  claims  between  the  United  States  and    V    »^ 
France,    1880,   in    same,    535;    treaty   of    amity   and    commerce    between    the 
United  States  and  China,  1844,  Art.  XIX,  in  same,  201 ;   treaty  on  natural-     \ 
ization  between  the  United  States  and  Ecuador,  1872,  in  same,  434;   treaty     J 
of  extradition  between  the  United  States  and  Bavaria,  1853,  in  same,  58.        / 


170  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

eighteenth  century  bears  the  title  "collection  of  treaties 
^i  of  alliance,  of  peace,  of  truce."    Of  late  years  there  have 

<          been  fewer  such  political  treaties  or  treaties  dealing  with 
r\  n)f  personal  and  formal  diplomatic  questions  and  more  treaties 

dealing  with  legal,  economic,  and  governmental  affairs.1 
There  have  Been""  fewer  treaties  of  alliance,  marriage 
treaties,  and  treaties  relating  to  the  privileges  of  rulers 
and  princes,  and  more  agreements  dealing  with  questions 
of  international  law,  providing  for  the  extradition  of  fugi- 
tives from  justice,  the  settlement  of  pecuniary  claims,  the 
exchange  of  commercial  and  postal  facilities,  and  the 
establishment  of  international  judicial  or  administrative 
organs. 

"""A  secondary  result  is  to  be  seen  in  the  increase  in  the 
/ft  J^  number  of  treaties  signed  by  more  than  two  powers,  or 
(  ft^  what  may  be  called  general  international  acts.  This  is  due 

to  the  fact  that  it  is  natural  for  several  states  to  combine 
in  law-making  treaties  while  it  was  not  natural  to  expect 
them  to  combine  in  treaties  of  the  older  type,  creating 
special  and  exclusive  privileges,  or  establishing  special  ties 
of  marriage  or  alliance  against  hostile  dynasties  between 
friendly  royal  houses.  The  more  recent  international 
.  \  agreements  are  of  a  broadly  cooperative  character  in  con- 
trast to  the  narrow  competitive  agreements  of  an  earlier 

2£e- 

The  character  of  the  treaty  nexus  is  thus  being  altered 
within  itself.  Not  only  is  the  web"  of  treaty  obligations 
growing  greater  in  magnitude  and  internal  complexity ;  it  is 
also  growing  firmer  and  more  stable  in  quality.  Bargains 
on  concrete  questions  of  no  permanent  significance  are 
being  superseded  by  what  looks  very  much  like  interna- 
tional legislation  on  legal  and  governmental  matters  of 
\  general  and  continuing  interest.  Just  as  personal  diplo- 
macy is  converted  into  something  far  more  significant  for 
the  problem  of  international  government  by  its  metamor- 

1  Wright,  Treaties,  243-245. 


THE  MODERN  TREATY  SYSTEM  171 

phosis  into  treaty  negotiation,  so  the  latter  takes  on  a 
new  and  far  more  significant  nature  by  the  reorientation  of 
its  outlook  as  to  subject  matter.  To  this  is  to  be  added 
the  changing  character  of  the  process  of  treaty  negotiation, 
whereby  treaties  between  two  parties  are  increasingly  sup- 
plemented by  treaties  concluded  in  international  confer- 
ences among  several  nations.  The  transition  from  personal 
contract  to  public  legislation  is  here  seen  in  all  its  detailed 
steps. 


'. 


CHAPTER  XH 

TREATIES  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

WHEN  the  contents  of  the  treaties  concluded  among 
the  nations  are  examined  more  closely  the   rela- 
tions between  provisions  found  there  and  the  whole  body 
of  national  and  international  law  appear  to  be  very  am- 
biguous.    Treaties  have  been  classified  in  the  preceding 
„   ^S  chapter  as  legal  and  governmental,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
^  economic  anapolitical,  on  the  .other.     Disregarding  the 
latter  class  henceforth,  it  remains  to  define  the  processes  by 
which  the  provisions  of  a  treaty  stating  a  rule  of  laAv  to 
which  the  signatory  parties  have  agreed  becomes  effective. 
This  investigation  leads  in  two  directions.    On  the  one  hand, 
it  leads  to  an  inquiry  into  the  relation  between  the  law  of 
treaties,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  and  national  law;  on  the 

^  other  side  it  leads  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  between 
treaties  and  international  law,  or,  more  broadly  still,  to  the 
origin,  nature,  and  development  both  of  international  law 

..  -     itself  and  of  the  science  of  international  law. 

It  is  obvious  from  an  inspection  of  the  text  of  many 
international  treaties  that  their  provisions,  although  stated 
as  rules  of  law,  and  sometimesprecTsely  because  they  are 
stated  in  that  form,  need_further  actionjii^rder  to  be  effec- 
tive. The  general  principles,  anoTeven  the  comparatively 
detailed  rules,  of  a  treaty  may  need  elaboration  in  statement 
and  in  the  explanation  of  their  precise  meanings.  In  any 
case  they  need  to  be  carried  into  practical  execution. 
Treaties  sometimes  relate  merely  to  the  state  as  such; 
thus,  a  treaty  recognizing  the  independence  of  one  of  the 

172 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW     173 

contracting  parties  would  need  no  elaboration  upon  that 
point,  and  it  would  call  for  no  direct  application  in  actual 
life.  The  effect  intended  is  an  effect  in  the  field  of  theory 
and  abstract  law,  and  it  is  accomplished  by  the  very  act 
of  concluding  the  treaty.  In  the  case  of  a  treaty  providing 
for  reciprocal  commercial  rights  for  citizens  of  the  con- 
tracting states,  however,  there  is  a  need  for  further  legal 
statement  and  also  for  practical  application  in  actual  life. 
After  all,  the  individual  is  the  ultimate  unit  of  political 
and  legal  action,  and  most  treaties  call  for  results  in  the 
realm  of  the  individual  citizen.  In  this  great  range  of  cases 
additional  action  is  necessary  in  national  law  and  govern- 
ment to  carry  out  the  treaty.  Let  us  note  those  cases  care- 
fully and  in  detail.1 

Certain  types  of  treaties  may  be  carried  out  by  the  sim- 
ple action  of  executive  officials  without  further  cooperation 
from  other  governmental  bodies  and  without  any  change 
in  the  national  law.  A  treaty  signed  by  the  United  States 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  consignatory  state 
would  automatically  constitute  such  recognition.  Fur- 
thermore, even  if  the  agreement  contained  also  a  pledge  to 
receive  diplomatic  or  consular  representatives  from  that 
state,  it  could  be  carried  into  execution  by  the  President 
alone,  in  the  exercise  of  his  Constitutional  power  to  conduct 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  nation. 

Where,  however,  the  action  needed  must  be  taken  by 
subordinate  officials  who  have  no  discretion  and  who  must 
act  solely  in  accordance  with  instructions  from  superior 
officers,  such  a  procedure  is  impossible.  In  such  cases  some 
further  action  is  necessary  in  order  to  set  the  machinery  of 
the  national  government  in  operation. 

In  certain  of  these  cases,  again,  the  chief  executive  might 
carry  the  treaty  into  execution  by  issuing  the  necessary  in- 
structions to  subordinate  officials.  This  would  be  true, 

1  On  the  relation  of  treaties  to  national  law  see  literature  cited,  below, 
Appendix  B,  §  12. 


174  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

for  example,  where  no  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions 
existed  to  control  executive  and  administrative  action  in 
that  field.  Such  situations  are  relatively  rare  and  can  be 
found  in  the  United  States  o_nly  in  the  field  of  foreign  rela- 
tions. Thus  the  President  could  instruct  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  issue  an  exequatur  to  a  certain  individual  in  execu- 
tion of  a  consular  convention  with  a  given  state,  without 
reference  to  any  statute  or  other  legal  standard. 

In  most  of  these  cases,  however,  action  by  subordinate 
administrative  officials  depends  on  authorization  from  the 
legislature,  because  the  chief  executive  is  unable  to  issue 
new  instructions  to  his  subordinates  for  the  execution  of 

i«n»n  i  ___   _0B^^fc^  '•  ......  1<B 

the  treaty  in  the  face  of  national  legislation  to  the  contrary 

&s  .  '  u%«.    «•*»     •*».        IWMR»  ,        .    ,        .  .„, 

or  in  the  absence  of  appropriate  legislation.    Even  m  the 
-t«-^j  -    .  ,...-.»».,  •••  f^apf*  - 

,  /United  States,  where  treaties  become  an  integral  part  of 
the  law  of  the  land,  and  where  a  treaty  acts  to  repeal  pre- 
vious statutes  in  conflict  with  it,1  this  is  true,  especially  as 
regards  the  payment  of  money  from  the  treasury,  and  in 

6  the  case  where  legislation  contravenes  a  prior  treaty.2    In 

these  cases  favorable  or  supporting  legislation  by  Congress 
Us  needed,  or,  at  the  very  least,  careful  abstention  from 
nostile  legislation. 

If  the  executive  is  somewhat  dependent  upon  the  legisla- 
ture for  its  power  to  act  in  execution  of  national  treaty  en- 
gagements, the  judiciary  is  doubly  dependent  upon  both 
the  legislature  and  the  executive  branches.  What  the  "  polit- 
ical" departments  of  the  government  do  or  say  as  respects 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  obligations  of  a  treaty  will 
be  accepted  by  the  judicial  department  as  final  in  many 
cases,  particularly  as  to  the  effectiveness  or  ineffectiveness 
0  irtf^  of  the  treaty  as  a  whole,  the  annexation  of  territory  by 
treaty,  and,  as  above,  the  actual  administrative  operations 
under  the  treaty.3  In  another  sense,  however,  the  courts 

1  Constitution,  Art.  IV,  82;  Moore,  Digest,  §  2:  Head  Money  Cases,  112 
U.  S.  580. 

'Crandall,  §§74-89. 

'Terlinden  v.  Ames,  184  U.  S.  270. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      175 

have  more  opportunity  and  power  to  carry  into  execution 
treaty  obligations  than  do  the  other  two  departments  of 

"^^"^^^•J^^M^^g^*"*^*"**^"-*  «.^ fet^ffM te^^^tt^*^^**^^"*"^^^^^*^**^^**^**^*^*1*^^*^1^^"*   "* 

the  government.  Thus,  where  the  requisite  action  has  been 
taken  by  these  departments  it  is  to  the  courts  that  the 
matter  comes  in  the  last  instance  if  there  be  any  doubt  or 
dispute  about  it.  Again,  where  no  such  action  is  necessary 
the  courts  are  free  to  act  upon  the  treaty  directly,  in  a  num- 
ber of  nations,  applying  the  treaty  in  litigation  between  pri- 
vate parties  wherever  it  is  in  place.  This  is  true  especially 
in  the  United  States,  because  of  the  constitutional  position 
of  treaties  in  the  national  legal  system,  as  already  defined.1 
It  is  not  true,  however,  that  this  posture  of  affairs  is  wholly 
exceptional,  and  it  seems  fairly  certain  that  the  drift 


of  things  is  toward  this  solution  of  the  problem  of  the    ^,    A 
application  of  treaties.     French  courts  apply  treaties  di- 
rectly as  they  do  statutory  law  to  private  interests  affected 


application  of  treaties.     French  courts  apply  treaties  di-  / 

ft  r 

thereby;  Belgian  courts,  apparently,  may  do  the   same.2 

With  the  growth  of  this  practice  of  subjecting  treaties  to  ^f/i*_ 
national  representative  bodies  for  approval  in  legislative  , 

form,  as  has  been  done  recently  in  England  and  in  the  new 
German  constitution,  this  method  of  action  is  bound  to 
spread.8  Thus  allbranches  of  the  national  government  will 
gain  increased  authority  in  carrying  into  execution  the  na- 
tional treaty  obligations. 

Sucli  a  result  is  earnestly  to  be  desired.  As  matters 
now  stand  in  the  field  of  international  government,  a  treaty 
depends  for  its  execution  upon  the  national  governments 
of  the  signatory  parties.  Whether  it  is  executed  or  not, 
and  the  terms  on  which  it  may  be  executed,  are  matters  of 
comparative  national  constitutional  law  and  government. 

1  Foster  and  Elam  v.  Neilson,  27  U.  S.  253;  Wright,  Enforcement,  15,  223. 

2Crandall,  §  70. 

3  Heretofore  Parliament  has  denied  the  legislative  power  of  the  Crown 
acting  through  treaty  agreements,  in  defending  the  powers  of  Parliament  over 
the  'public  funds  and  the  public  welfare  in  general ;  Crandall,  as  cited,  §  71. 
For  the  new  practice  of  legislative  ratification  in  England  see  Act  of  25  July,v*  ^f  •*(*,* ^ 
1919;  in  Germany:  Constitution  of  the  German  Commonwealth  (trans,  by 
Munro,  W.  B.,  and  Holcombe,  A.  N.),  Art.  45,  in.  League  of  Nations, 
Vol.  I,  365  (December,  1919). 


176 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


, 


i 


K 

I! 


Failure  of  a  national  government  to  act  means  that  the 
treaty  fails  of  execution.1  There  is,  of  course,  a  distinct 
moral  obligation  to  act,2  and  this  obligation  is  not  only 
moral  but  also  legal,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  supported  by  the 
accepted  principles  of  international  law.  It  is  not,  however, 
,  -  ,v(  enforceable  by  a  signatory  state  in  any  judicial  tribunal,  na- 
tional  or  international,  and  it  therefore  lacks  a  perfect 
binding  force  in  operation.  The  national  courts  cannot  at- 
tempt to  compel  the  legislature  to  act  in  execution  of  the 
(treaty.3  The  legislature  could  usually  compel  the  executive 
and  the  judiciary  to  act  by  the  processes  of  statutory  legis- 
lation or  impeachment,  butjf  the  legislature,  the  repository 
of  the  national  discretion,  sees  fit  to  refuse  to  carry  out 
the  national  obligations,  no  legal  or  governmental  redress 
is  available  to  the  other  state.  In  default  of  execution  the 
signatory  state  not  satisfied  with  the  performance  of  the 
other  party  to  the  treaty  may  legitimately  put  forward 
diplomatic  protests  and  seek  compensation  for  value  re- 
ceived and  for  any  losses  incurred.4  But  the  fact  remains 
that  in  order  to  be  finally  effective  a  treaty  must  be  incor- 
porated into  the  national  legal  systems  of  the  signatory 
states  andTthus  made  binding  and  operative  in  the  hands  of 
the  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  organs  of  the  state. 

Such  is  the  relation^  between_treaty  law  and  national 
law.  It  remains  "^o  "Be  seen  whether  ffie  relation  TSeiween 
treaty  law  and  international  law  is  as  intimate  and,  if  so, 
whether  it  is  of  the  same  type  or  form. 

That  relation  may  be  stated  tentatively  and  in  general 
terms  at  the  start  by  adopting  a  mathematical  form  of  ex- 
pression. As  diplomacy  is  to  treaty  negotiation  so  treaties 
are  to  international  law.  The  latter  is  a  higher  stage  in 
the  proc^ss_ojjejvplution  of  international  governmental  prac- 

I  1  Wright,  work  last  cited,  17,  218-220,  227,  228;  this  work  is  authorita- 

V     tive  on  the  general  subject. 

2  Moore,  work  cited,  §  758. 

•McChord,  v.  L.  #  U.  K.  S.  Co.,  183  U.  5.  483. 

*New  Orleans  v.  Abbagnato,  62  Federal  Seporter,  240;  also  Moore,  work 


/ 
cited, 


§  1026. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      177     f     /     . 

tice.    The  former  develops  into  the  latter,  but  is  superseded  ^^N* 

by  it  in  so  far  as  the  latter  expands  to  cover  more  and  more  ^7* 

of  the  territory  of  international  relations.    The  second  stage 

is  entered  from  the  first  because  of  a  desire  to  secure  a  more 

general  and  more  permanejit  f orm  of  regulation  for  those 

relations.    It  is  .a  case  of  developing  general  law  out  of  a 

system  of  more  or  less  specific  contractual  agreements  i 

,  ,  —  -,  .,,  -    ,C'    ''  It.      "'"£ "  •  -U  1     J.-L. 

order  to  pass,  and  with  the  result  ot  passing,  beyond  the 
stage  of  contract  to  the  stage  of  legislation  in  international 

...  •--„•--  fe:  TfariMMBM*  nnjnu..!— nn - 

life. 

The  processes  by  which  the  materials  of  treaty  agree- 
ments enter  into  the  composition  of  general  international 
law  vary  in  their  simplicity  and  directness.  Certain  trea- 
ties or  joint  international  declarations  set  forth  interna- 
tional law  directly  and  expressly,  and  leave  no  additional 
act  necessary  to  this  result.  Such  was  the  Declaration  of 
Paris  of  1856  which  ended  by  declaring  that,  in  naval  war, 
"blockades,  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective."  On  the  other 
hand,  international  law  can  be  derived  from  certain  eco- 

W1  ^-°-  • 

nomic  or  political  pacts  only  by  a  process  of  induction,  of 
inference,  by  indirection,  and  by  a  somewhat  hazardous 
generalization  from  the  specific  instance  to  a  common 
principle.  Thus  many  treaties  ceding  territory  in  exchange 
for  money  payments  imply  that,  in  international  law,  ter- 
ritory may  be  properly  acquired  by  purchase.  A  single 
case  of  the  kind  would  not,  however,  be  of  any  legalistic 
value.  Thus,  the  guarantee  by  the  United  States  of  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  Panama  in  connection  with  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  use  and  occupation  of  the  Canal  Zone  could  not 
be  relied  on  as  proving  that  states  receiving  concessions  of 
that  sort  must  guarantee  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
ceding  state. 

The  same  is  true  of  treaties  apparently  in  conflict  with 
commonly  accepted  international  law.  So  far  as  binding 
at  all,  they  constitute  exceptions  to,  not  evidences  of,  the 
rules  of  the  international  common  law,  as  national  statutes 


178 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


T+^ 
(^ 


make  exceptions  to  the  national  common  law.  In  the  inter- 
national field,  however,  the  repetition  of  such  a  treaty  by 
many  states  will  lead  to  an  alteration  in  the  rules  of  the 
common  law  itself,  based  on  the  evidence  afforded  by  these 
treaties.1 

The  names  and  numbers  of  the  parties  to  a  treaty  are, 
however,  of  as  much  importance  in  the  discussion  of  trea- 
ties as  are  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  itself.  Thus,  the 
/legalistic  value  of  treaties  and  their  effect  on  common  inter- 
[  national  law  depends  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  number 
\and  importance  of  the  signatory  powers.  A  treaty  between 
Siam  and  Haiti  would  not  have  much  effect  on  the  law 
of  nations,  even  if  it  pretended  to  declare  international 
law  directly  and  in  express  terms.  A  treaty  signed  by  ten 
twelve  leading  states  of  the  world  would  be  decisive  on 
bject  with  which  it  dealt,  even  if  not  cast  explicitly  in 
the  form  of  a  law-making  treaty.  According  to  the  doc- 
trine of  independence,  no  state  can  be  legally  bound  without 
its  consent,  and  a  given  state  could  by  express  declaration 
refuse  to  be  bound  by  the  rules  set  forth  in  or  deducible 
from  the  last-named  treaty.  But  jn  the  absence  of  such 
.  specific  and  explicit  action  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  by 
common  international  law,  other  states  would  be  presumed 
to  agree  to  the  rules  accepted  by  the  powers  signatory  to 
thatjreaty.  It  would  DC  almost  conclusive  evidence  upon 
f  tEe  content  of  the  current  accepted  law  of  nations  on  the 
subject  with  which  it  dealt.  Not  only  would  the  doctrine 
of  state  independence  be  ignored  in  so  far  as  it  is  not 
covered  by  the  theory  of  presumptive  and  tacit  consent; 
the  doctrine  of  state  equality,  likewise  involved  in  the  case, 
would  also  be  passed  by  in  silence.  The  injured  state  may 
bepartially  conciliated  and  satisfied  by  the  proposition  that, 
while  states  may  be  equal  in  the  right  to  enjoy  such  legal 
rights  as  they  possess  under  common  or  conventional  in- 
ternational law,  thex_are_  not  entitled  to  ecQial  political 

1  Atherley- Jones,  7-42;  Quigley,  7-29. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      179 

power  in  the  making  of  law  or  the  control  of  international  v 
government.  Leaving  these  problems  of  legal  theory  for 
farther  attention  later,  it  may  be  tentatively  concluded  that 
treaties  among  several  of  the  Great  Powers  specifically 
declaring  rules  of  international  law  would  contribute  most 
effectively  to  the  formation  of  general  international  law, 
even  if  these  Powers  did  not  through  their  agreements 
exercise  any  recognized  international  legislative  authority.1  ^* 

It  may  be  well,  however,  to  turn  aside  at  this  point  to 
review  the  origin  and  development  of  international  law  on 


an  independent  footing,  before  completing  the  study  of  the 
relations  between  that  system  of  law  and  international 
treaties. 

Antiquity,  so  it  has  been  declared,  knew  no  international 

-^   A.   j^*. »  i     .  * 


\A> 

^ 


treatises  haveHbeen*  compiled  upon 

international  law  and  custom  of  ancient  Greece  and 
Rome"  and  "international  law  of  antiquity."  The  doubt 
arises  from  the  fact  that  the  European  state-system  was, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  in  such  a  dubious  condition  during 
much  of  the  period  prior  to  the  end  of  the  fourth  Christian 
century,  especially  in  comparison  with  the  modern  state- 
system,  that,  although  there  was  much  public  law  of 
state  relations  it  hardly  seems  proper  to  regard  it  as  true 
international  law,  judging  it  by  what  we  have  today.2 

The  same  is  true  for  the  Medieval  period,  down  to  the 
end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  at  the  very  least.  There  was 
much  public  law  of  state  practice  on  the  books  and  in 
practical  use,  but  even  less  than  in  antiquity  did  it  measure  ^ 
up  to  any  logical  standard  of  true  international 'law.  Mod- 
ern international  law  did  not  appear  before  the  break-up 
of  the  feudal-imperial  state-system  and  the  formation  of 
the  society  of  free  national  states  at  the  end  of  the  Medieval 
period.3 

xHershey,  §§14,  15;  Nippold,  §3. 

2  On  international  law  in  Antiquity  see  Phillipson,  entire,  and  literature 
cited   therein. 

"Nys,  Origines,  7-12,  95-139. 


* 


180  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

All  of  this  is  predicated  of  Europe  and  the  West.  In 
the  Orient  there  seem  to  have  been  many  usages  and  not  a 
few  writings  which  related  to  interstate  rights  and  practices 
just  as  there  seem  to  have  existed  in  these  regions  certain 
institutions  of  diplomacy  and  treaty  negotiation,  prior  to, 
and  independent  of,  the  development  of  the  European  sys- 
tem of  international  law  and  diplomacy.1  It  is  of  no  general 
use  to  dwell  upon  these  facts  here,  however.  They  serve  to 
gratify  a  curiosity  about  the  East ;  they  furnish  an  isolated 
yv-episode  in  the  story  of  world  political  development;  but 
they  did  not  contribute  to  the  formation  of  the  existing 
system  of  international  law  and  practice.  The  states  of 
Asia  are  members  of  that  system  not  by  virtue  of  having 
entered  it  in  the  formative  period  as  charter  members 
contributing  to  its  original  constitution,  but  by  virtue  of 
admission  at  a  later  time,  at  the  hands  of  the  already  exist- 
ing members  of  the  European  family  of  nations.  Only  in 
the  past  century  have  China,  Japan,  Siani,  Persia,  and 
Turkey  been  admitted  to  anything  like  full  membership  in 
the  family  of  national  states  among  whom  run  the  princi- 
ples and  rules  of  international  law.2 

The  process  by  which  modern  international  law  and  the 
science  of  international  law  has  been  formed  is  somewhat 
curious.3  It  reminds  one  of  the  man  who  was  made  a  phy- 
sician in  spite  of  himself.  International  law  as  now  prac- 
»  /  ticed  by  the  states  of  the  world  is  largely  the  product  of 
private  scholarship,  taken  over  later  by  the  states  more  or 
less  in  spite  of  their  natural  instincts.  Unlike  the  man  in 
the  story,  however,  the  states  have  come  to  see  to  some 
extent  the  real  value  of  what  they  have  been  persuaded  to 
accept. 

When  the  modern  state-system  made  its  appearance  in 
Europe  there  was  great  interest  among  scholars  in  the  legal 

'Hershey,  §§  20-24. 

*  Turkey  was  admitted  in  1856,  Japan  and  China  in  the  last  decade  of  the 
last  century;  Oppenheim,  I,  §  28. 

1  Hershey,  §§  54-62,  86,  and  citations  on  p.  90. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      181 

problems  it  presented.    There  was  on  foot  at  the  time  a 

notable  revival  in  the  study  of  law,  particularly  the  law  of     ,*          /    * 

Rome,  as  a  result  of  the  rediscovery  of  certain  texts  of  that 
law  and  of  the  increased  interest  in   classical  antiquity 

yJrCv       ^*^^ 

characteristic  of  the  period  of  the  Renaissance.    There  was     ^    .     ^ 
current,  moreover,  a  spirit  of  inquiry  and  a  taste  for  phil-  K^Jr 

osophizing  and  theorizing  which,  in  combination  with  some 
of  the  better  elements  of  the  thought  of  the  Medieval  period,  / 
served  well  for  the  new  task.  Private  jurists  and  philoso- 
phers  proceeded  to  construct  a  theoretical  legal  system  to 
describe  and  regulate  the  new  independent  states  in  their 
relations  one  with  another. 

In  doing  this  the  early  writers  drew  upon  two  sources    / 
of  supply,  namely,  the  philosophy  of  nature,  or  their  own^ 
sense  of  right,  of  reason,  and  of  justice,  on  one  side,  and, 
on  the  other,  certain  more  concrete  materials,  old  or  new, 
of  a  legal  and  governmental  character.1 

Among  the  older  bodies  of  law  now  called  on  for  new 
service  was  the  law  of  Rome,  reviewed  and  revised  for  use 
in  the  field  of  international  relations — where  it  could  be 
applied  in  some  cases  directly  and  in  some  cases  only  by 
a  very  liberal  re-interpretation.  Along  with  the  law  of 
classic  Rome  went  the  more  recent  civil  and  canon  law 
developed  in  Medieval  Europe  on  a  basis  of  the  classical 
law.  Secular  lawyers  and  ecclesiastical  jurists  alike  con-  v^ 
tributed  their  work  in  the  new  field.2 

In  the  same  group  are  to  be  placed  the  commercial  law, 
— continental  and  maritime,  private,  public,  and  mixed — of 
the  period  of  the  Renaissance ;  feudal  law ;  and  English  law 
and  equity.  From  the  commercial  codes  of  the  period  of  re-  ' 
vival  came  much  law  relating  to  the  rights  of  merchants 
and  persons  dealing  with  them,  and  many  matters  now 
covered,  into  the  field  of  admiralty  law  proper.  From 
English  law  and  equity  came  little  at  first ;  in  later  decades 

1  Oppenheim,  I,  §  42. 

•Walker,  §§85-87,  113-120,  126-128,  130-134. 


182  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  spirit  of  legalism  on  one  side  and  the  spirit  of  practical 
justice  on  the  other,  as  they  have  developed  in  English 
jurisprudence  in  contrast  to  either  unstable  philosophiz- 
ing or  to  rigid  doctrinalism,  have  influenced  international 
law  perceptibly.  Most  important  of  all,  as  far  as  materials 
from  older  legal  systems  are  concerned,  the  concept  of 
territorial  sovereignty  and  territorial  jurisdiction  was 
drawn  from  Medieval  feudal  law.  Under  the  distinct  state- 
system  of  Greek  and  early  Roman  antiquity  territorial 
sovereignty  was  not  an  unfamiliar  concept.  But  with  the 
confusion  of  the  centuries  from  the  establishment  of  cos- 
mopolitan Rome  to  the  end  of  the  era  of  the  invasions  and 
the  wanderings  of  the  peoples  the  concept  had  been  lost. 
Now  it  was  resurrected  as  a  prime  element  in  the  legal 
theory  of  the  modern  state.1  It  had  been  developed  anew, 
all  over  again,  as  it  were,  by  the  feudal  states,  and  was 
ready  to  be  taken  up  where  Rome  had  weakened  it  and  the 
invasions  destroyed  it.  Political  society  in  Europe  had 
dissolved  and  then  reformed  again  about  new  politico- 
territorial  units ;  the  feudal  system,  curiously  enough,  thus 
contributed  to  modern  public  law  one  of  its  two  or  three 
principal  ideas. 

The  materials  employed  by  the  earlier  writers  on  inter- 
national law  were  not  entirely  of  a  legal  character.  There 
was  a  growing  body  of  state  practice  which  could  be  utilized 
to  illustrate  and  support  the  principles  derived  from  the 
philosophy  of  nature  and  the  law  of  Rome  and,  more  clearly 
still,  the  law  of  maritime  commerce  and  war.  The 
consular  system  was  expanding  rapidly  and  was  serviceable 
not  only  in  illustration  and  elaboration  of  rules  and  princi- 
ples derived  from  other  sources  but  as  a  source  of  new  prin- 
ciples devised  upon  consular  practice  as  a  basis.  So  for  the 
rapidly  developing  practice  of  diplomacy  proper,  and  the 
operations  of  the  new  permanent  embassies.  This  was  true 
also  for  the  frequent  interstate  wars  being  waged  with  a 

*  Wilson  and  Tucker,  16. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      183 

new  spirit  of  formalism  and  regularity  of  procedure  by 
the  new  professional  standing  armies  in  place  of  the  old  / 

informal  levies.1    In  addition  to  the  more  abstract  theoret- 
ical and  legal  materials,  the  scholars  of  the  period  of  the 
origins  of  international  law  were  thus  in  a  position  to  draw 
upon  current  state  practice  for  additional  data.     Modern 
international  law,  therefore,  runs  back  to  the  law  of  na- 
ture or  the  sense  of  reason  and  justice  and  right  in  man,  on 
one  side,  and  to  various  legal  and  governmental  founda- 
tions, on  the  other,  such  as  civil  and  canon  law,  feudal  law,  J 
consular  law  and  practice,  the  history  of  international  dip-' 
lomacy,  and  the  conduct  of  war. 

To  review  these  elements  in  a  series  is  of  less  impor- 
tance, however,  than  to  examine  their  relationship  one  to 
another  within  the  field  where  they  operate.  These  being 
the  historical  sources  from  which  the  materials  embodied 
in  international  law  have  been  drawn,  what  are  the  philo- 
sophical foundations  of  that  law  which  make  possible  the 
employment  of  these  materials?  2 

The  ultimate  foundation  of  international  law  is  justice. 
However  imperfect  the  vision  which  men  have  gained  of 
what  constitutes  justice  in  general  or  justice  among  the  na- 
tions in  particular,  and  however  imperfect  the  statements 
given  to  that  principle  as  it  is  visualized,  and  the  applica- 
tions made  of  the  rules  as  stated,  no  other  conclusion  is 
possible  than  that  the  law  of  nations  intends  to  give  every 
state  its  due.  To  intend  otherwise  were  to  undertake  what 
in  the  long  run  would  be  impossible,  _and  to  undertake  the 
unnatural.  Over  no  considerable  period  of  time  is  it  pos- 
sible for  a  state  to  secure  a  greater  share  of  this  world's 
benefits  than  it  is  entitled  to  on  a  basis  of  its  natural  capac- 
ities and  rights;  all  states  must  be  assumed  to  desire  to 
act  under  the  natural  conditions  of  the  world  in  which  we 

^^v^Cvx/^ve^^ 

1  Oppenheim,  as  last  cited.         -  / 

°Same> §§  15' 16'  ^^-rJ^^S^^y^J^^ 


& 


184 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


On  the  other  side  of  the  problem  we  have  the  facts  of 
state  practice,  constituting  the  imperfect  applications,  the 
imperfect  statements,  and  the  imperfect  visions  of  justice 
already  mentioned.  In  actual  life  and  in  the  actual  opera- 
tions of  states  it  is  state  practice  which  seems  to  be  decisive. 
What  rights  are  accorded  to  a  state  depend  definitely  upon 
the  rights  recognized  by  fellow  states  in  treaties  and  other 
interstate  agreements. 

The  divergence  which  seems  to  be  possible  between 
justice  and  practice  as  sources  of  the  authority  of  inter- 
national law  is  tobe  bridged  only  by  means  of  the  doctrine 
of  interstate  consent.  Justice  being  an  abstract  ideal  of 
right  and  state  practice  being  simply  the  operation  of  con- 
crete fact,  the  basis  of  the  law  of  nations  would  be ja.  void, 
a  gap,  if  no  connection  could  be  observed  between  the  prin- 
ciples of  justice  and  the  rules  of  practice.  In  point  of  fact, 
the  students  of  international  relations  may  be  perfectly 
clear  on  this  point:  if  justice  is  to  be  the  source  of  inter- 
national law  it  must  be  formulated  by  the  members  of  me 
international  community,  and  where  these  members  do  not 
formulate  it  expressly  they  do  give  expression  to  it  in 
practice  and  there  it  may  be  discovered.1  The  express 
provisions  of  international  treaties  declaring  the  law  of 
nations  and  the  incidents  of  international  practice  embody 
what  the  states  of  the  world  agree  constitutes  justice  in 
their  relations  one  with  another.  Not  that  there  are  three 
sources  of  authority — justice,  consent,  and  practice — but 
that  these  three  are  one.  As  a  typical  preamble  to  an 
international  treaty  runs:  "considering  tluaj;  justice  de- 
mands a  change  in  the  boundary  between  the  two  states, 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  agreed  tome  following 
articles." 

This  synthesis  of  justice  and  practice  in  the  doctrine  of 
consent  makes  the  historical  dissension  between  the  philo- 
sophical school  and  the  positivist  school  of  international 
jurists  unreal  and  uninteresting.2  There  have  been  those 

"Compare  Hershey,  §§  13,  14;  Oppenheim,  §§  16-19. 
'Hershey,  §§60,  61;  Holland,  Jurisprudence,  31-40,  63,  71. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      185 

who  have  considered  that  the  law  of  nations  ought  to  rest 
entirely  upon  justice  and  reason  and  have  thereupon  set 
fortlTtheir  ideas  as  to  what  justice  and  reason  demanded  in 
international  relations.  There  have  been  those  who  have 
held  that  the  law  of  nations  could  only  be  found  in  positive 
state  practice  and  that  considerations  of  abstract  justice 
and  reason  were  irrelevant.  The  former  have  forgotten 
that  it  is  not  their  law  on  international  relations  which  is 
sought,  but  the  law  of  the  nations  upon  their  own  relations 
one  with  another.  The  latter  have  forgotten  that  the 
nations  believe  that  they  are  acting  uporPthe  dictates  of 
justice  intnat  very  state  practice  which  seems  to  be  so 
purely  pragmatic  and  cynical  in  the  result.  Where  practice 
on  a  given  point  appears  uniform  for  some  time  among 
many  states, — the  only  situation  which  would,  in  sheer 
logic,  permit  generalization  as  to  the  rule  of  law  involved, 
— we  may,  moreover,  be  sure  that  the  states  have 
accurate  in  their  judgment. 

The  desirable  synthesis  of  the  views  of  the  positivists 
and  those  of  the  philosophers  has  been  made  only  in  recent 
times,  and  as  yet  very  imperfectly.  In  earlier  days  individ- 
ual  writers,  such  as  Pufendorf,  went  to  extremes  in  the  di- ,/ 
rection  of  philosophical  speculation,  while  others,  such  as 
Moser,  repudiated  too  completely  all  considerations  of  fc0^ 

.*^«^f»  -i<-J*Vi.-i.    .  •V.^i.X*'.  ^^-^--     —      ,  —  .>- 

justice.  Certain  writers,  not  necessarily  later  in  tjime  ' 
than  either  or  both  of  these,  who  have  been  called  "the 
eclectics,"  tried  to  carry  both  views  without  repudiating 
either.1  The  attempt  was  not  successful,  for  two  mutually 
exclusive  views  cannot  be  retained  simultaneously.  The  two 
views  must  be  reconciled  and  harmonized,  not  tolerated  or 
propounded  side  by  side.  Where  there  is  an  express  dec- 
laration of  law  by  the  nations  the  difficulty  vanishes:  the 
rule  embodies  justice  as  agreed  upon  in  law  by  the  signa- 
tories. Where  there  is  an  established  general  practice  the 
same  thing  is  true ;  positivists  and  philosophers  must  agree  ^ 

1  Hershey,  §  62. 


186 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


( 


that  such  is  the  law,  as  the  states  evidently  think  that  it 
should  be.  Where  there  is  neither  express  declaration  nor 
established  practice  the  individual  jurist  is  f  ree^  to  use  his 
own  judgment,  but  his  conclusion  must  be  based  on  the  same 
elements,  so  far  as  they  are  present  in  the  premises,  and  the 
only  valid  conclusions  are  that  the  law  is  unsettled,  that 
there  is  no  (settled)  law,  that  it  is  tending  to  become  this 
or  that,  or  that  it  ethically  ought  to  be  this  or  that. 

Such  a  position  was  that  of  Grotius,  the  great  Dutch 
jurist  who  is  commonly  regarded  as  the  father  of  modern 
international  law.1  Grotius  was  not  the  earliest  writer 
on  the  modern  law  of  nations  nor  yet  the  last  ;  nor  are  his 
writings  the  source  of  all  subsequent  international  law, 
nor  are  they  above  criticism  in  point  of  form  or  substance. 
Grotius  was  pedantic  at  times,  academic  at  times,  uncertain 
and  not  entirely  clear  at  other  times.  But  he  possessed 
the  true  approach  to  the  field  he  chose  to  cultivate.  Inter- 
national law  was  needed  to  reduce  to  order  the  chaos  of 
current  international  practice  and  to  provide  a  standard 
to  be  used  in  measuring  and  restraining  certain  of  the  more 
unbridled  practices  of  the  day.  In  discovering  that  stand- 
ard, he  said,  therefore,  that  what  the  student  could  not 
deduce  from  established  ethical  principles  by  a  process  of 
logical  deduction  and  yet  was  found  everywhere  observed 
in  practice  must  be  understood  as  arising  from  the  free 
consent  of  the  nations.2  Thus  Grotius,  albeit  imperfectly, 
set  forth  the  proper  foundations  for  the  science  of  inter- 
national law.  Modern  scholarship,  while  it  has  tended  to 

I        "l~'    '  lit     •   III  u__^___i  ___  II 

repudiate  the  ethical  element  on  the  side  of  which  Grotius 
committed  some  slight  degree  of  error,  has  not  thereby 
improved  upon  his  position.  The  perfect  synthesis  of 
justice  and  practice  in  international  law  remains  to  be 
worked  out  by  some  jurist  not  too  enamored  of  his  own 


1  Walker,  §§  141,  142,  144,  148;  the  best  edition  of  Grotius  for  American 
readers  is  still  that  by  Whewell,  now  out  of  print. 
3  Law  of  War  and  Peace,  Preliminaries,  §  40,  end. 


TREATIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      187 


ideas  of  right  and  wrong  nor  too  cynical  of  state  motives 
in  general. 

For  practical  purposes  it  is  necessary  to  have  some 
clearer  statement  of  the  documentary  sources  from  which 
a  knowledge  of  current  international  law  may  be  gleaned.1 

For  the  historical  materials  such  as  Roman  law  and  past 
state  practice,  the  texts  of  that  law  and  of  international 
acts  in  the  past  are  used.  Not  even  the  documents  of  civil 
and  canon  law  or  the  texts  of  early  commercial  codes  are 
without  value.  These  materials  at  once  supply  informa- 
tion upon  the  history  of  international  law  and  contribute  r 
to  a  knowledge  of  current  law. 

More  directly  in  point,  of  course,  are  documents  em- 
bodying modern  state  practice,  such  as  national  legislative 
acts  and  records  01  national  judicial  decisions  on  questions 
of  international  relations.  When  taken  from  one  nation 
they  may  show  practice  divergent  from  commonly  accepted 
international  law;  when  collected  from  many  nations  they 
reveal  the  consensus  —  or  lack  of  any  consensus  —  of  opinion 
on  the  points  of  law  dealt  with]  This  is  equally  true  of  -^ 
instructions  issued  to  national  diplomatic  representatives. 

Of  greatest  value  and  weight,  however,  are  the  texts  of 
international  diplomatic  settlements  of  various  types,  in- 
cluding the  awards  of  International  arbitral  tribunals  and 
international  treaties.  The  perfect  documentary  source  is\ 
the  text  of  a  treaty  signed  by  many  powerful  states  declar- 
ing international  law  on  a  certain  point  or  series  of  points.  . 

The  law  developed  by  international  practice  according 
to  these  processes  presumes  to  cover  the  whole  field  of 
international  relations.  There  are  to  be  found  in  the  law 
of  nations  the  most  general  principles  regarding  the  nature 
of  the  state  and  the  nature  of  war  and  of  neutrality,  and 
likewise  the  most  detailed  rules  regarding  the  enjoyment 
by  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  recognized  diplomatic 
immunities.2  The  relations  of  states  are  treated  as  they 

1  Hershey,  §  16. 

2  Same,  §§  131,  249. 


188  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

exist  in  time  of  peace,  in  time  of  war,  and  under  conditions 
of  neutrality.1  The  nature  and  attributes  of  the  persons 
of  international  law,  their  rights  and  obligations,  and  the 
modes  of  action  available  for  vindicating  these  rights  and 
obligations  are  set  forth.2  The  nature  and  powers  of  the 
instruments  of  international  government  —  consuls  and 
diplomats,  courts  and  commissions  and  congresses  —  are 
described.3  On  one  hand,  much  attention  is  given  to  inter- 
national diplomacy,  rather  than  to  substantive  rights  in 
the  abstract.  Thus  there  is  much  material  descriptive  of 
the  methods  whereby  the  international  governing  bodies  — 
courts,  commissions,  and  congresses  —  are  created  and 
operated.4  The  presence  of  these  subjects  in  works  on  in- 
ternational law  is  due  to  the  absence  of  works  dealing 
specifically  with  international  government  such  as  the  one 
now  in  the  hands  of  the  reader,  and  it  is  bad  both  for  inter- 
national  law  and  for  international  organization,  for  it 
.  "  detracts  from  the  strictly  legalistic  character  of  the  former 
and  it  obscures  the  independent  existence  of  the  latter. 
On  the  other  hand,  very  little  attention  is  given  to  inter- 
national economic  and  cultural  intercourse  by  comparison 
either  with  the  amount  of  attention  given  to  these  matters 
in  national  law  or  with  the  amount  given  to  purely  politi- 
cal matters  in  international  law.  Of  recent  years  there  has 
ibeen  a  considerable  change  in  this  respect,  but  tariff  legis- 
lation and  the  regulation  ofj^nTnigration,  for  example,  are 
I  still  left  entirely  to  national  ^discretion.5 

Naturally  enough,  the  multiplication  of  the  documen- 
tary records  of  international  law  produces  some  confusion. 
As  has  been  seen,  this  leads  individual  states  to  attempt 
to  simplify  matters  by  reducing  the  number  and  the  com- 
plexity of  their  outstanding  obligations.  It  also  leads  to 

1  Wilson  and  Tucker,  Parts  III,  IV,  V. 

"Same,  Parts  I,  II. 

•Same,  Chaps.  XIII,  XIV,  XV. 

*Hershey,  Chap.  XIX. 

6  Wilson  and  Tucker,  §  3,  end  (briefly). 


efforts  on  the  part  of  states  or  private  individuals  to  digest 
or  codify  the  law  of  nations  for  scientific  convenience.  In  a 
sense,  all  the  writing  of  private  scholars  in  the  field  is 
merely  an  effort  at  codification,  for  these  scholars  cannot 
make  law,  they  can  only  record  it  and  summarize  it  and 
reduce  it  to  system  and  ordered  statement.  Some  among 
them  have  recognized  this  by  the  titles  adopted  for  their 
works;  thus  Fiore  calls  his  last  treatise  "International  V" 
Law  Codified,"  and  Field  and  Internoscia  expressly  call 
their  complications  "codes"  of  international  law.1  Since  /? 
1870  the  number  of  such  compilations  has  increased  enor- 
mously.2 

Official  codification  has  followed  at  a  leisurely  pace'. 
After  three  centuries  of  private  efforts  In  this  direction, 
the  states  are  beginning  to  make  up  in  part  for  their  indif- 
ference to  international  law  in  the  past.  The  "Digest  of 
International  Law"  by  James  Bassett  Moore,  compiled 
from  the  documentary  records  of  the  priiotfcgrf&eUnited 
States^and  published  by  authority  of  Congress,  is  a  semi- 
official code,3  as  are  several  of  the  compilations  made  and 
published  by  the  Department  of  State  in  1918-19.4  For 
fully  official  codes  and  codes  which  rest  not  merely  upon 
the  authority  of  one  nation,  we  must  turn  to  the  great  inter- 
national conventions  adopted  by  the  states  of  the  world  in 

1  Below,  Appendix  B,  §  12  especially  Boot,  Function  of  Private  Codifica- 
tion. 

a  Number  of  general  treatises  on  the  substantive  rules  of  public  inter- 
national law  published  before  and  after  1870,  by  decades: 

1600-1649 2  1830-1839 4 

1650-1699 3  1840-1849 5 

1700-1749 6  1850-1859 3 

1750-1799 6  1860-1869 10 

1800-1809 0  1870-1879 9 

1810-1819 3  1880-1889 17 

1820-1829 2  1890-1900.. 23 

This  table  does  not  include  renditions,  works  on  the  history  of  international 
law,  monographs  on  special  topics — including  the  vast  number  of  theses 
written  by  students  in  Europe  and  America  in  recent  years  on  special  topics 
in  the  field  of  international  law, — nor  case  books;  it  does  not  include  works 
on  international  private  law. 

*  Full  title  below,  Appendix  B. 

*  Martin  and  Baker,  Maritime  Warfare;  Baker  and  Crocker,  Land  War- 
fare, below,  Appendix  B,  §  12. 


190  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

formal  congresses  and  conferences,  such  as  the  Geneva 
Convention  of  1864  setting  forth  the  rules  of  law  regarding 
the  treatment  of  the  wounded  in  the  field.1    Such  acts  have 
multiplied  rapidly  since  the  opening  of  the  present  cen- 
<        tury.2    Thus  we  return,  in  the  last  stage  in  the  formation 
of  international  law,  to  the  practice  of  treaty  negotiation. 
From  such  acts  of  codification  it  is  a  slight  step  in 
point  of  form,  although  a  tremendous  stride  in  point  of 
principle,  to  the  action  of  legislation  or  the  making  of  new 
law.    The  existing  law  is  not  only  codified  but  also  revised. 
•    Finally,  entirely  new  law  is  adopted  to  supplement  pre- 
^  existing  law.     This  law  relates  to  fundamental  constitu- 
tional arrangements  in  the  society  of  nations,  such  as  the 
neutralization  of  Switzerland  or  Belgium,3  and  also  to  the 
details    of    international    procedure,    such    as    the    rules 
adopted  at  the  Hague  in  1907  for  the  conduct  of  war  on 
land.4    In  the  former  action  we  reach  the  highest  stage  of 
international  government.    Lawmaking'  is  the  final  process  x 
in  the  development  of  political  organization  and  practice. „/ 
/We  reach  it  thus  early  in  the  study  of  world  government 
I  because  it  has  developed  in  point  of  form  out  of  diplomatic 
negotiation  pure  and  simple,  winch  is  a  very, jmmitive  form 
Vqfjjiternational  practice.    And  although  international  law- 
making  is  beginning  to  pass  out  of  the  form  of  treaty  nego- 
tiation, it  still  retains  that  form  as  regards  several  vital 
features,  such  as  the  necessity  for  unanimous  consent  and 
the  contractual  form  of  the  law  produced.    To  these  aspects 
of  the  case  we  shall  have  to  turn  later  in  connection  with 
international  conferences  and  congresses. 

1  Oppenheim,  §  560. 

'Number    of    general   international    law-making    treaties    since    1800    by 
decades : 

(1800-1809 0                    1860-1869 2 
1810-1819 1                     1870-1879 2 
1820-1829 0                     1880-1889 2 
1830-1839 0                     1890-1899 4  ^ 
1840-1849 0                     1900-1910 14 
1850-1859 1 
"Hershey,  §301. 
4  Same,  §  83. 


PART  IV 
INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 


CHAPTER  XIII 

GOOD  OFFICES  AND  MEDIATION;  COMMISSIONS 

OF  INQUIRY 

IT  is  conceivable,  perhaps,  that  international  relations 
might  proceed  smoothly  from  month  to  month  and  from 
year  to  year  merely  by  means  of  the  practices  of  diplomacy 
and  treaty  negotiation.  If  no  other  complicating  factors 
were  introduced  in  the  problem  these  forms  of  international 
organization  might  be  sufficient.  As  a  matter  of  actual 
experience,  however,  they  are  not  sufficient  to  meet  all  the 
needs  of  the  situation.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  appear- 
ance of  what  may  be  called  the  international  dispute. 
The  international  dispute  arises  precisely  because  the  pro- 
cedures of  diplomacy  and  treaty  negotiation  are  inadequate 
to  provide  for  the  management  of  all  future  and  contingent 
relationships  between  nations,  and,  in  turn,  once  the  dispute 
has  made  its  appearance,  the  inadequacy  of  diplomacy  and 
treaty  negotiation  to  resolve  the  difficulty  and  settle  the 
dispute  is  accentuated  at  each  succeeding  stage. 

Direct  personal  diplomatic  negotiation  is  not  always 
inadequate  to  settle  an  international  dispute,  and,  where 
successful,  it  constitutes  the  first  and  simplest  method  of 
removing  the  trouble  which  its  own  negligence  or  inca- 
pacity has  allowed  to  develop.  What  happemTnere  isTnat  >  •*. 
the  machinery  and  practice  of  diplomacy  as  it  is  ordinarily 
conducted  catches  up  with  its  task.  It  removes  the  dispute 
by  securing  a  diplomatic  agreement  of  one  sort  or  another, 
including,  as  one  of  the  possible  forms  of  settlement,  an 
international  treaty. 

This  simple  method  of  dealing  with  the  international 

193 


194  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

dispute  is  not,  however,  capable  of  resolving  the  more  diffi- 
cult and  complicated  questions  which  arise  between  nations. 
The  technique  of  such  a  method  is  too  primitive ;  it  does 
not  possess  resources  of  procedure  and  treatment  adequate 
for  the  task.  There  is  nothing  left  to  the  contending  parties 
but  to  continue  to  put  forward  their  own  views  of  the  facts 
the  principles  and  to  urge  IneiFclaims  and  try  to 
secure  satisfaction  of  their  interests  by  bargains  and 
demands,  persuasions,  threats,  or  arguments.  What  is 
needed  is  an  entirely  new  approach  to  the  questions  in 
dispute,  and,  particularly,  an  approach  from  a  point  of 

(view,  a  right,  and  an  interest,  radically  different  from  that 
of  either  of  the  two  contending  parties.  That  method  and 
that  approach  have  been  found  in  the  practices  of  media- 
tion and  arbitration,  or,  to  speak  in  still  broader  terms,  in 
the  judicial  settlement  of  international  disputes. 
tX-  There  are  two  forms  of  diplomatic  practice  which  serve 
to  prepare  the  way  for  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement 
proper.  These  are  mediation  and  the  still  milder  form  of 
international  regulation  of  international  disputes,  good 
JL,  offices.1  Each  of  these  preliminary  stages  has  its  peculiar 
nature  and  function,  and  it  is  worth  while  to  exert 

5f  /I  //         some  care  to  draw  clearly  the  distinctions  between  them. 
CWvC** /Thousands  of  newspaper  readers  in  the  United  States  were 
I  misled  and  confused  in  April,  1921,  as  to  what  was  happen- 

•  ing  between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  in  connec- 

*  tion  with  the  dispute  between  Germany  and  the  Allies  over 
the   reparations  question,  by   failure   to   understand   the 
differences  between  good  offices,  mediation,  and  arbitration. 

Both  good  offices  and  mediation  begin  within  the  field 
of  simple  diplomacy,  but  in  the  end  they  go  very  far  beyond 
that  field  and  get  well  over  toward  arbitration.  On  the 
other  hand,  both  stop  short  of  true  arbitration,  and  good 
offices  stop  very  far  short  of  that  point.  The  use  of 

1See  literature  cited  below,  Appendix  B,  §  13.  The  treatment  in  this 
and  the  succeeding  chapter  covers  the  subject  to  the  end  of  1918. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     195 
one    or   the    other  roaa 


^ 

Equally  well,  the  use^oT^o^e^or  ihT 

a  settlement  of  the  dispute  and  render  a  resort  to  arbitra- 

tion  unnecessary. 

The  proper  occasion  for  the  exercise  of  good  offices  or 
mediation  is  the  existence  of  a  dispute  between  two  nations 
respecting  their  rights  and  duties  toward  one  another.1 
War  may  be  impending,  and  may  possibly  be  averted  by 
these  means.  Or  a  war  which  is  already  being  waged  may 
be  brought  to  a  close  by  securing  an  agreement  between 


the  parties.  This  agreement  may  be  an  agreement  on  the 
merits  of  the  case, — the  most  definitive  result  which  can  be 
hoped  for, — or  it  may  be  an  agreement  for  arbitration  on 
the  merits,  pending  which,  or  in  view  of  which,  hostilities 
are  to  be  postponed  or  suspended  or  even  terminated 
entirely.  In  any  case  the  result  will  almost  certainly  take 
the  form  of  a  treaty,  since  a  dispute  so  important  as  to 

-..»//  A. 

have  reached  the  stage  of  mediation  or  arbitration  can 
hardly  be  settled  in  any  less  formal  manner.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances described  the  resulting  treaty  will  very  often 
be  a  treaty  of  peace  or  an  arbitration  convention.  Media- 
tion in  time  of  peace  is,  naturally,  the  commoner  of  these 
forms  of  action,  but  there  are  many  examples  of  good 
offices  or  mediation  in  the  termination  of  wars,  as  when 
France  used  her  good  offices  to  bring  Spain  and  the  United 
States  together  in  1898.2 

Whether  the  action  in  question  is  to  be  called  "good 
offices"  or  "mediation"  depends  upon  the  distance  to  which 
the  parties  to  the  dispute  are  in^rte^rtogom~adopting  a 
new  method  for  settling  their  quarrel.  For  what  really 
happens  is  that  the  nations  in  dispute  are  invited  to  com- 
pose their  dispute  for  the  good  of  the  general  peace.  This 
invitation  comes  from  a  state  or  states  not  party  to  the 
dispute,  and  whether  it  amounts  to  good  offices  or  media- 

1  Satow,  §  619. 
'    'Other  examples  in  same,  §§  627,  628,  636.     \S 


196  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tion  depends  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  third  party  goes 
in  offering  assistance  in  the  premises. 

Good  offices  consist  merely  in  offering  to  provide  a 
meeting  place"  wifefe  representatives  of  the  disputing 
nations  may  meet  together  to  discuss  anew,  perhaps  under 
the  presidency  of  the  third  party,  the  subject  matter  of  the 
dispute,  or  in  offering  to  receive  and  transmit  to  the  other 
party  written  proposals  and  counter-proposals  dealing 
with  the  question  in  dispute.  Injmch^a  case  the  third  party 
refrains  from  giving  any  opinion  or  advice  upon  the  sub- 

O  O  J  IT  1 

stance  of  the  question,  and  confines  its  activities  to  the 
mechanical   steps  just  described.1     From  this  point   on, 
therefore,  good  offices  do  not  possess  any  resources  be- 
yond those  of  ordinary  diplomatic  discussion.     It  does, 
however,  serve  to  renew  discussions  when  the  parties  them- 
selves have  drawn  apart,  and  in  this  way  may  affect  the 
future  course  of  the  dispute  considerably.    It  is  undertaken 
in  the  hope  that  renewed  or  continued  discussion  may 
result  in  some  agreement.    It  is  based  on  the  supreme  truth 
/that  conference  is  indispensable  in  such  situations  and  that 
\  the  more  conference  the  better,  so  long  as  any  issues  remain 
x>pen  between  nations. 

In  mediation  we  reach  an  entirely  different  sort  of 
thing.  Here  the  third  party  takes  up  for  consideration  the 
substance  of  the  dispute  itself  and  attempts  to  discover  a 
solution.  This  is,  of  course,  of  far  more  significance  and, 
potentially,  at  least,  is  of  far  more  service,  than  merely 
inviting  the  parties  to  continue  trying  to  find  a  solution 
themselves.  The  mediator  enters  into  much  more  intimate 
relations  with  the  nations  in  dispute  than  does  the  party 
who  merely  offers  good  offices.  The  mediator  must  there- 
fore possess  the  confidence  of  the  parties  in  greater 
measure.2  There  must  be  no  suspicion  that  the  mediator 
is  attempting  to  secure  a  certain  solution  for  motives  of 

*Hershey,  §§306,  307;  M61ik,  15-28,  52-57;   Satow,    §§619-623,   626-G29. 
'Satow,   §§619,  631. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     197 

immediate  self  interest  in  that  particular  solution.  The 
mediator  must  necessarily  enter  into  discussion  with  both  v 
parties ;  or,  if  the  parties  meet  face  to  face  for  discussions 
between  themselves,  the  mediator  must,  in  the  very  nature 
of  the  case,  meet  with  them  and  enter  into  the  discussions,  Y 
whereas  in  the  case  of  good  offices  the  third  party  may 
never  meet  the  disputants  or  either  of  them.  The  mediator 
may  even  sign  the  treaty  which  embodies  the  settlement 
reached,  as  did  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  "in  the 
character  of  mediator,"  in  the  settlement  of  the  war  be- 
tween Spain  and  Peru,  Chile,  and  Ecuador  in  1871.  The 
mediator  may  thus  become,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
perhaps  merely  by  implication,  a  guarantor  of  the  seUle_- 
ment.1 

Tl  is  worthy  of  note  that  in  good  offices  and  mediation, 
and  especially  in  the  latter,  there  appears,  for  the  first 
time,  the  case  of  a  mandate  or  grant  of  authority  resting 

upon  international,  rather  than  national,  bases.     Diplo- 

A  ,....•.•••••-.•'  '       --.,  * 

matic  representatives  are  purely  national  agents.     Even 
the  diplomatic  corps  is,  at  best,  a  composite  of  national 
agents.    Except  for  the  general  international  consent  back 
of  the  existence  of  the  diplomatic  service  as  a  whole,  no 
truly  international  authority  is  exercised  by  the  diplomats. 
The  power  whose  good  offices  or  mediation  are  accepted  \ 
by  other  states,  however,  acts  as  an  agent  or  official  repre-/ 
sentative  of  two  or  more  nations  directly. 

Good  offices  are,  very  naturally,  offered  more  easily  and      S 
accepted  more  readily  than  mediation.    Once  begun,  how- 
ever, good  offices  may  develop  into  mediation,  if  the  third 
party  is  led  to  take  up  the  substance  of  the  question  at 
issue   between   the   parties.2     Thus    President   Roosevelt  /    . 
began  in  1905  by  merely  extending  his  good  offices  to  bring 
tfapan  and  Russia  together  at  Portsmouth  to  try  to  reach 

1  Satow,  §634;   text  of  treaty  of  1871  in  Martens,  Now.  Eec.  G&n.,  X* 
serie,  III,  475. 

2Hershey,  §  306,  note  4;  Satow,  §  619,  end. 


198  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

an  agreement  for  a  settlement  of  the  conflicting  interests 
at  stake  in  the  war.  At  a  later  point  he  was  led  to  interest 
himself  in  the  terms  of  the  settlement,  and  in  the  final  event 
he  practically  dictated  the  terms  of  the  settlement.  Simi- 
larly, in  the  following  year  he  began  by  persuading  France 
!and  Germany  to  go  into  conference  on  their  claims  con- 
cerningTCtorogco,  and  ended,  in  1906,  by  drafting  the  settle- 
ment reached  at  Algeciras.1 

As  in  all  other  fields  of  international  relations,  the 
terminology  of  this  body  of  procedure  is  somewhat  unset- 
tled, even  after  three  centuries  of  practice.  Thus  the 
formula  "good  offices"  is  occasionally  used  to  describe 
the  diplomatic  action  of  one  state  toward  another  for  a 
certain  purpose  apart  from  any  dispute  between  the  latter 
and  a  second  or  third  state.  Likewise  a  power  exercising 
"good  offices"  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  an  "inter- 
mediary" in  the  case.2  Finally,  the  two  sorts  of  action  are 
at  times  confused  for  sheer  want  of  knowledge  or  want  of 
care  in  the  use  of  terms,  as  in  the  above-mentioned  case  of 
the  German-American  exchange  of  21  April,  1921.3 

To  be  of  any  service  the  mediator  must  be  neutral  and 
impartial.  The  parties  to  the  dispute  are  naturally  very 
suspicious  of  any  outsider  who  enters  the  scene  and  under- 
takes to  find  a  settlement  of  their  quarrel.  Only  in  the  rare 
case  where  the  mediator  very  clearly  gains  nothing  by  the 
result,  and  where  both  parties  are  and  remain  equally  satis- 
,/fied  with  the  settlement,  will  the  mediator  escape  all  sus- 
*  picion  and  insinuation.  The  gratitude  of  the  parties  will 
only  be  earned  where  both  fool  that  they  have  secured  the 
better  of  the  settlement.4  What  is  probably  the  most  re- 
^  markable  case  of  mediation  on  record,  when  all  the  circum- 

1  Bishop,  I,  382  and  410;  467,  477,  and  490. 
* Satow,  §  626. 

f,      'New  York  Times,  22  April,  1921,  p.  1;  Germany  really  asked  the  United 
/    States  to  act  as  arbitrator,  and  America  declared  herself  willing  to  extend  her 
good  offices  and  pass  on  the  proposals  of  Germany  to  the  Allies;   yet  head- 
\     lines  and  sub-heads  wandered  widely  in  interpreting  the  exchange. 
V  *  Satow,  §  631,  end. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY 

stances  are  borne  in  mind,  came  about  when,  in  1918, 
Germany,  through  Swiss  good  offices,  in  effect  asked  the 
United  States,  an  enemy  state,  to  act  as  mediator  to  secure 
mutually  acceptable  terms  for  an  armistice  and  prelimi- 
naries of  peace  with  the  Allies. 

The  mediator  will  not,  of  course,  be  led  to  undertake 
such  an  ungrateful  task  without  reason,  and  yet  that  very 
reason  may  well  affect  the  formula  of  settlement  proposed 
to  the  parties.    As  a  rule,  the  third  state  is  led  to  act  in 
such  cases  by  national  interests  which  demand  protection. 
Indeed,  it  would  hardly  seem  proper  for  a  third  state  to 
take  action  in  the  premises  unless  it  had  some  substantial  s 
interests  to  defend.    Mere  idle  meddling  would  be  intoler- 
able and  entirely  void  of  that  essential  basis  of  all  legiti- 
mate diplomatic  action,  the  necessity  of  defending  substan-  \r 
tial  interests   of  the   state.     Such  a  requirement  today, 
however,  means  primarily  that  these  interests  are  first  of 
all  the  interests  which  all  nations  have  at  stake  in  seeing  >/ 
the  general  peace  preserved  and  war  averted.     Nations 
which  may,  as  prospective  neutrals,  expect  to  see  their 
commerce  injured  if  war  breaks  out  and  nations  which  fear 
that  they  will  themselves  be  drawn  into  such  a  potential 
war  have  every  reason  for  promoting  a  settlement  on  those  x/ 
general  grounds.    This  is  the  common  basis  for  joint  inter- 
national action  to  mediate  a  quarrel  likely  to  lead  to  war. 
In  such  a  case,  also,  the  action  may  be  affected  because  one 
possible  solution  rather  than  another  is  desirable  in  the 
interests  of  peace.    Thus  President  Roosevelt,  because  he 
was  primarily  interested  in  seeing  Japan  and  Russia  reach 
any  solution  which  would  end  the  war,  was  interested 
almost  as  much  in  seeing  that  the  solution  reached  was 
just  in  order  that  it  might  really  end  the  war  and  not  be 
merely  temporary.     That  meant  that  at  the  time  of  the  V 
settlement  he  was  compelled  to  oppose  first  the  Russian  y 
views  and  then  those  of  the  Japanese.  V 

Beyond  its  interest  in  the  restoration  and  maintenance 


200 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


of  peace,  however,  a  nation  may  very  well  be  interested  in 
y  seeing  one  solution  rather  than  another  adopted  by  the 
parties  because  of  the  indirect  advantages  to  be  had  by  that 
nation  from  one  solution  and  not  from  the  other.  In  the 
case  of  neighboring  states  such  a  condition  is  almost 
certain  to  exist.  And  if  it  does  exist  the  third  nation  will 
commonly  regard  that  desired  solution  as  just  on  general 
grounds  and  feel  free  and  even  "compelled"  to  promote 
such  a  settlement  for  the  sake  of  all  concerned. 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  the  contending  parties  are 
unaware  of  this  situation.  Indeed,  in  earlier  times  all 
efforts  at  mediation  were  regarded  as  nothing  but  indirect 
efforts  at  self-aggrandizement.  They  were  therefore 
viewed  with  grave  suspicion  by  the  parties  in  dispute. 
With  the  growth  of  the  cost  of,  and  consequent  desire  to 
avoid,  international  war,  and  with  that  development  of 
closer  international  relations  which,  in  actual  fact,  has 
made  tiie  just  solution  of  a  given  dispute  that  solution 
which  accords  most  with  the  interests  of  third  states,  this 
instinctive  hostility  has  somewhat  diminished.  Neverthe- 
less, the  action  is  not  so  simple  and  natural  and  free  from 
suspicion  that  it  can  be  admitted  without  a  careful  defi- 
nition of  its  legitimate  scope  and  procedure. 
f  To  begin  with,  the  third  party  normally  possesses  no 
jurisdiction  over  the  question  in  dispute  or  over  either  of 
the  parties.  They  cannot,  therefore,  be  summoned  to  meet 
and  settle  the  dispute  by  discussion,  nor  can  any  solution 
be  imposed  upon  them.  Even  where  the  action  is  to  be 
/taken  by  two  or  more  third  parties,  or  by  the  family  of 
nations  in  general,  no  such  jurisdiction  exists  at  common 
international  law.  Granted  that,  in  the  interest  of  the 
general  peace  and  of  general  justice,  or  in  its  own  special 
interests  in  peace  and  justice,  a  third  party  or  a  group  of 
third  parties  has  a  right  to  attempt  to  secure  a  settlement 
under  such  circumstances,  precisely  what  may  be  done  with 
that  end  in  view  remains  to  be  seen. 


201 

The  simplest  case  of  all  occurs  where  both  parties  to 
the  dispute  request  a  third  state  to  extend  its  good  offices 
or  to  act  as  mediator.  Nothing  then  remains  but  to  accept 
the  request  and  perform  the  task  as  skilfully  as  may  be.1 
In  rare  circumstances,  as  where  no  peaceful  or  just  solu- 
tion^ seems  possible  and  the  attempt  atlnediation  can  lead 
only  to  further  embitterment  and  to  the  useless  involve- 
ment of  the  third  power,  the  latter  may  decline  the  request. 


01  intermediate  stage  is  found — and  in  many  ways  this 
is  the  most  natural  form  of  procedure — where  only  one  of 
the  disputing  parties  requests  good  officeT~or'~mediation> 
in  view  of  its  own  inability  to  secure  satisfaction  either  by 
diplomacy  or  war.  The  third  party  still  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  other  disputant  or  over  the  issue.  Assuming 
that  the  request  of  the  first  disputant  is  to  be  acceded  to, 
the  third  party  may  only  turn  to  the  party  of  the  second 
part  and  offer  to  extend  good  offices  or  to  act  as  mediator 
in  accordance  with  the  request  of  the  first  party.  The 
second  party  is  under  no  obligation  to  accept  such  an  offer, 
and  will  accept  or  reject  the  offer  as  circumstances  dictate. 
Here  are  to  be  considered  the  possibility  of  securing  satis- 
faction by  persisting  in  direct  diplomacy  or  war,  the 
desirability  of  getting  some  settlement  at  once,  and  of  con- 
ciliating the  opponent  and  the  would-be  mediator.  If  the 
offer  be  rejected  there  is  nothing  more  to  be  done.  If  it 
be  accepted  the  subsequent  course  of  events  is  clear  from 
the  previous  case. 

The  third  case  arises  where  there  is  no  request  from  the 
disputants.  Here  the  would-be  mediator  may,  if  circum- 
stances seem  propitious,  as  already  outlined,  offer  to  both 
parties  at  once  or  to  first  one  and  then — if  accepted — to  the 
other,  to  furnish  good  offices  or  to  act  as  mediator.  The 
offer  may  be  accepted  by  both  disputants  or  rejected  by 
one  or  by  both.  In  either  of  the  last  two  cases  the  effort 
fails.  Thus  President  Roosevelt's  first  attempt  to  extend  f 

1  Examples  of  failure  in  Satow,  §  638. 


202  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

his  good  offices  to  Russia  and  Japan  was  balked  by  the 
attitude  of  Japan  alone.  In  all  of  these  cases  mediation 
may  be  offered,  accepted,  or  undertaken,  upon  certain  con- 
ditions previously  stipulated  by  the  disputants,  or  by  the 
third  party,  and  these  conditions  must  then  be  observed  in 
all  future  negotiations  unless  repealed.1  In  the  same  way, 
the  disputants  and  the  mediator  alike  may,  at  any  stage  of 
the  proceedings,  lacking  an  agreement  to  the  contrary, 
withdraw  and  terminate  the  whole  affair. 

Under  certain  circumstances  these  normal  principles 
may  be  varied  considerably,  apart  from  any  specific  inter- 
national treaty  agreements  touching  the  matter.  In  cases 
of  civil  war  or  colonial  revolt  the  request  of  the  rebellious 
group  for  mediation  may  not  be  accepted  as  freely  as  that 
of  a  state  whose  independence  has  already  been  recognized. 
The  quarrel  is  in  law  a  domestic  matter,  and  in  most  cases 
the  very  issue  is  that  independence  the  establishment  of 
which  could  alone  make  mediation  by  a  third  power  legiti- 
mate and  even  an  offer  of  mediation  welcome  to  the  mother 
country.  Napoleon  III  was  suspected  of  desiring  to  pro- 
mote the  separation  of  North  and  South  when  he  suggested 
mediation  during  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States.  This 
does  not  entirely  preclude  the  use  of  good  offices  and  media- 
tion in  such  situations,  but  it  does  mean  that  their  range 
of  application  and  their  value  is  strictly  limited.2 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  situations  where  the  "third 
party"  possesses  a  basis  for  action  which  gives  greater 
authority  to  the  "offer"  than  inheres  in  such  action  in 
ordinary  circumstances.  Such  a  situation  exists  where  a 
common  superior  possesses  a  right  to  come  forward  and 
invite,  or  to  come  forward  and  compel,  the  parties  to  accept 
good  offices  or  mediation  to  settle  their  dispute.  Such 
action  was  taken  in  times  past  by  Rome,  by  the  Papacy,  by 
the  Emperor,  and,  in  modern  times,  by  the  great  powers  of 

lM61ik,  31-32. 

'Satow,  §§632,  638,  639;   Melik,  4-51. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     203 

Europe.1  This  is  not  free  international  practice  at  all  but, 
so  far  as  admitted  or  tolerated,  is  constitutional  govern- 
ment. Where  not  admitted  voluntarily  and  justified  on  that 
basis,  but  imposed  by  force,  it  is  intervention.  In  that  case 
it  must  be  justified,  as  any  intervention  must  be  justified, 
not  by  reference  to  any  general  right  of  intervention  but 
to  the  special  circumstances  of  each  case,  the  necessity  of 
self-defense  or  equally  cogent  interests;  of  "armed  media- 
tion" there  can  be  none  in  normal  circumstances.2 

It  will  be  noted  that,  under  ordinary  conditions,  accept- 
ability, not  justice,  is  the  quality  sought  by  the  mediator 
in  the  formula  of  settlement.  The  object  is  peace ;  the 
mediator  is  not  a  judge.  For  the  higher  form  of  settlement 
other  procedure  is  needed,  namely,  arbitration.3  Yet  it 
may  be  suggested  that  immediate  justice  between  the 
parties  may  result  as  frequently  from  the  attempt  to  find 
a  settlement  acceptable  to  both  parties  as  from  the  de- 
cision of  an  arbitrator  who  knows  that  his  award  must  be 
accepted,  right  or  wrong,  but  who  has  a  very  inadequate 
body  of  legal  principles  to  guide  him  in  his  action. 

In  the  history  of  modern  international  relations  good 
offices  and  mediation  have  passed  through  various  stages 
as  far  as  their  organization  and  practice  are  concerned. 

In  the  early  decades  of  the  modern  period  the  keen  and 
jealous  rivalry  of  the  new  national  states  caused  these 
devices  of  international  conciliation  to  be  regarded,  for 
reasons  already  described,  with  great  suspicion  and  even 
with  resentment.  As  late  as  1905  Japan  was  inclined  to 
resent  American  interference  as  calculated  to  prevent  her 
from  obtaining  all  that  she  hoped  to  obtain  from  a  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  with  Russia.  As  a  consequence,  nations 
were  reluctant  to  undertake  such  a  work  of  pacification  and 
preferred  to  stand  by  and  allow  the  rivals  to  weaken  each 
other  by  fighting  it  out,  taking  care,  if  possible,  to  prevent 

1Melik,  37-41,  136-147. 

'Satow,  §  631. 

'Hershey,  §306;  Melik,  58-66;  Satow,  §641;  Vattel,  §328. 


A 


204  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

a  too  decisive  victory  for  either  side  by  intervention  or 
mediation  of  a  narrow  type  at  the  strategic  moment.1 

As  a  further  consequence,  the  practice  of  good  offices 
and  mediation  was  left  unorganized,  and  also  unrecog- 
nized, as  far  as  formal  approval  goes.  A  spontaneous 
offer,  followed  by  rejection  or  acceptance,  was  the  only 
means  by  which  these  practices  could  be  put  in  play. 
Moreover,  not  a  great  deal  of  encouragement  was  given  to 
the  making  of  such  an  offer.  Outside  interference  in  pri- 
vate international  quarrels  was  discouraged. 

Not  until  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  this 
opinion  expressly  repudiated.  Then,  with  the  growth  of  a 
body  of  sounder  and  less  febrile  opinion  on  the  various 
questions  of  international  relations,  and  with  the  spread 
f^w*  of  the  desire  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  the  settle- 
ment of  disputes  in  some  more  permanent  way  than  by  war, 
on  the  only  basis  likely  to  be  permanent,  namely,  of  justice, 
things  began  to  change.2  In  a  treaty  signed  at  Paris  in 
1856  at  the  end  of  the  Crimean  War  there  was  inserted 
a  declaration  in  favor  of  the  general  resort  to  good  offices 
for  the  settlement  of  international  disputes.3  Turkey  was, 
moreover,  required  by  the  peace  treaty  signed  in  the  same 
year  to  request  the  joint  mediation  of  the  Powers  in  future 
disputes  in  which  she  should  be  involved,  thus  incorporat- 
ing mediation  into  the  conventional  international  constitu- 
tional law  of  Europe.4  Again  in  1885  the  Powers  pledged 
themselves  to  have  recourse  in  the  future  to  mediation 
before  appealing  to  arms  in  matters  relating  to  the  Congo.5 

The  final  stage  in  the  development  of  the  organization 
of  good  offices  and  mediation  is  found  in  the  Hague  Con- 
vention dealing  with  the  pacific  settlement  of  international 
disputes,  drawn  up  in  1899,  and  revised  in  1907.6  In  that 

'Kamarowsky,  95-97. 

•Same,  81. 

1  Satow,  §  624. 

*  Below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  5. 

•Melik,  118-126. 

•Same,  215-251;  text,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  6. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     205 

Convention  the  signatory  powers  agreed  to  have  general 
recourse  to  the  good  offices  and  mediation  of  friendly 
powers  in  future  disputes  of  a  serious  character,  endorsed 
the  practice  of  offering  good  offices  and  mediation  in  suit- 
able cases,  even  during  hostilities,  and  attempted  to  pro- 
vide for  a  special  form  of  mediation  designed  to  settle  a 
dispute  and  prevent  war  by  a  process  approaching  arbi- 
tration in  its  nature.1 

Thus,  good  offices  and  mediation  were,  in  1914,  already 
in  a  relatively  high  stage  of  perfection,  so  far  as  their 
organization  is  concerned.  One  link,  however,  was  miss- 
ing in  the  system,  namely,  the  automatic  commencement  of 
the  process.  There  was  nothing  to  bring  these  practices 
into  operation  without  a  delicate  and  complicated  process 
of  offer  or  invitation  and  acceptance.  With  things  moving 
as  fast  and  as  furiously  as  they  did  in  July,  1914,  there  was 
not  time  to  get  these  practices  into  play,  not  time,  that  is, 
to  persuade  or  compel  the  German  war  party  to  accept 
conference  on  the  issue  at  stake.  This  lack  of  time  may  be 
traced  back  further  to  the  determination  of  Prussia  to  have 
war  on  the  issue  at  the  time.  In  that  view  of  the  matter 
it  is  no  defect  in  the  practices  of  good  offices  and  mediation 
which  is  responsible  for  the  occurrence  of  hostilities.  For 
these  practices  are  limited  in  their  efficacy  by  the  essential 
stipulation  that  they  may  operate  only  where  both  parties 
are  willing  to  accept  them  of  free  will.  "What  the  events 
of  July,  1914,  show  is  that  good  offices  and  mediation,  so 
limited,  are  not  enough,  and  that  other  methods  of  settling 
international  disputes  are  needed. 

Another  method  of  dealing  with  such  disputes  which 
serves  as  a  preliminary  to  arbitration,  and  which  should  be 
examined  together  with  the  exercise  of  good  offices  and 
mediation,  is  the  use  of  a  commission  of  inquiry.2 

The  commission  of  inquiry  is  based  in  theory  upon  two 

1  Arts.  2,  3,  8;   on  joint  mediation   as  such  see  Hershey,   §307,  Kama- 
rowsky,  91-102;   Melik,  70-80;   Satow,  §619,  end. 
3  See  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  13. 


206  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

phenomena  familiar  to  all  who  have  studied  international 
relations.1  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  undeniably  true  that 
much  of  the  difficulty  of  settling  international  disputes 
amicably  derives  from  the  initial  difficulty  of  establishing 
a  statement  or  version  of  the  facts  to  which  both  parties 
will  agree.  On  the  other  hand,  this  difficulty  perpetuates 
itself  by  allowing  passions  to  be  roused  on  either  side  which 
not  only  obstruct  agreement  between  the  parties  on  points 
of  principle  but  also  prevent  a  clear  settlement  of  the  facts 
in  the  case  in  preparation  for  agreement  on  points  of  prin- 
ciple. Given  goodwill  in  point  of  principle  to  start  with, 
it  would  still  be  of  little  avail,  and  would  often  be  destroyed 
very  shortly,  by  claims  and  counter-claims  on  questions  of 
fact. 

Thus  the  first  task  of  the  mediator  is  often  that  of  allay- 
ing international  tension  and  getting  agreement  upon  the 
facts.  It  may  then  appear  that,  the  facts  being  what  they 
are,  the  solution  follows  almost  automatically  because  of 
the  spontaneous  agreement  of  the  parties  on  the  law  and 
equity  of  the  case.  Seeing  that  such  a  task  is  useful  when 
performed  by  a  mediator,  the  nations  have  in  very  recent 
years  developed  the  commission  of  inquiry  to  perform  the 
same  function,  while  abstaining  from  any  treatment  of  the 
substance  of  the  dispute  in  principle.  The  commission  is 
to  take  over  the  function  of  ferreting  out  the  facts  and 
providing  time  for  passions  to  cool  and  for  inquiry  to  be 
made  into  the  real  merits  of  the  case. 

Here  for  the  first  time  we  meet  an  international  govern- 
mental body,  an  organ  made  up  of  several  members  repre- 
senting several  states.  The  diplomatic  corps  would  con- 
stitute such  a  body  if  it  were  more  closely  organized  and 
enjoyed  an  international  mandate.  In  the  commission  of 
inquiry  there  is  no  doubt  on  this  score.  Here  we  have  a 
body  of  persons  acting  as  a  unified  international  govern- 
mental institution. 

1  Beaucourt,  11,  12;  Bokanowski,  1-9,  especially  7. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     207 

The  commission  of  inquiry  originated  in  the  "  mixed 
commission,"  which  had  been  extensively  used  since  1794, 
when  the  institution  was  adopted  by  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  for  conducting  certain  arbitrations  provided 
for  in  the  Jay  Treaty  of  that  year.1  These  commissions 
were  created  to  settle  the  amount  of  damages  done  to 
property,  to  evaluate  losses  incurred  by  claimants,  to  carry 
out  investigations  and  hearings  chiefly  upon  questions  of 
fact,  and  to  report  their  findings  to  the  nations  appointing 
them,  as  a  basis  for  such  action  as  was  thought  fit  in  settle- 
ment of  the  claims.  In  such  cases  the  principles  had  usually 
been  agreed  upon  in  advance,  and  the  work  of  the  commis- 
sion consisted  merely  in  the  application  of  the  principles 
already  agreed  upon  in  the  location  of  a  boundary  or  in 
fixing  the  amount  of  a  claim.2 

The  commission  of  inquiry  is  organized,  as  was  the 
mixed  commission,  by  the  appointment  of  representatives 
by  the  disputing  parties,  with  or  without  an  umpire,  with 
provisions  for  majority  votes  or  unanimous  consent  as  the 
parties  may  prefer.  The  questions  examined  are  questions 
of  fact,  and  the  final  settlement  and  political  considerations 
are  removed  from  the  scene.  The  members  of  the  com- 
mission are  chosen  primarily  for  their  expert  scientific 
ability,  rather  than  from  the  diplomatic  forces.  The  at- 
mosphere of  the  commission  is,  therefore,  more  conducive 
to  calm  and  able  discussion  than  it  might  otherwise  be. 
For  that  reason  a  surprising  degree  of  unanimity  can  be 
obtained  in  the  decisions  of  the  commission. 

Following  the  report  of  the  commission  on  the  facts,  the 
parties  are  free  to  settle  the  questions  of  principle  or  of 
honor,  and  to  act  upon  the  application  of  the  latter  to  the 
facts  as  found.  The  fact  that  the  report  of  the  commission 
is  known  may  make  difficult  an  agreement  upon  the  prin- 
ciples or  law  to  be  applied,  since  the  outcome  would  be  a 


1Beaueourt,  18-47;  Bokanowski,  11-31. 

'Examples  in  Beaucourt,  36-47;  Moore,  Arbitrations, 


especially  Chap.  XL 


208  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

foregone  conclusion.  This  situation  may  be  avoided  only 
by  prior  agreement  upon  the  principles.  This  step,  how- 
ever, is,  in  turn,  likely  to  influence  the  decisions  or  dis- 
cussions of  the  commission  in  the  same  way,  although  not 
to  the  same  extent.  In  the  former  case  the  report  of  the 
commission  leaves  the  definitive  settlement  open,  and  there 
may  be  a  need  for  good  offices  or  mediation  or  arbitration 
on  top  of  the  work  of  the  commission.  For  that  matter, 
mediation  may  be  used  to  induce  the  disputants  to  accept 
a  commission  of  inquiry  or  arbitration  in  the  first  place. 
Still  further,  in  the  second  case  the  commission  may  amount 
to  a  court  of  arbitration,  as  did  many  of  the  mixed  com- 
missions.1 The  ''questions  of  fact"  and  "questions  of 
law"  are  not,  of  course,  always  distinct  or  even  distin- 
guishable in  these  cases,  and  the  commission  inevitably 
tends  to  include  legal  questions  in  its  work.  In  this  manner 
a  "commission  of  inquiry"  which  sat  in  Paris  in  1905  upon 
an  Anglo-Russian  dispute  over  the  action  of  a  Russian 
fleet  in  firing  on  English  fishermen  in  the  North  Sea  during 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  found  on  the  facts  and  also  upon 
the  liability  of  the  parties  arising  out  of  the  facts.2  Such 
action  serves  to  show  the  relation  between  the  commission 
of  inquiry  and  arbitration,  but  is  likely  to  bring  suspicion 
on  the  commission  of  inquiry  as  a  court  in  disguise.3 

Not  until  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  there 
any  general  international  recognition  and  organization  of 
the  commission  of  inquiry.4  Then,  in  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion already  mentioned,  the  nations  endorsed  the  institu- 
tion for  its  proper  purpose  and  defined  the  procedure  to 
be  followed  in  making  up  the  commission  and  in  its  opera- 
tion.5 The  experience  of  the  Commission  which  dealt  with 
the  Anglo-Russian  dispute  served  to  provide  information 

1  Beaucourt,  30-36 ;  Bokanowski,  33-40 ;   denial  in  Hershey,  §  308,  note  9. 
'Beaucourt,   105-109;    Bokanowski,    61-89;    Hershey,    §309   and   note   15 
thereto. 

'Beaucourt,  175,  176;  Bokanowski,  86-89. 
4  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  265  and  following. 
6  Text,  Arts.  9  and  10-36,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  6. 


GOOD  OFFICES,  MEDIATION,  AND  INQUIRY     209 

according  to  which  the  embryonic  clauses  relating  to  the 
subject  in  the  Convention  in  1899  were  greatly  elaborated 
in  1907.1  The  result  was  a  procedure  adequate,  if  invoked, 
to  deal  fairly  and  comprehensively  with  the  most  compli- 
cated problems  of  fact.  Here  again  the  weak  point  is  the 
voluntary  character  of  recourse  to  the  commission. 

A  great  improvement  has  since  been  made  by  the  United 
States  in  this  regard  in  concluding  some  thirty-five  treaties 
with  different  nations  providing  for  commissions  of  inquiry 
to  be  appointed  in  advance  of  the  occurrence  of  any  dis- 
pute between  the  parties.  The  commission  is  given  power 
to  act  upon  its  own  initiative,  when  such  a  dispute  arises, 
to  investigate  the  facts  and  report  upon  them.  A  period 
of  one  year  is  allowed  for  this  investigation  and  report, 
and  for  diplomatic  settlement  upon  the  basis  of  this  report, 
before  hostilities  may  be  begun.2  This  is  about  as  far  as 
the  institution  could  well  be  developed  without  passing  over 
into  something  quite  different. 

'Beaueourt,  192-224;  Bokanowski,  91-97. 

3  See  editorial  comment,  giving  facts  and  interpretation,  in  Am.  Jour. 
Int.  Law,  VII,  566,  823;  VIII,  565;  IX,  175;  X,  882;  and  Scott,  Treaties, 
entire. 


y 


CHAPTER  XIV 

HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION  BEFORE  1899 

NEITHER  good  offices  nor  mediation  provide  a  means 
of  settling  international  disputes  unless  the  solution 
worked  out  in  conference  or  proposed  by  the  mediator  is 
acceptable  to  both  parties,  and  it  will  command  the  assent 
of  both  parties  _only  if  it  appears  to  offer  to  them  the  maxi- 
mum of  advantage  obtainable  in  that  particular  case  at 
that  particular  time.  The  parties  may  conceivably  take 
account  of  the  advantages  of  a  peaceful  settlement  instead 
of  war.  They  may  take  account  of  any  indirect  or  remote 
advantages  to  be  derived  by  the  acceptance  of  a  settlement 
of  the  current  dispute  which  is  less  favorable  on  its  merits 
than  they  would  desire  to  accept.  In  international  rela- 
tions, however,  with  the  constant  rise  and  fall  of  national 
power  and  advantage  and  the  constant  shifting  of  support 
to  one  party  or  another  in  tne  diplomatic  game,  the  nations 
are  not  prone  to  seek  these  indirect  advantages  which  might 
come  by  the  support  of  legal  principles  calculated  to  bring 
a  general  benefit  in  the  long  run.  They  are  prone  to  seize 
^the_imniediate  advantage  and  take  a  chance  on  being  able 
to  do  the  same  thing  in  whatever  circumstances  may  arise 
in  the  future.  Thus  it  is  that  the  formula  proposed  by  the 
mediator  must  be  acceptable,  not  so  much  because  in  con- 
formity with  general  principles  which  might  be  acceptable 
in  themselves  for  constant  application  to  all  cases  at  all 
times,  but  because  it  represents  concrete  benefits  at  the 
time  in  the  case  in  hand. 

The  result  is  to  diminish  considerably  the  value  of 

210 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      211 

mediation  as  an  international  practice.  Mediation  is  the 
sort  of  task  which,  being  performed,  may  easily  have  to  be 
performed  all  over  again  at  once,  not  because  of  any 
change  in  the  subject  matter  of  the  dispute  but  because  of 
the  relative  positions  of  the  two  parties  and  their  abili- 
ties and  courage  to  demand  greater  things  for  them- 
selves. Each  mediation  is  a  new  task,  not  to  be  performed 
by  reference  to  any  preceding  act  of  the  same  sort  or  any 
principles  or  rules  of  law,  unless  the  results  of  the  applica- 
tion of  such  rules  or  the  rules  themselves  appeal  at  the 
time  to  the  parties  as  desirable.  This  prevents  the  use  of 
artificial  or  antiquated  legal  rules  or  principles,  just  be- 
cause they  have  once  been  established,  and  irrespective  of 
their  intrinsic  justice.  In  this  way,  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  mediation  may  secure  greater  substantial  justice  and 
equity  in  certain  cases  than  a  more  legalistic  settlement. 
The  result  in  the  total  number  of  cases,  however,  is  to  pro- 
duce instability,  uncertainty,  and  disorder,  and  to  allow  V 
free  reign  to  capricious  political  claims  which  take  no  i 
account  of  any  general  principles  of  law. 

This  is  partly  accountable  for  the  reluctance  often  felt 
by  third  states  to  undertake  the  task  of  mediation.  The 
mediator  has  no  fixed  rules  which  he  is  free  to  follow  in 
proposing  a  settlement.  Not  that  there  are  no  such  rules 
of  law  or  equity  in  existence  which  could  be  called  on  to 
settle  the  dispute.  There  may  not,  indeed,  be  any  such 
generally  accepted  rules  applicable  to  the  case;  many 
aspects  of  international  relations  are  still  in  that  position. 
Even  where  such  rules  are  available,  however,  the  mediator 
dares  not  depend  upon  them  for  fear  that  the  parties  will 
not  agree  with  him  or  with  each  other  on  the  merit  of  the 
rules  or  the  results  of  their  application.  To  the  world  in 
general,  interested  in  seeing  a  peaceful,  a  permanent  and, 
to  that  end,  a  just  settlement,  this  objectionable  fact  pre- 
sents itself  even  more  sharply. 

The  attempt  to  remedy  this  defect  in  the  practice  of 


212  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

mediation  leads  to  the  use  of  arbitration.  The  mediator, 
anxious  to  be  free  to  devise  a  solution  which  shall  avoid 
war  at  the  present  and  avoid  it  for  good  and  all  if  possible, 
so  far  as  this  particular  case  is  concerned,  may  ask  to  be 
freed  from  the  necessity  of  too  solicitously  conciliating  the 
particular  demands  put  forward  at  the  time  by  the  parties. 
He  may  then  be  authorized  to  apply  existing  principles  of 
law  and  equity  to  the  case  by  a  prior  agreement  of  the 
parties  to  accept  the  result  of  his  mediation.  Agreed 
mediation  results  in  setting  up  the  mediator  as  judge  of 
the  dispute.  This  is  arbitration  in  all  but  name.  Indeed, 
at  one  time  in  the  history  of  arbitration  the  judges  were 
called  indifferently  " arbitrators"  and  " amicable  media- 
tors."1 

Arbitration  2  may  be  formally  denned  as  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  by  judges  chosen  by  the  parties.3 
Several  elements  in  this  concept  deserve  special  notice. 

Arbitration  is  judicial  settlement.  That  is  to  say,  it  is 
settlement  by  a  person  or  group  of  persons  acting  in  a 
judicial  capacity,  attempting  to  settle  the  dispute  by  refer- 
ence, not  to  the  claims  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  parties, 
for  those  conflicting  claims,  indeed,  constitute  the  dispute 
itself,  but  by  reference  to  some  standard  common  to  both 
parties  and  external  to  the  particular  dispute.  That 
standard  may  be  merely  one  of  general  convenience — con- 
venience to  the  parties  and  to  the  community  at  large — or 
it  may  be  one  of  philosophical  justice,  as  conceived  by  the 
arbitrator  and  as  presumed  by  him  to  be  conceived  by  the 
parties.  Where  the  arbitrator  is  able  to  discover  legal 
rules,  rules,  that  is,  which  have  actually  been  accepted  at 
V  some  time  in  the  past  as  such  by  the  parties,  which  are 
applicable  to  the  case  in  hand,  he  will  not  hesitate  to 

1  Bishops  acting  for  Louis  XI  of  France  and  Edward  IV  of  England 
under  treaty  of  1475  were  called  "arbitrators  or  amicable  mediators";  Moore, 
Arbitrations,  V,  4831. 

'  On  arbitration  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  14. 

•Scott,  Conferences,  I,  188. 


HISTOEY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      213 

utilize  them,  even  where  those  rules  have  not  been  accepted  \s 
generally  by  the  family  of  nations.  For  the  arbitrator, 
although  acting  on  the  basis  of  a  pledge  by  the  parties  to 
accept  his  award,  knows  that  the  award  must  in  fact  be 
accepted  and  carried  out  by  the  parties  if  it  is  to  be  effec- 
tive. It  would,  therefore,  injure  his  standing  with  the 
parties  to  hand  down  an  award  not  capable  of  being  justi- 
fied by  reference  to  previous  declarations  made  by  them. 
Whether  the  arbitrator  decides  the  case  by  equity  or  by  law, 
he  is  acting  in  a  judicial  capacity,  and  where  legal  founda- 
tions are  not  used  in  the  process  it  is  because  they  do  not 
exist.  The  deficiencies  of  the  system  of  international  law, 
however,  should  be  kept  distinct  from  the  supposed  defi- 
ciencies of  arbitral  procedure. 

Note  may  be  profitably  taken  at  this  point  of  the  fact 
that  judicial  settlement  is  a  more  primitive  form  of  inter- 
national government  than  legislation,  or  even  administra- 
tion. Logically,  perhaps,  the  making,  the  administration, 
and  the  explanation  or  interpretation  of  law  would  seem  to 
follow  in  that  order.  Historically  it  has  been  otherwise. 
Judicial  settlement  began  in  international  law  while  yet 
there  was  available  merely  the  customary  law  and  special 
compacts  between  individual  states.  The  revision  of  the 
law  and  its  codification  have  come  much  later.  Meanwhile, 
of  course,  the  law  of  nations  has  been  somewhat  revised, 
digested,  and  codified  by  the  judicial  process.  But  the 
deficiencies  of  the  law  continue  to  operate  as  a  handicap 
upon  the  arbitrator.1 

The  arbitrator  is  not,  ordinarily,  left  to  his  own  re- 
sources respecting  the  standards  to  be  applied  in  settling 
the  case  submitted  to  him.  The  parties  to  the  dispute 
commonly  agree  at  the  time  of  the  submission  on  the  prin- 
ciples to  be  applied  in  the  case,  and  this  provides  the 
arbitrator  with  his  necessary  basis  of  settlement.  Where 
the  parties  simply  agree  to  a  settlement  "  according  to  the 

'Goodnow,  9,  72,  73;  Holland  Jwtspnwtercce,  56-57;  65-67. 


214  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

principles  of  international  law  and  equity"  the  arbitrator 
is  left  free  to  do  very  much  as  he  pleases.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  bases  of  settlement  are  closely  specified  by 
the  parties,  the  arbitrator  will  depart  from  them  at  his 
peril,  even  where  the  bases  agreed  upon  seem  to  him  to 
be  out  of  accord  with  common  international  law.  For 
settlements  according  to  common  international  law  a  sub- 
mission on  general  grounds  is  preferable. 

Implicit  in  these  conditions  regarding  the  basis  for  the 
decision  of  the  arbitrator  lies  the  most  significant  prin- 
ciple governing  the  practice  of  international  arbitration, 
namely,  the  principle  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  arbitrator 
and  all  that  this  involves  is  derived  from  the  special  con- 
sent of  the  parties,  exercised  in  a  choice  of  a  particular 
judge  for  a  particular  case  to  be  decided  at  a  particular 
time  and  place.1  There  exists  no  general  arbitral  jurisdic- 
tion based  upon  general  agreement  of  the  community  of 
nations,  covering  all  the  issues,  or  even  any  special  group 
of  issues,  submitted  in  advance  of  their  appearance  to  any 
court  of  continuous  sessions.  ^The  arbitrator  is  chosen  by 
the  parties  at  the  time,  and  the  issue  to  be  settled  by  him, 
as  well  as  the  time  and  place  of  the  trial  and  the  standards 
to  be  applied  in  reaching  the  decision,  are  defined  at  the 
same  time.  This  is  the  essence  of  arbitral  settlement. 


Endless  variation  is  possible  among  the  methods 
adopted  in  making  up  the  arbitral  tribunal.  A  single  arbi- 
trator may  be  chosen  by  agreement.  Each  party  may  first 
select  one  or  more  judges  and  then  an  umpire  may  be 
chosen  by  agreement.  The  umpire  may  be  chosen  by  lot 
or  by  the  judges  already  named,  or  by  third  and  fourth 
powers  who  have  been  named  by  the  parties.  All  of  this 
procedure  is  settled  in  the  agreement  for  submission.2 

In  each  case  submitted  to  arbitration,  therefore,  the 
critical  legal  step  is  the  agreement  to  submit  the  case. 
This  agreement  is  ordinarily  embodied  in  what  is  called 

1  Moch,  §  8. 

'Examples  in  Wilson,  Cases,  3,  42,  67,  82,  329. 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      215 

a  compromis  d' arbitrage,  one  of  the  minor  forms  of  inter- 
national treaties.  It  is  in  this  document  that  provisions 
are  made  controlling  the  choice  of  arbitrators,  the  scope  of 
the  question,  the  time  and  place  of  the  trial,  the  procedure 
at  the  trial, — including  the  languages  to  be  used,  the  forms 
of  argument  and  counter-argument  to  be  permitted,  the 
submission  of  evidence,  and  whatever  else  is  necessary.2 
The  bases  of  the  award  are  here  specified  and  the  document 
closes  with  provisions  for  the  rendering  of  the  award,  pro- 
visions for  carrying  out  the  decision  and,  perhaps,  for 
guaranteeing  execution.  This  is  the  simplest  and  most 
primitive  basis  for  an  arbitral  trial.1 

Where  a  dispute  involves  several  nations  the  compromis 
for  arbitration  may,  of  course,  be  signed  by  more  than  two 
parties.  In  that  case  the  relative  positions  of  the  parties 
in  the  trial  will  be  denned  in  the  text. 

Very  different  from  the  compromis  for  the  arbitration 
of  a  dispute  which  has  arisen,  and  providing  the  machinery 
and  rules  for  this  arbitration,  is  the  arbitration  treaty 
proper,  which  provides  for  the  submission  in  the  future  of 
disputes  between  the  parties  as  they  arise.  Such  an  agree- 
ment may  cover  all  varieties  of  disputes,  or  it  may  cover 
only  a  certain  list  of  disputes  described  in  general  terms, 
or  it  may  cover  all  disputes  outside  of  a  certain  specified 
list  of  exceptions.  In  any  case,  the  object  is  to  provide  in 
advance  for  the  submission  of  a  question  to  arbitration 
without  leaving  for  discussion,  at  the  time  when  the  dispute 
arises,  the  question  whether  it  shall  be  submitted  or  not. 
When  a  dispute  has  actually  arisen  between  two  nations, 
the  atmosphere  is  not  suitable  for  the  conclusion  of  an 
agreement  to  arbitrate,  even  though  the  question  be  such 
that  in  general — apart  from  the  current  case — there  would 
be  no  hesitation  to  submit  it  to  arbitration. 

1  Wilson,  Cases,  83,  for  compromis  between  France  and  Germany  in  Casa- 
blanca case. 

2  Same,  Arts.  I,  II,  III,  V,  IX,  and  compromis  between  United  States 
and  Venezuela,  1909,  Arts.  IV,  VI,  in  same,  212;  also  Hershey,  §311. 


•-f' 
• 


216  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  agreement  in  advance  to  submit  certain  questions 
to  arbitration  upon  occurrence  may  take  several  forms. 
The  earliest  form  was  the  arbitral  clause,  a  clause  inserted 
in  a  treaty  dealing  with  commjercial  or  territorial  or  any 
other  subjects,  providing  that  if  disputes  should  arise  in 
the  future  over  the  meaning  of  terms  of  the  treaty  or  any 
questions  arising  out  of  the  treaty,  these  disputes  should 
be  submitted  to  arbitration.1  The  arbitral  clause  was  in 
use  in  ancient^  Greece.  was  not  unknown  in  early  modern 
times,2  and  was  revived  in  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Tripoli  in  1796.3  Since  1875  it  has  been  in  com- 
mon use.4 

The  arbitral  clause  was  followed  by  the  bi-lateral  per- 
manent arbitration  treaty  as  just  described,  covering  differ- 
ent questions  of  one  sort  and  another,  apart  from  any  par- 
ticular treaty.  ^This  is  the  prevalent  type  of  arbitration 
treaty  today.  Examples  of  such  treaties  are  to  be  found 
dating  back  to  Medieval  and  even  Greek  and  Roman  times,5 
but  the  full  use  of  agreements  for  future  arbitration  came 
only  in  the  modern  period,  chiefly  after  1875.6 

The  third  stage  is  the  multi-lateral  or  general  arbitra- 
tion treaty,  providing  for  the  submission  to  arbitration 
in  the  future  of  all  disputes  of  a  certain  sort  arising  among 

1  Hershey,  as  cited. 

yf         *  Treaty  of  Miinster,  1648,  Art.  VIII;  Peace  of  the  Pyrennees,  1659,  Arts. 
CVIII-CX;    Treaty  of  Eisivick,  1679,  Art.  VIII;    in  Moore,  work  cited,  V, 
4832  and  following. 

"Art.  XII;  in  Malloy,  1787. 

*  Hershey,  as  cited,  note  23  ;  the  clause  may  extend  to  disputes  arising 
outside  of  the  treaty  in  which  it  is  found;  same,  note  24. 

/         "Treaty   of   1238   between   Genoa   and   Venice;    treaty  of   1321   between 
v  Brittany  and  England;  Moch,  §  27,  and  Moore,  as  cited,  4831. 

•Hershey,  §312;   Merignhac,  206;   Moch,   §86;   "Historical  Light  on  the 

League  to   Enforce   Peace,"   in  W.P.F.,  Pamph.   Ser.,   Vol.   VI,   No.    6,   8-9 

(December,   1916).     Example  in  Malloy,   290.     Treaties  for  arbitration   are 

naturally  less  numerous  than  arbitral  cases,  since  several  cases  may  be  sub- 

/      mitted  under  one  treaty.     The  following  table,  based  on  the  data  given  in 

^        Darby,    Lafontaine,    MSrignhac,    and    other    works,    represents    approximately 

the  multiplication  of  permanent  treaties  of  arbitration  from  1845  to  1914: 

1845-1854  ............    1  1885-1894  ............    10 

1855-1864  ............   2  1895-1899  ............   25 

1865-1874  ............  11  1900-1906  ............   65 

1875-1884  ............  9  1907-1914  ........  100 


HISTOEY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      217 

the  parties,  and  signed  by  a  large  number  of  states.  This 
type  of  arbitration  treaty  is  a  little  in  advance  of  general 
usage  today.  Examples  of  general  arbitration  treaties 
may  be  found  in  Medieval  Europe  l  and  in  Greek  times, 
but  the  device  has  never  been  widely  adopted.  Such  exam- 
ples as  may  be  found  all  date  from  1890  onward.2  There 
exist  a  few  such  treaties  today,  notably  the  Hague  Con- 
vention relative  to  the  collection  of  contract  debts  among 
nations  3  — and  even  here  the  result  is  accomplished  by 
indirection, — but  attempts  made  to  secure  the  adoption  of 
such  treaties  on  a  wide  scale  failed  in  1899,  1907,  and  again 
in  1920.4 

For  this,  in  the  technical  language  of  diplomacy,  is 
"  obligatory "  arbitration.  By  this  it  is  meant  that,  once  \ 
such  a  treaty  is  concluded,  the  signatory  states  are  under 
legal  obligation  to  submit  certain  cases  to  arbitration  when 
they  arise.  Of  course,  this  obligation  arises  from  a  sover- 
eign act  of  consent  made  at  an  earlier  time,  and  is  therefore 
a  self-assumed  obligation.  In  that  sense  it  is  not  obliga- 
tory but  voluntary.  But  at  the  time  of  the  dispute  the 
legal  obligation  is  real  and — what  is,  perhaps,  more  impor- 
tant— is  felt  very  keenly  in  the  state  of  opinion  existing 
at  the  time  of  the  dispute. 

On  the  other  hand,  even  the  existence  of  such  a  treaty  , 
does  not  avoid  the  necessity  for  a  special  agreement  at  the  j 
time  of  submission.    This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  issue  / 
must  be  defined  more  precisely  than  can  ever  be  done  in 
advance  by  a  general  treaty,  that  judges  must  be  chosen, 
times  and  places  for  the  hearings  selected,  and  all  the  many 
details  of  procedure  arranged.     No  general  standing  ar- 
rangements  of  this  kind  exist.     There  are  no   standing 

1  Moch,  §  26. 

1  Hershey,  §  313. 

8  Text  in  Malloy,  2248. 

4  Hershey,  §  313.    A  qualification  should  be  made  to  cover  the  very  recent 
action  of  some  fifteen  states  in  accepting  such  an  arrangement  in  connection  ^/ 
with  the  new  Court  of  Justice  established  under  the  League  of  Nations;  see 
below,  Chap.  XVI,  end. 


218 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


^.S*^ 


'  courts,  no  forms  of  action,  no  sufficient  code  of  procedure ; 
and  no  way  exists  for  making  good  these  deficiencies  ex- 

•'  cept  by  special  agreement  at  the  time.1  This  means  that  a 
large  part  of  the  force  of  any  agreement  in  advance  to 
arbitrate  certain  cases  as  they  appear  is  destroyed.  Not 
until,  in  addition  to  the  promise  in  advance  to  arbitrate  a 
specified  set  of  cases  as  they  arise,  there  exists  ja  standing 
court,  a  prearranged  method  of  initiating  the  action,  and 
a  previously  established  code  of  procedure  ready  for  in- 
stant use,  will  the  need  for  the  special  agreement  at  the 
time  disappear. 

The  questions  specified  for  submission  to  arbitration 
vary  greatly.  No  question  is  incapable  of  submission  to  a 

'mediator,  of  course,  for  he  may  devise  a  formula  of  settle- 
ment in  reliance  solely  upon  his  own  ideas  of  convenience 

';and  expediency,  apart  from  any  law  or  formal  equity,  so 
long  as  he  can  secure  its  acceptance  by  the  parties.  Where 
legal  standards  are  to  be  used  in  the  settlement,  however, — 
and  agreements  to  arbitrate  generally  specify  that  such 
standards  are  to  be  so  used, — the  range  of  questions  capa- 
ble of  submission  is  immediately  restricted  to  those  on 
which  there  exist  accepted  rules  or  principles  of  law  or 
equity,  namely  justiciable  questions.2  Such  are  questions 
of  treaty  interpretation,  which,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
was  the  earliest  type  of  question  submitted  to  arbitration. 
Such,  likewise,  are  questions  arising  under  national  statutes 
and  accepted  rules  of  international  law.  Yet  the  great 
difficulty  here  resides  in  the  number  of  questions  of  large 
importance  which  arise  in  international  relations,  for 
whose  settlement  there  are  no  legal  standards  available. 

Turning  to  the  other  side  of  the  question,  there  are  cer- 
tain types  of  questions  which  have  commonly  been  ex- 
cepted  from  the  scope  of  pledges  to  arbitrate  future  dis- 

1  Hershey,  §  313. 

'Same,  §319;  also  text  of  Art.  I  of  proposed  treaty  of  arbitration 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  signed  in  1911,  in  Am.  Jour. 
Int.  Law,  V,  Supp.,  253  (1911). 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      219 

putes.1  These  are  questions  of  honor  and  of  vital  interest,  V""" 
and  questions  affecting  the  national  independence  or  the 
rights  of  third  powers.  These  exceptions  may,  of  course, 
be  used  as  disguises  for  a  reluctance  to  arbitrate  based  on 
other  grounds.  "National  honor"  may  be  employed  to 
cover  anything  which  it  is  desired  to  withhold  from  arbi- 
tration. The  terms  are  so  general  that  they  are — like  all 
general  terms — subject  to  abuse.  Yet  they  do  mean  some- 
thing, and  their  abuse  can  usually  be  detected.  The  terms 
as  properly  used  merit  examination. 

The  exception  of  national  honor  explains  itself.2  No 
nation  could  bring  itself  to  submit  to  arbitration  a  question 
imputing  to  it  dishonor  and  shame,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  the  very  admission  of  the  possibility  that  the  nation 
had  acted  dishonorably  would  itself  be  a  dishonor  to  the  \s 
state.  What  is  to  be  treated  as  a  question  of  national 
honor  is,  of  course,  a  question  of  fact  with  which  the  law 
does  not  deal.  The  law  merely  says  that  such  questions 
as  are  in  fact  felt  to  be  questions  of  national  honor  may 
justifiably  be  withheld  from  arbitration.  The  more  impor- 
tant fact  is  that  conceptions  of  what  affects  the  national 
honor  are  changing.  The  national  sensitiveness  of  the  early 
modern  period,  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  and 
early  nineteenth  centuries — which  made  so  much  ado 
about  questions  of  diplomatic  precedence,  which  cast  sus- 
picion on  the  offer  of  good  offices  and  mediation — is 
dwindling  to  a  more  prosaic  and  sensible  tone.  This  is 
not  true,  of  course,  among  the  new  states  of  eastern  and 
southeastern  Europe;  and  the  exception  proves  the  rule. 
Nations  with  secure  prestige  are  not  likely,  in  this  unsen- 
timental  age,  to  hold  out  on  this  ground  very  long. 

Similarly  with  questions  which  affect  the  vital  inter- 

- 

ests,  the  independence,  the  very  existence  of  the  state.    No 
state  could  submit  to  arbitration  a  question  which  might 

1  Hershey,  as  cited,  notes. 
aPerla,  entire,  especially  Part  I. 


220  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

result  in  a  decision  that  it  had  no  right  to  exist.  The  logic 
of  such  a  step  would  be  questionable,  and  such  a  loss  of 
sovereignty  could  only  be  tolerated,  on  any  accepted  theory 
of  international  relations,  as  the  result  of  a  direct  consent 
on  the  part  of  the  state,  just  as  it  is  well  established  that 
in  the  interpretation  of  treaties  no  loss  of  sovereignty  and 
independence  may  take  place  by  implication  or  indirection. 
Again  the  important  thing  is  not  to  try  to  deny  the  prin- 
ciple itself,  for  the  principle  is  sound,  but  to  notice  that 
its  consequences  are  not  as  extensive  in  application  as  they 
once  were.  As  the  state  system  becomes  more  and  more 
/  stable,  and  the  nations  are  more  and  more  firmly  estab- 

(jb*-  lished,  the  questions  which  in  reality  do  affect  their  vital 

/i   1^      \  interests  are  fewer  and  fewer.    With  the  development  of 
fa  legal  system  defining  national  rights  more  fully,  less  is 
U*     f^  f  left  to  political  maneuvering.    With  the  continued  exist- 
.nfl*  ence  of  certain  states  side  by  side,  relationships  spring  up 

which  cut  down  the  zone  of  undefined  potentialities  between 
them.  A  new  state  may  have  its  existence  menaced,  and, 
what  is  more,  may  feel  that  its  independent  existence  is 
menaced,  by  questions  which  an  older  state  would  accept 
as  arbitrable  with  far  more  safety  and  equanimity.1  This 
is  not  merely  speculative.  The  new  states  of  Europe  are 
conspicuously  apprehensive  about  events  and  actions  in 
the  territories  of  their  neighbors  which  are  not  of  sufficient 
importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  older  and  more  firmly  estab- 
lished states  to  justify  in  the  eyes  of  the  latter  the  feelings 
of  the  weaker  states. 
j  As  for  questions  affecting  the  rights  of  third  parties, 

<i  -f^  the  case  is  somewhat  different.    Such  questions  are  likely 

to  increase  rather  than  decrease  as  time  goes  on;  at  the 

-p  same  time,  it  is  well  agreed  that  the  rights  of  third  parties 

may  not,  as  a  matter  of  principle^  be  settled  by  decisions 
between  others.  The  solution  lies,  apparently,  in  two  direc- 
tions. The  third  parties  may  be  invited  to  join  in  the  case, 

1  Bernard,  99,  bottom. 


HISTORY  AND  THEOEY  OF  ARBITRATION      221 

or  may  even  be  brought  in  under  standing  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration, as  was  done  in  the  Venezuelan  controversy  in 
1903. *  Or  secondary  arbitration  cases  may  be  instituted 
to  settle  issues  derived  from  the  decision  in  the  first.  After 
all,  this  is  an  exception  relating  not  to  the  subject  matter 
of  questions  submitted  to  arbitration  but  to  the  parties  to 
the  cases  submitted.  It  argues  a  defect,  not  in  the  nature 
of  arbitration,  but  in  the  existing  mechanism  of  conducting 
cases. 

In  actual  practice  several  states  have  agreed  to  arbitrate 

all  international  questions.2     There  is  revealed  in   such   -          < 
,.  .  .    .  „        .  .  ,  . ,     ,.  „  K*>AA.<*/>X* 

action  a  curious  mixture  of  cynicism  and  idealism,  or  prac-          ^     * 

ticality  and  romanticism.  Considerations  of  national  honor 
and  pride  are  put  aside  for  the  sake  of  getting  a  settle- 
ment without  the  expense  and  waste  of  war.  In  the  en- 
thusiastic support  of  the  peace  ideal,  the  limitations  of 
arbitral  practice  due  to  the  insufficiency  of  the  legal  mate- 
rials available  are  overlooked.  At  all  events,  the  tendency 
seems  to  be  to  eliminate  the  traditional  exceptions  as  de- 
scribed and  to  take  care  of  the  real  interests  formerly 
covered  by  those  exceptions  in  some  other  way.  It  may 
be  added  that  the  preliminary  question  of  the  propriety  of 
submission  may  itself  be  arbitrated.3 

Finally,  as  regards  the  questions  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion, it  should  be  recognized  that  there  is  a  vast  difference 
between  the  questions  of  public  law  submitted  to  arbitral 
tribunals  and  private  claims  submitted  to  international 
commissions.4  The  former  are  the  questions  which  attract 
attention.  The  latter  bulk  large  in  actual  practice.  Even 
in  the  latter  case,  of  course,  the  nations  whose  citizens  have 
claims  against  each  other  and  against  the  governments 
act  on  behalf  of  their  citizens  and  make  these  claims  their 

1  Wilson,  Cases,  12-39,  especially  34,  35. 
2Hershey,  as  cited,  note  55,  examples. 
3  Moch,  §  7. 

*  Public  questions:   Casablanca  case;  private  claims:   Canevaro  case;   in  S/ 
Wilson,  as  cited,  89,  239. 


1222  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

own  in  arranging  for  the  creation  of  mixed  commissions 
to  evaluate  them  and  often  to  adjudicate  upon  them. 
Moreover,  the  principles  of  national  liability  determining 
the  settlement  of  the  various  claims  presented  are  princi- 
ples of  public  law.  Without  the  latter,  and  the  action  of 
the  states  as  such,  no  hearing  and  settlement  could  be  had 
on  the  claims.  But,  granted  the  provision  for  hearing  and 
settlement,  the  claims  actually  settled  are  claims  of  private 
individuals. 

In  practice  there  is  often  a  close  intermixture  of  public 
and  private  law  in  cases  submitted  to  arbitral  courts.1  In 
the  end  the  commission  is  led  to  try  to  settle  the  cases 
coming  before  it  by  any  law  applicable — public  or  private 
international  law,  Anglo-American  or  Civil  law,  or  what 
not.2  And  the  further  we  go  in  that  direction  the  more 
evident  does  it  become  that  arbitration  is,  whenever  cir- 
cumstances permit,  judicial  settlement. 

•  <*>•  Once  the  arbitral  award  is  rendered,  it  is  subject  to 
no  appeal.  The  reason  is  to  be  found  in  two  facts.  There 
is  no  other  tribunal  to  which,  as  of  right,  the  case  may  be 
jrff*-  carried.  There  is  no  superior  court ;  all  arbitral  courts  are 
supreme  courts.  In  the  second  place,  the  parties  have 
pledged  themselves  to  accept  the  award,  duly  made  accord- 
ing to  the  convention  of  submission.  The  pledge  of  accept- 
ance having  been  given,  the  rendering  of  the  award  makes 
it  part  of  the  treaty  itself  and  of  final  effect,  pending  any 
action  having  legal  power  to  alter  the  obligations  of  the 
treaty. 

In  point  of  fact,  few  arbitral  awards  have  been  rejected 
by  the  participants.3    One  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 

1  On  relation  between  arbitration  at  public  and  private  law  see  remark- 
able document  in  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  Appendix  V,  giving  picture  of  arbi- 
i    tration  in  early  English  law;  also  see  Redman  entire,  especially  the  forms  in 
V       V  Appendix  for  future  submission,  submission  of  a  dispute  which  has  actually 
irisen,  et  cetera. 

a  Decision  in  Canevaro  case  rested  on  international  law,  Italian  law,  and 
the  law  of  Peru ;  Wilson,  243-259. 

1  Hershey,  §  312,  and  note  49  thereto;  Moore,  Digest,  §  1081. 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      223 

that  by  the  time  a  state  is  willing  to  submit  to  arbitration 
the  chief  desire  is  to  secure  a  settlement  of  some  sort  or 
other,  and  this  is  the  chief  reason  for  that  willingness. 
This  leads  to  the  mutual  pledge  of  acceptance  and  to  its 
almost  automatic  observance,  especially  among  Anglo- 
American  peoples,  whose  respect  for  judicial  decision  is 
naturally  strong. 

In  order  for  this  rule  to  operate,  however,  the  award 
must  have  been  duly  made.  An  award  made  in  excess  of 
the  authority  conferred  by  the  parties  submitting  the  case 
is  not  binding ;  nor  is  an  award  touching  questions  not  sub- 
mitted, or  based  upon  considerations  not  open  to  the  court 
acting  under  the  convention  of  submission.  Likewise,  an 
award  obtained  by  coercion  or  fraud,  the  use  of  threats  or 
of  dishonest  documentary  or  oral  evidence,  would  have  no 
binding  force.  It  is  commonly  said  that  in  such  cases  the  ^ 
parties  may  ask  for  a  revision  of  the  award.  It  would  be 
more  to  the  point  to  say  that  the  case  may  be  resubmitted 
to  a  new  tribunal  for  a  new  decision.  The  original  award 
has  no  legal  existence.  It  is  not  appealed,  revised,  or  over- 
ruled. It  is  of  no  further  importance  at  all.1 

jrn          S~~* 

This   whole   general   theory   of   arbitration   has   been  - 
worked  out  through  twenty-five  hundred  years  of  interna- 
tional practice.2    In  the  course  of  that  development  much 
has  been  done  to  bring  the  practice  to  the  high  state  of 
perfection  in  which  we  find  it  today. 

As  long  ago  as  the  time  of  classical  Greece,  four  or  five 
centuries  before  the  Christian  era,  interstate  arbitration 
was  extensively  employed  among  the  Mediterranean  city- 
states,3  and  a  system  of  procedure  was  elaborated  which 
compares  favorably  with  anything  put  forth  in  Europe 
until  the  later  nineteenth  century.  With  the  advent  of 
the  Macedonian  Empire,  of  the  Leagues,  and  of  Rome,  -y/ 

'Hershey,  §312;   Moore,  Digest,  §1081;   Nippold,  §16. 

J  On  history  of  arbitration  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  14.  v 

1  On  arbitration  in  Antiquity  see,  beside  Phillipson,  Eaeder  and  Tod,  entire.  \/ 


224  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Greece,  however,  saw  a  decline  in  the  practice  of  free  inter- 
national arbitration.  The  submission  of  interstate  ques- 
tions to  arbitral  tribunals  continued,  indeed,  and  even  in- 
creased in  frequency  for  a  time,  but  the  basis  was  the 
action  of  Alexander,  the  federal  Leagues,  and  imperial 
Rome,  in  compelling  subject  cities  and  provinces  to  settle 
their  disputes  by  submitting  them  to  arbitrators — often 
named  by  the  Emperor  or  the  League — instead  of  by  fight- 
ing them  out.  It  had  come  to  be  a  device  of  constitutional 
government,  not  a  form  of  free  international  practice. 
Later,  as  Rome  increased  the  pressure  for  complete  control 
over  all  sections  of  the  empire,  and  sought  to  perfect  the 
unity  of  the  state,  even  this  disappeared. 

During  the  period  of  the  barbarian  kingdoms  there 
came  a  slight  revival  of  arbitration,  only  to  die  away  again 
by  the  eighth  century.1  With  the  development  of  feudalism 
there  came  another  movement,  lasting  to  the  end  of  the 
Medieval  period,  which  had  some  appearance  of  interna- 
tional arbitration.2  Here  again,  however,  appearances  are 
deceptive,  and  on  closer  inspection  the  arbitraments  of  the 
Middle  Ages  turn  out  to  be  cases  where  the  Pope,  the 
Emperor,  or  some  superior  feudal  ruler  rendered  an  award 
in  a  dispute  between  parties  over  whom  he  claimed  a  con- 
stitutional authority.  Again  the  device  was  being  used  for 
the  convenience  of  the  superior,  not  for  its  merits  in  the 
eyes  of  the  parties.3 

It  is,  therefore,  to  the  period  of  the  Renaissance  that 
we  are  compelled  to  turn  for  the  definite  revival  of  inter- 
state arbitration  and  to  the  cradle  of  the  Renaissance,  the 
Italian  peninsula.  The  same  state-system  which  gave  rise 
to  modern  diplomacy  produced  like  results  in  another  field.4 
Between  1200  and  1300  there  occurred  some  one  hundred 
cases  of  interstate  arbitration  among  independent  Italian 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  202. 

'Moore,  Arbitrations,  V,  4825-4851  (translated  from  Merignhac). 

1  Scott,  as  cited,  203,  208. 

4  Moore,  as  cited,  4825,  4826,  4831. 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      225 

cities  and  principalities.1    From  Italy  the  practice  spread 
to  Northern  and  Western  Europe,  and  during  the  three   L    / 
centuries  from  1200  to  1500  interstate  arbitration  spread   ) 
rapidly  and  grew  greatly  in  prestige.2 

The  development  of  interstate  arbitration  in  the  modern 
period  was,  however,  retarded  somewhat  by  the  develop- 
ment of  the  national  monarchies  after  1500. 3  The  new 
absolute  sovereigns  would  no  longer  yield  to  the  arbitra- 
ments of  Emperor  and  Pope,  and  the  organization  of  free 
international  relations  was  still  so  feeble  as  to  offer  noth- 
ing in  the  place  of  the  earlier  form  of  procedure.  Arbitra- 
tion by  free  agreement  was  still  in  the  most  elementary 
stage.  The  kings  would  brook  no  checks  and  legalistic 
hindrances  upon  their  power.  The  ready  appeal  to  arms* ; 
was  too  simple  and  natural  to  be  put  aside  for  such  an/ 
elaborate  and  considered  device  as  arbitration.  The  high 
temper  and  excessive  national  sensitiveness  of  the  period 
quite  prevented  the  further  growth  of  international  arbi- 
tration until  well  into  the  nineteenth  century.  Less  use, 
it  clearly  appears,  was  made  of  arbitration  from  1500  to 
1800  than  in  the  three  centuries  preceding. 

The  year  1794  is  frequently  taken  as  the  date  from 
which  the  history  of  modern  international  arbitration  is  rT 
to  be  traced.4  In  a  sense  this  is  accurate,  for  the  Jay  treaty 
of  that  year,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  7.-  yl 
made  provision  for  three  arbitrations  and  thus  inaugurated 
that  Anglo-American  practice  of  arbitration  which  has  been 
the  leading  factor  in  promoting  the  development  of  arbi- 
tration since  that  time.  Things  moved  rather  slowly,  how- 
ever, until  the  Napoleonic  period  had  passed,  and  the  period 
of  the  revolutionary  movements  of  the  early  decades  of  the 
last  century.5  By  1850  a  noticeable  increase  in  the  number 

1  Moch,   §  26 ;   Moore,  as  cited,  4829. 

'Moore,  4828. 

1  Moch,   §  29. 

4  For  example,  by  Scott,  as  cited,  210,  216,  224. 

•Moch,  41;  Moore,  4851;   Scott,  224. 


226  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  arbitrations  had  set  in.  In  1872  came  the  celebrated 
Geneva  Arbitration  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  and  the  effect  of  this  demonstration  of  the  feasi- 
bility of  arbitration  for  complicated,  delicate,  and  highly 
contentious  questions  between  great  states  was  soon  evi- 
dent.1 There  was  a  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  arbi- 
Frations  down  to  1899,  and  after  that  a  still  more  rapid 
increase.2  In  the  years  from  1899  to  1914  arbitration  as- 
sumed the  proportions  of  an  international  fad,  with  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  still  leading  the  move- 
ment, but  with  all  states  of  the  world  joining  in  the  vogue.3 
The  Latin- American  states — for  reasons  better  left  to  con- 
jecture— have  adopted  the  practice  with  acclaim,  have  in- 
corporated provisions  relating  to  arbitration  in  their 
national  constitutions,  and  have  even  pretended  to  regard 
it  as  a  peculiarly  American  institution.4 

By  1899  it  became  evident  that  something  might  well 
be  done  to  place  international  arbitration  upon  a  more 
secure  footing  than  that  of  bi-lateral  agreements  for  the 
submission  to  special  tribunals  of  cases  as  they  arose. 

1  Moore,  Arbitrations,  Chap.  XIV ;  Digest,  §  1330. 

'  The  following  table,  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  data  given  by 
Darby,  Lafontaine,  and  others,  represents  approximately  the  number  of  cases 
submitted  to  arbitration  from  1794  to  1914: 

1794-1800 4  1861-1880 44 

1801-1820 11  1881-1900 89 

1821-1840 8  1901-1914 200 

1841-1860 19 

Compare  Scott,  224-226;  also  Hershey,  §80,  notes;  W.P.F.,  Pamph.  Ser., 
Vol.  VI,  No.  6,  as  cited,  7-8. 

*  The  following  table,  constructed  as  were  the  tables  above,  shows  ap- 
proximately the  relative  frequency  with  which  different  nations  have  sub- 
mitted cases  to  arbitration  from  1794  to  1914: 

Great  Britain    70 

United  States    56 

Chile    26 

France   26 

Peru     13 

Portugal    12 

Brazil    11 

Argentina     10 

Compare  Lafontaine,  4,  5. 

4  Alvarez,  255;  Constitution  of  Venezuela,  Art.  120,  in  Rodriguez,  I,  230; 
Quesada,  xi,  125. 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY  OF  ARBITRATION      227 

There  had  been  a  constant  development,  as  has  been  seen, 
in  the  basis  or  foundation  of  international  arbitration  in 
the  past.1  Accordingly,  an  effort  was  made  in  1899,  at  the 
first  Hague  Peace  Conference,  to  provide  a  yet  broader  and 
more  stable  foundation ;  and  this  attempt  was  reviewed  and 
revised  at  the  second  Conference  in  1907.2  As  a  result, 
there  came  into  existence  what  may  be  called  the  Hague 
system  of  arbitration,  including  certain  institutions  and 
certain  methods  of  practice  adopted  for  use  by  the  nations 
participating  in  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  the 
system.  Down  to  1920  this  Hague  system  constituted  the\ 
highest  development  of  general  international  arbitration,  J 
and  as  such  it  deserves  special  attention. 

aHershey,   §§311-313,  and  notes. 

a  Text  in  Appendix  A,  below,  Document  No.  6. 


CHAPTER  XV 
THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM 

AS  far  as  international  arbitration  was  concerned,  the 
members  of  the  Peace  Conference  which  met  at  The 
Hague  in  May,  1899,  had  a  fairly  obvious  task  before  them. 
Arbitration  was  an  institution  of  long  standing  among  indi- 
vidual nations.  It  needed,  therefore,  not  approval  in  prin- 
ciple, but  such  practical  reorganization  as  would  improve 
its  effectiveness  in  operation.  Specifically,  what  was 
needed,  as  every  student  of  the  problem  knew,  whether  he 
desired  to  see  that  need  satisfied  or  not,  was  a  permanent 
court  of  arbitration,  always  available  to  all  the  nations,  as 
member  states  in  an  arbitral  union,  so  to  speak,1  and  com- 
petent to  deal  automatically  with  certain  types  of  cases 
defined  in  advance.  If  the  commencement  of  proceedings 
in  the  court  could  be  facilitated  by  the  elimination  of  the 
need  for  special  consent  by  the  parties  in  each  case  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration,  so  much  the  better.  Some  of  these 
results  were,  after  a  fashion,  obtained;  and  the  Hague 
system  of  arbitration  must  be  regarded  as,  up  to  the  year 
1920,  a  thing  standing  by  itself  and  entitled  to  full  con- 
sideration in  its  own  name.2 

In  the  process  of  reorganizing  international  arbitration 
on  broader  foundations,  the  Conference  began,  as  has  been 
seen,  by  reorganizing  the  practice  of  good  offices  and  media- 
tion. These  topics  constitute  the  subject  matter  of  the 
opening  articles  of  the  First  Convention,  known  as  the 
Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes,  signed  at  The  Hague  in  July,  1899.3 

1  On  Hague  system  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  15. 

"  Text  of  the  Convention,  as  revised  in  1907,  below,  in  Appendix  A,  Docu- 
ment No.  6,  with  italics  showing  portions  changed  since  1899.  Cited  here- 
after as  "I  H.C.  '07." 

1  Sehiicking,  by  title. 

228 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         229 

Passing  on  to  arbitration  proper,  the  Convention  pro- 
vided for  a  panel  of  judges  and  a  code  of  procedure  J — 
and  that  is  about  all.  The  "court"  created  is  permanent 
only  in  the  sense  that  there  is  constantly  on  file  a  list  of 
persons  in  the  various  states  participating  in  the  plan  who 
may  be  chosen  by  the  parties  to  a  dispute  to  act  as  arbi- 
trators between  them.  Such  a  choice,  however,  .must  be 
made  in  the  same  way  as  before,  namely,  by  an  arbitration 
agreement,  or  compromis,  which  defines  the  issue,  indicates 
the  place  and  date  of  trial,  and  names  the  judges  or  pro- 
vides for  the  method  of  selecting  them  from  the  member- 
ship of  the  "permanent  court."  It  is  true  that  it  is  not  as 
necessary  as  it  once  was  to  provide  in  the  compromis  a 
detailed  plan  of  procedure  for  the  arbitration,  inasmuch 
as  the  Hague  Convention  itself  attempts  to  do  this.  There 
is,  however,  nothing  to  prevent  the  parties  from  framing  a 
special  code  of  procedure  in  each  case. 

This  is  the  essential  defect  of  the  Hague  court.  It  does 
not  even  obviate  certain  mechanical  steps  which  must  be 
taken  in  submitting  a  case  to  arbitration  unless  the  parties 
to  the  case  are  affirmatively  desirous  of  following  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  First  Convention.  Even  then  they  must 
consume  a  certain  amount  of  time  in  the  formation  of  a 
special  tribunal.  The  procedure — on  mere  mechanical 
grounds — is  far  from  automatic. 

This  is  still  further  true  regarding  the  questions  which 
are  or  are  not  to  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  There  is  no 
list  of  questions  or  types  of  questions  previously  agreed 
upon  as  suitable  for  arbitration  and  to  be  referred  to  ar- 
bitration in  one  way  or  another — by  action  of  one  party  or 
by  action  of  the  court — without  special  consideration  and 
discussion  at  the  time.  In  other  words,  the  court  has  no 
continuous  jurisdiction  over  a  succession  of  cases;  its 
jurisdiction  is  episodic  and  intermittent. 

This  has  ordinarily  been  described  by  saying  that  there 

*I  H.C.  '07,  Arts.  44,  51-85  (I  H.C.  '99,  Arts.  23,  30-57). 


230  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

is  no  obligatory  arbitration  under  the  Hague  Convention. 
Attempts  were,  indeed,  made  to  secure  the  acceptance  of 
various  schemes  for  submitting  cases  to  arbitration  auto- 
matically as  they  arose.  No  headway  could  be  made  in  this 
direction  in  1899.  Hence  it  is  said  that  obligatory  arbitra- 
tion failed  of  acceptance.  As  has  been  suggested,  this 
form  of  statement  leaves  much  to  be  desired.  No  arbitra- 
tion founded  upon  previous  agreement — as  this  would  be — 
can  be  called  obligatory  in  any  absolute  sense.  On  the 
other  hand,  arbitrations  on  special  agreements  are  fully 
obligatory,  once  the  agreement  is  signed.1  Moreover,  the 
essence  of  the  procedure  which  is  so  desirable  is  not  the  im- 
position upon  reluctant  states  against  their  will  of  lists  of 
cases  suitable  for  arbitration,  but  merely  the  agreement 
upon  suitable  types  of  cases  in  advance,  to  save  time  and 
exasperation  when  a  dispute  actually  arises. 

Of  course,  the  resistance  put  forward  by  the  opposition 
has  its  own  explanation.  The  nations  desired  to  retain 
the  power  to  block  the  impartial  arbitration  of  cases  which 
they  did  not  feel  confident  of  winning  and  were  not  willing 
to  risk  losing.2  In  addition  there  was  a  vague  feeling  of 
opposition  to  this  sort  of  thing  in  general,  that  is,  to  inter- 
national courts  and  the  attempt  to  create  a  permanent  juris- 
diction in  this  way.  The  opposition  developed  a  still  more 
detailed  set  of  arguments  at  the  Second  Conference  at  The 
Hague,  when  an  effort  was  made  to  carry  farther  the  move- 
ment for  obligatory  arbitration. 

The  First  Conference  also  created  a  Bureau  to  admin- 
ister the  First  Convention,  including  the  articles  dealing 
with  good  offices  and  mediation ;  this  Bureau  is  placed  un- 
der the  supervision  of  the  diplomatic  corps  stationed  at  The 
Hague,  converted  for  this  purpose  into  a  Permanent  Ad- 
ministrative Council.3  In  a  sense  this  supplies  the  greatest 

'Taft,  96-98,  112-114. 

•Same,  112,  126. 

»I  H.C.  '07,  Arts.  43,  49  (I  H.C.  '99,  Arts.  22,  28). 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         231 

element  of  permanence  and  continuity  which  the  Court 
possesses.  The  records  of  the  Court  are  kept  in  the  Bu- 
reau, and  business  is  conducted  through  the  Bureau  at  the 
time  of  arbitral  trials  before  the  Court  and  during  the 
intervals  between  cases. 

It  may  well  be  wondered,  however,  whether  the  bare 
facts  thus  related  tell  the  whole  story  of  the  action  of  1899 
and  of  the  Court  itself.  A  large  part  of  the  work  of  1899 
is  to  be  found  in  the  effect  on  public  opinion  and  the  public 
imagination.  Ideas  are  dynamic  things,  and  the  expecta- 
tions aroused  by  the  efforts  of  the  Conference  could  not  be 
entirely  suppressed  even  by  the  failure  of  the  Conference 
to  satisfy  them.  They  remained  to  operate  in  the  years 
after  1899.  Indeed,  the  results  of  1899  were  for  this  reason 
estimated  more  highly  than  they  deserved,  and  a  steady 
practice  of  arbitration  at  The  Hague  was  expected.  When 
these  expectations  were  deceived,  and  the  defects  of  the 
scheme  of  1899  were  made  manifest,  the  same  force  of 
opinion  and  desire  was  converted  into  a  demand  for  reor- 
ganization and  improvement. 

The  Second  Conference  held  at  The  Hague  to  deal  with 
these  matters  met  in  June,  1907,  and  took  up  at  once  the 
task  of  revising  the  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement 
of  International  Disputes.1  During  the  years  1899-1907 
four  cases,  all  of  great  importance  and  complexity,  had 
been  submitted  to  arbitration  at  The  Hague,2  and  this  body 
of  experience  served,  along  with  the  general  desire  for  a 
system  of  arbitration  stronger  than  that  provided  in  1899, 
as  the  foundation  for  changes  made  and  attempted  to  be 
made  in  the  First  Convention.  The  changes  actually  made 
indicate  both  the  nature  of  the  Hague  system  as  it  stood  in 
1920  and,  indirectly,  the  nature  of  the  difficulties  en- 
countered in  the  establishment  and  operation  of  the  Hague 
Court. 

1  Deuxieme  Conference,  I,  399-454. 
'Wilson,  Cases,  ix,  1-81. 


232  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Certain  changes  were  made  in  the  rules  governing  the 
organization  of  the  Court.1  Thus,  a  limit  was  placed  upon 
the  selection  by  parties  to  a  dispute  of  nationals  as  members 
of  the  trial  tribunal.2  Likewise,  members  of  the  Court  were 
forbidden  to  act  as  agents  or  counsel  before  the  Court  ex- 
cept on  behalf  of  the  state  appointing  them.3  A  process  of 
drawing  lots  was  adopted  for  settling  disputes  between 
the  parties  over  the  choice  of  the  umpire  on  the  tribunal.4 
Provision  was  made  whereby  one  party  to  a  dispute  might 
notify  the  Bureau  of  its  willingness  to  submit  a  dispute  to 
arbitration  and  the  Bureau  was  authorized  thereupon  to 
notify  the  other  disputant.5  By  these  steps  the  character 
of  the  tribunal  was  elevated  somewhat,  the  element  of 
diplomatic  negotiation  and  of  good  offices  and  mediation  in 
the  preliminary  procedure  was  cut  down,  and  a  means  of 
getting  the  case  before  the  Court  was  adopted  which  might 
facilitate  matters  when  a  dispute  arose.  An  attempt  to 
eliminate  all  national  representatives  from  the  trial 
tribunal  failed  of  acceptance.6 

The  code  of  procedure  of  the  Court  was  altered  at  many 
points.7  The  subjects  to  be  settled  in  the  compromis  were 
defined  in  great  detail.  This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  some 
difficulties  had  arisen  in  the  period  since  1899  because  par- 
ties to  cases  to  be  submitted  to  arbitration  had  failed  to 
settle  at  the  beginning  of  the  trial  all  of  the  manifold 
points  of  procedure  involved.  Power  to  frame  the  com- 
promis was  even  conferred  upon  the  Court,  or,  in  effect, 
upon  the  tribunal  selected  to  try  the  case.  The  chief  func- 
tion of  the  compromis,  the  choice  of  arbitrators,  would 
in  such  cases  be  committed  to  a  previous  agreement,  a  sort 
of  pre-compromis,  providing  for  submission  and  naming 

1 1  H.C.   '07,  Arts.  44-46. 

'Same,  Art.  45,  Par.  3. 

'Same,  Art.  62,  Par.  3. 

*Same,  Art.  45,  Pars.  4-6. 

•Same,  Art.  48,  Pars.  3,  4. 

*  Deuxifme  Conference,  I,  419. 

7 1  H.C.   '07,  Arts.  52,  53,  61,  63,  64,  67-74. 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         233 

the  tribunal,  but  leaving  the  details  of  procedure  to  be 
fixed  by  the  tribunal  itself.  This  is  a  weak  suggestion  of 
what  might  be  done  to  allow  the  Court  to  take  jurisdiction 
in  proper  cases  on  its  own  initiative. 

Provisions  were  inserted  dealing  with  difficulties  which 
had  arisen  in  regard  to  the  languages  to  be  used  before  the 
tribunals  and  the  periods  of  time  allowed  in  the  various 
stages  of  the  trial.1  The  mechanical  ease  and  consequent 
smoothness  with  which  arbitration  may  be  conducted  has 
great  influence  upon  the  willingness  of  parties  to  resort  to 
arbitration  and  upon  the  soundness  of  the  result.  New 
powers  were  conferred  on  the  Court  to  secure  evidence 
from  the  parties  or  in  the  territories  of  third  states.2  Dis- 
putes regarding  the  interpretation  and  execution  of  awards 
were  to  be  submitted  to  the  tribunal  which  made  the  award.3 

Finally,  a  new  chapter  of  five  articles  was  added  to  the 
Convention  providing  a  simpler,  less  tedious,  and  less  ex- 
pensive method  of  arbitration  "by  summary  procedure."4 
It  \vas  hoped  that  this  would  encourage  smaller  and  poorer 
states  to  use  the  Court  more,  and  that  it  would,  in  general, 
speed  things  up.  Just  as  in  national  jurisprudence  the 
cost  and  delay  of  litigation  may  well  be  prohibitive  to 
some  potential  parties  to  a  trial  at  law,  so  here  the  cost 
and  delay  of  arbitration  was  felt  to  be  a  serious  obstacle 
to  more  frequent  recourse  to  the  Court  at  The  Hague.5 

With  all  these  modifications,  however,  the  essentials  of 
the  Hague  system  stand  as  in  1899.  There  is  a  panel  of 
names  from  which  tribunals  for  the  trial  of  special  cases 
may  be  selected  at  will  by  parties  agreeing  upon  the  sub- 
mission of  a  given  dispute  to  the  Court  for  arbitration. 
The  parties  agree  in  advance  to  accept  the  award  and  pro- 
ceed to  plead  their  cases  by  written  and  oral  arguments 

1 1  H.C.  '07,  Arts.  61,  63. 

'Same,  Arts.  75-76. 

*Same,  Art.  82. 

*Same,  Arts.  86-90. 

6  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  302. 


234  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

before  the  tribunal.1  The  tribunal  decides  the  questions 
submitted  to  it  by  a  majority  vote,2  renders  an  award,  and 
gives  the  reasons  which  had  led  to  the  decision;  and  from 
this  award  there  is  no  appeal.3  There  is  a  provision 
whereby  non-signatory  states  may  join  the  Hague  system,4 
and  in  1914  there  were  some  thirty  members.5  From  1907 
to  1914  some  twelve  cases  were  submitted  to  the  Court 
under  treaties,  among  states  which  were  members  of  the 
Hague  system,  providing  for  arbitration  of  disputes  be- 
tween the  parties  as  they  arise.6  The  Hague  system  does 
not,  of  course,  supplant  such  treaties;  on  the  contrary,  it 
stimulated  the  formation  of  such  treaties  between  1899  and 
1907.7 

What,  then,  are  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the 
arrangements  made  at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  1907  for  the 
promotion  of  international  arbitration? 

In  the  first  place,  the  conclusion  is  inevitable  that  the 
Hague  system  constitutes  an  accomplished  fact  in  the  or- 
ganization of  international  arbitration  which  must  naturally 
be  taken  as  a  starting  point  for  anything  to  be  done  in  the 
future  in  that  field.  The  system  exists  today;  cases  may 
be  submitted  to  the  Court  at  any  time,  indeed,  are  again 
being  submitted  and  tried  at  the  present  time.  In  so  far 
as  international  organization,  in  general,  centers  about  the 
development  of  international  judicial  settlement,  the  system 
installed  by  the  conferences  at  The  Hague  must  be  the 
starting  point  for  future  efforts  of  this  sort.8  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  soundness  of  this  conclusion  has  already  been 
demonstrated.  In  formulating  plans  for  an  international 

»I  H.C.   '07,  Arts.  37,  63. 

'Same,  Art.  78. 

"Same,  Arts.  79,  81. 

*Same,  Art.  93. 

'Myers,  D.  P.,  "Kecord  of  the  Hague,"  in  W.P.F.,  Pamph.  Ser.,  Vol.  IV, 
No.  6,  Part  iii  (October,  1914),  Appendix. 

•Wilson,  Cases,  ix-x,  83-445. 

7 1  H.C.  '07,  Art.  40;  see  data  given  in  note  6,  p.  216,  above. 

8  See  the  views  of  Dr.  James  Brown  Scott  in  Carnegie  Endowment,  Year 
Books,  1920,  111,  and  1921,  103. 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         235 

court  to  be  set  up  under  the  League  of  Nations,  recourse 
was  had  in  the  first  instance  to  the  First  Convention  of 
the  Hague  Conferences.  The  work  went  forward  as  a 
revision  of  that  Convention.1 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  noticeable  that  all  events  from 
1899  to  1907  tended  to  strengthen  the  Hague  system,  and 
that  everything  about  the  debates  in  the  Second  Conference 
pointed  in  the  same  direction.  The  number  of  cases  sub- 
mitted increased  in  the  years  just  before  1907  and  went  on 
increasing  down  to  1914.2  All  of  the  changes  made  in  the 
Convention  in  1907  strengthened  the  Court  and  tended  to 
expand  its  usefulness.  Other  efforts  to  expand  it  still 
further  were  put  forward  and  failed  for  want  of  unanimous 
consent,  although  they  commanded  a  majority  support  and 
even  general  approval  in  most  cases.3  Thus  it  was  with 
the  question  of  obligatory  arbitration,  or  the  definition  in 
advance  of  cases  for  submission  to  arbitration  as  they  arose. 
The  progress  made  toward  securing  acceptance  of  some 
such  plan  was  much  greater  than  in  1899.  And,  it  may 
be  added  that  in  1920  the  proposal  to  confer  "  compulsory 
jurisdiction"  on  the  new  court  of  the  League  of  Nations 
got  much  further  still.4 

This  matter  of  jurisdiction  may  well  be  regarded  as 
the  test  question  for  progress  in  the  organization  of  inter- 
national judicial  settlement.  Other  questions  are,  indeed, 
significant.  Thus,  giving  the  tribunal  authority  to  settle 
questions  as  to  its  own  competence  under  the  compromis, 
as  was  done  in  1907,5  is  a  step  of  vast  potentialities.6  But, 
after  all,  the  central  issue  just  now  is  how  to  get  cases  be- 

1  League  of  Nations,  First  Assembly,  Document  44,  21-24,  being  reports 
to  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  relating  to  the  proposed  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice;  below,  Chap.  XVI. 

1  Wilson,  Cases,  ix-x. 

•  Hershey,  §  313,  note  27. 

*Fenwick,  C.  G.,  "Meeting  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations," 
in  Am.  Pol.  Sci.  Rev.,  XV,  102  (February,  1920);  below,  Chap.  XVI. 

8 1  H.C.  '07,  Art.  73. 

•Compare  debates  on  this  point  in  1899:  Conference  de  la  Paix,  Ptie.  I, 
105. 


236  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

fore  the  Court.  It  is  well,  therefore,  to  note  the  nature  of 
the  opposition  in  1899  and  1907. 

The  opposition  to  obligatory  arbitration  in  1899  and 
1907  came  chiefly  from  Germany  and  Austria.1  Other 
states — Italy,  Japan,  and  some  others — joined  the  opposi- 
tion from  time  to  time,  but  the  leadership  came  from 
Germany.  This  position  was  undoubtedly  part  of  a  gen- 
eral German  policy  of  resistance  to  this  sort  of  thing,  to 
international  control  and  cooperation  in  general,  unless  she 
could  use  it  for  her  own  advantage.  Thus  in  1905  she  had 
demanded  an  international  conference  on  Morocco,  expect- 
ing to  use  it  to  control  French  action  for  her  own  benefit. 
But  three  years  later  the  demand  for  a  conference  on  the 
Bosnian  question  was  defeated  by  Germany  and  Austria 
for  the  simplest  of  reasons,  namely,  fear  that  such  a  con- 
ference would  not  approve  of  the  Austrian  annexation. 
More  specifically,  Germany  was  pushing  a  program  of  ex- 
pansion and  making  her  way  forward  again  in  the  diplo- 
matic world.  She  believed  herself  strong  and  entitled  to 
more  of  the  good  things  of  the  earth  than  she  then  pos- 
sessed. She  was  determined  to  get  them,  and  that  not  by 
general  consent  but,  if  need  be,  in  defiance  of  standing  law 
and  equity.  She  therefore  opposed  the  development  of  the 
sort  of  international  organization  planned  at  the  Confer- 
ences at  The  Hague. 

One  may  profitably  pause  at  this  point  and  reflect  upon 
the  motives,  in  general,  which  lead  to  opposition  to  inter- 
national organization.  A  strong  nation  which  is  hungry 
for  more  of  the  good  things  of  earth  than  it  has  will  desire 
to  remain  free  for  independent  action.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  nation  which  is  in  possession  of  all  it  can  well  expect,  or 
even  desire,  to  secure;  will  be  satisfied  to  see  the  existing 
situation  legalized  and  provided  with  guarantees.  The 
rigid  maintenance  of  the  established  order  is  always  desired 
by  the  beneficiaries  thereof;  the  needy  are  the  revolution- 

1Hershey,  as  cited. 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         237 

aries.  Again,  the  smaller  powers  have  more  to  gain  by  the 
protection  afforded  by  an  international  organization,  in  so 
far  as  conquest  is  thereby  prevented,  and  hence  they  very 
generally  support  such  schemes.  On  the  other  hand,  these 
smaller  powers  constantly  stand  in  fear  of  the  use  which 
the  larger  powers  may  make  of  the  organization  which  they 
will  more  or  less  completely  control,  and  this  tends  to  lead 
the  former  to  hesitate  to  commit  themselves  to  membership 
in,  and  the  jurisdiction  of,  such  a  union  unless  provision  is 
made  for  equality  of  representation.  They  may  even  wreck 
the  whole  plan  unless  this  demand  is  granted.  Better  no 
cooperation,  they  are  likely  to  feel,  than  cooperation  be- 
tween superiors  and  subordinates. 

As  things  stood  in  1907,  Germany  was  bound  to  go  into 
the  opposition.  She  wanted  more  than  she  could  hope  to 
get  by  free  common  consent ;  she  probably  dreamed  of  more 
or  less  universal  empire,  and  she  felt  strong  enough  to  stand 
alone.  In  1914  the  bid  was  made — for  colonies,  for  com- 
merce, for  world  hegemony.  It  failed.  The  opposition  of 
1907  is  thus  discredited.  Defiance  of  common  international 
consent,  as  the  issue  was  formulated  in  1907  and  1914,  is  not 
regarded  as  profitable  after  the  events  of  1914-18.  It  would 
appear  that  the  issue  had  been  clearly  raised  and  clearly 
settled.  No  nation  or  alliance  of  nations,  it  would  seem, 
can  safely  defy  common  international  law  and  opinion. 

Yet  the  suggestion  to  give  the  court  to  be  created  under 
the  League  of  Nations  compulsory  jurisdiction  was  re- 
jected in  1920  as  it  had  been  in  1907.  The  opposition  came 
no  longer  from  the  small  states,  for  a  plan  of  representation 
or  membership  was  worked  out  to  satisfy  the  large  and 
small  states  alike.  The  opposition  came  from  Great  Bri- 
tain, France,  Italy,  and  Japan.1  It  was  not  due  to  lack 
of  satisfaction  with  the  existing  situation  in  the  diplomatic 
world.  It  was  not  due  to  fear  of  being  dominated  by  others. 
It  was  probably  due,  in  part,  to  a  disinclination  to  see  the 

1  Fenwick,  as  cited. 


238  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

political  hegemony  over  the  diplomatic  world  enjoyed  by 
the  victors  of  1918  in  any  way  restricted,  and  to  a  disincli- 
nation to  risk  seeing  any  of  the  items  of  the  settlement  of 
1919  called  in  question.  It  was  probably  due  also  to  a  sin- 
cere feeling  of  caution  and  a  sincere  doubt  whether  the 
nations  were  ready  for  such  a  step.  It  was  officially  de- 
fended on  technical  grounds  to  be  discussed  later. 

The  final  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  a  study  of  the 
Hague  system  as  it  was  left  in  1907  is  that  there  is  still 
much  room  for  improvement.  It  will  be  worth  while,  in 
completing  this  survey,  to  summarize  the  chief  defects  of 
that  system. 

The  Court  is  weak  in  not  being  permanent ;  for,  in  spite 
of  its  title,  the  * '  Permanent  Court  of  Justice, "  it  is  not  per- 
manent. Indeed,  there  is  no  court,  properly  speaking.1 
There  are  many  courts  or  tribunals  which  are  made  up  from 
a  panel  of  "judges"  and  these  tribunals  come  and  go  from 
time  to  time  with  no  necessary  connection  one  with  another. 
The  panel  is  the  only  thing  permanent  about  the  Court,  and 
the  members  of  the  panel  never  meet  as  a  body.  There  is 
a  lack  of  continuity  and  of  corporate  spirit  which  weakens 
the  institution  as  a  whole.  Moreover,  the  practical  difficulty 
of  getting  a  tribunal  selected  from  the  panel  and  getting 
the  members  together  each  time  is  not  negligible.  What 
is  needed  is  a  small  court  in  substantially  continuous  ses- 
sion, in  which  a  body  of  practice  may  be  developed  by  the 
constant  operation  of  the  same  body  of  judges. 

The  second  weakness  of  the  Court  is  its  lack  of  conti- 
nuity as  to  jurisdiction.  As  has  been  said,  this  jurisdiction 
is  intermittent,  not  continuous.  The  only  remedy,  of  course, 
is  to  define  in  advance  the  cases  to  be  taken  before  the  Court 
as  they  arise.  This,  however,  gets  over  into  "obligatory 
arbitration"  and  has  been  given  full  treatment  already. 

As  it  stands  in  the  First  Convention  the  definition  of 

1  Hershey,  §  316. 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         239 

cases  proper  for  submission  to  arbitration  upon  agreement 
by  the  parties  is  ambiguous.  In  one  place  it  is  said  that  any 
sort  of  dispute  may  be  submitted  to  arbitration.1  In  an- 
other place  it  is  pointed  out  that  certain  types  of  questions 
— the  interpretation  of  treaties,  for  example — are  es- 
pecially suited  to  this  method  of  treatment.2  This  implies 
some  uncertainty  as  to  the  true  nature  of  arbitration.  There 
are  certain  questions  which,  if  submitted  to  arbitration 
would  undoubtedly  be  settled,  and  would  almost  necessarily 
be  settled,  on  the  basis  of  existing  law.  There  are  others 
which,  if  submitted  to  an  arbitral  tribunal,  would  have  to 
be  settled  as  the  members  of  the  tribunal  thought  best  in 
the  interest  of  all  concerned,  on  grounds  of  common  justice. 
The  nations  in  committing  cases  of  the  latter  type  to 
arbitration  neglect  the  necessary  task  of  laying  down  more 
fully  the  principles  and  rules  which  are  to  be  followed  in 
the  conduct  of  international  relations  and  make  of  the  ar- 
bitral tribunal  in  part  a  diplomatic  conference  or  a  legisla- 
tive body.  When  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  the  tribunal 
usually  contains  one  "representative"  of  each  of  the  par- 
ties, the  result  is  obvious.  The  Hague  system  does  not 
carry  arbitration  far  enough  in  the  direction  of  judicial 
settlement  by  law.3  The  members  of  the  Court  have  not 
universally  been  jurists,  but,  have  too  frequently  been  dip- 
lomats. Furthermore,  the  procedure  of  the  Court  itself  has 
not  served  well  the  purpose  of  giving  the  trial  the  character 
of  a  judicial  settlement.  Altogether,  the  legal  elements  in 
the  institution  are  not  given  the  prominence  which  they  de- 
serve. 

Finally,  the  complexity  and  expense  of  the  procedure 
under  the  Hague  system  are  too  great.  This  is  partly  be- 
cause the  Court  must  be  organized  anew  for  each  case.  It 
is  partly  because  the  use  made  of  the  Bureau  in  the  actual 

*I  H.C.    '07,  Art.  42. 
'Same,  Art.  38. 

3 Lansing,  E.,  "Some  Legal  Questions  of  the  Peace  Conference,"  in  Am. 
Jour,  Int.  Law,  XIII,  636,  638  (October,  1919). 


240  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

trial  of  cases  is  small.  It  is  partly  because  there  is  no  pro- 
vision for  spreading  the  expense  of  the  Court,  or,  rather,  of 
the  trial  tribunals,  over  all  the  members  of  the  system.  The 
parties  to  the  case  pay  all  the  expenses.1  That  means  that 
almost  none  of  the  expense  of  the  system  is  carried  as  an 
overhead  charge.  The  result  may  be  estimated  by  imagin- 
ing that  the  salaries  of  judges  were  included  in  the  costs  of 
litigation  in  national  jurisprudence.  For  great  states  this 
factor  is  not  of  supreme  importance.  But  where  the  par- 
ties bear  equal  shares  of  the  expense  of  the  trial  the  smaller 
state  may  well  find  the  cost  prohibitive. 

As  has  been  seen,  efforts  were  made  in  1907  to  remedy 
some  of  these  defects.  Between  1899  and  1907  some  thirty 
treaties  were'  concluded  among  states  which  were  members 
of  the  Hague  system  providing  for  obligatory  arbitration 
in  certain  cases.2  The  Conference  voted,  in  commission,  on 
several  proposals'  of  this  sort,  and  in  all  cases  the  proposals 
commanded  a  majority  of  the  votes — in  several  cases  three- 
fourths  of  those  voting.  The  conference  finally  adopted  by 
unanimous  vote  a  resolution  in  favor  of  obligatory  arbitra- 
tion in  principle;  and  of  its  extension  by  bilaterial  conven- 
tions.3 In  addition  to  this,  provisions  were  adopted  for 
inducing  arbitration  by  action  of  member  states  not  parties 
to  the  dispute  in  reminding  the  parties  of  the  possibility 
of  having  recourse  to  the  Hague  Court,4  and  provisions 
whereby  one  party  to  a  dispute  may  notify  the  Bureau 
and,  through  the  Bureau,  its  opponent,  of  its  willingness 
to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration.5 

Two  or  three  other  decisions  were  taken  at  The  Hague 
in  1907  which  deserve  special  attention  in  this  connection. 

There  was  adopted  as  the  Second  Convention  of  the 
Conference  in  1907  an  agreement  providing  against  the  use 

'I  H.C.   '07,  Art.  85. 
'Hershey,  §313. 

'Final  Act  of  Second  Conference,  Pars.  19-21,  below,  in  Appendix  A, 
Document  No.  9. 

4 1  H.C.  '07,  Art.  48,  Par.  1. 
•Same,  Pars.  3,  4. 


THE  HAGUE  ARBITRATION  SYSTEM         241 

of  force  in  the  collection  of  contract  debts,1  the  agreement 
being  subject  to  the  proviso  that  the  debtor  state  should 
not  refuse  arbitration  on  the  question.2  By  this  agreement 
and  counter-agreement  obligatory  arbitration  was,  in  effect, 
provided  for  upon  this  subject.  In  the  debates  in  the  Con- 
ference the  advocates  of  obligatory  arbitration  sought  the 
adoption  of  this  Convention  on  its  own  merits,  being  care- 
ful, prior  to  its  adoption,  not  to  put  it  forward  as  an  agree- 
ment for  obligatory  arbitration.  Likewise  the  opposition 
solemnly  maintained  that  they  were  voting,  not  for 
obligatory  arbitration,  but  against  the  use  of  force  in  the 
collection  of  international  contract  debts.  After  the  Con- 
vention was  adopted  there  was  no  doubt  about  what  had 
been  done. 

The  Conference  of  1907  likewise  adopted  a  Convention 
for  the  establishment  of  an  International  Prize  Court.3 
It  was  provided  that  certain  cases  could  be  carried  to  that 
court  by  parties  under  certain  circumstances  as  they  arose.4 
Here  also,  in  effect,  was  automatic  or  obligatory  jurisdic- 
tion. In  the  event  the  Convention  was  not  put  into  opera- 
tion, but  the  reason  does  not  lie  directly  in  the  feature  just 
mentioned,  which  was  accepted  by  all  parties. 

Similarly,  the  Conference  drew  up  a  convention  for  a 
new  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,5  and  provision  was  made  in 
this  Convention  for  what  amounts  to  obligatory  arbitra- 
tion in  default  of  affirmative  action  of  one  party  to  a  dispute 
where  the  other  has  taken  the  case  to  the  Court.6  This 
Convention  also  has  failed  of  adoption,  but  likewise  for 
reasons  only  remotely  connected  with  the  feature  of  ob- 
ligatory arbitration. 

Mention  of  the  proposals  for  new  courts  which  were 

1  Seott,  Conferences,  II,  356,  Art.  1,  Par.  1. 

'Art.  1,  Par.  2. 

8  Scott,  Conferences,  II,  472. 

*Arts.  3-5. 

6  Scott,  Conferences,  II,  291. 

•Art.  19. 


242 

made  in  1907,  however,  leads  to  an  entirely  new  field.  At- 
tention must  now  be  given  to  proposals  for  new  interna- 
tional courts  which  were  brought  forward  between  1907  and 
1920.  Already  in  1907  it  was  suggested  that  the  situation 
demanded  not  a  revision  of  the  old  plan,  but  the  creation  of 
a  new  one ; 1  and,  as  has  been  seen,  two  attempts  were  made 
at  The  Hague  to  bring  this  about.  Finally,  in  1920  an 
attempt  was  made  to  create  a  new  court  which  should 
operate  under  the  League  of  Nations,  albeit  as  a  distinct 
body.  To  these  successive  efforts  we  must  now  turn. 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  423-464. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS 

IN  the  course  of  the  criticism  of  the  Hague  system  of 
international  arbitration,  and  as  a  result  of  the  same 
movement  for  an  improvement  in  the  methods  of  the  judicial 
settlement  of  international  disputes  which  led  to  the  re- 
vision of  the  Hague  Convention  in  1907,  three  outstanding 
efforts  have  been  made  to  create  new  international  judicial 
bodies.  A  study  of  these  efforts,  and  a  comparison  of  the 
arrangements  proposed  with  those  of  1899  and  1907,  will 
throw  much  light  on  the  present  status  of  international 
judicial  organization  and  upon  the  place  of  judicial  settle- 
ment in  international  organization  as  a  whole. 

The  first  effort  was  the  signing,  at  the  Second  Con- 
ference at  The  Hague,  in  1907,  of  a  convention  for  the  crea- 
tion of  an  International  Prize  Court.1  In  some  ways  this 
is  the  most  radical  step  ever  taken  in  the  field  of  interna- 
tional organization.2 

The  International  Prize  Court  was  to  be  composed  of 
fifteen  jurists  3  appointed  by  the  participating  nations  ac- 
cording to  a  plan 4  whereby  the  judges  appointed  by  the 
eight  Great  Powers — as  things  stood  in  1907 — were  to  sit 
at  all  times  on  the  court,  while  those  appointed  by  the  lesser 
powers  were  to  be  present  in  rotation,  in  such  a  way  that 
judges  chosen  by  powers  of  secondary  rank  would  appear 
less  frequently  than  those  chosen  by  the  Great  Powers,  but 
more  frequently  than  those  chosen  by  powers  of  third  rank, 

1  Scott,  Conventions,  188-203,  cited  hereafter  as  XII  H.C.  '07. 
»  Higgins,  431-444. 
"XII  H.C.   '07,  Art  14. 
4  Art.  15. 

243 


244  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

and  so  on.  Nations  were  always  to  be  represented  on  the 
bench  in  cases  arising  from  a  war  in  which  they  had  partici- 
pated, but  judges  who  had  been  parties  to  cases  in  national 
courts  were  debarred  from  hearing  those  cases  in  the  Inter- 
national Prize  Court,  and  the  judges  in  general  were  barred 
from  appearing  as  advocates  before  the  court.  The  general 
expenses  of  the  court,  including  the  salaries  of  the  judges, 
were  to  be  paid  entirely  from  a  general  fund  contributed 
by  member  states.  The  Bureau  and  Administrative  Coun- 
cil created  by  the  Hague  Convention  of  1899  were  to  serve 
this  court  as  well  as  the  Court  of  Arbitration.1  . 

In  matters  of  procedure  equally  radical  steps  were  taken. 
The  court  was  given  control  over  the  use  of  languages 
in  pleadings,  with  provision  for  the  use  in  all  cases  of  the 
language  of  the  national  court  where  the  case  had  first  ap- 
peared. Supplementary  evidence  might  be  called  for,  or 
even  taken  directly  by,  the  court.  The  discussion  of  cases 
before  the  court  was  to  be  public,  subject  to  the  right  of 
either  party  to  the  case  to  demand  privacy.  Even  in  such 
an  event  minutes  of  the  discussion  were  to  be  kept,  signed, 
and  published  with  the  judgment.  Costs  of  the  trial  were  to 
be  borne  by  the  unsuccessful  litigant.2 

In  the  matter  of  jurisdiction  the  Prize  Court  Conven- 
tion went  still  further.  The  cases  which  might  be  brought 
before  the  court  on  appeal  were  denned  in  advance.  The 
parties  capable  of  bringing  appeals  were  so  defined  as  to 
include  not  only  neutral  states  but  neutral  individuals,  and 
even  citizens  of  belligerent  enemy  powers.  Normally, 
cases  might  be  carried  to  the  court  only  after  final  judg- 
ment in  the  national  courts.  But  if  this  were  delayed  over 
two  years  the  case  might  be  taken  direct  to  the  interna- 
tional court.3 

In  either  event  action  was  to  be  brought  in  the  inter- 

1  Arts.  16,  17,  20,  22,  47. 
•Arts.  24,  36,  39,  45,  46. 
•Arts.  1-6. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        245 

national  court  by  written  declaration  in  the  national  court, 
followed  by  transmission  of  the  record  of  the  case  by  the 
latter  tribunal  to  the  former,  or  notice  to  the  Bureau,  fol- 
lowed by  a  call  from  the  Bureau  to  the  national  court 
for  the  record  of  the  case,  and,  apparently,  notice  to  the 
other  parties.  Judgment  might  be  given  against  a  party 
cited  to  the  court  in  spite  of  failure  to  appear  or  failure 
to  comply  with  rules  of  procedure  in  the  court,  and  the 
decision  was  to  be  notified  to  such  a  party.1 

The  basis  for  the  adjudication  by  the  court  was  to  be 
international  law — conventional  or  treaty  law  if  there  were 
any  treaties  applicable  to  the  case,  common  or  customary 
law  otherwise,  and  justice  and  equity  in  the  absence  of  any 
recognized  rules  that  were  applicable.  The  court  was 
given  power  to  disregard  national  belligerent  enactments 
contrary  to  justice  and  equity.2 

The  decision  of  the  court  was  to  be  given  in  the  form  of 
an  affirmance  of  the  decision  of  the  national  court  or,  in  the 
contrary  case,  an  order  for  restitution  of  the  prize  property 
or  a  judgment  of  damages,  or  both.  The  participating 
states  agreed  in  advance  to  accept  and  execute  the  court's 
decisions.3 

The  radical  character  of  some  of  these  provisions  is 
evident,  yet  the  Convention  was  actually  signed  by  thirty- 
three  states.4  Reservations  were  made  by  ten  of  these, — 
on  the  whole,  the  less  important  ones, — relating  to  the 
method  of  choosing  the  judges.5 

It  will  be  noted,  especially,  that  "obligatory"  adjudi- 
cation was  here  provided  for,  and  that  the  court  was  to  be 
continuously  available  without  any  special  agreement  or 
discussion.6  The  method  provided  for  bringing  the  appeal 

1  Arts.  28,  29,  40,  41. 

'Art.  7,  especially  Par.  5. 

•Arts.  8,  9. 

4  Scott,  work  cited,  208. 

6  Same,  539 ;  also  Art.  15  of  the  Convention. 

8  Arts.  28,  29. 


246  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

through  the  Bureau  served  to  emphasize  this  feature  of  the 
plan,  as  did  the  rule  allowing  decisions  to  be  given  in  the 
absence  of  one  of  the  parties. 

Giving  individuals  the  right  of  action  in  cases  before 
the  court  was,  furthermore,  an  indication  that  the  stage  of 
true  international  federation  had  been  reached,  for  it  has 
always  been  held  that  one  of  the  marks  of  a  true  federa- 
tion is  to  be  found  in  the  power  of  the  organs  of  govern- 
ment of  the  federation  to  act  upon  individual  members  of 
the  federated  states  and  not  merely  upon  or  through  those 
states  as  such.1  Conversely,  it  has  been  held  that  interna- 
tional law  ran  only  between  states  pleno  jure.2  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  of  course,  prize  cases  always  affect  private 
individuals  directly  and  states  as  such  only  indirectly.  It 
would  have  been  possible  to  require  action  by  the  states  in 
all  these  cases  on  behalf  of  their  nationals.  Provision  is 
indeed  made  that  the  neutral  state  may  act  on  behalf  of  its 
national,  or  even  merely  forbid  him  to  act,3  and  this  might 
have  been  required  in  all  cases.  But  it  appeared  more  con- 
venient to  adopt  the  simpler,  though  more  revolutionary, 
method.  Some  precedent  for  this  step  is  found  in  the  right 
often  accorded  to  private  individuals  to  appear  before 
claims  commissions  established  by  treaty  to  act  on  behalf 
of  two  or  more  states.4  Likewise,  international  administra- 
tive bodies  occasionally  operate  directly  upon  national  citi- 
zens of  the  member  states,  as  will  appear  later.  When  indi- 
viduals who  are  citizens  of  a  belligerent  state  are  allowed 
to  carry  the  enemy  nation  into  court  the  significance  of  the 
procedure  becomes  greater  still. 

Some  concessions  were,  indeed,  made  to  the  established 
order  of  things.  Such  was  the  provision  that  belligerents 
should  be  represented  on  the  bench  in  all  cases  affecting 
them.  Such,  too,  was  the  provision  putting  special  conven- 

1  Garner,  Introduction,  151,  196-197. 

'See  Wilson  and  Tucker,  Chaps.  V  and  VI,  for  conflicting  views. 

•Art.  4,  (2). 

4  Example  in  Malloy,  594-595. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        247 

tional  agreements  ahead  of  general  international  law  among 
the  grounds  of  decision  by  the  court.  A  still  greater  con- 
cession was  made  some  three  years  after  the  signing  of 
the  Convention,  a  concession  which  related  to  the  mode  of 
bringing  actions  in  the  court  and  to  the  form  in  which  the 
decisions  were  to  be  rendered.  These  changes,  while  they 
derogated  from  the  significance  of  the  plan  in  one  limited 
particular,  enlarged  the  meaning  and  consequence  of  the 
Convention  in  another  direction.  This  whole  matter  may 
best  be  discussed  in  connection  with  the  subsequent  his- 
tory of  the  Convention. 

The  Convention  was  not  ratified  and  the  court  was  not 
established.  To  understand  why  this  is  so  is  to  understand 
much  of  the  problem  of  internationl  judicial  organization. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  court  was  to  proceed 
upon  international  treaty  law,  common  international  law, 
and  equity,  in  its  adjudications.  This  provision  fell  far 
short  of  satisfying  all  the  Powers,  particularly  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  United  States.  In  the  first  place,  treaty  agree- 
ments cover  a  relatively  insignificant  proportion  of  the  field 
of  prize  law.  Notwithstanding  the  mass  of  treaty  agree- 
ments which  exist,  and  it  has  been  seen  that  that  mass  is 
very  great,  the  court  would  by  no  means  be  able  to  find  in 
treaties  between  the  parties  to  cases  brought  before  it  rules 
to  cover  all  the  points  of  law  arising  in  the  course  of  the 
pleadings.  In  the  second  place,  there  is  little  "common" 
international  law  in  matters  of  prize  which  really  is  "com- 
mon," that  is,  little  law  which  is  generally  or  universally 
accepted.  The  law  of  prize  badly  needs  standardization. 
Indeed,  that  is  precisely  why  such  a  court  as  was  here  pro- 
posed is  needed  at  all,  and  why  international  courts  are 
needed  in  general.  But  the  lack  of  agreed  law  is  the  great- 
est obstacle  to  the  creation  of  courts  to  remedy  that  very 
defect.  For,  in  the  absence  of  precise  and  recognized  law, 
the  court  must  go  upon  "the  principles  of  justice  and 
equity,"  and,  in  the  eyes  of  Anglo-American  jurists,  at 


248  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

least,  that  is  dangerous.  In  England  and  America  it  is, 
of  course,  assumed  that  the  law  will  be,  and  is,  in  the  long 
run,  substantially  in  accord  with  ethical  justice  and  social 
equity.  It  is  held,  however,  that  whether  this  be  true  at 
a  given  time  or  not,  the  court  must  apply  the  law  as  it 
stands  and  leave  to  others  to  whom  it  properly  belongs — the 
legislative  body — to  make  the  law  to  conform  to  the  stan- 
dards of  justice.1  The  motto  "let  justice  be  done  though 
the  heavens  fall,"  has  been  revised  to  read  "let  the  law 
be  enforced  though  justice  be  slain  in  the  process."  In 
England  and  America  ethical  right  and  legal  rights  are 
not  necessarily  synonymous.  The  civilian  or  continental 
jurist  of  France  or  Germany  sees  no  such  distinction  be- 
tween the  two  sorts  of  right,  between  justice  and  law. 
But  to  American  and  English  jurists  "equity" — particu- 
larly in  the  hands  of  continental  jurists, — may  well  be 
merely  a  means  through  which  personal  or  political  prefer- 
ences and  prejudices  express  themselves.  In  Britain  this 
was  a  particularly  serious  consideration,  in  view  of  what 
some  continental  legal  critics  had  been  saying  from  time 
to  time  regarding  certain  rules  of  British  prize  law.  Indeed, 
there  is  little  doubt  that  the  German  sponsors  of  the  Inter- 
national Prize  Court  had  something  of  this  in  mind  in  pro- 
posing the  scheme.2 

At  all  events,  Great  Britain  determined  not  to  ratify 
the  Convention  until  the  law  to  be  applied  by  the  court 
should  be  defined.3  In  this  she  was  supremely  right,  quite 
apart  from  motives  of  self-defense  and  self-interest.  The 
lack  of  agreed  law  lies  at  the  very  threshold  of  the  back- 
wardness of  international  judicial  organization.  Accord- 
ingly, a  Naval  Conference  was  held  under  British  auspices 
in  London  in  1909,  and  a  convention  called  the  Declaration 
of  London  was  signed  which  consisted  of  a  code  of  the  law 

lBertholf  v.  O'Reilly,  74  N.  T.  509. 
*Hall,  1-5;  Higgins,  431-432,  438. 
» Garner,  World  War,  §  19. 


of  prize.1  Incidentally,  it  may  be  noted  that  this  code  pre- 
tended to  be,  not  new  law  created  by  the  Naval  Confer- 
ence, but  the  existing  law,  and  that  in  its  substance  it  was 
exceedingly  liberal  to  neutral  commerce,  reaching,  indeed, 
the  high-water  mark  of  the  American  campaign  for  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  for  neutral  commerce  in  time  of  war. 
And  it  was  so  primarily  because  Britain  yielded  so  largely 
to  the  continental  views  of  her  guests. 

The  Liberal  Ministry  of  the  day  was,  however,  unable 
to  carry  the  plan  through  Parliament.  A  bill  to  enable  the 
Government  to  adopt  the  Declaration  and  proceed  with  the 
establishment  of  the  International  Prize  Court,  after  hav- 
ing been  passed  in  the  Commons,  was  defeated  by  Navy  and 
Empire  people  in  the  House  of  Lords.2  In  the  minds  of  the 
peers  other  political  issues  were  connected  with  the  Decla- 
ration. Mr.  Lloyd  George's  budget  and  taxes  were  bad 
enough,  the  reform  of  the  House  of  Lords  was  worse,  and 
the  Declaration  was,  taken  on  top  of  it  all,  too  much  en- 
tirely. The  first  two  measures  were  accepted,  but  the  third 
was  refused.  After  the  reform  of  the  House  of  Lords  had 
been  accomplished  in  1911,  and  its  power  to  defeat  Govern- 
ment measures  which  had  passed  the  Commons  thereby 
largely  taken  away,  a  new  bill  was  prepared  to  render  the 
Declaration  and  the  Convention  effective.  The  outbreak 
of  war,  in  1914,  prevented  final  action,  however,  and  there 
the  matter  rests  today.3 

Meanwhile  no  other  state  had  ratified  either  the  Decla- 
ration or  the  Prize  Court  Convention.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  States  consented  to  ratification  in  1912,  but  the 
President,  acting  as  had  all  the  other  signatory  parties, 
waited  upon  the  decision  of  Great  Britain.4  The  reason 
for  this  is  simple,  even  if  it  be  not  obvious  upon  the  surface. 
Britain,  having  a  maritime  supremacy  not  questioned  by 

*Text  in  Malloy,  III  (Charles),  266. 

2  Garner,  World  War,  §  21. 

» Myers,  D.  P.,  "Record  of  The  Hague,"  17,  note  4. 

4  Garner,  as  cited,  29,  end. 


250  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

any  other  power,  could  and  did  write  the  law  of  prize.  It 
would  have  no  effect  for  a  weak  naval  power  to  try  by  itself 
to  reform  that  law.  Nor  would  it  have  been  of  any  real 
effect  for  all  naval  powers  in  defiance  of  Great  Britain  to 
attempt  to  change  prize  law  by  agreement.  Other  nations 
could  expect  to  be  neutrals  in  most  cases  and  subject  to 
British  belligerent  rights.  And  if  they  anticipated 
belligerency  themselves  they  could  not  afford  to  resign 
belligerent  rights  which,  as  neutrals,  they  would  have  to 
concede  to  Britain  in  her  belligerency.  In  the  course  of  a 
century  they  would  make  few  captures,  while  Britain  would 
make  many.  The  law  enforced  by  Britain  would  be  ruling 
prize  law.  Prize  law  has  been,  in  the  past,  nothing  but  a 
measure  of  British  self-restraint  in  naval  war.  As  in  so 
many  fields  of  international  law,  the  progress  of  the  law 
is  fixed  by  the  minima  set  by  the  least  advanced  state. 
There  being  no  balance  of  power  at  sea,  this  was  inevitably 
the  case  in  prize  law.  What  is  to  happen  in  the  future  is 
less  certain. 

As  a  matter  of  general  gain  and  loss,  it  is  probably  a 
good  thing  for  the  cause  of  international  law  and  organiza- 
tion that  the  Declaration  and  the  Convention  were  not 
ratified.  The  Declaration  was  unsound  in  the  extent  to 
which  it  restricted  belligerent  rights  at  sea.1  If  the  Court 
had  existed  during  the  World  War,  and  had  attempted  to 
apply  the  rules  of  the  Declaration,  one  of  two  results  would 
have  followed.  Either  the  Central  Powers,  who  had  been 
the  greatest  opponents  of  the  development  of  international 
organization  in  the  years  before  the  war,  and  who  were 
undertaking  their  adventure  of  conquest  in  the  same  spirit, 
would  have  been  successful  in  the  war,  or  the  Allies  would 
have  been  induced  to  repudiate  the  Declaration  and  the 
Court.  Either  event  would  have  been  disastrous  to  the 
general  cause  of  international  law  and  organization.  The 
whole  episode  well  illustrates  how  dangerous  it  is  to 
attempt  to  organize  society — national  or  international — 

1  Garner,  as  cited,  §  23. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        251 

on  the  basis  of  law  if  perchance  that  law  happens  to  be 
unsound,  and  also  how  unwise  it  is  to  attempt  to  reform 
international  practices — such  as  the  practice  of  capture 
and  condemnation  of  property  at  sea  in  time  of  war — from 
the  outside,  without  attacking  the  causes  at  the  bottom, 
namely,  the  freedom  to  make  war. 

A  second  event  in  the  history  of  the  Prize  Court  Con- 
vention must  be  noted.  In  1910  there  was  signed  at  The 
Hague  a  protocol x  revising  certain  provisions  of  the  Con- 
vention so  that  appeals  to  the  court  should  take  the  form 
of  actions  against  the  nations  for  damages,  not  of  appeals 
in  the  original  cases  as  tried  in  the  national  courts.2  Other 
changes  were  necessitated  by  this  principal  alteration,  and 
it  was  provided  that  the  international  court  should  not  pass 
on  the  validity  of  captures  under  national  prize  law,  nor 
act  in  any  way  upon  decisions  of  the  national  courts.3 
The  court  was  not  to  act  upon  the  subject  matter  of  the 
original  cases  or  order  restitution,  but  to  award  damages 
against  the  nation.4  So  far,  the  significance  of  the  Conven- 
tion seems  to  have  been  diminished,  although  more  because 
of  the  obstacles  raised  to  further  international  organization 
in  the  future  than  because  of  any  obstacles  to  the  securing 
of  substantive  justice  in  the  prize  cases  contemplated  by 
the  Prize  Court  Convention. 

Even  so,  the  protocol  of  1910  introduced  other  changes 
which  in  some  ways  more  than  make  up  for  these  revisions. 
All  cases  thereafter  were  to  be  carried  to  the  international 
court  by  notice  to  the  Bureau,  the  governments  of  the  par- 
ticipating nations  were  always  to  be  made  the  defendants 
in  actions  before  the  court,  and  the  decisions  of  the  court 
were  always  to  run  against  these  governments.  Here  is 
obligatory  adjudication  and  consent  to  be  sued,  with  a 
vengeance ! 

Of  course,  these  changes  tended  to  destroy  the  strictly 

1  Scott,  work  cited,  204-208;  cited  hereafter  as  Protocol. 
'Protocol,  Art.  I. 
"Same,  Art.  II, 
4  Art.  I. 


252  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

federal  character  of  the  union  created  by  the  Prize  Court 
Convention  and  to  reduce  this  union  to  a  confederation. 
The  alleged  ground  was  the  constitutional  inability  of  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  individual  nations  to 
involve  the  latter  in  an  arrangement  whereby  judicial 
procedure  by  the  national  constitutional  law  was  altered 
by  adding  a  stage  of  international  appeal.1  Such  an  objec- 
tion, if  pressed  in  all  its  logical  applications,  would  abso- 
lutely prevent  international  organization  of  any  kind.  All 
international  arrangements  modify  to  some  extent,  by 
adding  further  steps  of  procedure,  the  national  constitu- 
tional systems  of  the  participating  nations,  some  more, 
some  less.  There  is  some  difficulty  in  accepting  the  con- 
clusion that  a  constitutional  agent  of  the  state  is  incapable 
of  committing  the  state  to  an  arrangement  which  would 
alter  the  nature  and  world-position  of  the  state  merely 
because  of  the  magnitude  of  the  consequences,  providing, 
of  course,  that  the  agent  acts  otherwise  within  the  limits  of 
his  constitutional  powers.  Such  a  contention  was  dealt 
with  for  America  pretty  conclusively  in  1803.  If  diplomatic 
representatives  and  the  treaty-making  organ  are  to  be 
denied  such  a  power,  then  there  is  an  end  to  the  process 
of  international  federation.  The  obvious  answer  is  that 
nothing  of  the  kind  is  going  to  happen,  if  the  experience 
of  the  past  century  is  any  guide.  Sudden  and  radical 
steps,  such  as  the  Prize  Court  Convention  undoubtedly 
was,  will  lead  to  gasps,  hesitation,  and  even,  perhaps,  steps 
backward.  Progress  in  this  work  must  be  graduated  to 
the  rapidity  with  which  public  opinion  and  feeling  develops 
throughout  the  world.  But  the  work  has  gone  on  so  long 
and  so  far  as  to  make  it  inconceivable  that  it  will  suddenly 
come  to  an  end,  especially  in  view  of  the  persistence  and 
intensification  of  the  forces  which  in  the  past  have  caused 
that  work  to  be  undertaken. 

A  second  effort  made  at  The  Hague  in  1907  to  create 

1Higgins,  443,  and  Scott,  as  cited,  204. 


new  international  tribunals  was  the  drafting  of  a  Conven- 
tion for  the  establishment  of  what  was  to  be  called  a  ' '  Court 
of  Arbitral  Justice. " l  As  this  Draft  Convention  was  not 
signed,  a  brief  examination  of  its  provisions  will  suffice. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Prize  Court,  the  tribunal  proposed 
by  this  Draft  Convention  was  to  be  small  in  size,  strictly 
judicial  and  legalistic  in  character,  and  was  to  be  continu- 
ously available  for  cases  proper  to  be  submitted  to  it.  In 
most  respects,  indeed,  it  was  a  duplicate  of  the  proposed 
Prize  Court.2 

In  one  particular  the  two  proposals  were  similar  in  con- 
ception, yet  experienced  widely  different  treatment  in  the 
outcome.  This  was  in  the  matter  of  composition  of  the 
court,  the  choice  of  judges,  and  their  service  on  the  bench. 
As  always,  the  smaller  states  demanded  equal  representa- 
tion. This  might  conceivably  have  been  granted  by  the 
Great  Powers,  on  the  assumption  that  the  work  of  the  court 
would  be  purely  judicial  in  character,  based  upon  previ- 
ously established  law,  and  that  hence,  so  long  as  competent 
jurists  were  secured,  it  would  make  no  difference  whether 
or  not  they,  the  Great  Powers,  were  "represented"  on 
the  bench  in  proportion  to  their  power  and  responsibility; 
or  it  might  have  been  granted  on  the  assumption  that  the 
judges  appointed  by  the  Great  Powers  would  exert  a  con- 
trolling influence  in  the  work  of  the  court  in  spite  of  mere 
numbers  or  the  lack  of  them.  Both  of  these  assumptions 
would  be  true,  in  the  main,  and  would,  of  course,  in  so  far 
as  they  were  true,  similarly  undermine  the  force  of  the 
demand  of  the  smaller  states. 

But  the  Great  Powers  were  not  willing  to  concede 
equality  of  representation.  The  law  is  so  unsettled  that  the 
court  would  in  many  cases  be  called  upon  to  decide  accord- 
ing to  the  opinions  of  the  judges  as  to  what  was  right  and 
just — or  agreeable — to  the  family  of  nations,  and  to  their 

1Higgins,  31-39. 
2  Arts.,    I-VI,    XIV. 


254  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

own  nations  among  the  rest.  .The  court  would  often  have 
to  make  the  law  which  it  applied.  In  such  circumstances 
the  Great  Powers  felt  entitled  to  representation  in  propor- 
tion to  their  responsibility  and  their  power,  and,  if  an 
opinion  upon  the  merits  of  the  problem  be  in  place  here,  it 
would  appear  that  they  were  thoroughly  justified  in  such 
a  position.  Nations  must  receive  equal  treatment  as  liti- 
gants before  the  court — equality  before  the  law  as  to  the 
enjoyment  of  recognized  rights — if  any  stable  international 
system  is  to  exist  at  all.1  To  maintain,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  they  should  be  equal  in  political  power  in  making  law, 
that  the  two  million  people  of  Haiti  and  the  one  hundred 
million  people  of  the  United  States  are  entitled  to  the  same 
influence,  and  no  more,  in  the  determination  of  the  content 
of  the  law  of  nations,  especially  upon  constitutional  and 
political  questions,  because  they  happen  to  be  organized  in 
two,  and  only  two,  independent  states,  is  to  become  the 
victim  of  some  subtle  form  of  legalistic  superstition.  In 
addition,  to  have  created  a  court  containing  one  judge  from 
each  state  would  have  been  to  create  a  court  too  large  for 
all  practical  purposes.2 

A  solution  of  this  difficulty  had  been  sought  in  the  case 
of  the  Prize  Court  through  the  plan  already  described, 
whereby  the  judges  named  by  the  Great  Powers  were  to  sit 
constantly,  and  those  named  by  the  lesser  powers  only  for 
a  part  of  the  time,  in  rotation.  This  plan  had  been  accepted 
by  fifteen  of  the  lesser  powers  signatory  to  the  Prize  Court 
Convention,  including  such  states  as  Argentina,  Belgium, 
Bolivia,  Denmark,  and  Sweden,3  but  rejected  by  ten  of  the 
signatory  states,  including  Chile  and  Turkey,  but  includ- 
ing also  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Persia,  and  Salvador.4 

This  solution  was  rejected  entirely  by  the  lesser  states 
in  regard  to  the  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice.5  The  Great 

1  Dickinson,  335. 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  456-457. 

•Scott,  Conventions,  208. 

*  Same. 

6  Scott,  Conferences,  459. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        255 

Powers,  it  was  admitted  by  some,  might  be  entitled  to  a 
preponderant  control  of  the  bench  of  the  Prize  Court,  in 
view  of  the  probability  that  they  would  most  frequently  be 
belligerents  whose  interests  would  have  to  be  passed  on  by 
the  court.  But  in  regard  to  the  great  range  of  questions 
under  the  law  of  nations,  outside  of  prize  law,  and  arising 
in  time  of  peace,  no  such  considerations  were  admissible. 
To  consent  to  inequality  here  meant  to  abandon  the  princi- 
ple itself.  Hence  the  plan  which  was  accepted  in  one 
Convention  was  rejected  in  the  other. 

It  may  well  be  admitted  that  the  lesser  powers  were 
right  in  feeling  that  surrender  here  meant  surrender  for 
good  and  all.  It  is  not  obvious,  however,  that  they  were 
well  advised  in  admitting  the  relevancy  of  belligerent 
strength  and  interest  in  distinguishing  the  Prize  Court 
from  the  Arbitral  Court.  After  all,  that  is  the  principle 
for  which  the  Great  Powers  stand  throughout  this  whole 
problem,  namely,  that  their  greater  physical  power  and 
interest  and  responsibility  entitle  them  to  greater  legal 
power  in  international  government.  If  this  be  true  in  the 
case  of  the  Prize  Court,  it  is  true  in  some  measure  in  the 
case  of  any  international  court. 

Opportunity  was  provided  again  in  1920  for  the  lesser 
powers  to  pass  upon  this  question.  The  same  problem  of 
the  composition  of  the  bench  arose  in  connection  with  the 
third  attempt  to  create  a  new  court,  this  time  under  the 
auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations.  To  this  we  now  turn. 

When  the  Covenant  of  the  League  was  drawn  up  in 
1919  attention  was  considerably  removed,  for  the  time 
being,  from  projects  and  plans  for  judicial  organization 
such  as  those  adopted  in  1899  and  1907  at  the  conferences 
at  The  Hague.  There  were  three  or  four  principal  reasons 
for  this.  The  Hague  system  still  stood  and  was  available 
at  any  time.  Moreover,  what  was  now  needed  was,  not 
machinery  for  applying  existing  law  to  the  details  of  inter- 
national disputes  after  they  arose,  but  machinery  to  make 
law  or  to  devise  formulas  for  settling  international  prob- 


256 

lems  as  they  appeared  and  developed,  and  before  they 
reached  the  stage  where  they  presented  a  joinder  of  issue 
susceptible  of  judicial  treatment.  Third,  technical  prob- 
lems such  as  the  organization  of  a  court  were  very  gener- 
ally left  for  the  future,  the  Covenant  merely  laying  down 
the  main  principles  of  international  organization.  Finally, 
it  is  clear  that  the  diplomats  and  political  leaders  who  made 
up  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  attached  comparatively 
little  importance  to  law  and  lawyers,  to  judges  and  judicial 
settlement.  As  a  result,  the  first  draft  of  the  Covenant 
contained  simply  a  provision  1  for  the  later  formation  of 
a  court,  and  the  final  text  contains  nothing  further  except 
a  provision  for  advisory  opinions  by  the  court  when  it 
shall  have  been  established.2 

This  episode  raises  the  broad  question  of  the  value  of 
judicial  settlement  in  the  organization  of  the  international 
community.  The  League  has  been  severely  criticised  in 
the  United  States  by  leaders  of  the  legal  profession  and 
by  those  who  have  supported  the  development  of  interna- 
tional arbitration  because  it  is  intended  to  operate  so 
largely  by  means  of  diplomatic  conferences,  political  rec- 
ommendations, and  military  or  economic  intervention.  It 
is  maintained  that  international  peace  and  order  depend 
on  doing  justice  to  all  nations  and  that  the  only  reliable 
method  to  be  followed  with  that  object  in  view  is  that  of 
judicial  settlement.  The  more  careful  students  of  inter- 
national organization  who  feel  this  way  go  on  to  couple 
with  the  demand  for  judicial  settlement  a  demand  for  inter- 
national law-making  conferences  to  codify,  revise,  and 
amplify  the  system  of  international  law.3 

Without  such  an  additional  demand  the  view  just  stated 
is,  indeed,  extremely  inadequate.  It  goes  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  existing  system  of  international  law  is  suffi- 
ciently complete  to  cover  all  cases  arising  for  submission 

1Art.  XIV  of  first  draft,  in  Sen.  Doc.  46,  66  Cong.,  1  Sens.,  18. 

J  Covenant,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  15,  Art.  XIV. 

*  This  view  is  well  set  forth  in  Oppenheim  's  Future  of  International  Law. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        257 

to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement,  or  that  the  court  will 
be  able  to  evolve  the  necessary  legal  rules  in  the  course  of 
the  proceedings  on  a  case,  by  reasoning  from  analogy  or 
by  the  application  of  the  principles  of  equity,  or  in  some 
other  way.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  existing  system  of 
international  law  is,  as  has  been  seen,  very  incomplete; 
it  fails  to  cover  the  whole  of  the  field  of  international  rela- 
tions and  it  fails  to  treat  in  sufficient  detail  even  those  por- 
tions which  it  does  cover.  Moreover,  to  reason  by  analogy 
and  to  base  decisions  upon  the  judicial  notion  of  what  is 
just  and  right  is  especially  dangerous  in  this  field,  wkere 
fundamental  principles  and  first  premises  are  so  largely  in 
dispute.  It  is  to  demand  a  respect  for  the  courts  as  makers 
of  the  law  which  continental  peoples  do  not  share,  accus- 
tomed as  they  are  to  regard  the  courts  largely  as  adminis- 
trative organs  of  the  state.  And  it  is  to  open  the  door  to 
political  opinion,  personal  judgment,  and  national  preju- 
dice on  the  part  of  the  judges  in  a  way  which  should  be 
particularly  obnoxious  to  precisely  those  people  who  are 
advocating  this  step. 

Even  where  the  additional  demand  is  made  for  legisla- 
tive conferences,  the  view  in  question  is  in  some  measure 
defective.  It  assumes  the  feasibility  of  reducing  interna- 
tional relations  at  once  to  general  rules  and  defining  in  a 
form  applicable  in  courts  of  law  the  rights  and  duties  of 
nations.  Such  an  assumption  appears  overbold  and  over- 
sanguine.  The  extreme  difficulty  of  finding  acceptable 
formulas  of  settlement  for  application  in  the  crises  of  inter- 
national relations  is  well  known.  The  outbreak  of  a  war  is 
usually  attributed  to  the  desires  and  demands  of  one  or  both 
of  the  parties,  with  the  implication  that  these  demands  are 
irreconcilable.  With  equal  propriety  it  might  be  attributed 
to  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  belligerents,  and  the  other 
members  of  the  family  of  nations,  to  find  a  formula  of  set- 
tlement acceptable  to  the  disputants.1 

1  Examples  in  New  York  Times,  21  April,  1918,  §  5,  pp.  1-2,  and  26 
November,  1921,  p.  1,  column  6,  end. 


258  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

We  know  but  little  about  the  inherent  nature  and  the 
essential  rights  and  wrongs  of  international  life.  Even 
the  basic  principles  are  hardly  fixed  as  yet.  The  Civil 
Law  of  private  relations  is  over  ten  centuries  old,  the 
English  Common  Law  about  as  old ;  the  science  of  interna- 
tional relations,  dealing  with  a  subject-matter  far  less 
stable  and  far  narrower  and  more  uneven  in  the  foundation 
which  it  offers  for  the  development  of  fixed  rules,  is  only 
three  centuries  old  at  the  outside.  It  is,  by  comparison,  in 
its  infancy.  Hence  the  difficulty  of  the  task ;  hence  the  im- 
possibility of  rapidly  expanding  the  code  of  the  law  of 
nations ;  and  hence  the  need  for  just  such  conferences  and 
arrangements  and  bargains  in  the  diplomatic  and  political 
field  as  are  opposed  by  the  lawyers  and  the  jurists.  In  the 
pre-legalistic  and  pre-legislative  stage  in  which  interna- 
tional society  still  largely  finds  itself  these  deliberative 
agents  are  indispensable. 

In  time,  the  promise  of  the  Covenant  that  a  new  court 
should  be  created  was  made  good.  A  committee  of  private 
jurists  was  asked  by  the  Council  of  the  League  to  meet  at 
The  Hague  in  1920  to  devise  a  plan  for  the  court ; *  and  on 
June  16  of  that  year  the  jurists  of  ten  leading  powers  met 
and  proceeded  to  the  task.2  A  Draft  Scheme  for  the  Estab- 
lishment of  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice 
was  completed  in  July.3  This  Draft,  modified  in  one  im- 
portant respect  by  the  Council,  was  submitted  by  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  League  to  the  League  Assembly  at  its  first  meet- 
ing, at  Geneva,  in  November,4  and  was  approved  by  the 
Assembly,  with  some  alterations.5  It  constitutes  the  last 
effort  down  to  1921  to  reorganize  the  Hague  system,  and 
deserves  attention  as  such.  The  actions  of  the  Council 

1  League  of  Nations,  First  Assembly,  Document  No.  44,  as  cited,  21. 

2  Same. 
'Same,  7-17. 

4  League    of    Nations,    First    Assembly,    Proces-V erbaux    of    Committees, 
No.  3,  p.  3. 

5  League    of    Nations,    First    Assembly,    Provisional    Verbatim    Record, 
Monday,  13  December,  1920,  afternoon  session,  4  P.M.,  p.  13. 


and  of  the  Assembly  are  also  not  without  significance  in 
themselves.1 

The  principal  problems  faced  in  the  formation  of  the 
new  court  were  the  composition  of  the  tribunal,  its  juris- 
diction— both  as  to  what  cases  were  proper  for  submission 
and  the  method  to  be  used  in  bringing  cases  before  it — 
and  the  bases  of  the  decisions  to  be  rendered  by  the  court. 
On  all  other  points  the  court  resembles  the  Court  of 
Arbitral  Justice  proposed  in  1907.  Thus,  the  bench  is  to 
be  occupied,  not  by  diplomats,  but  solely  by  jurists,  chosen, 
it  is  expected,  upon  the  advice  of  the  highest  national  courts 
and  faculties  of  law  in  the  individual  nations.2  The  court 
is  a  court  of  " justice,"  not  even  a  court  of  " arbitral  jus- 
tice"; we  are  beyond  arbitration.  Continuity  in  the  ses- 
sions of  the  court  is  provided  for ; 3  and  the  general 
expenses  of  the  tribunal  are  to  be  borne  by  the  League.4  A 
majority  vote  is  to  be  decisive,5  and  the  decision  is  to  be 
accompanied  with  reasons.6 

Only  one  important  concession  was  made  to  the  old 
order  of  things.  After  it  was  provided,  in  the  beginning, 
that  the  judges  shall  be  chosen  without  regard  to  natipn- 
ality — a  new  step  in  advance — it  was  also  provided  that 
in  each  case  tried  by  tile"  (UWbri  Cite  parties  should  be  repre- 
sented on  the  court  by  one  means  or  another.7  The  reason 
assigned"  iM  Wiat  not  only  must  imparaSBf^Se  assured  in 
the  operations  of  the  court  but  also  the  appearance  of 
impartiality.8  So  long  as  nationalism  remains  as  strong 
as  it  is  today  it  is  probably  impossible  to  find  a  better  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty. 

1  For  account  of  the  whole  matter  by  one  of  the  participants  see  Scott, 
in  Carnegie  Endowment,  Year  Books,  1921,  104-131. 

3  Draft  Scheme,  Arts.   5,   6,   in  Document   No.   44  of  First   Assembly  of 
League   of  Nations,   108-109. 

•Same,  Arts.  24,  26. 

4  Art.  30. 
"Art.  54. 
"Art.  55. 
"Arts.  2,  7,  28. 

8  Doc.ume.nt  No.  44,  as  cited,  43-44. 


260  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  Draft  Scheme  diverges  further  from  the  precedents 
in  the  handling  of  the  three  central  problems  involved, 
namely,  the  composition  of  the  court,  its  jurisdiction,  and 
the  bases  of  its  decisions. 

As  finally  created,  the  tribunal  is  to  be  composed  of 
fifteen  judges,  nominated,  to  the  number  of  four  each,  by 
the  national  groups  in  the  panel  of  the  Hague  Court  of 
Arbitration,  and  elected  by  majority  votes  by  the  Assembly 
and  Council  of  the  League,  voting  independently,  provi- 
sions being  made  for  reconciling  divergent  elections  by  the 
two  bodies  and  for  filling  the  bench  in  spite  of  failure  on 
the  part  of  these  bodies  to  elect.1  Thus  the  question  of 
state  equality  is  avoided,  or  ignored,  or  transmitted  to  the 
electoral  bodies.  The  solution  has  been  hailed  as  a  recog- 
nition of  the  principle  of  state  equality,  in  that  it  does  not 
specifically  provide  for  representation  of  the  powers  ac- 
cording to  size  and  strength.2  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  such  an  interpretation  is  sound.  It  is  expected, 
naturally,  that  in  the  elections  in  the  Council,  where  they 
predominate,  the  Great  Powers  will  choose  their  o\vn  repre- 
sentatives and  that  the  lesser  powers  will  control  the 
choices  made  by  the  Assembly.  The  result  will  be  the 
necessity  for  a  compromise  between  the  Council  list  and  the 
Assembly  list.  That  compromise  is  to  be  made  at  the  start 
by  a  joint  conference  committee ; 3  and,  failing  this,  the 
judges  already  chosen  are  given  power,  if  and  when  en- 
trusted with  that  task  by  the  Council,4  to  fill  the  bench  by 
election. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  settlement  of  the  problem  of 
equality  of  representation  is  simply  postponed  and  dis- 
guised. The  issue  is  not  posed  in  its  obvious  form,  and 
several  steps  are  provided  for  its  treatment.  The  smaller 
powers  represented  in  the  Assembly  at  Geneva,  therefore, 

1  Draft  Scheme,  Arts.  3-12. 

1  Verbatim  Eecord  of  First  Assembly,  as  cited,  p.  8. 

'Draft  Scheme,  Art.  12,  Pars.  1,  2. 

4  Same,  Par.  3. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        261 

felt  safe  in  accepting  the  Draft  Scheme  on  this  point. 
Nevertheless  the  problem  is  latent  in  the  Draft  Scheme, 
and  will  have  to  be  met  whenever  the  elections  take  place. 
Moreover,  as  the  rules  stand,  the  Council  of  the  Great 
Powers  may  block  the  elections  until  assured  of  what  they 
consider  their  due  share  of  the  judges,  while  the  smaller 
powers  are  without  similar  power  except  likewise  to  block 
the  elections  by  refusing  to  give  the  Great  Powers  that 
"due  share."  Thus  the  deadlock  of  1907  may  reappear. 
If  it  does  so,  it  will  be  the  direct  result  of  a  continued 
refusal  or  inability  to  face  and  settle  by  agreement  the 
critical  problem  of  state  equality  in  international  repre- 
sentative bodies.1 

The  Draft  Scheme  attempted  to  define  the  bases  of  de- 
cision of  the  court  in  explicit  terms.  The  court  is  to  apply, 
in  order,  the  following:  international  conventions  between 
parties  to  the  case  before  it,  international  custom,  recog- 
nized general  principles  of  law,  national  judicial  decisions, 
and  the  writings  of  publicists.2  Contractual  agreements 
are  put  in  advance  of  common  law,  law  in  advance  of  ab- 
stract justice.  National  judicial  decisions  and  private 
juristic  writings  are  naturally  placed  last.  With  most  of 
this  no  fault  can  be  found. 

The  problem  of  jurisdiction  was  more  troublesome. 
The  questions  proper  for  submission  to  the  court  were 
defined  by  the  committee  of  jurists  as  questions  concerning 
treaty  interpretation,  questions  "of  international  law," 
questions  of  fact  under  the  preceding  legal  obligations,  the 
nature  and  extent  of  reparation  due  under  the  same,  and 
the  interpretation  of  its  own  decisions.3  The  last  class  of 
cases  calls  for  no  comment.  The  fourth  constituted  a  great 
step  in  advance;  the  court  was  thereby  empowered  to  fit 
the  penalty  to  the  offense  at  its  own  discretion.  The  third 

*For  elections  in  1921  see,  below,  Chap.  XXIX. 

1  Art.  35. 

•Art.  34  of  original  text,  Document  No.  44,  p.  12, 


262  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

class  referred  back  to  the  second  and  the  first,  and  here  it 
is  seen  that  international  contracts  were  to  take  prece- 
dence of  common  law  questions,  as  might  be  expected,  but 
that  common  law  questions  were  to  be  turned  over  to 
the  court  wholesale,  despite  the  unsettled  state  of  the  law. 
The  court  was  given  the  further  power  to  decide  whether 
a  given  case  fell  within  any  of  these  classes.  This  was 
tantamount  to  reviving  all  of  the  difficulty  connected  with 
the  Prize  Court  of  1907,  especially  when  the  method  of 
bringing  action  in  the  court  and  the  ambiguities  in  the 
choice  of  judges  are  recalled. 

For  action  was  to  be  brought  in  the  court  by  one  party 
at  will,  without  previous  agreement  with  the  opponent, 
and  a  decision  was  to  be  rendered,  if  justified  on  the  merits, 
in  default.1  In  other  words,  compulsory  or  obligatory 
jurisdiction  was  provided  for.  The  committee  was  some- 
what divided  within  itself  as  to  the  advisability  of  this 
step,  and,  indeed,  as  to  the  power  of  the  committee  to  in- 
clude such  a  proposal  in  their  plan  under  the  provisions 
of  the  Covenant  governing  their  action.2  Nevertheless,  in 
reliance  upon  the  sovereign  power  of  the  states  which  were 
to  adopt  or  reject  the  plan  to  establish  such  a  court  as 
they  saw  fit,  and  in  reliance  on  the  progress  made  at  The 
Hague  in  1899  and  1907,  the  proposal  was  made. 

The  recommendations  of  the  jurists  on  these  matters 
were  too  radical  for  the  Council  of  the  League,  to  which 
body  the  plan  Was  first  referred.  Before  passing  the  plan 
on  to  the  Assembly  for  approval,  the  Council  therefore 
revised  the  Draft,  deleting  all  definition  in  advance  of 
cases  to  be  brought  before  the  court,  and  all  provisions 
for  action  by  one  party  to  a  dispute — in  short,  all  obligatory 
jurisdiction.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  court  was  made  to 
depend  upon  special  consent  of  the  parties  to  a  case,  either 

1Same,  Arts.  33,  52  of  original  text. 

*  Proces-Verbaux  of  Committees  of  First  Assembly,  as  cited,  No.  5,  pp. 
7,  11. 


PROPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        263 

in  a  compromis  concluded  after  a  dispute  had  arisen  or  in 
a  treaty  of  obligatory  arbitration  previously  concluded  be- 
tween them.1  The  Council  felt  compelled  to  rely  upon  those 
provisions  of  the  Covenant  which  create  obligations  for  the 
members  of  the  League  to  resort  to  arbitration  in  inter- 
national disputes  of  a  justiciable  nature,  without  accepting 
a  mechanism  such  as  proposed  by  the  jurists  for  making 
those  obligations  easily  effective.2  It  was  deemed  impos- 
sible to  accept  a  scheme  which  varied  from  the  rules  of  the 
Covenant  at  two  or  three  points.  The  Covenant  envisaged 
arbitration  only  by  mutual  consent  of  "the  parties'*;  it 
authorized  one  party  to  a  dispute  to  withhold  a  case  from 
arbitration  if  the  dispute  was  not ' '  suitable ' '  for  submission 
to  that  process ;  and  it  held  out  the  alternative  of  subject- 
ing the  dispute  to  inquiry  by  the  Council.3 

The  Draft  Scheme  definitely  varied  from  these  rules, 
as  has  been  seen.  It  was  suggested  that  to  accept  and 
recommend  the. Draft  Scheme  as  drawn  was  outside  the 
power  of  the  Council,  acting  under  the  Covenant,  inasmuch 
as  this  would  be  to  propose  something  in  violation  of  the 
Covenant.  If  the  Covenant  was  to  be  amended,  it  must  be 
done  in  the  prescribed  manner,  not  by  indirection.  Even 
assuming  that  the  members  of  the  League  possessed  legal 
power  to  adopt  the  Draft  and  so,  in  effect,  to  modify  the 
Covenant  without  amending  it  formally,  it  was  felt  that  it 
would  be  bad  policy  to  begin  the  practice  of  alteration  so 
soon  in  the  life  of  the  League.  It  was  also  felt  that  many 
states  would  object  to  the  substance  of  the  change  and 
would  refuse  to  accept  the  obligation  as  stated,  no  excep- 
tions being  made  for  national  honor  or  vital  interests,  and 
•with  escape  by  submitting  to  inquiry  by  the  Council  thereby 
cut  off.4 

1  Draft  Scheme,  with  alterations  by  Council,  in  Document  No.  44,  112-113 
(Arts.  33,  34,  italics). 

*  Proces-Verbaux,  as  cited,  No.  3,  pp.  3-4,  and  No.  5,  p.  8. 

8  Covenant,  Arts.  XII-XIV;  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  15. 

*  Pr aces-Verb aux,  as  cited,  No.  5,  pp.  8-11. 


264  INTEBNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

To  these  suggestions  no  adequate  replies  were  given. 
In  the  committee,  the  Japanese  and  Italian  delegates  were 
strongest  in  their  objections ;  in  the  Council  the  British  and 
French.  An  attempt  was  made  to  show  that  the  term 
"parties"  in  the  Covenant  might  be  taken  to  mean  "one 
or  more  of  the  parties,"  but  this  was  felt  to  be  a  strained 
interpretation.  Again,  it  was  maintained  that  the  difficul- 
ties might  well  be  passed  on  by  the  Council  to  the  members, 
and  that  if  they  actually  accepted  the  Draft  these  difficulties 
would  themselves  disappear.  The  trouble  with  such  an 
argument  was  that  the  Council  desired,  above  all,  to  pre- 
sent a  scheme  which  would  stand  a  good  chance  of  being 
accepted.  Besides,  the  members  of  the  Council  were  not 
themselves,  in  all  probability,  ready  to  accept  such  a  drastic 
scheme.  At  all  events,  the  Council  took  the  decisive  action 
described. 

The  Assembly  at  Geneva  approved  the  Draft  as  revised 
by  the  Council,  with  a  few  changes.1  Many  members  de- 
sired to  restore  the  provisions  for  obligatory  arbitration.2 
To  do  so  would  have  been  to  court  the  opposition  of  the 
Great  Powers  in  control  of  the  Council — Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy,  and  Japan.  For  the  acceptance  by  the  As- 
sembly was  not  to  be  definitive.  The  Covenant  provided  for 
the  creation  of  the  court  by  the  "Members  of  the  League. "  3 
Approval  by  the  Assembly  was  of  no  legal  effect,4  and 
only  acceptance  and  ratification  by  the  members  of  the 
League  acting  as  sovereign  states  could  create  the  court. 
If  the  Assembly  had  restored  obligatory  jurisdiction  to 
the  Draft,  the  Great  Powers  would,  it  may  be  feared,  have 
failed  to  ratify.  The  changes  in  the  Draft  Scheme  which 
the  Assembly  pretended  to  make  derive  their  authority 
only  from  the  fact  that  they  are  acceptable  to  the  members 

1  Documents  Nos.  216,  199  of  the  First  Assembly,  especially  Document 
No.  199,  pp.  5-6,  14-15. 

1  Verbatim  Eecord,  13  December,  1920,  morning  and  afternoon  sessions. 

•  Covenant,  Art.  XIV. 

*  Proces- Ver b aux,  No.  15,  p.  4,  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  speaking. 


PEOPOSED  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS        265 

of  the  Council,  some  of  whom  assisted  in  the  work  of  the 
Assembly. 

The  Assembly  did,  however,  provide  a  means  whereby 
members  of  the  League,  by  a  special  protocol,  might  accept 
the  Draft  Scheme  with  the  provisions  for  obligatory  arbitra- 
tion included.  This  protocol  was  eventually  accepted  by 
some  fifteen  states,  which  thus  carried  the  process  of 
international  judicial  organization  considerably  beyond 
anything  previously  attained.  The  more  important  states, 
however,  have  chosen  to  stand  upon  the  more  conservative 
decision  of  the  Council. 

Comment  on  this  action  is  hazardous.  The  Great 
Powers,  that  is,  the  Allies,  who  were  in  control  of  the  Coun- 
cil, took  a  very  definite  action,  an  action  characteristic  of 
Germany  as  she  appeared  at  The  Hague  in  1907.  A  public 
explanation  has  been  given  of  that  action  as  outlined  above, 
yet  we  are  free  to  form  our  own  opinions  upon  the  matter. 
In  the  first  place,  these  Powers  are  amply  protected  in  the 
method  of  selecting  the  judges.  Secondly,  the  Covenant 
provides  an  obligation  upon  the  members  of  the  League  to 
submit  disputes  to  arbitration  in  the  cases  named  by  the 
jurists  in  the  original  version  of  the  Draft  Scheme,  even  if 
it  leaves  actual  submission  to  depend  upon  special  agree- 
ment at  the  time  or  some  previously  existing  treaty. 
Whether  the  Council  could  not  have,  and  might  not  better 
have,  supplemented  these  provisions  by  accepting  the 
Draft;  whether  the  Great  Powers  acted  upon  reasonable 
and  honorable  grounds;  whether  the  Draft  Scheme  as  re- 
vised means  much  or  little  in  the  development  of  arbitra- 
tion, time  alone  can  tell.  Certain  it  is  that  Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy,  and  Japan  blocked  a  step  which  would  have 
meant  vastly  more  in  the  cause  of  international  organiza- 
tion than  anything  done  so  far  by  either  the  Council  or  the 
Assembly  or  the  two  together. 


PARTY 
INTERNATIONAL  ADMINISTRATION 


CHAPTER  XVII 
OFFICIAL  UNIONS,  COMMISSIONS,  AND  BUREAUS 

IN  addition  to  the  international  institutions  already  ex- 
amined, there  has  appeared  in  recent  years  another 
device  for  use  in  world  government,  namely,  the  inter- 
national administrative  bureau.1  This  institution  fills  a 
special  place  in  the  international  constitutional  system  and 
yields  rich  results  when  carefully  examined  in  comparison 
with  the  simpler  forms  of  international  organization. 

We  have  seen  that  the  outstanding  defect  of  arbitration 
or  judicial  settlement  is  that  such  a  process  can  be  applied 
only  when  a  dispute  has  arisen  between  nations.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  relatively  uneconomical  mode  of  caring  for 
the  maladjustments,  the  abnormalities,  the  breaks,  in  inter- 
national life.  An  institution  is  needed  to  take  care,  now 
and  in  the  future,  of  the  normal,  current,  day  by  day  busi- 
ness of  international  relations,  the  great  bulk  of  which 
goes  forward  without  contention,  dispute,  or  interruption. 

Simple  personal  diplomacy  cannot  perform  this  task. 
The  established  diplomatic  representatives  attempt  to  carry 
along  the  relations  between  the  nations  in  the  field  of  public 
law  and  high  politics;  and  within  that  field  the  accredited 
diplomatic  representatives  possess  a  great  advantage  over 
the  administrative  bureau  because  they  possess  a  measure 
of  legislative  power,  a  power  to  change  the  very  conditions 
of  their  own  work,  while  the  bureau  has  no  such  power. 
But  the  great  body  of  international  intercourse  concerns 
private  individuals,  and  not  so  much  high  politics  as  travel, 

1  On  international  administrative  bureaus  see  literature,  cited  below,  Ap- 
pendix B,  §  17. 

269 


270  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

commerce,  and  business.  For  the  supervision  of  these 
forms  of  international  activity  something  is  needed  unlike 
a  court  of  arbitration  and  unlike  a  diplomatic  representa- 
tive. Some  public  official  or  governmental  body  with  fixed 
personnel  is  needed  to  work  in  the  field  now  occupied  by 
the  consul,  but  which  will  be  free  from  the  limitations  of  a 
national  mandate  and  a  restricted  consular  district.  Such 
is  the  international  bureau  or  commission. 

The  international  administrative  bureau  has  not,  until 
very  recently,  received  the  attention  which  it  deserves. 
For  this  there  are  several  reasons.  The  institution  is  com- 
paratively new;  it  is  rarely  spectacular  in  its  operations; 
and  it  is  hidden  among  the  petty  events  of  daily  life,  instead 
of  being  placed  conspicuously  out  in  the  glare  of  high 
politics.  Speaking  broadly,  the  bureau  does  not  affect  na- 
tional policies  or  international  politics,  and  its  work  is  done 
unostentatiously  and  silently  in  the  world  of  business  and 
private  affairs. 

The  international  bureau  proper  has  for  close  neighbors 
in  the  general  field  of  world  intercourse  the  private  interna- 
tional organizations  such  as  the  International  Association 
of  Medicine.  Such  bodies  lead  off  into  the  highly  fascinat- 
ing subject  of  modern  cosmopolitanism,  to  which  attention 
will  presently  be  turned.  We  are  here  concerned  only  with 
official  international  bureaus  or  commissions,  of  which  there 
were,  in  1915,  some  forty-five.1 

1  This  figure  is  based  upon  a  comparison  of  data  given  by  Reinseh,  Sayre, 
Woolf ,  and  others,  and  certain  primary  materials.  It  includes  only  bureaus  and 
commissions  and  omits  all  conferences  or  associations  not  possessing  such 
bureaus.  It  does  not  include  several  bureaus  which  had  been  created  prior 
to  1914  but  which  had  passed  from  the  scene  in  one  way  or  another.  The 
complete  list  on  which  the  conclusions  of  this  chapter  are  based  is  given 
herewith : 

International  Administrative  Bodies  in  Operation  in  1915 
Central  Rhine  Commission,   1804 
Douro  River  Commission,  1835 
Sanitary  Council  at  Constantinople,  1838 
International  Sanitary  Council  of  Tangier,  1840 
Danube  Commission,  1856 
Universal  Postal  Union,  1863 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  271 

These  agencies  may  be  examined  from  several  points 
of  view,  such  as  their  historical  development,  the  subjects 
with  which  they  deal,  the  functions  performed  by  them,  or 
the  jurisdiction  enjoyed  in  the  performance  of  these  func- 
tions, and  their  forms  of  organization. 

Administrative  bureaus  made  their  appearance  in  inter- 
national affairs  much  later  than  arbitral  courts.  Indeed, 
no  such  administrative  machinery  existed  before  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century;  down  to  1804  interna- 
tional governmental  practice  remained  entirely  in  the  field 
of  politics  and  diplomacy. 

International  Geodetic  Union,  1864 

Universal  Telegraphic  Union,  1865 

Lighthouse  at  Cape  Spartel,  1865 

Pruth  Biver  Commission,  1866 

International  Penitentiary  Union,  1872 

International  Metrical  Union,  1875 

Financial  Commission  for  Turkey,  1878 

Union  on  Eailway  Freight  Transportation  in  Europe,  1878 

Financial  Commission  for  Egypt,  1880 

Union  for  Publication  of  Customs  Tariffs,  1880 

Union  for  Protection  of  Industrial  Property,  1880 

Union  for  Protection  of  Literary  and  Artistic  Property,  1880 

Sanitary  Council  for  Egypt,  1881 

Council   of   Sanitation   for   the   Danube,    1881 

International  Maritime  Conference,  1889 

Pan-American  Union,  1889 

Union  for  Suppression  of  African  Slave  Trade,  1890 

International  Sanitary  Union,  1892 

Financial  Commission  for  Greece,  1897 

Hague  Arbitration  Convention,  1899 

Union  for  Eegulation  of  African  Liquor  Traffic,  1899 

Council  for  Exploration  of  the  Sea,  1899 

International  Labor  Office,  1900 

Maritime  Customs  Board  for  China,   1901 

Plague  Surveillance  in  China,  1901  ( ?) 

Conference  on  Unification  of  Formulas  of  Potent  Drugs,  1902 

Pan-American  Sanitary  Convention,  1902 

International  Sugar  Union,  1902 

International  Association  of  Seismology,  1903 

International  Institute  of  Agriculture,  1905 

Wireless  Telegraphic   Union,   1906 

Pan-American  Scientific  Congress,  1907 

International  Office  of  Public  Health,  1907 

Central  American  Union,  1907 

Union  for  Standardization  of  Electrical  Units,  1908 

International  Opium  Commission,   1909 

International  Commission  on  Map  of  the  World,  1909 

South  American  Postal  Union,  1911 

Inter-American  High  Commission,  1915 


272  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  Central  Rhine  Commission  set  up  in  the  year  men- 
tioned seems  to  have  been  the  first  such  bureau.1  In  the 
next  sixty  years  seven  bodies  of  this  sort  were  formed,  an 
average  of  one  for  every  nine  years.  These  early  cases  in- 
cluded, beside  the  Central  Rhine  Commission,  the  Danube 
Commission  (1856)  and  the  Universal  Postal  Union  (1863). 
In  the  next  twenty-five  years,  extending  down  to  1890,  some 
fifteen  bureaus  were  established,  an  average  of  one  about 
every  twenty  months.  These  included  the  Universal  Tele- 
graphic Union  (1865),  the  Union  for  the  Protection  of 
Industrial  Property  (1880),  and  the  Pan-American  Union 
(1889).  Between  1890  and  1914  some  twenty- three  such 
organs  were  set  up,  an  average  of  one  for  every  thirteen 
months.  Among  these  newer  administrative  bodies  are  the 
Sugar  Union  (1902),  the  Institute  of  Agriculture  (1905), 
and  the  Wireless  Telegraphic  Union  (1906). 

This  record  reveals  much.2  The  absence  of  any  such 
bodies  prior  to  1804  is  significant.  The  slow  growth  of  such 
bodies  until  after  the  middle  of  the  century  deserves  notice. 
Finally,  the  rapid  increase,  and  the  acceleration  of  the  rate 
of  increase,  in  the  last  years  before  1915,  reveal  a  funda- 
mental change  in  the  scope  and  nature  of  international 
relations  which  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  the  future. 

The  subjects  handled  by  these  international  bureaus 
vary  widely.  Moreover,  as  time  has  passed  there  has  been 
some  change  in  the  subjects  treated.  Both  matters  may  be 
reviewed  together. 

The  earlier  international  administrative  bodies  dealt 
with  questions  of  international  communications,  such  as 
river  navigation  and  the  exchange  of  postal  matter.  Such 
were  the  Central  Rhine  Commission  (1804),  the  Danube 

*Sayre,  132. 

"In  tabular  form: 

Period  Bureaus  formed         Bureaus  per  year 

1648-1803  0  0.0 

1804-1864  7  0.11 

1865-1889  15  0.60 

1890-1915  23  0.92 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  273 

Commission  (1856),  the  Postal  Union  (1863),  and  the 
Telegraphic  Union  (1865).  This  may  be  compared  with  the 
familiar  fact  that,  historically,  the  individual  states  have 
taken  public  control  of  the  roads  and  bridges  of  the  country 
at  a  very  early  stage.  The  provision,  maintenance,  or 
supervision  of  the  means  of  communication  marks  the  be- 
ginning of  the  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  power  of  gov- 
ernment. 

The  international  bureaus  next  to  appear  were  those 
dealing  with  health  and  morals.  Such  were  the  Sanitary 
Council  of  Constantinople  (1838),  the  Sanitary  Council  for 
Tangier  (1840),  and  the  Penitentiary  Union  (1872).  Apart 
from  the  elementary  matter  of  communications,  health  and 
safety  are  the  primary  concerns  of  government. 

A  third  group  of  bureaus  includes  several  that  have 
been  created  to  deal  with  commercial  and  financial  ques- 
tions. Such  are  the  Union  for  the  Publication  of  Customs 
Tariffs  (1880),  and  the  Financial  Commission  for  Greece 
(1897). 

In  recent  years  bureaus  have  been  created  to  deal  with 
general  scientific  matters  in  all  the  special  fields  of  inter- 
national life.  Such  are  the  Committee  for  the  Exploration 
of  the  Sea  (1899),  the  International  Institute  of  Seismology 
(1903),  and  the  Pan-American  Scientific  Congress  (1907). 

The  bureaus  dealing  with  commercial  matters  seem  to 
have  multiplied  most  rapidly,  while  the  bureaus  dealing 
with  purely  scientific  questions  are  least  numerous.  The 
bureaus  dealing  with  questions  of  health  and  the  bureaus 
dealing  with  communications  are  more  constant  in  their 
early  appearance,  their  later  expansion,  and  their  continued 
multiplication,  even  in  recent  years. 

It  is  not  out  of  place  to  raise  an  inquiry  at  this  point 
concerning  the  reason  or  reasons  which  determine  whether 
a  given  subject  shall  or  shall  not  be  included  in  the  list  of 
matters  to  be  handled  through  an  international  bureau. 
The  test  is  not  the  importance  to  state  life,  national  and 


274  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

international,  of  the  subject  in  question,  for  many  subjects, 
such  as  immigration  and  armaments,  which  are  of  superla- 
tive concern  to  the  individual  states  and  to  the  interna- 
tional community  at  large,  are  left  untouched  by  this  move- 
ment. Nor  is  the  test  the  absence  of  importance,  or  even 
the  absence  of  contentiousness,  as  the  Postal  Union  and  the 
Sanitary  Union  amply  demonstrate.  The  subject  may  be 
purely  national  in  its  incidence,  but  impossible  of  adequate 
treatment  without  international  cooperation;  so  for  the 
matter  of  health  and  sanitation.  Or  it  may  be  purely  inter- 
national, such  as  the  question  of  maritime  law  and  interna- 
tional railway  transport  in  Europe. 

The  fact  is  that  there  is  no  simple  objective  test  which 
can  be  applied  in  answering  this  question.  We  are  dealing 
with  the  old  generic  problem  of  the  proper  scope  of  govern- 
mental action.  The  nations  will  get  as  much  international 
government  as  they  want,  and  no  more.  The  danger  of  too 
much  government  may  be  faced  with  equanimity.  Com- 
plete internationalization  is  a  remote  bogey.  When  it  seems 
best  to  the  nations  to  provide  a  bureau  to  care  for  a  given 
subject  that  step  will  be  taken,  and  not  before.  There  is 
no  formal  necessity  for  such  action,  and  only  the  real  needs 
of  the  case  will  lead  to  it.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
formal  limit  to  such  action,  and  the  expansion  of  inter- 
national administration  is  subject  to  no  a  priori  limitations 
as  we  move  into  a  future  bound,  in  the  very  nature  of  things, 
to  call  for  more  activities  of  the  sort  here  described. 

The  international  bureaus  and  commissions  created  since 
1800  vary  greatly  in  form  and  function.  To  attempt  to 
study  these  organisms  is  like  gathering  some  fifty  pebbles 
at  random  from  the  beach  and  attempting  to  classify  them 
and  to  reach  general  conclusions  concerning  pebbles  as 
such.  The  highest  authority  on  the  subject  almost  despairs 
at  the  task — as  an  introduction  to  what  turns  out  to  be,  in 
the  event,  a  masterly  treatment  of  the  matter.1  The  reason 

'Reinsch,  143. 


OFFICIAL  BUEEAUS  275 

for  this  degree  of  variation  is  that  the  bureaus  have  come 
into  being  spontaneously,  independently,  and  according  to 
no  concerted  plan,  and  have  developed  in  the  same  free  and 
independent  fashion.  Only  in  recent  years  has  the  move- 
ment become  conscious  of  its  own  place  in  the  world ;  only 
of  late  has  a  deliberate  practice  of  comparison  and  imita- 
tion sprung  up  in  this  field.  The  bureaus  have,  in  the  past, 
been  created  to  meet  certain  needs  and  have  been  given 
duties  according  to  the  need  in  each  case,  and  a  form  cal- 
culated to  support  the  functions  assigned  to  the  organiza- 
tion. We  have  examined  the  needs  which  have  led  to  the 
creation  of  these  bodies.  It  remains  to  examine  their  func- 
tions and  their  forms. 

The  simplest  task  intrusted  to  an  international  bureau 
is  that  of  gathering  and  distributing  information.  This 
task  is  not,  however,  as  is  sometimes  suggested  by  the  cynic, 
so  simple  and  innocent  as  to  be  wholly  unimportant.  Inter- 
national discord  and  waste  frequently  arise  from  no  other 
cause  than  a  lack  of  data  upon  all  phases  of  a  question 
upon  which  different  nations  are  each  acting  from  their 
detached  positions  in  the  international  community.  With 
adequate  data,  the  possibility  of  obtaining  harmonious  ac- 
tion by  all  interested  nations  is  considerably  greater, 
whether  that  result  is  left  to  chance  or  to  informal  and 
wholly  voluntary  cooperation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  states 
are  not  always  willing  to  interchange  such  data  directly; 
nor  are  they  pleased  to  have  requests  for  such  data  made, 
nor  to  have  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  and  attaches 
active  in  collecting  such  information  on  their  own  initiative. 
For  these  reasons  the  collection  and  distribution  of  infor- 
mation is  not  to  be  despised,  when  it  is  intrusted  to  an  inter- 
national bureau,  quite  part  from  the  fact  that  such  work 
can  be  done  more  effectively  by  joint  action  through  a  com- 
mon central  office.  With  the  increased  use  of  statistics  and 
statistical  methods  in  government  in  recent  years,  the 
number  of  informational  bureaus  has  multiplied  rapidly. 


276  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  bureaus  performing  informational  services  have 
a  threefold  task,  namely,  to  collect  data,  to  assemble  and 
print  such  data,  and  to  distribute  the  results  to  the  nations, 
or,  if  authorized  to  do  so,  to  others  interested  in  the  infor- 
mation. The  publications  of  the  Geodetic  Union,  the  Pan- 
American  Union,  and  the  Institute  of  Agriculture  are  con- 
stantly in  great  demand  from  all  parts  of  the  world.  This 
service  of  information  is  also  performed,  of  course,  as  an 
incident  in  the  performance  of  their  main  work,  by  several 
international  bodies  whose  chief  functions  are  of  another 
sort. 

Closely  related  to  the  collection  and  distribution  of  in- 
formation is  the  action  of  several  administrative  bodies 
in  serving  as  clearing  houses  for  the  exchange  of  opinions 
and  views  regarding  matters  of  common  or  concurrent  in- 
terest. In  this  capacity  the  bureau  is  both  a  little  more 
and  a  little  less  than  a  permanent  international  conference, 
for  the  speakers  remain  at  home  and  exchange  views  at 
long  range,  without  meeting  face  to  face,  yet  the  Bureau 
serves  to  raise  the  process  of  conference  above  the  level 
of  that  ordinarily  maintained  in  international  gatherings 
for  oral  discussion  and  debate.  Such  bureaus,  moreover, 
prepare  the  programs  and  the  materials  for  discussion  at 
the  international  conferences  which  are  frequently  held 
to  deal  with  the  same  subjects.  The  ultimate  object  is  con- 
current national  action,  but  action  apart  from  any  formal 
convention  or  agreement.  Such  service  is  performed  by  the 
International  Labor  Office. 

The  similar,  though  not  identical,  function  of  keeping 
a  record  of  facts  and  acts  communicated  to  the  bureau  by 
member  states  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection.  The 
bureau  of  the  Labor  Office,  for  example,  becomes  a  deposi- 
tory or  registry  for  laws  or  treatises  in  force  in  the  terri- 
tories of  member  states. 

The  turning  point  is  reached  when  the  bureau  begins  to 
concern  itself  with  the  subject  matter  under  discussion. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  277 

The  members  of  the  bureau  now  examine  the  data  available 
and  the  views  put  forward  by  different  states  and  decide 
upon  the  action  which  should  be  taken  by  member  states. 
This  decision  may  take  the  form  of  a  model  statute,  or  a 
draft  convention,  or  rules  of  practice  less  formal  than  a 
convention.  Such  is  the  work  of  the  Metrical  Union  (1875). 

When  this  has  been  done  the  work  of  the  bureau  is,  in 
most  cases,  finished.  The  results  of  its  deliberations  are  re- 
ferred to  the  member  states  for  consideration  and  action  as 
recommendations,  but  only  as  recommendations.  Action 
still  depends  upon  voluntary  cooperation  by  the  states 
themselves.  This  is  indicative  of  the  fact  that  international 
organization  at  present  rests  upon  what  may  be  described 
as  the  level  of  immediate  consent.  Just  as  in  the  field  of 
arbitration,  so  here  the  states  are  unwilling  to  bind  them- 
selves indirectly,  and  in  advance,  to  obey  the  rulings  of  an 
administrative  body.  A  rehearing  is  demanded  at  each 
stage  of  the  process;  the  decision  is  kept  open  as  long  as 
possible,  and  is  taken  in  the  last  resort  only  by  the  state 
acting  for  itself,  not  through  a  delegated  body  of  represen- 
tatives. 

Before  concluding,  however,  that  the  whole  work  of  such 
bodies  is  ineffective,  one  should  remember  that,  assuming, 
as  we  must  assume,  that  the  states  would  not  tolerate  a 
supernational  legislature,  the  highest  and  the  very  valuable 
service  which  is  called  for  from  any  international  organ  is 
precisely  that  of  inducing  voluntary  cooperation.  Given 
the  conditions  of  the  problem, — the  unwillingness  of  the 
states  to  submit  to  supergovernment,  such  bureaus  perform 
the  highest  possible  international  governmental  function 
in  this  field.  If  such  a  function  appears  to  be  unimportant 
the  trouble  is  in  the  conditions  of  the  problem  which  limit 
international  action  to  that  type. 

In  a  few  instances,  indeed,  more  significant  action  has 
been  provided  for.  In  the  cases  of  some  ten  or  more  inter- 
national administrative  bodies  the  bureau  is  given  power  to 


278  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

fix  rules  binding  upon  member  states  or  their  nationals, 
and  even  to  carry  out  these  rules  in  application  to  the  daily 
business  of  the  world  through  its  own  staff  of  employes. 
Such,  in  general,  are  the  sanitary  councils  and  the  commis- 
sions dealing  with  river  navigation.  Such,  notably,  is  the 
International  Sugar  Union  (1902). 

Part  of  this  actual  administrative  work  which  is  at 
times  conferred  upon  international  bureaus  consists  in  the 
collection  of  moneys,  the  keeping  of  accounts,  the  payment 
of  expenses,  the  distribution  of  surpluses  and  other  varie- 
ties of  fiscal  duties.1  In  some  cases  this  is  the  chief  work 
of  the  bureau,  in  others  it  is  done  simply  by  way  of  paying 
the  expenses  of  the  organization.  Certain  of  the  bureaus 
are  supported  in  part  by  private  funds,  but  for  the  most 
part  the  expenses  are  paid  by  the  member  states,  either  by 
equal  contributions  or  by  contributions  proportioned  in 
amount  to  the  size,  population,  or  wealth  of  the  member 
states,  and  in  either  case  the  collection  and  expenditure 
of  the  funds  rest  with  the  bureau  itself.2 

Another  somewhat  special  variety  of  work  conferred 
upon  the  international  bureau,  but  a  function  which  is  in 
reality  only  a  phase  of  the  power  of  administration  proper, 
is  the  power  to  settle  by  arbitration  disputes  which  arise  in 
the  course  of  operations  of  the  bureau.3  Such  power  is  con- 
ferred upon  either  the  bureau  itself  or  a  special  committee 
or  office  attached  thereto.  Such  work  is  not,  of  course,  ad- 
ministrative, but  judicial,  and  must  be  understood  by  refer- 
ence to  the  nature  of  arbitration  as  such. 

The  international  bureaus  to  which  actual  authority 
over  member  states  of  their  nationals  is  given  may  operate 
entirely  in  a  local  area  and  confine  their  work  to  the  ac- 
tions of  individuals,  or  they  may  operate  in  the  interna- 
tional field  at  large,  and  act  upon  the  member  states  as 

'Beinsch,  162. 
•Same,  163. 
•Same,  164. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  279 

such.1  There  appears  to  be  no  essential  difference  between 
these  two  forms  of  jurisdiction.  In  both  cases  the  bureau, 
by  prior  international  agreement,  is  given  authority  which 
at  the  moment  supersedes  that  of  the  state,  either  to  act 
itself  or  to  act  through  or  upon  its  citizens. 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  bodies  with  authority  of 
the  sort  just  described  are  relatively  few  in  number,  and 
that  the  bureaus  performing  services  of  information  are 
most  numerous.  Likewise,  the  major  part  of  the  work  of 
each  existing  bureau  is  of  the  first  or  unauthoritative  type. 

It  is  rather  surprising  to  find  that  the  order  of  historical 
development  does  not  correspond  with  this  difference  of 
type.  The  earliest  international  administrative  organs 
were  prevailingly  of  the  class  having  authority  over  mem- 
ber states  and  their  citizens.  Such  were  the  Central  Rhine 
Commission  and  the  Sanitary  Council  at  Constantinople 
(1804  and  1838  respectively).  The  bureaus  created  since 
1875  provide,  relatively,  a  greater  number  of  purely  infor- 
mational bureaus  than  do  those  created  prior  to  1875. 
Again,  it  is  not  always  the  bureaus  enjoying  administrative 
authority  which  are  most  useful.  The  Universal  Postal 
Union,  for  example,  is  extremely  serviceable  to  the  nations, 
yet  its  bureau  has  no  discretionary  powers  at  all.  Discre- 
tionary bureaus  are,  perhaps,  the  most  useful  in  dealing 
with  situations  demanding  direct  and  immediate  action; 
yet  even  that  is  not  always  the  case. 

An  explanation  of  these  phenomena  is  discoverable  in 
two  directions.  The  earlier  bureaus  and  commissions  were 
created  in  response  to  very  urgent  needs  for  joint  action. 
Things  had  been  allowed  to  drift  so  long  that  nothing  short 
of  an  organ  of  real  authority  would  meet  the  needs  of  the 
case.  Later  organs  have  been  created  to  minister  to  less 
urgent  needs,  and  a  less  decisive  action  is  felt  to  be  suffi- 
cient. Furthermore,  the  nations  have  never  been  unwilling 
to  create  international  organs  of  government  of  real  power 

'Sayre,  14-15. 


280  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

when  convinced  of  the  necessity  for  such  action,  and  what 
counts  is  not  so  much  the  degree  of  authority  exercised 
as  the  field  in  which  the  activity  of  the  bureau  falls.  The 
need  for  joint  international  action  is  not  always  made 
clear  to  the  national  governments  by  those  interested  in 
one  variety  or  another  of  the  world's  work.  And  a  great 
deal  more  can  at  times  be  accomplished  simply  by  the  col- 
lection and  publication  of  information  than  would  be  ex- 
pected. The  underlying  reason  is  the  same  in  both  cases. 
When  a  real  identity  or  community  of  interests  makes  itself 
felt  by  the  nations  neither  will  they  hesitate  to  act  and  act 
decisively,  nor  will  it  make  a  great  deal  of  difference 
whether  formal  international  action  is  taken  or  not,  for 
the  community  of  interest  will  dictate  a  spontaneous  com- 
munity of  action  apart  from  any  joint  bureau  with  discre- 
tionary authority. 

Apparently,  also,  the  form  and  structure  to  be  given  to 
an  international  administrative  organization  is  little  in- 
fluenced by  the  functions  to  be  performed  by  the  organiza- 
tion after  it  has  been  established.  Perhaps  it  would  be 
more  accurate  to  say  that  the  fundamental  principles  on 
which  such  organizations  are  based  are  so  firm  that,  in 
spite  of  variations  of  duties,  the  framework  of  the  interna- 
tional organization  is  inevitable. 

The  essential  element  in  all  of  these  organizations  is 
the  standing  bureau  or  commission.1  In  several  cases  the 
expression  "international  union"  is  employed.  This  is 
because  in  all  such  action  there  occurs  a  banding  together  of 
the  nations,  a  loose  international  confederation  for  limited 
purposes.  The  bureau  is  merely  the  organ  of  the  confeder- 
ation or  union,  and  it  derives  its  international  mandate 
from  the  act  of  confederation,  the  formation  of  the  union, 
as  a  result  of  which  it  is  created.  The  bureau  is  the  admin- 

1Reinsch,  155;  for  illustration  see  Convention  for  the  Creation  of  an 
International  Institute  of  Agriculture,  Arts.  II  and  VI,  below,  Appendix  A, 
Document  No.  7,  cited  hereafter  as  "Conv.  Inst.  Agr."  The  bureau  is  called 
a  "permanent  committee"  in  this  case. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  281 

istrative  body  proper  and  derives  its  authority  from  a 
treaty  or  "convention"  which  is  the  constitution  of  the 
union.  This  convention,  supplemented  by  certain  "regula- 
tions" or  by-laws,  controls  the  activities  of  the  bureau  in 
all  subsequent  practice  although  the  "regulations"  are 
sometimes  drawn  up  or  amended  by  the  bureau  itself.1 

Beyond  these  essential  elements,  there  are  two  others 
deserving  mention.  The  treaty  or  convention  in  question 
is  concluded,  ordinarily,  by  means  of  an  international  con- 
ference or  congress.2  This  conference  may  reassemble 
from  time  to  time  to  revise  the  constitution  of  the  union, 
and  it  may  select  a  body  of  delegates  to  meet  during  the 
intervals  between  the  sessions  of  the  conference  for  the 
purpose  of  supervising  the  work  of  the  bureau,  and,  per- 
haps, revising  the  "regulations."  Where  such  a  body 
exists  it  is  ordinarily  called  a  commission,  and  the  final  ad- 
ministrative body  a  bureau.3  Neither  the  conference,  the 
convention,  nor  the  commission  is  administrative  in  charac- 
ter. As  has  been  seen,  the  convention  or  treaty  is  an  inter- 
national contract  and,  as  will  appear  shortly,  the  con- 
ference and  commission  are  constituent  and  legislative 
bodies.  Where  the  conference  does  not  so  much  as  create 
a  permanent  bureau,  but  confines  itself  to  the  conclusion 
of  an  international  convention  providing  for  concurrent 
national  legislative  or  administrative  action,  the  case  is  not 
one  of  international  administration  at  all,  and  should  be 
carefully  excluded  from  this  field  of  discussion.  The  same 
is  true  of  a  general  federation  or  league  providing  oppor- 
tunities for  lawmaking  conferences  of  one  sort  or  another ; 
this  is  merely  a  case  of  treaty  negotiation  as  already  de- 
scribed. Even  where  a  bureau  exists,  the  conference  itself 
has  no  administrative  character ;  while  the  union  as  a  whole 
is  an  international  federation  or  confederation  of  high  or 
low  degree.  The  bureau  alone  is  the  administrative  organ. 

'Eeinsch,  153;  Conv.  Inst.  Agr.,  Article  V,  Pars.  2  and  3. 
a  Eeinsch,  150 ;  called  the  ' '  general  assembly ' '  in  the  case  of  the  Institute 
of  Agriculture ;   Conv.t  Art.  II.  '  Eeinsch,  153, 


282  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  contrast  in  form  between  the  conference  or  commis- 
sion and  the  bureau  is  sharp.  The  former  is  a  large  diplo- 
matic body  meeting  periodically  to  perform  constituent  or 
legislative,  but  no  administrative,  functions.  The  bureau 
is  a  small  body  of  technical  experts  acting  continuously  in 
the  administration  of  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  con- 
ference, or  in  the  formulation  and  administration  of  de- 
tailed rules  for  the  application  of  these  principles.  In  the 
former  body  the  rule  of  unanimous  consent  is  very  generally 
applied,  while  in  the  bureau,  and  even  in  the  commission, 
this  is  not  always  the  case.  Indeed,  the  whole  action 
of  voting  is  rather  unimportant  in  the  bureau. 

It  should  be  mentioned  that  there  is  at  times  a  fifth 
wheel  to  these  administrative  systems,  namely,  the  Direct- 
ing Government,  as  it  has  been  called,  the  government  of 
the  state  in  which  the  bureau  is  located.1  Such  functions  of 
supervision  are  occasionally  intrusted  to  the  local  govern- 
ment as  would  be  conferred  upon  an  interim  commission 
of  the  conference  if  such  a  body  existed. 

Certain  conclusions  may  now  be  formed  upon  the  basis 
of  the  facts  just  reviewed. 

As  was  said  at  the  beginning,  the  administrative  bodies 
here  discussed,  particularly  the  bureaus  having  administra- 
tive authority,  such  as  the  organs  for  supervising  river 
navigation,  constitute  to  a  peculiar  degree  an  application 
of  international  government  to  daily  life,  continuously,  at 
the  instant  moment,  and  directly  in  contact  with  the  ultimate 
units  of  international  life,  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the 
nations  engaged  in  international  intercourse  of  one  sort  or 
another.  Other  forms  of  international  government,  notably 
arbitration,  operate  upon  international  life  intermittently, 
retrospectively,  and  indirectly,  through  the  national  units. 
The  former,  it  need  hardly  be  said,  is  much  more  useful 
where  it  is  feasible. 

The  statement  has  often  been  made  that  such  organs 

1Eeinsch,  155. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  283 

as  are  here  discussed  deal  merely  with  non-political  sub- 
jects, subjects  not  likely  to  cause  international  disputes  or 
war  in  any  case,  because  they  are  non-contentious.  As  has 
been  shown  elsewhere,  this  is  simply  not  accurate  as  a 
statement  of  fact,  when  it  is  considered  that  such  matters 
as  quarantine  regulations  and  postal  charges  and  sugar 
bounties,  all  direct  manifestations  of  national  sovereignty, 
have  been  dealt  with  by  these  bodies.  Furthermore,  the 
record  reveals  several  sharp  contentions  among  the  nations 
in  connection  with  the  work  of  such  bodies.1  What  is  un- 
doubtedly true  is  that  such  bodies  tend  to  remove  a  given 
subject  from  the  field  of  political  discussion  and  diplomatic 
contention.  Once  a  subject  is  committed  to  the  care  of  a 
bureau  upon  the  basis  of  rules  agreed  upon  in  conference, 
it  is  removed  from  the  arena  of  international  politics.  It 
is  denatured,  depoliticalized,  so  to  speak.  Not  that  the 
bureaus  necessarily  deal  with  non-political  subjects,  but 
that  they  deal  with  whatever  subjects  are  intrusted  to  them 
in  a  non-political  way.2  When  the  conference  meets  there 
is  another  story.  The  sharp  disputes  just  mentioned  took 
place,  in  point  of  fact,  in  conferences.  If  once  a  convention 
can  be  concluded  and  a  subject  referred  to  a  bureau  and 
kept  there,  there  is  some  prospect  that  it  will  be  dealt  with 
on  its  merits  and  not  by  reference  to  what  are  often  ficti- 
tious or  artificial  ''national  policies."  The  great  danger, 
indeed,  is  that  politicians  will  seek  to  withdraw  the  subject 
to  the  field  of  political  discussion  again  and  to  interrupt  the 
scientific  treatment  of  the  subject  by  the  expert  commis- 
sion. It  would  be  a  curious  thing,  however,  to  disparage 
the  work  of  the  bureaus  because  of  the  success  with  which 
they  keep  subjects  from  becoming  involved  in  heated 
political  wrangling. 

It  is  precisely  this  effect  of  closing  off  discussion  on  the 

'Woolf,  189,  195,  213,  227. 

3  Similarly,  the  operation  of  courts  of  arbitration,  once  they  are  estab- 
lished, passes  unnoticed;  so  for  the  present  (1921)  activities  of  the  Hague 
court. 


284  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

case,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  which  makes  the  nations 
so  reluctant  to  commit  themselves  to  such  action  as  the 
creation  of  a  bureau.  International  relations  being  as  un- 
stable and  variable  as  they  are,  the  nations  hope  to  gain 
more  by  a  constant  watchfulness  and  a  readiness  to  take 
advantage  of  each  turn  of  the  wheel,  each  chance  for  advan- 
tage and  benefit  as  it  arises,  than  by  securing  permanent 
arrangements  of  general  benefit  and  going  ahead  to  live 
under  them.  Only  where  such  a  catch-as-catch-can  policy 
is  fraught  with  too  much  risk,  or  costs  more  than  it  could 
possibly  yield,  is  the  other  form  of  action  likely  to  be  taken. 

Specifically,  the  nations  have  been  willing  to  commit 
themselves  to  international  administration  only  where  na- 
tional action  must  needs  be  ineffective  to  prevent  injury, 
or  where  the  international  action  is  positively  more  eco- 
nomical. The  adoption  of  the  Sanitary  Convention  is  an  ex- 
ample of  the  former;  national  quarantine  measures  were 
ineffectual  to  prevent  epidemics  and  plagues,  and  interna- 
tional action  was  needed.1  The  creation  of  the  Union  for 
the  Publication  of  Customs  Tariffs  is  an  example  of  the 
latter. 

The  persons  in  each  nation  who  are  interested  in  the 
sort  of  work  undertaken  by  these  bureaus  and  commissions 
are  more  eager  for  such  a  development  than  the  public 
officials  themselves.  In  spite  of  attempts  to  prove  the 
contrary,  it  clearly  appears  that  the  states  are  less  active 
in  the  formation  and  promotion  of  such  bodies  than  are  pri- 
vate individuals.2  That  is,  most  of  the  public  international 
administrative  unions  originated  in  private  movements  and 
were  more  or  less  willingly  taken  over  by  the  states  later. 
There  is  a  regular  series  of  steps  in  the  process  of  conver- 
sion whereby  private  international  activities  pass  into  pub- 
lic activities.  A  private  association  or  bureau  is  first  given 
approval,  then  cooperation,  then  diplomatic  status,  and, 

1Woolf,  221-242. 
'Beinsch,  144. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  285 

finally,  it  is  supplanted  entirely  by  an  official  union  and 
bureau.1  Safety  and  economy  for  the  state  have  not  been 
as  powerful  in  bringing  forth  and  sustaining  such  bodies 
in  the  past  as  private  professional  interest  and  loyalty. 

This  is  reflected  further  in  the  divergent  attitudes  taken 
by  the  technical  officials  connected  with  the  bureaus  and  the 
diplomatic  representatives  in  the  conferences  and  commis- 
sions.2 The  former,  laymen  in  diplomacy,  have  their  atten- 
tion and  interest  centered  in  their  work  on  its  technical 
side — statistical  work,  research  and  publication,  administra- 
tive technique.  The  latter,  laymen  in  real  life,  are  con- 
stantly fussing  about  state  sovereignty  and  independence 
and  national  interests.  The  former  have  in  mind  the  posi- 
tive achievement  of  results  in  the  field  of  action  of  the 
proposed  bureau ;  the  latter,  the  negative  aim  of  protecting 
and  defending  national  sovereignty.  In  many  cases  the 
establishment  of  the  bureau  is  the  work,  not  of  the  foreign 
offices  at  all,  but  of  the  postal,  commerce,  labor,  or  other 
departments  of  the  national  governments,  acting  in  inter- 
national relations  for  the  time  being.  So  far  as  sovereignty 
and  independence  are  real  considerations  in  this  day  and 
generation,  and  in  the  special  fields  where  these  bureaus 
operate,  the  diplomats  can  only  be  praised  for  guarding  the 
holiest  of  holies  and  the  experts  only  regarded  as  danger- 
ously indifferent  to  the  greater  things  of  life.  So  far  as 
this  assumption  is  unsound,  however,  the  reverse  is  true. 
It  is  unquestionably  true  that  the  unions  have  arisen  chiefly 
to  satisfy  the  social  and  economic  needs  of  men,  and  not  the 
political  requirements  of  the  states. 

One  of  the  rules  most  sacredly  guarded  by  the  diplomats 
is  that  of  state  equality,  together  with  its  corollary,  the 
rule  of  unanimous  consent.  All  states,  as  such,  are  equal  in 
law,  irrespective  of  size  and  power,  and  therefore  none 
can  lay  down  a  rule  for  another.  There  are  no  a  priori 

1Reinsch,  145-147. 
'Same,  146. 


286  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

foundations  of  international  jurisdiction,  and  the  consent  of 
each  state  is  necessary  for  giving  force  to  any  rule  which  is 
to  be  binding  upon  that  state.  This  is  no  place  to  discuss 
the  rule  of  state  equality,  nor  yet  the  rule  of  unanimity.1 
They  are  calculated  to  prevent  unjustifiable  dictation  by 
the  Great  Powers  to  the  smaller  states  and  to  secure  a  fair 
hearing  for  the  established  rights  of  each.  But  when  these 
rules  are  used  to  give  the  small  power  an  equal  voice  in  the 
control  of  decisions  upon  the  content  of  law  in  the  making, 
they  are  glaringly  unjust;  a  citizen  of  Panama  cannot 
fairly  be  given  two  hundred  times  the  power  of  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  in  the  making  of  conventional  inter- 
national law.  This  conclusion  is  all  the  more  inevitable 
and  natural  in  view  of  the  fact  that  unions  of  this  sort  are 
generally  open  to  all  nations  that  care  to  join, — uncondi- 
tionally in  most  cases,  upon  conditions  in  others.  If  such 
a  procedure  is  to  be  followed,  and  it  is  eminently  desirable 
that  it  should  be  followed,  it  is  only  equitable  that  adherents 
accept  such  a  position  in  the  union  as  they  are  entitled  to 
fill  and  not  demand  more. 

The  rules  in  question  are,  moreover,  simply  unworkable 
when  it  comes  to  the  payment  of  the  expenses  of  a  bureau, 
the  appointment  of  officials,  and  similar  tasks.  The  smaller 
states  simply  cannot  contribute  as  heavily  as  the  larger 
ones.  They  cannot  provide  the  same  number  of  trained 
persons  for  service  in  the  organization.  They  are  not, 
moreover,  interested  to  the  same  degree  or  amount  in  the 
services  to  be  rendered  by  the  bureau.  Within  the  confines 
of  the  colonial  empires  are  many  states  in  everything  but 
name.  The  persons  engaged  in  the  operation  of  the  admin- 
istrative bodies  are  therefore  inclined  to  go  upon  what 
seem  to  them  the  realities  of  the  case  and  to  ignore  the 
fictions.  They  are  all  the  more  inclined  to  do  this  because 
the  rule  of  unanimity  is  an  almost  insuperable  obstacle  to 
action  in  international  commissions — or,  for  that  matter,  in 
any  other  order  of  commissions. 

1  Dickinson,  280-336. 


OFFICIAL  BUREAUS  287 

A  solution  has  been  sought  in  several  ways.  In  one  or 
two  cases  schedules  have  been  drawn  up  indicating  classes 
of  members  contributing  different  quotas  of  the  expense  of 
the  union  and  enjoying  different  voting-powers,  and  each 
state  is  allowed  to  choose  its  own  degree  of  power  and 
obligation.1  In  another  case  colonial  units  have  been  given 
representation  in  their  own  names,  the  result  being  to  multi- 
ply and  equalize  the  states  of  the  world  in  startling  fashion.2 
Finally,  in  several  cases  agreements  have  been  made  at  the 
beginning  to  abide  by  majority  decisions  in  the  course  of 
the  operations  of  the  bureau,  and  thus  national  sovereignty 
is  saved  and  the  practical  needs  of  the  situation  are  met  at 
the  same  time.3  The  behavior  of  those  intimately  connected 
with  the  promotion  of  such  bodies  may  be  compared  to  the 
attitude  of  the  jurists  at  The  Hague  in  1907  in  their  attempt 
to  organize  an  international  court.  The  greater  the  atten- 
tion given  to  the  realities  of  the  case,  the  greater  the  effort 
made  to  actually  accomplish  something,  just  so  much  less 
is  the  attention  paid  to  the  fictions  of  diplomacy  and  legal 
theory. 

The  international  administrative  bureaus  created  since 
1804  have  not  been  uniformly  successful.  In  addition  to 
the  forty-five  in  operation  in  1915,  some  ten  or  fifteen 
others  have  been  established  only  to  fail  in  actual  practice. 
Such  were  the  Suez  Commission  (1888)  and  the  Albanian 
Commission  (1913).  The  causes  for  the  failure  of  these 
bodies  and  other  similar  organs  are  variously  described. 
Thus,  lack  of  power,  unimportance  of  the  subject  matter — 
leading  to  indifference  on  the  part  of  the  contracting  powers 
— and  the  impossible  situations  in  point  of  fact  with  which 
certain  bureaus  have  been  confronted,  have  been  set  forth  as 
causes  for  certain  failures  in  the  past.  Likewise,  the  unani- 
mity rule  and  the  rule  of  equality  have  been  held  responsible 
for  the  difficulties  and  deficiencies  of  international  adminis- 

^ayre,  164-165;  Conv.  Inst.  Agr.,  Arts.  Ill  and  X. 

'Sayre,  162-163. 

"Sayre,  150-158;  Conv.  Inst.  Agr.,  Arts.  V,  Par.  4, 


288  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tration.  It  has  been  felt  that  the  success  attendant  upon 
international  administrative  organization  in  the  past  has 
been  discouraging.1 

The  fundamental  difficulty  lies  deeper.  Bureaus  are 
not  given  adequate  power,  the  situations  in  which  they 
are  placed  are  beyond  their  control,  and  the  equality  and 
unanimity  rules  are  insisted  upon,  because  the  nations  do 
not  see  any  necessity  for  acting  otherwise.  The  necessity  is 
present,  latent  in  the  situation,  but  is  not  recognized.  If 
it  is  not  soon  recognized,  international  social  order  may 
very  well  be  wrecked.2  The  responsibility  lies  with  political 
thinkers  to  make  clear  the  need  and  the  solution.  Nations 
and  governments  will  delegate  discretionary  authority  to 
administrative  bodies  when  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
doing  so,  but  only  when  they  are  so  convinced.  That  they 
have  not  done  so  in  the  past  is  due  to  the  absence  of  such 
conviction,  which,  in  turn,  is  due  to  the  weakness  of  the 
case  made  out  by  advocates  of  international  organization 
who  have  talked  much  of  the  beauty  of  peace  but  little  of 
the  substantial  economy  and  advantage  of  international 
government.  The  cause  of  the  deficiencies  of  international 
administration  is  largely  the  weakness  of  support  given 
it  by  those  in  the  best  position  to  support  it. 


147-150. 
"Woolf,  especially  179-183. 


CHAPTER  XVIH 
PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS 

THE  fact  that  a  large  number  of  the  existing  official 
international  unions  and  bureaus  have  originated  in 
private  international  organizations  implies  the  continued 
existence  of  a  certain  number  of  private  associations  which 
have  not  been  taken  over  by  the  states  and  converted  into 
official  bodies.  Such,  indeed,  is  the  case.  In  addition  to 
the  public  international  unions  with  their  bureaus  and 
commissions,  there  have  developed  in  recent  years  a  still 
larger  number  of  private  bodies, — some  five  hundred  or 
more, — which  carry  on  their  activities  in  the  same  or  closely 
allied  fields  of  international  life.  Some  of  these  private 
bodies  are  always  receiving  public  approval  or  support,  and 
are  thus  approaching  ever  more  closely  the  status  and  func- 
tions of  the  official  unions.1 

In  a  general  sense,  the  private  international  association 
is  an  older  institution  in  world  affairs  than  the  official 
union.  Decades,  and  even  centuries,  before  the  national 
states  were  willing  to  join  together  in  common  administra- 
tive unions,  private  persons  were  ready  and  eager  to  as- 
sociate their  activities  and  their  interests  across  national 
frontiers.  Private  international  financial,  scientific,  and 
commercial  organizations  date  back  to  the  early  days  of 
modern  Europe,  not  to  mention,  for  the  moment,  the  great 

1  On  private  international  associations  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appen- 
dix B,  §  18. 

289 


290  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

religious  orders  and  trading  companies  of  a  still  earlier 
period. 

In  a  narrower  sense,  however,  private  associations  such 
as  are  here  under  discussion  have  made  their  appearance 
in  the  world  more  recently  and  more  slowly  than  the  public 
unions.  Not  until  after  1830  did  these  private  associations 
begin  to  multiply  in  the  form  in  which  we  now  find  them. 
Prior  to  that  time  there  had  been  private  associations  ex- 
tending over  territorial  regions  occupied  by  various  na- 
tions, but  these  earlier  associations  were  not  organized  on 
the  international  principle.  The  later  associations,  while 
private  and  unofficial  in  composition,  have  taken  the  na- 
tional state  system  as  their  foundation  and  structural 
standard.  In  this  form  private  international  associations 
are  still  very  new  and  very  tentative  things. 

Statistical  information  regarding  the  exact  dates  of 
organization  of  these  associations  is  lacking.  The  reason 
is  obvious :  in  their  beginnings  these  bodies  are  relatively 
inconspicuous,  unrecognized,  and  unrecorded.  Only  at  a 
later  stage,  when  the  association  has  attained  a  position 
of  power  and  influence,  is  it  given  a  place  in  the  annals  of 
international  life. 

Some  figures  are  available,  however,  relating  to  the  num- 
ber of  meetings  held  by  these  associations  during  recent 
years,  and  these  figures  reveal  the  state  of  affairs  in  this 
field  with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy  and  completeness. 
Thus,  during  the  decade  1850-59  there  were  held  some 
eighteen  meetings  of  private  international  bodies.  During 
the  decade  1880-89  there  were  over  two  hundred  and 
seventy  such  meetings.  During  the  first  decade  of  the  pres- 
ent century  the  number  rose  almost  to  the  thousand  mark, 
and  when  war  broke  out  in  1914  meetings  were  being  held 
at  a  rate  which  promised  to  exceed  that  of  the  preceding 
decade.  Such  was  the  volume  and  force  of  the  tide  of  pri- 
vate internationalism  when  the  defects  of  official  interna- 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS    291 

tional  organization  permitted  the  breakdown  of  1914  to 
occur  and  to  interrupt  the  normal  course  of  events.1 

In  a  very  literal  sense  it  is  possible  to  say  that  these 
private  associations  cover  every  field,  every  nook  and  cor- 
ner, of  human  endeavor.  To  inspect  a  list  of  the  private 
international  organizations  now  covering  the  globe  is  a 
revelation.2  Science  is  represented  by  the  International 
Association  of  Medicine  and  the  Institute  of  International 
Law ;  art  by  the  International  Institute  of  Public  Art ;  re- 
ligion by  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  the  World  Church  Alliance,  and 
other  bodies.  In  different  fields  we  have  the  Olympic  Games 
Committee,  the  International  Congress  for  the  Protection 
of  Animals,  the  Interparliamentary  Conference,  and,  in 
the  world  of  industry  and  commerce,  the  International 
Congress  of  Chambers  of  Commerce,  the  International 
Association  for  the  Legal  Protection  of  Laborers,  various 
international  labor  and  socialist  bodies,  and  many  private 
capitalist  organizations.  If  we  explore  farther  we  en- 
counter such  oddities  as  the  International  Petrol  Commis- 
sion, the  General  Association  of  Hotel  Keepers,  the  Inter- 
national Congress  of  the  Deaf  and  Dumb,  the  International 
Association  of  Copper  Chemists,  and  the  International 
Cynological  Federation.3  No  important  aspect  of  human 
life  is  unrepresented. 

In  their  general  form,  most  of  these  private  associations 
resemble  the  public  unions.  There  is  as  much  variety  of 

1  Table  of  meetings  of  private  international  organizations  since  1840 : 

1840-1849 10 

1850-1859 18 

1860-1869 64 

1870-1879 139 

1880-1889 272 

1890-1899 475 

1900-1909 985 

1910-1914 458 

' '  Historical  Light  on  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace "  in  W.  P.  F.,  Pamph.  Ser., 
Vol.  VI,  No.  6,  22-23  (December,  1916),  and  Krehbiel,  136,  citing  La  Vie 
Internationale,  1908-1909,  I,  175. 

*  La  Vie  Internationale  (each  number),  annexes;  Krehbiel,  130-132. 
•La  Vie  Internationale,  1912,  Te.  II,  Fasc.  8,  Annex,  1-9. 


292  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

form  among  them  as  among  the  public  unions,  if  not  more, 
but  two  types  may  be  singled  out  with  a  fair  degree  of 
distinctness,  namely,  the  federalistic  Association  and  the 
unified  business  concern. 

The  federalistic  Association  is  made  up  of  national 
units,  joined  in  a  federal  system,  under  a  constitution  de- 
fining the  membership  and  structure  of  the  Association. 
The  Association  holds  conferences  at  intervals  of  a  year 
or  more — sometimes  less — attended  by  delegates  represent- 
ing the  national  units ;  papers  are  read  and  there  is  general 
discussion  of  various  subjects  of  interest  to  the  members. 
The  results  are  summed  up  in  a  set  of  printed  proceedings, 
including,  perhaps,  a  set  of  resolutions,  copies  of  which 
may  be  forwarded  to  various  national  governments  if  any 
purpose  is  to  be  served  thereby.  In  addition,  the  Associa- 
tion usually  maintains  a  central  office  or  bureau  to  look 
after  its  administrative  and  clerical  work. 

These  wide-spreading  Associations  built  on  the  federal- 
istic plan  are,  as  has  been  said,  of  recent  growth.  More 
elementary  in  form  are  the  great  business  houses  with  part- 
ners and  share-holders  in  different  nations,  with  branches 
all  over  the  world,  and  with  activities  extending  to  all  the 
continents  and  all  the  seven  seas.1  Certain  of  our  great 
industrial  concerns,  such  as  the  Standard  Oil  Company, 
certain  trading  companies  and  export  and  import  houses, 
and  certain  of  our  banking  and  insurance  firms,  belong  to 
this  class.  Here  belong  likewise  the  world  news  agencies, 
those  of  the  Associated  Press,  Renter,  Havas,  Wolff,  and 
others.  The  national  state  system  is  respected  by  such 
organizations  in  their  activities  just  as  far  as  it  is  necessary 
to  do  so,  but  it  is  commonly  merely  utilized  as  a  convenient 
tool. 

The  organization  of  capitalists  and  employers  into 
world-wide  trusts  and  syndicates  has  had  its  response  in  the 
development  of  the  international  trade  union.  Such  are 
the  International  Metal  Workers  Federation  and  the  Inter- 

1  Woolf,  327-343. 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS   293 

national  Trades  Union  Congress.  It  is  not  for  any  philo- 
sophical or  idealistic  reason  that  such  bodies  are  created. 
No  attachment  to  the  abstract  or  humanitarian  idea  of 
international  organization  caused  the  employers  and  the 
bankers  and  the  manufacturers  to  combine  in  one  inter- 
national association  or  another.  International  combina- 
tion was  perceived  to  be  good  business.  So  with  the  interna- 
tional labor  bodies ;  a  prosaic  calculation  of  the  advantage 
and  benefits  to  be  derived  dictated  their  formation.  The 
testimony  here  borne  to  the  advantages  of  international 
cooperation  is  especially  sincere. 

As  between  the  two,  the  employers  and  the  financial  and 
commercial  interests  have  developed  their  organizations 
further  and  with  more  conviction  than  the  workers.  Na- 
tionalism is  an  affair  of  the  middle  classes  largely,  a  bour- 
geois idea.  The  great  capitalist  has  little  of  it  to  bother 
him,  the  common  laborer  likewise.  But  the  latter  may 
be  aroused  by  appeals  to  his  passions,  and  the  skilled 
worker  is  petty  bourgeois  in  his  own  way.  Hence  the  inter- 
national labor  bodies  are  not  as  cohesive  and  do  not  run 
as  smoothly  as  the  international  banking  firms.  Further- 
more, it  is  the  employers  and  financial  and  commercial 
chieftains  who  are  able  to  prevail  upon  the  official  states  to 
recognize  them  and  to  take  over  their  interests.  Several 
of  the  more  recent  public  international  bureaus  were  formed 
under  the  influence  of  the  industrial  and  commercial  com- 
munity.1 Where  international  government  is  asked  for 
in  the  name  of  labor  it  is  not  always  regarded  as  reasonable 
and  practical,  but  rather  Utopian.  Economic  considerations 
prompt  the  creation  and  development  of  international  or- 
ganization in  the  first  place,  and  the  relative  economic 
power  of  different  interests  in  society  determines  the  share 
which  each  shall  enjoy  in  the  development  of  official  inter- 
national government.2 

There  are  no  questions  of  jurisdiction  to  be  raised  in 

'Woolf,  269-285. 
2  Same,  285-304. 


294  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

connection  with  the  private  international  organizations. 
Questions  of  internal  jurisdiction  do  exist — as  between  the 
component  national  bodies  and  the  international  associa- 
tion— but  no  questions  which  project  themselves  into  the 
realm  of  public  law  or  affect  the  national  states.  For  these 
organizations  are  not  official,  and  they  rest,  not  upon  a  foun- 
dation of  public  authority,  but  upon  voluntary  private  co- 
operation. 

There  are  significant  differences  of  interest  among  the 
different  classes  of  private  international  organizations. 

The  commercial  concerns, — exporters  and  importers  and 
shipping  syndicates, — the  international  news  agencies,  and 
similar  bodies,  desire  to  see  a  rapid  and  extensive  develop- 
ment of  free  international  communication  and  trade.  They 
thrive  in  proportion  as  international  trade,  travel,  and  com- 
munication are  freed  from  nationalistic  restrictions,  vexa- 
tious discriminations,  dangers  of  interference,  and  national 
monopolistic  controls  in  the  form  of  tariffs,  exclusive  patent 
and  copyright  laws,  and  similar  devices. 

The  international  bankers,  so-called,  are  in  a  similar 
position.  Dealing  as  they  do  in  international  exchange  and 
foreign  credit,  they  desire  to  see  the  world  credit  structure 
developed  and  strengthened,  and  to  that  end  they  desire, 
above  all,  peace  and  order  among  the  nations.  An  attempt 
has  been  made  to  show  that  certain  world  banking  interests, 
by  stimulating  international  jealousies,  have  managed  to 
sell  credit  to  many  nations  at  once  to  finance  war  prepara- 
tions one  against  another,  thus  creating  an  invisible  empire 
of  debt  over  them  all.1  This  may  or  may  not  be  true  in 
general  and  it  may  have  been  true  in  the  past.  Certainly 
it  can  apply  to  few  concerns  today;  certainly  it  is  not 
applicable  to  the  great  majority  of  banking  concerns  deal- 
ing in  world  credit.  And  even  where  it  is  applicable  the 
outbreak  of  war  is  not  the  thing  desired,  but  the  prepara- 
tion for  it,  and  the  outbreak  might  still  be  dreaded  for  its 
effect  upon  existing  national  credit.  Public  financing  for 

1  Jordan,  Unseen  Empire,  entire. 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS    295 

war  and  for  military  preparations  is  so  gigantic  today 
that  private  concerns  do  not,  and  could  not,  handle  it  except 
in  a  minor  and  auxiliary  fashion.  The  states  prefer  to 
sell  bonds  in  public  at  lower  rates  of  interest  than  they 
would  be  compelled  to  pay  to  private  concerns,  thus  also 
enlisting  popular  support  and  enthusiasm.  At  all  events, 
everything  goes  to  show  that,  in  actual  fact,  the  interna- 
tional banking  houses  are  now  internationalistic  in  their 
outlook.1 

Great  manufacturing  concerns,  drawing  upon  world- 
wide sources  of  supply  and  selling  in  world-wide  markets, 
take  the  same  position.  Freedom  of  trade  and  peace  on  the 
seas  is  their  desire. 

So  for  the  labor  organizations,  especially  in  Europe. 
To  mention  but  a  single  consideration,  their  members  may 
have  to  depend  on  temporary  migrations  from  country  to 
country  in  search  of  work,  and  they  naturally  want  inter- 
national protection  in  their  wanderings. 

On  the  other  hand,  manufacturing  concerns  enjoying  a 
national  monopoly  of  one  sort  or  another,  labor  groups  en- 
joying a  similar  fixed  advantage  over  other  groups,  and 
banking  houses  confining  their  activities  to  national  finan- 
cial activities — in  other  words,  industrial,  financial  and 
labor  organizations  which  are  not  international  in  their 
foundations  and  outlook — are  usually  active  in  opposition 
to  the  development  of  internationalism  and  cosmopolitan- 
ism. They  oppose  free  trade,  free  immigration,  and  the 
establishment  of  international  bureaus  to  control  and  adjust 
national  competitive  activities.  International  cooperation 
appears  to  them  to  be  either  positively  dangerous  or,  at 
least,  foolish  and  unnecessary,  depending  upon  whether 
their  advantage  is  natural  or  depends  upon  national  legisla- 
tion. All  they  demand  in  the  international  field  is  free- 
dom to  sell  their  goods  abroad. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  small  measure  of  freedom  can 
hardly  be  obtained  except  by  international  reciprocity 

1Krehbiel,  127-128. 


296  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

and  agreement.  And,  finally,  even  industries  enjoying  na- 
tionalistic protection  find  it  expensive  to  pay  for  such  legis- 
lative protection  and  are  led  to  a  new  manoauvre  which 
eventually  lands  them  in  the  other  camp.  By  the  prem- 
ises of  the  problem,  there  are  competitive  supplies  of  mate- 
rial and  labor  in  foreign  lands.  The  simplest  remedy  is, 
therefore,  to  set  up  a  branch  in  that  place  and  rise  superior 
to  the  national  state  system.  Indeed,  such  concerns  not 
infrequently  expand  in  this  way  and  end  by  becoming 
powerful  enough  to  dictate  to  the  national  governments. 
Private  international  organization  becomes  so  complete  and 
adequate  as  to  be  able  to  dispense  with  official  help.  In- 
deed, as  will  presently  appear,  it  may  turn  out  to  be  profit- 
able for  the  concern,  because  of  its  peculiar  interests,  to 
oppose  official  internationalism,  itself  indulging  in  private 
internationalism  all  the  while.  This  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  states  have  neglected  to  keep  up  with  the  develop- 
ment of  world  civilization  and  have  forced  private  interests 
to  launch  into  the  international  field  independently. 

One  other  form  of  private  international  activity  de- 
serves passing  notice.  From  time  to  time  since  1850  there 
have  been  held  at  one  important  city  or  another  a  number 
of  international  expositions  or  world  fairs,  beginning  with 
the  exhibition  at  the  Crystal  Palace  in  London  in  1851  and 
continuing  at  the  present  time.  Paris,  Vienna,  Philadel- 
phia, Brussels,  Melbourne,  Chicago,  and  numerous  other 
cities  have  been  the  scenes  of  these  huge  international 
symposiums.1  In  addition,  hundreds  and  thousands  of 

1  A  partial  table  of  such  expositions  follows: 

1851  London  1893  Chifiago 

1855  Paris  1900  Paris 

1867  Paris  1901  Buffalo 

1873  Vienna  1904  St.  Louis 

1876  Philadelphia  1905  Liege 

1878  Paris  1910  Brussels 

1880  Melbourne  1915  San  Francisco 

1888  Melbourne  1915  Seattle 

1889  Paris 
Otlet,  54. 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS    297 

smaller  fairs  have  been  held,  especially  in  the  cities  of 
Europe,  where  exhibits  from  abroad  are  invited,  although 
the  fair  is  organized  as  a  national  event.  Such  are  the 
fairs  frequently  held  at  Leipzig  and  Birmingham.1  The 
international  expositions  proper  enjoy  a  semi-official  stand- 
ing and  the  national  governments  send  official  exhibits  and 
encourage  private  exhibitors  to  participate  on  behalf  of 
the  nation.  The  result  is  a  composite  picture  of  world 
civilization  at  the  time. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  motives  underlying  the 
formation  of  these  private  international  bodies  are  motives 
of  business  advantage  and  pecuniary  benefit.  The  result 
is  that,  once  established,  such  associations  make  every  effort 
to  secure  advantages  for  themselves  and  to  secure  satisfac- 
tion for  the  interests  which  they  embody.  This  means,  in 
most  cases,  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  the  official  national 
governments  with  this  in  view.  The  resolutions  of  the 
International  Congress  of  Chambers  of  Commerce  are  not 
communicated  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  purely 
as  a  compliment,  but  in  the  hope  that  they  may  commend 
themselves  to  him  for  support.  The  international  business 
house  does  not  hesitate  to  carry  its  case  to  the  government 
of  the  state  in  which  it  is  located  or  to  the  governments  of 
all  the  states  in  which  it  has  active  interests. 

This  sort  of  activity  is  of  great  present  importance. 
The  foreign  policies  of  national  governments  are  pro- 
foundly influenced  by  the  representations  and  pleadings  of 
special  international  interests.  The  policy  of  the  United 
States  toward  Turkey  and  Mexico  since  1917  has  been  influ- 
enced to  some  degree  by  the  international  missionary  move- 
ment, and  by  the  international  oil  interests.2  The  American 
attitude  toward  Russia  since  the  same  year  has  been  in- 
fluenced by  international  commercial  concerns.  Labor 

1  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  Bulletin,  1  January,  1920. 
'New  YorTc  Times,  13  December,  1919.  p.  3:  New  Republic,  XXIII,  218 
(21  July,  1920). 


298  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

organizations  have  not  been  without  their  power  in  the 
international  relations  of  the  past  few  years. 

The  most  spectacular  case  of  this  kind  is  that  of  the 
international  armament  firms.  For  a  concern  to  maintain 
and  operate  factories  for  the  manufacture  of  war  materials 
in  five  or  six  nations  at  the  same  time  and  to  continue  to 
supply  these  materials  to  the  different  national  govern- 
ments while  they  are  at  war  one  with  another,  distributing 
the  profits  among  its  share-holders  of  one  nationality  or 
another,  seems  somewhat  anomalous.  For  Englishmen  to 
derive  financial  profit  from  shells  sold  to  Germany  in  1916 
seems  dubious.  The  accusation  is  raised  that  war  is  en- 
couraged by  such  concerns  because  of  the  sales  it  brings. 
Englishmen  and  Germans  so  interested  are  accused  of 
bringing  on  war  between  their  countries  for  the  excess 
profits  obtainable  thereby.  War  scares  are,  it  is  said, 
worked  up  because  of  the  extra  contracts  which  result  there- 
from.1 

A  great  deal  of  this  criticism  is  apparently  sound,  and 
the  private  manufacture  of  arms  has  been  officially  recog- 
nized as  ''open  to  grave  objections"  on  this  score.2  The 
most  sensational  charges  have  repeatedly  been  made,  sel- 
dom denied,  and  proved  to  the  hilt  as  far  as  anything  can  be 
proved  by  circumstantial  evidence.3  And  during  the  recent 
World  War  the  French  Government  practically  admitted 
that  it  had  determined  its  military  policy  partly  by  ref- 
erence to  the  representations  of  certain  German-French 
iron  interests  holding  mineral  properties  in  Lorraine.4 
There  is  no  room  for  doubt  that  private  international  con- 
cerns manufacturing  arms  have  impeded  the  development 
of  international  peace,  order,  and  government,  in  the  past. 

'"Syndicates  for  War,"  in  W.P.F.,  Pamph.  Ser.,  Vol.  I,  No.  2  (July, 
1911),  and  Snowden,  P.,  "Dreadnoughts  and  Dividends"  in  same,  Vol.  IV, 
No.  5  (August,  1914);  Hudson,  M.  O.,  "Private  Enterprise  and  War,"  in 
New  Eepublio,  XXVIII,  No.  363  (16  November,  1921),  Supp.,  26. 

'  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Art.  VIII,  Par.  5,  in  Sen.  Doc.  49,  66  Cong.,  1  Sess. 

*Note  1  above. 

4Streit,  Where  Iron  is  There  is  the  Fatherland,  especially  43-45. 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS    299 

To  say  that  international  peace  societies  have  exerted  an 
opposite  influence  is  not  to  say  very  much,  for  the  people 
engaged  in  the  former  sort  of  activity  possess  ten  times 
the  power  and  influence  possessed  by  the  peace  people. 
Only  in  a  rare  case,  such  as  that  where  the  International 
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  compelled  the  Hungarian 
Government  to  change  its  policy  toward  labor  and  the 
Hungarian  Socialists  in  1920,  do  we  find  labor  and  the  re- 
formers enjoying  an  influence  comparable  with  that  of  their 
opponents.1 

The  activity  of  private  international  interests  is  going 
on  continually.  In  1920  and  1921  there  appeared  to  be  more 
activity  in  this  field  of  international  organization  than  in 
any  other.  The  Baltic  and  White  Sea  Conference  of  Ship- 
owners met  at  Copenhagen  in  June,  1920,  and  endeavored 
to  reorganize  Baltic  trade  methods  after  the  war.2  The 
International  Congress  on  the  Causes  of  Death  and  Sick- 
ness met  for  the  first  time  after  the  war  in  Paris  in 
November,  1920,  and  resumed  its  work.3  The  Miners  Inter- 
national resumed  its  activity.4  An  international  conference 
of  steel  manufacturers  was  planned.5  An  international 
Board  of  Agriculture  was  projected  by  American  and 
Canadian  farmers.6  The  first  Pan-Pacific  Educational 
Conference  was  called  in  Honolulu.7  Various  unofficial 
conferences  of  diplomatic  representatives  were  held  to  dis- 
cuss world  trade.8  The  World's  Young  Men's  Christian 
Association  met  in  Utrecht.9  The  International  Conference 
on  the  White  Slave  Traffic  met  and  resumed  work  on  the 
basis  of  the  pre-war  conventions.10  Finally,  an  Interna- 

1  Nation  (New  York),  3  July,  1920,  Supp.,  p.  28;  New  Eepublic,  XXIII, 
136  (30  June,  1920). 

*New  York  Times,  10  June,  1920,  p.  17. 

"Same,  14  November,  1920,  p.  1. 

*Same,  15  November,  1920,  p.  14. 

5  Same,  26  February,  1921,  p.  2. 

8  Same,  12  May,  1921,  p.  4. 

T  Same,  4  April,  1921,  p.  15. 

8  Same,  4  April,  1921,  p.  22. 

8  Same,  12  June,  1921,  p.  2. 

10  Same,  27  June,  1921,  p.  15. 


300  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tional  Chamber  of  Commerce  was  planned,  to  supplant, 
perhaps,  the  older  and  rather  loosely  organized  Interna- 
tional Congress  of  Chambers  of  Commerce.1  In  all  direc- 
tions private  international  organizations  were  revived  after 
the  war,  were  carried  forward,  or  were  organized  to  meet 
some  new  need. 

In  several  cases  the  private  international  activities  here 
described  have  developed  into  something  quite  unlike  that 
from  which  they  started.  In  all  such  movements  there  is 
present  an  element  which  easily  constitutes  a  distinct  and 
in  some  ways  a  novel  departure.  Private  international 
bodies  do  not  have  a  great  deal  of  patience  with  the  na- 
tional state  system.  They  tolerate  it  or  utilize  it  as  best 
they  may.  They  are  more  concerned  with  association  on 
the  basis  of  the  interest  to  be  served — science,  art,  religion, 
business,  or  what  not — and  they  are  inclined  to  ignore  na- 
tional lines.  They  are  inclined,  that  is,  to  develop  a  dis- 
tinctly cosmopolitan  outlook,  which  is  a  decisive  turn  in 
events. 

This  development  serves  to  bring  out  very  clearly  the 
essential  relations  between  internationalism  and  cosmopoli- 
tanism. On  one  hand  private  interests  demand  satisfaction 
irrespective  of  national  lines,  yet  they  are  not  averse  to 
obtaining  satisfaction  through  the  mechanism  of  the  na- 
tional governments  if  this  is  possible,  and  they  often  call 
upon  the  latter  for  recognition,  approval,  and  support, 
thereby  manifesting  a  willingness  to  become  part  of  the  na- 
tional and  international  system.  But  if  satisfaction  is 
denied,  the  former  position  is  likely  to  be  resumed  and  the 
existing  national  states  and  governments  will  probably  be 
ignored  and  even  defied.  Cosmopolitanism  as  a  condition 
is,  in  point  of  fact,  at  once  a  support  and  an  encouragement 
to  internationalism  on  one  side  and  a  threat  and  a  menace 
on  the  other  side.  So  long  as  the  national  governments 

1  New  York  Times,  21  May,  1920,  p.  16;  12  June,  1921,  §  7,  p.  1;  20  June, 
1921,  p.  21. 


PRIVATE  INTERNATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS    301 

strive  by  international  cooperation  to  satisfy  the  legitimate 
interests  involved,  the  development  of  world  trade,  world 
science — world  civilization,  in  short — can  only  stimulate  and 
strengthen  the  system  of  national  states  and  the  fabric  of 
international  relations  among  them.  Let  the  national  gov- 
ernments manifest  an  obstinate  attachment  to  extreme  na- 
tionalism, however,  and  attempt  to  ignore  the  facts,  arrest 
the  march  of  political  evolution,  and  shut  their  eyes  to  the 
realities  of  world  life  today,  and  the  world's  life  will  simply 
pass  by  on  its  own  course. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM 

MOST  of  the  activity  of  the  private  international  or- 
ganizations just  described  touches  only  remotely  the 
official  life  of  the  states;  the  greater  part  of  private  in- 
ternationalism exists  and  functions  with  scant  reference  to 
the  system  of  national  states.  National  lines  are  at  times 
recognized  for  the  sake  of  mechanical  convenience,  at  times 
they  are  simply  ignored  as  irrelevant  to  the  business  in 
hand,  and  at  times  they  are  deliberately  set  aside  as  anti- 
quated obstacles  to  the  proper  and  natural  growth  of  world 
civilization.  In  other  words,  there  has  developed  since  the 
early  part  of  the  last  century,  a  cosmopolitanism  which 
differs  from  the  rather  impotent  cosmopolitanism  of  An- 
tiquity and  the  Middle  Ages  as  already  studied,  and  which 
bids  fair  to  exert  a  profound  influence  upon  the  interna- 
tional relations  of  the  future.1 

Cosmopolitanism  has  been  denned  as  the  grouping  to- 
gether of  people  in  the  world  by  reference  to  common  in- 
terests apart  from  nationality.  It  is  spiritual  unity  based 
on  one  or  more  of  the  elements  which,  taken  together,  make 
up  nationality;  it  is  a  supernationality.  The  individuals 
join  together  for  cooperative  action  in  associations  which  do 
not  greatly  take  into  account  the  otherwise  distinct  nations. 
Such  cosmopolitanism  is,  of  course,  quite  distinct  from 
internationalism.  If  completely  developed,  it  would  super- 
sede internationalism  entirely. 

Cosmopolitanism  may  develop  within  one  nation  as 
well  as  among  or  above  several  nations.  Ordinarily  cos- 

1  On  modern  cosmopolitanism  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  19. 

302 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM  303 

mopolitanism  appears  as  a  union  of  individuals  legally 
belonging  to  several  distinct  states  but  having  interests  in 
common  irrespective  of  their  diverse  citizenship.  In  cer- 
tain cases,  however,  as  where  a  state  diverges  from  the 
standard  type  of  national  state  and  embraces  within  its 
confines  several  nationalities,  cosmopolitanism  may  be 
infra-national,  or  infra-state.  This  is  notably  true  in  all 
imperial  states.  Ancient  Eome  and  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
pire of  the  Middle  Ages,  to  mention  only  two  illustrations, 
produced  a  cosmopolitanism  within  their  bosoms  more  pro- 
nounced and  self-conscious  than  anything  of  the  kind  which 
the  world  was  to  know  for  centuries  afterwards.  In  that 
cosmopolitanism  was  found  a  measure  of  justification  for 
the  imperial  domination.  Under  the  sway  of  the  Emperor 
unity  of  culture  and  feeling  was  achieved  and  the  conflicts 
of  national  spirit  were  quieted.  Unfortunately  for  the 
picture,  however,  this  imperial  cosmopolitanism  was  not 
entirely  natural  and  spontaneous,  but  was  imposed  by 
authority  from  above;  and  such  is  commonly  the  sanction 
of  imperial  cosmopolitanism.  To  be  genuine,  cosmopoli- 
tanism must  come  by  a  natural  disappearance  of  nation- 
alism, not  by  its  destruction  at  the  hands  of  imperial 
masters. 

The  cosmopolitanism  of  our  day  differs  somewhat,  as 
has  been  said,  in  its  bases  and  foundations,  from  that  of 
earlier  periods,  and  the  prospects  of  its  continuation  and 
development  are  affected  by  that  difference. 

Greek  cosmopolitanism  was  racial,  religious,  and  lin- 
guistic. The  people  of  all  the  independent  city-states  were 
Hellenes  and  were  conscious  of  their  race,  in  contrast  to  the 
outer  barbarians.  All  were  embraced  in  one  great  religious 
cult;  all  worshiped  the  gods  of  Olympus,  whatever  local 
deities  and  shrines  they  might  cherish.  All  spoke  one 
generic  tongue,  albeit  with  differing  accents  and  inflections. 
By  virtue  of  these  things  they  were  ultimately  Greeks,  al- 
though they  might  be  primarily  Athenians  or  Spartans, 


304  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Viewed  in  a  larger  perspective,  this  may  appear  to  be  Greek 
nationalism  rather  than  cosmopolitanism.  But  the  Greeks 
themselves  were  so  attached  to  their  city-states  as  to  make 
it  very  difficult  for  them  to  attain  the  idea  of  political  unity 
when  that  question  was  actually  raised,  and  they  certainly 
looked  upon  Greek  unity  as  a  complex  and  ultimate  syn- 
thesis based  upon  much  that  had  gone  before,  not  as  a  pri- 
mary national  allegiance.1 

In  Rome  the  elements  of  imperial  cosmopolitanism  were 
more  restricted,  and  were  derived  from  different  sources.2 
Of  racial  unity  there  was  none.  Even  the  Italians,  all 
Latins  though  they  were,  felt  their  tribal  ancestry  too 
strongly  in  the  early  period  to  recognize  Italian  unity,  and 
when  Italian  unity  was  finally  attained  Italy  was  no  longer 
the  whole  state.  And  the  mature  empire — where  and  when 
alone  any  cosmopolitanism  at  all  developed —  was  a  con- 
geries of  Latins,  Gauls,  Iberians,  Carthaginians,  Greeks, 
Slavs,  and  peoples  of  every  race  and  stock.  Similarly,  in 
general  culture  the  peoples  of  the  Empire  lived  divergent 
Hves,  following  different  manners  and  customs.  Such 
cosmopolitanism  as  existed  was  based  upon  other  founda- 
tions than  race  and  manners. 

Religion  and  law  were  the  great  forces  used  by  Rome 
to  bind  her  peoples  into  one  society.  Above  the  manifold 
pagan  cults  were  erected  first  the  worship  of  the  Emperor 
and  later  state  Christianity.  The  official  faith  created  some 
degree  of  spiritual  oneness  from  the  Augustan  period  to  the 
end  of  the  imperial  age.  Closely  related  to  the  state  reli- 
gion was  the  public  law  of  the  Empire.  While  allowing  the 
peoples  of  the  outlying  regions  to  retain  their  local  man- 
ners and  customs  and  their  local  private  law,  Rome  insisted 
upon  establishing  a  single  system  of  constitutional  and  ad- 
ministrative law  in  all  parts  of  the  state  and  upon  regulat- 
ing by  imperial  authority  such  conflicts  as  appeared  be- 

1  Fairbanks,  13-29,  148-164;  Murray,  Part  I. 

•Mahaffy,  Chaps.  V-VIII,  X-XVIj  Muir,  33-34  j  Wendland,  Chaps.  VII-IX. 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM  305 

tween  different  local  systems  of  private  law,  especially 
where  those  conflicts  arose  in  the  capital  city  or  the  great 
commercial  centers.  Thus  potentially,  and,  to  a  large  de- 
gree, actually,  one  system  of  law  prevailed  from  the  straits 
of  Gibraltar  to  the  Syrian  desert,  from  the  plains  of  North- 
ern Europe  to  the  valley  of  the  Nile.  Though  imposed  from 
above  by  authority,  and  maintained  in  part  by  armed  force, 
the  effect  was  the  same.  The  peoples  of  the  far-flung  em- 
pire lived  and  died  subject  to  and  participants  in  the  one 
great  and  majestic  system  of  the  law  of  imperial  Rome. 

Medieval  cosmopolitanism  was  broader  in  its  character 
and  more  varied  in  its  manifestations.1  At  bottom  Medie- 
val European  unity  was  religious  and  ecclesiastical.  The 
Church  and  the  Faith  of  Rome  supported  and  informed 
men's  minds  when  Rome  herself  had  fallen  into  disorder. 
One  common  inheritance  bound  the  faithful  together  and 
preserved  a  spiritual  European  unity  through  centuries  of 
material  chaos  and  ruin.  Added  to  this  was  the  nebulous 
but  thoughtful  allegiance  in  the  Empire  of  the  Carolingians 
and  the  Hohenstaufens.  The  ideal  membership  held  by  all 
the  peoples  of  Europe  in  this  theoretical  projection  of  im- 
perial Rome  served  to  strengthen  and  enrich  the  ecclesias- 
tical and  religious  unity  under  the  Popes.  Finally,  espe- 
cially in  the  later  centuries  of  the  Medieval  period,  the 
Roman  law  itself,  and  Latin  literature  and  the  classical 
cultural  inheritance,  bound  the  best  people  of  European 
society  into  one  spiritual  school.  One  Church  and  Faith, 
one  Empire,  and  one  body  of  neo-classical  enlightenment — 
such  was  cosmopolitan  Europe  in  the  later  Middle  Ages. 

Then  came  the  dissolution.  In  political  power,  in  ec- 
clesiastical organization,  in  dogma  and  ritual,  one  after 
another,  the  Church  was  shaken  from  end  to  end.  The 
Babylonian  Captivity,  the  Great  Schism,  and  the  Protestant 
Reformation  worked  out  their  disintegrating  effects  from 
1309  to  1555,  and  the  religious  and  ecclesiastical  unity  of 

*  Muir,  124-126. 


306  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Europe  was  destroyed.  The  Empire  had  already  fallen  into 
anarchy,  and  the  feudal  princes  of  Germany,  the  free 
cities  of  Italy,  and  the  national  kingdoms  of  Western 
Europe — Portugal,  Spain,  France,  England,  and  other 
states — rose  in  the  place  of  the  Emperor.  Feudal  allegiance 
to  the  successor  of  the  Caesars  gave  place  to  allegiances, 
more  immediate  and  more  real,  to  local  city,  prince,  or  king. 
Finally,  the  cultural  revival  soon  developed  in  such  a  way 
that  not  unity  but  variation  was  the  result,  and,  other 
things  being  as  they  were,  that  variation  fell  out  upon  lines 
of  nationality.  Turning  from  classical  art  and  literature 
directly  back  to  nature  itself,  men's  individual  tastes  and 
faculties  emerged,  and  this  meant  that  national  peculiari- 
ties and  national  characteristics  were  revealed.  By  the 
middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  Europe  was  a  maelstrom 
of  the  most  varied  religious  beliefs,  political  allegiances, 
and  cultural  aims  and  ideals. 

For  more  than  three  centuries  this  state  of  affairs  per- 
sisted. It  is  true  that  during  a  brief  period  extending 
from  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  down  to  the 
French  Revolution  a  sham  theoretical  cosmopolitanism  de- 
veloped among  the  intellectuals,  among  the  literary  and 
philosophical  devotees  of  the  salons.  At  the  same  time  a 
process  of  intermarriage  and  inheritance  had  brought  the 
royalty  and  aristocracy  of  the  states  of  Western  Europe 
into  a  closely  knit  family.  But  this  eighteenth  century  cos- 
mopolitanism was  superficial.  It  came  at  a  time  when 
the  colonial  and  commercial  competition  of  the  European 
states  was  most  bitter  and  when  conditions  in  the  world 
of  real  facts  were  such  that  no  deep  or  lasting  unity  was 
possible  among  the  peoples  of  Europe.  The  barriers  to 
free  communication,  free  personal  development,  and  that 
spiritual  breadth  of  vision  without  which  real  cosmopoli- 
tanism is  impossible,  were  still  too  great.  Hence  the  effect 
of  the  French  Revolution  and  subsequent  events  was  to  dis- 
perse very  quickly  such  misty  unity  as  existed.  The  Revo- 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM 


307 


lution  itself  was  but  a  culminating  manifestation  of  the 
deep  and  abiding  change  which  came  over  Europe  between 
1300  and  1700 ;  the  Renaissance  had  merely  got  down  to  the 
people.  But  it  was  sufficient  to  dispel  the  illusion  of  Euro- 
pean unity  created  by  the  litterateurs  and  illuminati  of  the 
re  of  Voj 

[odern  cosmopolitanism  is  built  upon  more  solid  foun- 
dations. Some  of  the  older  elements  remain,  but,  in  gen- 
eral, the  world  civilization  of  today  is  unlike  that  of  An- 
tiquity or  the  Middle  Ages,  and  equally  unlike  that  of 

eighteenth-century  Europe.  |L        ,  , 

»»»J}lNJw«"WWPwr4ih*«rf*«H^  means 

something,  at  least  in  continental  Europe  and  Latin  Amer- 
ica. In  Great  Britain  and  North  America  it  is  felt  to  a  less 
degree,  as  the  religious  temper  becomes  milder  and  secular 
ideals  replace  the  old  feelings  of  piety  and  devotion.  A 
similar  phenomenon — a  religious  cosmopolitanism —  exists 
in  the  Mohammedan  world  and  in  Buddhist  Asia.  But  the 
distinct  existence  of  these  three  great  groups,  and  of  the 
great  subdivisions  in  the  Christian  world — Orthodox,  Ro- 
man, and  Protestant — lowers  the  importance  of  this  effect. 
Religion  is  hardly  strong  enough,  and  certainly  not  suffi- 
ciently unified,  in  this  day  and  age  to  produce  a  world  so- 
ciety. Indeed,  such  cosmopolitanism  as  exists  is  somewhat 
cynical  and  skeptical  of  the  religion  which  is  too  often 
tribal  and  nationalistic  in  its  origin  and  employment. 

Of  legal  unity  Europe  still  knows  something,  at  all  events 
continental  Europe  west  of  Budapest.  The  Civil  Law, — 
the  law  of  Rome  in  modern  guise, — obtains  in  Madrid  and 
Paris  alike,  in  Berlin  and  in  Bern,  in  Brussels  and  in  Rome. 
Similarly,  the  Civil  Law  governs  private  rights  and  obli- 
gations in  all  of  Latin  America,  in  Louisiana,  in  Quebec. 
This,  however,  is  only  part  of  the  story.  As  in  the  field  of 
religion,  so  here  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  Great  Britain 
and  North  America  are  under  the  English  Common  Law, 
that  Eastern  Europe  lives  under  Slavic  law,  and  that  Asia 


308  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

and  Africa  possess  many  indigenous  legal  systems  of  their 
own.  Added  to  this  is  the  fact  that  even  where  supposedly 
common  legal  systems  exist  the  practice  of  constituent  and 
statutory  law-making  has  so  worked  upon  and  made  over 
the  historically  received  private  law  as  to  produce  endless 
variations  among  the  nations.  And  it  is  curious  to  notice 
that  it  is  in  connection  with  this  particular  legislative 
activity,  which  has  largely  destroyed  the  inherited  cosmo- 
politanism based  on  the  Civil  Law,  that  a  new  legal  cosmo- 
politanism may  be  expected  as  a  result  of  deliberate 
imitation  and  concurrent  legislative  action.  This  leads  us 
forward  to  the  true  bases  of  modern  cosmopolitanism. 

The  principal  element  in  modern  cosmopolitanism,  as 
it  has  developed  since  1850,  is  a  common  economic  and 
scientific  culture. 

The  facts  are  familiar  to  every  observer.1  With  the 
introduction  of  steam  and  electricity,  travel  and  the  trans- 
portation of  goods  have  become  enormously  easier, 
cheaper,  and  more  rapid.  The  communication  of  informa- 
tion by  post,  telegraph,  and  telephone  and  the  shipping  of 
printed  matter  has  been  expanded  and  speeded  up  to  a 
point  unimagined  a  half -century  ago.  The  commercial 
market  of  even  the  small  manufacturer  has  become  a 
world-market.  Raw  materials  and  labor  come  from  places 
where  they  are  plentiful  to  lands  where  exists  the  capital 
to  put  them  to  use;  or  capital,  increasingly  mobile  in  the 
hands  of  the  international  banking  organizations,  is  trans- 
mitted in  vast  amounts  to  places  where  the  materials  and 
labor  already  exist.  The  manufactured  product  is  carried 
by  a  world  transportation  system  to  all  corners  of  the 
globe,  so  standardized  and  labeled  that  a  merchant  in 
Calcutta  whose  credit  is  attested  by  the  credit  agencies, 
and  who  probably  maintains  relations  with  an  American 
house  in  New  York,  may  buy  automobiles  in  Detroit  by 
post  or  telegraph  and  rely  on  the  results  of  his  action  with 
some  confidence.  This  means  a  new  world,  as  compared 

1  Clark,  Unifying  the  World,  9-51;  Woolf,  181-183. 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM  309 

with  the  world  of  the  twelfth  century,  or  even  the  world 
of  the  seventeenth. 

The  basic  causes  for  this  commercial  revolution,  com- 
parable only  with  the  commercial  revolution  of  the  thir- 
teenth, fourteenth,  and  fifteenth  centuries,  are  scientific 
inventions,  such  as  steam  locomotion  on  sea  and  land,  and 
the  electric  telegraph.  The  railroad,  the  steamship,  and 
the  telegraph  have  reorganized  the  world. 

"With  these  must  be  grouped  several  other  devices,  of 
less  importance  by  themselves,  but  influential  as  subsidi- 
aries of  the  major  inventions  of  Watt  and  Edison.  Such 
are  the  decimal  metric  system,  the  standardization  of  time 
on  the  basis  of  Greenwich,  England, — a  result  accom- 
plished by  formal  international  treaty,  it  may  be  noted, — 
the  perfection  of  a  system  of  maritime  signals,  and  so  on. 
The  Gregorian  calendar,  long  used  generally  in  Europe 
and  America,  has  finally  been  adopted  in  Russia  and  is 
establishing  itself  in  Asia.  The  English,  German,  Spanish, 
and  French  languages,  especially  English  and  Spanish,  are 
making  great  headway  in  all  parts  of  the  world  as  the  com- 
monly accepted  languages  of  commerce.  These  scientific 
devices,  and  numerous  others,  all  contribute  to  the  support 
of  a  world  economy  possible  only  with  free  and  complete 
communication  and  intercourse. 

The  results  are  manifest  in  many  quarters,  and  are 
recognized  by  the  most  careful  and  competent  authorities.1 
The  private  scientific  and  economic  associations  just  re- 
viewed are  based  upon  this  foundation  as  are  the  official 
administrative  organizations  previously  studied.  As  a 
result  of  these  forces  many  private  organizations  and  cor- 
porations are  being  recognized  in  public  international  law 
and  treaty  agreements  and  become  units  in  the  official 
international  system.2  These  acts  of  recognition  in  their 
turn  help  to  intensify  modern  cosmopolitanism ;  the  recog- 

1  Guaranty  Trust  Company,  Bulletin,  "Effect  of  War  on  Neutrals,"  15 
December,  1919,  especially  p.  5. 

2  See  fuller  description  in  Hicks,  280-292;  for  law  see  conflicting  views  in 
Oppenheim,  I,  §  63. 


310  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

nition  of  such  world  unity  as  exists  leads  to  steps  which 
increase  that  unity,  and  thus  the  process  is  accelerated. 

There  is,  however,  another  form  in  which  modern  cos- 
mopolitanism is  made  manifest,  a  form  which  has  received 
a  name  recognizing  in  so  many  words  the  character  of  the 
phenomenon  it  describes:  cosmopolitan  law-making.1  It 
would  probably  be  more  accurate  to  speak  of  this  activity 
as  concurrent  uniform  national  legislation,2  but  a  detailed 
account  of  just  what  has  been  done  is  probably  the  best 
explanation  and  definition. 

Uniformity  of  national  legal  systems  is  needed  in  the 
whole  range  of  commercial  law,  regarding  bills  of  exchange, 
commercial  contracts,  and  the  thousand  and  one  details  of 
business  law.  Uniformity  is  needed  in  the  field  of  admir- 
alty or  maritime  law,  in  the  field  of  labor  and  labor  pro- 
tection, and  in  all  fields  where  a  world  activity  has  devel- 
oped. The  need  of  uniformity  in  patent  and  copyright  law 
to  protect  inventors  and  authors  from  pirate  manufac- 
turers and  printers  is  especially  grave.3 

The  object  to  be  accomplished  is  clear,  but  the  methods 
to  be  adopted  are  hard  to  find.  A  treaty  alone  would  hardly 
satisfy  the  needs  of  the  case  except  in  those  few  nations 
where  a  treaty  becomes  a  law  to  be  enforced  in  the  courts 
on  a  par  with  statute  law.  Some  more  subtle  procedure 
is  necessary.  The  result  has  been  a  novel  experiment  in 
international  government,  dating  only  from  1880;  and,  al- 
though the  resulting  action  is  of  such  nature  as  to  fall 
outside  the  category  of  international  administration,  it 
may  be  briefly  described  here,  for  the  action  escapes  the 
classes  of  international  diplomatic  treaty  negotiation,  arbi- 
tration and  conference  alike. 

What  happens  is  that  a  model  code  is  drafted  by  an 

1Woolf,  266-310. 

'Hicks,  242-243. 

1  See  the  importance  attached  to  this  subject  as  indicated  in  the  prepara- 
tions made  for  the  Peace  Conference  in  1918-19 ;  Langner  and  White,  Patent 
Laws. 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM  311 

international  committee  or  convention,  and  then  efforts  are 
made  to  secure  its  adoption  in  different  states  as  national 
legislation.  Thus,  an  International  Maritime  Committee 
was  established  in  1898,  composed  of  experts  in  that  field, 
acting  as  delegates  of  seventeen  national  associations  of 
shipping  interests,  and  this  Committee  has  succeeded  in 
securing  the  adoption  of  several  items  in  a  potentially 
complete  code  of  maritime  law.1  Questionnaires  are  sent 
out  to  member  associations;  the  replies — relating  to  the 
existing  state  of  the  national  law  and  suggestions  for  a 
uniform  code — are  scanned ;  a  model  code  is  drawn  up  and 
recommended  to  the  individual  national  legislatures.  The 
obstacles  to  acceptance  are  many:  national  habit  and  tra- 
dition— "our  way  of  doing  things" — and  competitive 
advantages  enjoyed  by  certain  national  groups  by  one 
accident  of  fate  or  another.  There  is,  of  course,  no  super- 
national  legislature  to  act.  International  uniformity  must 
make  its  way  on  its  merits.  Treaties  alone  would  be  inade- 
quate. The  only  recourse  is  to  persuade  national  legisla- 
tures to  adopt  these  model  statutes  for  the  sake  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  uniformity  and  certainty  in  world  business. 
This  is  not  international  action,  properly  speaking,  but 
concurrent  national  action.  The  result,  however,  is  felt 
directly  in  the  field  of  international  life.  It  is  legislative 
cosmopolitanism. 

Similar  action  was  taken  more  or  less  successfully  in 
the  field  of  patent  law  and  copyright  law  in  1883  and  1886, 
respectively,  and  in  subsequent  years.  Some  fifteen  na- 
tions— among  which  the  United  States  is  not  conspicuous — 
have  unified  their  national  laws  on  the  question  of  copy- 
right, and  patent  and  trade-mark  laws  have  been  similarly 
adjusted.2 

An  attempt  to  accomplish  the  same  result  in  the  field 
of  labor  legislation  may  be  studied  for  what  it  indirectly 

1  Woolf,  269-285. 
'Same,  304-310. 


312 

reveals  regarding  the  motives  of  the  parties  in  interest.1 
Speaking  generally,  the  employers  in  the  individual  nations 
are  opposed  to  labor  legislation.  The  menace  of  foreign 
competition  is  raised  as  an  argument  against  such  legis- 
lation.2 Therefore  concurrent  international  action  has 
been  proposed  to  meet  the  situation. 

An  International  Association  for  Labor  Legislation  was 
formed  in  1900,  after  the  futile  conference  at  Berlin  in  1890 
of  which  Kipling  once  wrote  so  tellingly.  The  Association 
is  made  up  of  several  national  sections.  It  maintains  an 
International  Labor  Office  at  Bern  and  has  attempted  to 
secure  concurrent  national  legislation  in  the  interests  of 
labor  but  has  made  little  headway.  The  philanthropic  re- 
formers in  charge  have  been  able  to  accomplish  little,  and 
organized  labor  has  not  given  consistent  support  to  its  ac- 
tivities. The  real  reason  for  the  association's  comparative 
failure,  however,  is  the  character,  not  of  its  support,  but 
of  the  opposition.  The  employers  have  leagued  themselves 
together — French  and  German  and  British,  irrespective  of 
nationality — to  oppose  the  labor  people,  who  were  likewise 
associated  together  irrespective  of  nationality.3  This  is 
the  very  essence  of  cosmopolitanism.  German  and  British 
capitalists  have  fought  the  German  and  British  labor  or- 
ganizations hand  in  hand.  What  headway  has  been  made 
has  been  made  by  compromises  not  so  much  between  na- 
tions as  between  the  two  social  groups  running  through 
the  several  nations. 

From  this  state  of  affairs  it  is  not  a  far  step  to  the 
Socialist  International  and  the  International  Workers  of 
the  World.  The  world  capitalists,  whose  activities  have 
already  been  reviewed,  are  confronted  by  the  world  prole- 
tariat. The  cry  goes  out  for  the  workers  of  the  world  to 
unite — even  as  the  owners  of  the  world,  the  manufacturers, 

1Woolf,  285-304,  and  Lowe,  entire. 
'Woolf,  at  289. 
•Same,  296. 


MODERN  COSMOPOLITANISM  313 

the  traders,  the  bankers,  have  already  united.  This  is 
cosmopolitanism  with  a  vengeance.  Unfortunately  also, 
the  national  states,  as  has  been  mentioned,  pay  more  heed 
and  give  more  recognition  and  support,  both  in  national 
and  in  international  affairs,  to  the  latter  groups,  with  the 
result  that  international  organization, — that  is,  organized 
cooperation  by  the  existing  national  states, — appears  to 
the  proletariat  as  organized  exploitation  by  capitalist  class 
governments.1  Hence  they  withhold  from  it  their  support. 
The  one  class  most  interested  collectively  and  individually 
in  providing  a  substitute  for  unrestricted  international  war 
opposes  the  one  feasible  solution  of  the  problem.  An  at- 
tempt has  recently  been  made  to  remedy  this  by  the  labor 
clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  which  will  presently 
receive  attention.  But  if  internationalism  cannot  be  made 
attractive  to  the  workers,  world  unity  will  come  by  the 
path  of  cosmopolitanism;  for  the  future  of  government, 
national  and  international,  certainly  belongs — whether  we 
like  it  or  not — to  that  class  in  society.  Whether  interna- 
tionalism or  cosmopolitanism  wins  depends  upon  the  speed 
with  which  the  national  governments  become  subject  to  the 
power  of  the  workers,  and  the  workers  thus  nationalized. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  legislation  here  under  exami- 
nation is  markedly  different  from  legislation  adopted  by 
the  individual  states  to  carry  out  their  duties  one  to  an- 
other under  public  international  law,  as  already  described, 
or  regulating  subjects  rising  in  their  official  relations  one 
with  another.  Uniform  laws  regarding  naturalization, 
citizenship,  and  extradition  are  desirable  and  serve  to 
regularize  the  relations  of  individuals  to  the  national  states 
and  the  international  state-system.2  But  they  are  not  a 
manifestation  of  cosmopolitanism,  as  are  uniform  codes 
of  private  international  law  regarding  marriage  and  di- 
vorce, property,  and  the  subjects  just  described. 

1  New  York  Times,  25  and  26  August,  1919,  p.  1. 
'Hicks,  245-254,  and  references  on  255. 


314  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  cosmopolitanism  of  our  day  is  always  making  its 
appearance  at  unexpected  places.  Thus,  it  has  recently 
appeared  that,  the  financial  situation  of  the  world  being 
what  it  is,  American  bankers  will  necessarily  have  the  final 
word  on  the  size  of  the  reparation  fund  paid  by  Germany 
to  the  Allies,  through  the  market  price  which  they  set  upon 
the  reparations  bonds.1  It  has  also  developed  that,  the 
commercial  situation  of  the  world  being  what  it  is,  Ameri- 
can industry  and  commerce  are  largely  dependent  upon 
European  industrial  and  commercial  recovery  for  their 
own  prosperity.2  It  has  been  discovered  that  our  manu- 
facturers and  inventors  face  huge  losses  unless  the  Ameri- 
can Congress  acts  to  put  us  again  in  a  position  to  enjoy 
the  protection  of  international  patent  agreements.3  In  all 
directions  this  new  cosmopolitanism  of  travel,  communica- 
tion, industry,  commerce,  and  finance  is  developing  and 
establishing  a  control  over  the  international  relations  of 
the  world.  It  is  bound  to  go  on  increasing,  as  the  means 
of  communication  become  farther  perfected  and  the  inter- 
change of  ideas  and  the  generalization  of  world  culture  are 
intensified.  It  provides  a  firm  basis  for  international  co- 
operation. It  also  constitutes  a  threat  that,  failing  inter- 
national cooperation,  the  nations  will  be  overrun  against 
their  will  by  a  unified  world  civilization.4  Eventually,  the 
cosmopolitanist  is  heard  to  say,  there  will  no  longer  be 
any  ''nations,"  even  as  there  were  none  in  Medieval 
Europe.  If  this  is  chimerical  or  undesirable,  the  alterna- 
tive is  international  cooperation, — which  itself,  however, 
helps  to  develop  cosmopolitanism! 

1  New  York  Times,  2  February,  1921,  p.  2,  and  7  May,  1921,  p.  1. 

*  Same,  first  citation. 

*  Same,  30  January,  1921,  §  2,  p.  1. 

*  Compare  what  is  happening  in  the  matter  of  personal  movement  among 
the  nations  today.     The  states  possess  and  exercise  the  right  to  control  emigra- 
tion from,  and  immigration  into,  their  territories,  and  the  device  employed  for 
this  purpose  is  the  passport  system,  but  today  the  demand  goes  up  from  com- 
mercial bodies  that  this  restriction  on   free  world  travel  shall    be   abolished. 
See  Wilson  and  Tucker,   §  62,   for  law,  and   New   York   Times,  29   May,   16 
October,  21  November,  1921,  pp.  5,  20,  10,  respectively. 


PART  VI 

INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCES  AND 
CONGRESSES 


CHAPTER  XX 

INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF 
PEACE ;  THE  HAGUE  CONFERENCES 

THE  most  valuable  feature  of  the  League  of  Nations 
as  organized  in  1919  is  felt  to  be  its  provision  for  a 
continuous  series  of  international  conferences.  It  was  the 
failure  of  the  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  July  and 
August,  1914,  to  secure  the  consent  of  Germany,  Austria, 
and  Russia  to  the  holding  of  an  international  conference 
on  the  Serbian  question  that  finally  allowed  the  great 
catastrophe  to  come  upon  Europe.  The  most  vital  defect 
in  the  international  organization  of  the  past  has  been  the 
difficulty  of  securing  international  conference  where,  and 
especially  when,  it  was  needed.  This  form  of  world  govern- 
ment will  therefore  demand  our  best  attention. 

International  conference  may  be  defined  as  joint  con- 
sideration and  discussion  by  representatives  of  two  or 
more  states  of  matters  of  interest  common  to  both. 
Whenever  the  representatives  of  two  states  meet  together 
to  settle  an  international  difference,  not  by  the  arbitral 
or  judicial  process  but  by  discussion  and  mutual  agreement, 
we  have  the  phenomenon  for  which  we  are  now  looking. 
Conferences  of  two  nations,  however,  naturally  give  way 
to  conferences  of  several  nations,  as  the  problems  of  inter- 
national life  become  generalized  and  expanded  so  that  they 
affect  more  than  two  states.  Eventually  we  reach  the  con- 
ference in  which  thirty  or  forty  independent  nations,  per- 
haps the  states  of  the  whole  world,  participate.  Bi-party 
conferences  become  tri-party  and  multi-party  conferences 

317 


318  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

as  the  interests  of  all  states  become  further  and  further 
interwoven. 

International  conference  in  its  simplest  form  is  merely 
personal  diplomacy  as  already  studied.  Whenever  the 
Ambassador  of  a  foreign  state  visits  for  business  purposes 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  capital  where  he 
is  stationed  we  have  an  international  conference.  The  ac- 
tion takes  on  its  full  significance,  however,  when  the  confer- 
ence is  specially  arranged  before  it  takes  place,  when  the 
questions  for  discussion  are  previously  defined,  and  when 
the  discussions  in  conference  are  conducted  by  representa- 
tives specially  named  for  the  purpose.  If,  in  addition,  the 
conference  includes  several  nations,  as  just  described,  the 
action  is  still  more  significant. 

Like  personal  diplomacy  of  the  simpler  form,  the  inter- 
national conference  may  end  in  one  of  two  ways.  A  for- 
mal international  treaty  of  one  type  or  another  may  be 
signed;  or  the  results  may  be  left  in  the  form  of  memo- 
randa or  minutes  of  the  discussions.  The  more  important 
the  conference  and  the  questions  there  discussed,  the  more 
likely  is  it  that  a  formal  treaty  will  be  drawn  up  and 
signed.  Likewise,  where  extensive  agreements  are  reached 
in  conference  and  definite  decisions  are  taken,  the  results 
will  be  put  in  treaty  form.  Inconclusive  conferences  on 
unimportant  topics  are  recorded  only  in  minutes  or  memo- 
randa of  discussions. 

When  the  treaty  form  is  adopted  for  expressing  the 
result  the  conference  reaches  its  highest  point  of  signifi- 
cance, and  also  the  highest  point  of  development  possible 
for  any  of  the  special  forms  of  international  organization. 
For  this  is  legislation,  constituent  or  statutory.  It  is  law- 
making.  The  adjustment  of  differences  by  personal  nego- 
tiations and  bargains  and  compromises  is  a  comparatively 
simple  thing;  the  conclusion  of  special  contractual  agree- 
ments regarding  international  relations,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  customary  law,  carry  us  but  little  further;  the 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         319 

settlement  of  disputes  by  arbitration  on  the  basis  of  exist- 
ing law,  and  the  administration  of  international  business 
according  to  existing  law,  are  not  revolutionary,  as  far  as 
the  substance  of  international  rights  is  concerned.  But 
the  revision  and  amendment  of  international  constitutional 
and  statutory  law  by  deliberate  discussion  and  agreement 
reaches  the  most  vital  point  of  world  government.  Petty 
law-making  is  to  be  found  in  all  of  the  other  special  fields 
of  international  government;  here  legislation  is  the  prin- 
cipal business,  and  the  practice  of  diplomacy,  the  negotia- 
tion of  treaties,  the  development  of  the  law  of  nations,  and 
international  arbitration  and  administration  are  all,  in 
turn,  amenable  to  its  control. 

The  subjects  dealt  with  by  international  conferences 
range  over  the  whole  field  of  international  relations.  The 
decisions  taken  may  relate  to  constitutional  questions  of 
deep  and  lasting  moment  to  all  nations,  such  as  the  decision 
to  establish  a  compulsory  court  of  arbitration.  At  times 
they  relate  to  comparatively  trivial  concrete  questions  af- 
fecting two  states  only,  such  as  the  cession  of  a  bit  of 
territory  by  one  state  to  another.  The  more  important 
questions,  both  constitutional  and  practical,  arise  in  con- 
ferences held  at  the  termination  of  wars,  and  we  shall 
encounter  at  that  point  the  whole  general  problem  of  peace 
and  war  and  of  the  relation  between  peace  and  interna- 
tional organization. 

No  distinction  need  be  made,  probably,  between  the 
terms  "conference"  and  "congress."1  It  was  once  felt 
that  a  "congress"  must  be  more  formal,  more  important, 
and  more  general,  than  a  "conference."  But  in  view  of 
the  practice  of  speaking  of  the  gatherings  at  The  Hague  in 
1899  and  1907  as  the  "Hague  Conferences"  and  of  the  gath- 
ering in  Paris  in  1919  as  the  "Peace  Conference  of  Paris," 
this  distinction  vanishes.  No  international  meetings  were 
ever  more  formal,  more  important,  or  more  general  than 

'Satow,  §§439,  463,  468. 


320  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

these.  It  sometimes  appears  that  the  term  "conference" 
is  given  to  gatherings  of  diplomats  for  the  discussion  of 
political  questions,  while  the  meeting  of  experts  and  ad- 
ministrative officials  on  legal  and  scientific  matters  is  called 
a  "congress,"  as  in  the  cases  of  the  Postal  Congress  and 
the  Pan-American  Scientific  Congress.  Here  again,  how- 
ever, the  Hague  Peace  Conferences  and  the  Pan-American 
Financial  Conference  rise  to  confound  all  attempts  at 
differentiation  by  reference  to  the  terms  actually  used  in 
the  names  of  international  bodies.  Indeed,  there  seems  to 
be  a  tendency  to  get  away  entirely  from  the  rather  flowery 
and  pompous  term  "congress"  and  to  stick  to  the  simpler, 
more  direct,  and  more  accurate  designation. 

At  times,  the  term  "peace"  is  also  used  ambiguously  in 
this  connection.  A  "peace  conference"  is,  curiously 
enough,  a  conference  which  meets  in  time  of  war  to  settle 
questions  connected  with  the  war.  It  derives  its  name  from 
its  object,  which  is  the  reestablishment  of  peace.  The  con- 
ferences at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  1907,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  commonly  referred  to  as  the  "Hague  Peace  Confer- 
ences ' '  for  this  same  reason,  namely,  that  they  were  aimed 
at  the  more  effective  maintenance  of  peace,  although,  unlike 
most  "peace  conferences,"  they  were  not  called  at  the  close 
of  hostilities  to  define  the  terms  of  peace  between  belliger- 
ents. Now  every  international  conference  is  a  peace  con- 
ference, in  a  sense,  for  it  aims  at  the  maintenance  or 
reestablishment  of  international  peace.  It  seems  best 
therefore  to  classify  international  conferences  more  care- 
fully, as  conferences  in  time  of  peace  and  conferences  for 
the  termination  of  war. 

International  conferences  in  time  of  peace  are  rela- 
tively new  institutions  in  the  field  of  international  govern- 
ment.1 Indeed,  they  are  the  most  recent  special  form  of 
international  governing  body.  Personal  diplomacy  of 
course  is  older;  courts  of  arbitration  are  far  older;  and 

1  On  international  conferences  in  time  of  peace  see  literature  cited,  below, 
Appendix  B,  §  20. 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         321 

even  international  administrative  bodies  are  older  by  some 
sixteen  years.  Cosmopolitan  law-making  is  more  recent  in 
origin,  but  no  standing  international  organ  of  government 
is  there  involved. 

International  conferences  in  time  of  peace  developed 
out  of  conferences  for  the  termination  of  war.1  The  latter 
have  held  their  prominent  place  in  world  affairs,  at  least 
in  their  primitive  form,  from  the  very  earliest  times. 
Down  to  1820,  however,  no  international  conferences  were 
held  which  were  not  connected  more  or  less  directly  with 
preparations  for  waging  war  or  with  the  termination  of 
war.  Even  the  first  conferences  held  in  time  of  peace, 
— those  held  at  Troppau  in  1820,  at  Laibach  in  1821,  and 
at  Verona  in  1822, — were  not  wholly  unconnected  with 
the  wars  which  ended  in  1815. 

An  explanation  is  found  in  the  fact  that  international 
organization  was  still  accidental  and  passive,  rather  than 
deliberate  and  active.  In  the  absence  of  any  special  and 
unescapable  need  for  a  conference,  such  as  the  necessity 
of  settling  a  war,  why  tempt  fate  by  indulging  in  useless 
discussion?  Let  well  enough  alone.  There  being  no 
a  priori  reason  for  conferences,  they  were  to  be  held  only 
when  indispensable. 

Criticism  of  this  attitude  was  soon  forthcoming. 
Speaking  of  the  subject  in  a  rather  lively  vein  in  1849, 
Cobden  inquired  whether  as  good  men  as  Lord  Castlereagh 
could  not  have  been  found  to  settle  the  matters  dealt  with 
at  Vienna  in  1815  before,  as  after,  twenty  years  of  war. 
In  the  same  year  the  King  of  Portugal  touched  upon  the 
same  problem  in  an  address  at  the  opening  of  the  Cortes 
and  added  another  element  in  his  treatment  of  it.  He  said : 
"Congresses  which  assemble  in  consequence  of  war  only 
sanction,  as  a  rule,  the  advantages  secured  by  the  strong- 
est ;  and  the  treaties  which  result  from  such  congresses  rest 
on  accomplished  fact  rather  than  on  right.  They  create 

1Satow,  §§  462-465,  468;  the  meetings  described  in  §§439-462  are  to  be 
contrasted,  in  this  connection,  with  those  in  §§  463-495. 


322  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

forced  situations,  ending  in  general  uneasiness,  and  pro- 
ducing protests  and  armed  demands.  A  congress  before 
war,  and  intended  to  prevent  war,  is  to  my  mind  a  gener- 
ous idea,  favoring  progress. ' ' 1  There  are  thus  two  mo- 
tives back  of  the  holding  of  conferences  in  time  of  peace: 
the  prevention  of  war  and  the  superiority  in  the  quality  of 
the  settlement  which  can  be  obtained  in  such  conferences 
when  compared  with  the  settlement  possible  of  attainment 
in  a  conference  for  the  termination  of  war. 

Since  1850  such  conferences  have  increased  rapidly, — 
not  as  rapidly  as  private  international  associations  and 
conferences,  yet  with  a  regular  and  firm  trend.  Seven  in- 
ternational conferences  were  held  in  time  of  peace  between 
1820  and  1850,  five  between  1820  and  1829,  and  one  in  each 
of  the  two  following  decades.2  All  but  one  of  these  confer- 
ences, however,  were  more  or  less  connected  with  the 
Napoleonic  period,  and  they  do  not  constitute  the  real  be- 
ginning of  the  modern  process.  There  was  a  decided  lull 
between  1830  and  the  middle  of  the  century;  when  the 
practice  was  actually  resumed.  Two  conferences  are  re- 
corded in  the  decade  1850-59,  and  seventy-seven  between 
1900  and  the  end  of  the  first  decade  of  the  century.3  As 
will  shortly  appear,  there  is  a  partial  correlation  between 
the  meetings  of  such  conferences  and  the  formation  of  in- 
ternational administrative  bureaus,  but  this  correlation 
cannot  be  clearly  traced  in  the  data  relating  either  to  the 

lNew  York  Times,  24  January,  1921,  p.  10. 

*  International  conferences  in  time  of  peace  before  1850: 

Date  Place  Subject 

1820  Troppau         Peace  of  Europe 

1821  Laibach          Same 

1822  Verona  Same 

1826  Panama          Peace  of  America 

1827  London  Greek  affairs 
1830           London            Belgian  affairs 
1847          Lima               Peace  of  America 
Satow,  §§462-465;  440,  end;  470,  471. 

*  W.P.F.,  Pamph.  Ser.,  VoL  VI,  No.  6,  as  cited,  22-23.  This  list  does  not 
include  the  earlier  conferences.  Another  list  (incomplete)  in  Am.  Jour.  Int. 
Law,  I,  808.  Table  below,  p.  323,  note  1. 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         323 

frequency  of  the  formation  of  such  bodies  or  to  the  fre- 
quency of  meeting  of  international  conferences. 

International  conferences  in  time  of  peace  deal  with  a 
multitude  of  subjects,  which  may  be  grouped,  roughly, 
under  three  heads:  political  subjects,  legal  problems,  and 
questions  of  economics  and  finance. 

International  discussions  on  political  questions  are 
older  than  the  conferences  on  legal  or  economic  questions, 
for  the  reason  that  such  a  conference  is  not  much  more  than 
simple  diplomatic  negotiation.  By  the  same  token,  how- 
ever, such  conferences  tend  to  diminish  as  international 
relations  enter  the  stage  of  legal  regulation  and  as  more 
nations  are  called  in  to  participate  in  the  discussions.  The 
result  is  that  when  we  reach  the  later  nineteenth  century, 
and  the  period  of  multilateral  international  conferences 
proper,  the  meetings  which  deal  with  purely  political  or 
diplomatic  matters  are  relatively  few.1  Such,  however, 
were  the  Conference  on  Cretan  Affairs  in  1869  and  the 
Conference  of  Algeciras  in  1906. 2 

1  This  may  be  seen  from  the  following  table : 

Date  Purely  Political                 Total  of  all 

(decade)  Conferences                     Conferences 

1850-59  2                                        2 

1860-69  4                                     13 

1870-79  3                                       29 

1880-89  0                                       39 

1890-99  0                                       35 

1900-09  2                                      77 

1910-14  (half -decade)  1                                     38 

"A  list  of  the  political  conferences  since  1850  follows: 

Date            Place  Subject 

1855           Vienna  Crimean  War  (mediation  attempted) 

1858          Paris  Danubian  Principalities 

1860           Paris  Syrian  question 

1864          London  Schleswig  and  Holstein 

1867          London  Question  of  Luxembourg 

1869          Paris  Question  of  Crete 

1871           London  Black  Sea  question 

1876          Constantinople  Balkan  question 

1878           Berlin  Same 

1900          Peking  Chinese  affairs 

1906           Algeciras  Moroccan  question 

1913           London  Balkan  affairs 

Satow,  §§  472,  474,  476,  479,  481,  484,  485,  487,  467,  491,  493,  496,  re- 
spectively. 


324  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Frequently,  especially  since  the  development  of  "  public 
international  law,"  such  questions  take  on  also  a  legal 
aspect.  Thus,  the  conference  held  at  London  in  1871  re- 
garding the  Black  Sea  question  issued  a  declaration  con- 
cerning the  inviolability  of  treaties.1 

More  frequently,  however,  legal  questions  arise  in  con- 
nection with  the  details  of  current  international  practice, 
and  a  conference  must  be  held  to  revise  and  codify  the  rules 
of  international  law  relating  to  the  conduct  of  war,  the 
treatment  of  wounded  in  time  of  war,  or  the  neutralization 
of  certain  sections  of  territory  or  certain  bodies  of  water. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  most  of  the  early  conferences  on 
legal  subjects  dealt  with  the  laws  of  war,  just  as  the  first 
treatises  on  the  law  of  nations  dealt  with  this  subject.  The 
reason  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  namely,  that  war  is  the 
earliest  and  most  critical  form  of  international  contact. 
The  question  of  neutralization,  again,  harks  back  rather 
directly  to  the  political  sphere,  inasmuch  as  the  proposal 
to  neutralize  a  given  body  of  water  can  hardly  be  based  on 
any  established  legal  grounds  and  inevitably  affects  one 
nation  or  another  adversely.  Thus  the  neutralization  of 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg  resulted  from  the  actions  of  the 
conferences,  political  in  character,  convened  at  London  in 
1830  and  1867.  The  Hague  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907 
were  conferences  on  legal  subjects,  as  also  were  the  Lon- 
don Naval  Conference  in  1909,  the  Conference  of  Brussels 
in  1874,  and  others.2 

Finally,  economic  and  financial  questions  have  become 
so  prominent  in  international  relations  in  recent  years  that 
several  international  conferences  have  been  held  to  deal 
with  them.  Such  was  the  Conference  of  Peking,  in  1900, 
which  dealt  with  claims  for  compensation  for  damages 
suffered  by  Europeans  during  the  Boxer  uprising  in 
China,  although  at  this  meeting  political  and  diplomatic 


,  §  485. 
'Same,  §§  471,  481,  486,  490,  494,  495. 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         325 

questions  arising  out  of  the  quasi-war  occupied  the  atten- 
tion of  the  delegates  in  large  measure.  Such  was  the  Con- 
ference on  the  Scheldt  Dues  in  1863,  and  such  was  the 
Conference  of  Algeciras  in  1906,  in  so  far  as  it  dealt  with 
questions  of  trade  rights  in  Morocco.1 

It  is  quite  common,  as  this  mention  of  the  Conference 
of  Algeciras  shows,  and  as  is  also  indicated  by  the  com- 
ments on  the  Conference  of  Peking,  for  political,  legal,  and 
economic  problems  to  arise  for  treatment  in  the  same  con- 
ference. 

Speaking  broadly,  the  last-named  problems  yield  solu- 
tions more  satisfactory  from  all  points  of  view  than  the 
first  two,  and  the  second  better  results  than  the  first. 
Economic  questions  can  be  subjected  to  statistical  treat- 
ment and  the  knowledge  and  opinions  of  business  men  can 
be  utilized;  moreover,  business  is  business,  and  neither 
eternal  wrangling  nor  false  pride  nor  national  sentiment 
count  as  heavily  in  the  business  world  as  in  the  world  of 
diplomacy.  Legal  questions  might  possibly  be  treated  in  a 
scientific  manner,  also,  and  professional  lawyers  and 
jurists  might  be  called  in  for  assistance.  But  the  definition 
of  general  rules  to  govern  all  cases  arising  in  the  future  is 
a  delicate  task  for  an  international  conference,  and  hence 
legal  problems  are  not  as  easy  of  approval  as  they  might  be 
expected  to  be.  When  we  get  back  into  the  world  of  political 
and  diplomatic  relations  conditions  are  still  worse.  There 
are  no  fixed  points  to  go  upon,  no  generally  accepted  prin- 
ciples to  apply,  and  not  only  is  every  man  an  expert — in 
his  own  estimation — but  national  desire,  rather  than  in- 
herent reason  and  right  or  the  general  interest,  governs 
the  outcome.  In  the  fields  of  law  and  economics  national 
greed  is  not  unknown,  but  neither  are  considerations  of 
common  benefit,  mutual  protection,  and  good  business 
for  all. 

The  form  given  to  the  results  of  the  conference  varies 

'Satow,  §§  478,  491,  493. 


326  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

with  the  subjects  discussed,  as  well  as  with  the  extent  and 
definiteness  of  the  conclusions  reached.  Legal  problems 
are  commonly  disposed  of  by  an  international  convention, 
which  constitutes  for  the  future  a  code  of  the  law  of  nations 
on  the  subject  with  which  it  deals.  Such  were  the  Hague 
Conventions  relating  to  the  Rules  of  War.1  Economic  and 
political  problems  are  frequently  settled  by  treaty  agree- 
ments, and  in  such  cases  the  whole  body  of  theory  applying 
to  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  treaties  is  applicable. 

As  has  been  said,  the  settlement  in  such  cases  may  be 
a  specific  bargain  for  territory  or  an  indemnity  payment, 
or  it  may  consist  of  the  declaration  of  a  general  principle. 
The  former  type, — a  mere  contractual  bargain, — resulted 
from  the  Conference  at  Hanover  in  1861  regarding  the 
Stade  Toll.2  The  latter  type  of  settlement  resulted  from 
the  Conference  in  London  in  1871  respecting  the  Inviola- 
bility of  Treaties  and  Navigation  of  the  Black  Sea.3  Such 
treaties  or  declarations  as  the  latter,  dealing  with  political 
problems,  and  at  the  same  time  attempting  to  provide  a 
permanent  rule  of  public  law  as  a  solution  to  govern  simi- 
lar cases  in  the  future,  represent  the  acme  of  difficulty  and 
importance  in  the  field  of  international  legislation.  They 
constitute  international  constitution-making.  The  one 
thing  more  important  and  more  difficult  is  the  closely  allied 
task  of  establishing  international  governing  bodies  to  exer- 
cise authority  over  the  states  in  the  future  according  to 
principles  now  defined  in  advance.  Such  action  followed 
from  the  Hague  Conferences  and  from  the  numerous  con- 
ferences for  the  creation  of  international  administrative 
bureaus.4  Practically  all  of  the  forty  or  fifty  administra- 
tive bureaus  now  in  existence  have  been  created  in  this 
way. 

It  will  be  apparent  that  single  international  conferences 

1  Malloy,  2259  and  following. 
a  Satow,  §  476. 

8  Same,  §  485,  especially  at  131. 
*  Malloy,  1924,  2220. 


may  well  perform  various  functions.  The  Congress  of 
Vienna,  for  example,  was  primarily  a  conference  for  the 
definitive  termination  of  war,  yet  it  was  also  a  conference 
in  time  of  peace  striving  to  prevent  future  war.  It  dealt 
with  purely  legal  questions, — diplomatic  rank, — with  eco- 
nomic questions,  and  with  political  problems.  It  created 
an  administrative  bureau,  it  defined  certain  principles  of 
the  public  law  of  nations  in  Europe,  and  it  produced  cer- 
tain political  results  still  evident  in  the  state-system  of 
the  Old  World.1 

The  form  given  to  the  decisions  of  the  international 
conference  is  not  the  only  thing  influenced  by  the  nature 
of  the  problems  discussed.  The  organization  and  methods 
of  action  of  the  conference  are  subject  to  the  same  influ- 
ence. This  will  appear  as  we  examine  the  way  in  which 
the  conference  meets  and  sets  about  its  work. 

International  conferences  meet  only  upon  invitation.2 
There  are  no  regular  or  automatic  sessions,  as  in  the  case 
of  national  legislative  bodies.  There  is  no  presumption 
that  a  conference  will  be  held  at  any  time.  In  the  normal 
course  of  events  no  conferences  meet  at  all.  The  burden 
of  proof  is  upon  any  one  suggesting  a  conference  at  any 
time,  because  of  the  absence  of  any  conviction  that  a  con- 
tinuous series  of  regular  conferences  is  needed.  No  state 
has  any  recognized  right  to  call  the  nations  to  a  confer- 
ence and  the  family  of  nations  has  no  recognized  right  to 
summon  its  members  to  an  assembly.  The  proposal  made 
at  the  conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899  that  such  confer- 
ences should  meet  continuously  at  regular  intervals  in  the 
future  was  considered  a  radical  proposition. 

This  situation  gives  the  nation  which  initiates  the  con- 
ference an  enormous  tactical  advantage.3  The  agenda  or 

1  Satow,  §  461. 

a  Oppenheim,  §484;  Proposals  for  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  below,  Ap- 
pendix A,  Documents  No.  8a,  8b,  and  8c,  cited  hereafter  as  Props.  Hague 
Conf.,  a,  b,  or  c. 

'Lansing,  12-16. 


328  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

program  of  discussions  at  the  conference  must  be  decided. 
What  shall  be  discussed  and  what  shall  not  be  discussed 
depends  in  the  first  instance  upon  the  proposal  of  the 
"august  initiator"  of  the  conference.1  Frequently  the 
acceptance  or  rejection  by  other  nations  of  the  invitations 
issued  to  them  by  the  nation  suggesting  the  conference 
depends  upon  the  views  held  by  the  former  as  to  the  gen- 
eral advisability  of  the  meeting  and  as  to  their  own  advan- 
tage in  discussing  the  subjects  proposed.  Frequently  they 
will  make  reservations  concerning  the  proper  range  of  dis- 
cussion in  the  forthcoming  conference,  thereby  excluding 
certain  topics  from  its  jurisdiction.  Frequently  the  agenda 
as  originally  proposed  will  be  modified,  in  view  of  prelimi- 
nary objections  from  the  nations  invited  to  attend  the  con- 
ference, and  in  order  to  obtain  their  consent  to  participate. 
This  power  of  defining  the  agenda  before  the  beginning 
of  the  conference  also  gives  great  prestige  and  influence  to 
the  nation  initiating  the  conference,  an  advantage  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that  the  conference  will  usually  be  held  in  the 
territory,  and  at  the  seat  of  government,  of  this  state.  It 
is  likewise  an  occasion  of  suspicion.  If  a  certain  nation 
moves  for  a  conference  on  a  certain  subject  it  may  be  as- 
sumed that  it  is  for  certain  definite  national  advantages 
that  the  move  is  made.  So  Napoleon  III  was  continually 
under  suspicion  because  of  his  frequent  suggestions  for 
European  conferences ;  he  was  suspected  not  only  of  having 
an  axe  to  grind  in  each  particular  case  but  of  desiring  to 
secure  a  sort  of  diplomatic  domination  over  Europe  as  a 
whole.  The  other  nations,  therefore,  come  prepared  to 
combat  the  demands  of  the  nation  which  is  chiefly  sponsor- 
ing the  conference.  Because  of  the  way  in  which  the 
agenda  is  drawn  up,  there  can  hardly  be  a  set  of  openly 
competing  programs  when  the  conference  meets;  and  this 
is  an  unhealthy  thing  in  itself.  Furthermore,  competition 
or  opposition  which  is  stifled  makes  itself  felt  in  a  silent 

1  Props.  Hague  Con/.,  b  and  c. 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         329 

suspicion  and  mistrust  and  an  opposition  '  *  on  general  prin- 
ciples. ' '  Where  preliminary  national  views  have  been  can- 
vassed fully  in  advance,  something  like  competing  party 
programs  exist  at  the  outset,  and  it  is  generally  agreed  that 
such  a  procedure  helps  enormously,  for  the  members  do  not 
then  need  to  lose  time  in  discovering  each  other's  beliefs 
and  demands. 

The  nation  holding  the  conference  is  free,  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  to  invite  such  other  states  as  seems  best,  sub- 
ject to  the  danger  of  giving  offense  by  failing  to  invite  this 
or  that  state,  and  to  the  danger  of  opposition  to  the  results 
of  the  conference  from  non-participants.  A  nation  initiat- 
ing a  conference  on  maritime  law  and  failing  to  invite 
Great  Britain  would  encounter  both  British  resentment  and 
futility  of  results.  In  such  a  case,  other  states  would  in 
all  probability  refuse  to  attend,  for  the  same  reasons. 

Membership  in  the  conference  itself  is  limited  to  ac- 
credited representatives  of  states  which  have  been  invited 
to  attend  and  which  have  accepted.  This  limitation  is 
enforced  through  a  system  of  credentials.  Delegates  carry 
commissions  and  powers  identifying  them  as  representa- 
tives of  this  or  that  nation,  and  these  credentials  are  in- 
spected by  a  credentials  committee  at  the  beginning  of  the 
conference.1 

The  membership  of  the  conference  having  been  decided, 
it  remains  to  select  the  presiding  officials  and  the  secre- 
tariat. Here  again  the  state  holding  the  conference  has  an 
enormous  advantage,  for  that  bane  of  international  rela- 
tions, precedence  and  diplomatic  courtesy,  decrees  that  the 
presiding  officer  and  the  chief  secretary  shall  be  chosen 
from  among  the  representatives  of  the  local  state.2  When 
the  deliberations  of  the  conference  are  also  conducted  in 
the  language  of  that  nation  the  result  is  complete.  The 
secretarial  force,  working  with  all  the  conveniences  which 

1  Oppenheim,  §  485. 
'Same,  at  512. 


330  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  local  government  can  place  at  its  disposal,  largely  con- 
trols the  agenda  and  the  record  of  the  conference,  and  the 
chief  secretary  controls  the  secretarial  force.  Even  where 
no  effort  is  made  to  abuse  its  power,  the  state  holding  the 
conference  exerts  an  enormous  influence  on  the  conference 
through  these  simple  facts. 

The  conference  meets  in  full  session  at  the  beginning 
and  may  hold  plenary  sessions  thereafter  as  often  or  as 
seldom  as  seems  best.  It  ordinarily  closes  with  one  or 
more  plenary  sessions.  In  the  intervals  come  many  sittings 
of  committees  and  commissions,  in  which  experts  are  heard 
and  matters  are  thrashed  out  in  detail  for  reference  to  full 
sessions  of  the  conference  for  final  decision  later.1  The 
conferences  on  legal  and  economic  questions  employ  the 
committee  system  and  make  use  of  experts  more  exten- 
sively than  do  those  on  political  and  diplomatic  problems ; 
in  the  latter  the  principal  delegates  insist  on  keeping  things 
strictly  in  their  own  hands.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  there 
seems  to  be  some  ground  for  speaking  of  the  former  bodies 
as  " congresses"  and  the  latter  as  " conferences." 

Debate  is,  of  course,  far  freer  in  the  committees  than  in 
the  full  sessions,  especially  among  the  experts  in  attend- 
ance at  committee  meetings,  who  are  interested  in  the  sub- 
ject-matter under  debate  and  have  few  scruples  about 
international  delicacy  and  sensitiveness.  Speeches  at  the 
plenary  meetings  are  stilted,  formal,  flowery.  The  real 
argumentation  in  the  conference,  so  far  as  there  is  any  at 
all,  comes  in  committee  meetings.  Steam-roller  methods 
are  not  uncommonly  employed  in  the  plenary  sessions  to 
put  through  bargains  made  outside,  either  in  committees  or 
still  further  out  in  the  corridors  of  the  conference  cham- 
bers. This  is  especially  true  where  the  plenary  sessions 
are  public  and  where  committee  meetings  are — as  is  com- 
monly the  case — confidential.  This  may  not  be  true  where 
the  conference  is  concerned  with  legal  problems,  where 
committee  meetings  have  been  public,  and  where  a  fight  in 

1  Hershey,  §  293. 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         331 

committee  crops  out  again  on  the  floor  in  plenary  session. 
All  of  this  is  quite  like  the  situation  in  national  legislative 
bodies,  only  in  greater  degree.  To  criticize  the  methods 
of  doing  business  in  international  conferences  is,  of  course, 
to  criticize  the  common  methods  of  legislation  in  all  ranks 
of  political  organization — international,  national,  provin- 
cial, and  municipal.  That  criticism  may,  however,  be  ap- 
plied to  international  conferences  with  special  aptitude. 
There  seems  to  be  something  in  the  nature  of  the  subject 
matter  and  in  the  traditions  of  the  profession  which  en- 
courages this  particular  sort  of  thing  in  international 
bodies. 

Members  of  the  conference  are  not  ordinarily  free  to 
vote  according  to  their  best  judgment  on  proposals  coming 
before  them  but  are  bound  by  restrictions  from  their  home 
governments.  They  are  instructed  delegates,  not  discre- 
tionary representatives.  As  a  further  result,  the  votes 
are  not  so  much  counted  as  weighed.  That  is,  the  vote  of 
a  delegate  is  not  regarded  simply  as  one  vote,  but  as  evi- 
dence of  the  support  of  his  government,  whatever  that  be, 
great  or  small,  strong  or  weak.  The  vote,  moreover,  is  not 
given  so  much  upon  the  basis  of  arguments  or  facts  brought 
out  in  the  conference  as  upon  grounds  of  national  policy 
maintained  and  asserted  by  the  home  government,  not 
present  at  the  conference  at  all. 

This  is  made  easier  by  the  rule  of  unanimity  which  in- 
variably prevails,  as  far  as  final  decisions  are  concerned, 
at  such  conferences.1  After  all,  this  is  at  bottom  the  nego- 
tiation of  a  treaty,  the  making  of  a  contract.  The  consent 
of  each  participating  state  is  therefore  necessaiy  to  give 
binding  force  to  the  result.  The  doctrine  of  sovereignty 
admits  national  consent  alone  as  the  basis  of  national  obli- 
gations. Even  without  any  formal  doctrine  of  sovereignty, 
however,  the  result  would  be  the  same.  There  are  no  a 
priori  grounds  on  which  any  nation  or  nations  can  claim 
as  of  right  to  impose  obligations  upon  another, 

1  Hershey,  §  293,  and  note  10. 


332  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

This  requirement  weakens  the  value  and  effect  of  com- 
mittee decisions  unless  all  members  of  the  conference  are 
represented  on  all  committees.  In  that  case  the  value  of 
committee  work  is  lowered  by  being  made  more  cumbersome 
and  difficult.  The  committee  becomes  a  miniature  confer- 
ence, with  all  the  power — potentially — and  all  the  difficul- 
ties of  a  conference.  The  only  solution  is  a  prior  agree- 
ment among  the  nations  in  conference  to  be  bound  by  a 
majority  or  a  two-thirds  vote  on  decisions  to  be  taken  in  the 
course  of  the  conference.  Such  a  vote  would  preserve 
the  doctrine  of  consent  and  at  the  same  time  remove  the 
necessity  for  unanimity  at  every  step  and  on  every  point 
in  the  discussion.  Whether  the  nations  are  ready  for  such 
a  step,  and  whether,  on  the  whole,  it  would  be  wise,  are 
other  questions.  Its  effect  on  the  procedure  of  international 
conferences  cannot  be  doubted. 

A  similar  result  flows  from  the  doctrine  of  state  equality 
as  applied  in  international  conferences.1  The  smaller 
states  would  generally  refuse  to  go  into  conference  with 
the  larger  ones  if  they  were  compelled  to  admit  that  the 
larger  states  possess  some  degree  of  jurisdiction  over 
themselves  as  of  right.  Yet  nothing  could  be  more  unjust 
and  unscientific  than  to  give  the  few  thousand  citizens  of 
Panama  equal  power  in  international  legislation  with  the 
hundreds  of  millions  of  subjects  of  the  British  Empire. 
And  in  actual  practice,  of  course,  the  votes  of  different 
nations  count  differently  in  the  results  in  the  sessions  of  the 
conference.  What  is  needed  is  a  theory  of  national  repre- 
sentation in  international  bodies  which  will  rest  on  facts, 
not  upon  an  outworn  metaphysic  of  public  corporations.2 

The  conference  ends  with  the  signing  and  sealing  of  the 
treaty,  as  described  in  connection  with  treaty  negotiation. 
The  fact  that  only  signatories  are  bound  by  the  treaty 

1  Oppenheim,  §  484,  end ;  also  Dickinson,  281-283. 

"Dickinson,  286-292,  and  Myers,  "Representation  in  Public  International 
Organs,"  in  Am.  Journ.  Int.  Law,  VIII,  81-108  (January,  1914). 


CONFEEENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         333 

derogates  somewhat  from  its  legislative  character.  But 
for  those  who  sign,  and  in  so  far  as  the  signers  do  not 
impose  reservations  upon  their  signatures,  the  effect  is  to 
legislate  into  existence  new  rules  of  international  law, 
assuming,  of  course,  as  we  must  assume,  that  the  national 
states  will  ratify  the  actions  of  their  agents.  The  delegates 
accept  the  new  statute  for  their  constituents  as  do  members 
of  legislative  bodies  in  the  national  states,  at  least  in  na- 
tional states  where  legislation  is  subject  to  referendum. 
This  is  the  most  vitally  important  process  in  international 
control. 

Amonpr  all  the  international  conferences  in  time  of  peace 
during  the  last  hundred  years  the  Hague  Peace  Cont'er- 

o-nooQjyro    |frf>    mr>gt    farnnng        ygiMrma    /wmmpnfa    Vig-iro    al- 

ready  been  made  upon  them,  but  it  may  not  be  superfluous, 
in  spite  of  the  amount  of  attention  bestowed  on  these  con- 
ferences in  the  literature  of  international  organization  in 
the  past  fifteen  years,1  to  summarize  here  some  of  the  more 
important  observations  to  be  made  concerning  them. 

The  conferences  of  1899  and  1907  were  held  on  the  invi- 
tation of  Russia  and  the  Netherlands.  The  cooperation 
of  the  latter  was  made  necessary  as  the  conference  was  to 
meet  in  Dutch  territory.  The  conference  was  to  discuss 
a  list  of  topics  suggested  by  Russia.2  Proposals  from  other 
nations  were  brought  forward  with  more  or  less  hesita- 
tion. The  conferences  were  attended  by  thirty  or  forty 
independent  states  of  the  world  and  dealt  with  legal  ques- 
tions entirely,  questions  ranging  from  the  details  of  the 
conduct  of  war  to  constitutional  principles  concerning 
the  organization  of  tribunals  of  arbitration.  Great 
difficulties — apart  from  national  opposition  on  political 
grounds — were  encountered.  Plenary  sessions  were  fre- 
quently held,  and  also  sessions  in  committee,  where  the 
main  work  was  done,  largely  by  expert  jurists  and  lawyers. 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  as  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  20 

2  Props.  Hague  Con/.,  below,  Appendix  A,  as  cited,  b  and  c. 


334  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  equality  of  states  was  formally  recognized,  and  like- 
wise the  principle  of  unanimous  consent,  thus  badly  crip- 
pling the  work  except  where  considerations  of  power  and 
influence  served  to  correct  that  dogma  in  the  interests  of 
realistic  truth.  The  results  were  put  in  the  form  of  con- 
ventions, which  were  signed  in  the  usual  treaty  form  for 
subsequent  ratification  by  the  home  governments. 

The  object  of  all  of  the  work  of  the  conferences  was  to 
prevent  war,  to  limit  its  application,  to  regulate  its  con- 
duct. It  was  hoped  that  the  common  interest  of  Europe 
might  prevail  to  some  extent,  in  spite  of  national  policies, 
military  and  naval  programs,  and  diplomatic  considera- 
tions, and,  in  a  certain  measure,  this  hope  was  gratified 
The  chief  results  of  the  conferences  were  to  encourage  this 
general  type  of  international  practice ;  to  establish  a  court 
of  arbitration  which,  as  has  been  seen,  settled  several  in- 
ternational disputes  of  considerable  importance  before 
1914,  and  is  still  in  active  operation;  to  begin  the  work  of 
codifying  international  law;  and  to  reveal  the  limitations 
of  international  organization  at  the  time  and  the  source  of 
the  most  determined  opposition  to  its  improvement, 
namely,  Germany.  Other  conferences  have  accomplished 
far  more  in  definite  effective  and  constructive  work;  none 
have  influenced  public  opinion  so  strongly  in  favor  of  inter- 
national conferences  as  such.  In  many  directions  the  con- 
ferences at  The  Hague  asked  more  questions  than  they 
answered.  Their  chief  value  was  neither  to  ask  questions 
nor  to  answer  them,  but  to  assert  the  feasibility  of  inter- 
national constituent  and  legislative  assemblies. 

After  all  is  said  of  the  work  of  the  past,  however,  the 
fight  for  the  principle  of  international  discussion  and 
agreement  is  yet  to  be  won.  The  nations  do  not  fully  admit 
that  international  conference  is  a  natural  and  normal  ac- 
tion. They  have  not  seriously  set  themselves  to  the  task 
of  solving  the  problems  of  procedure  connected  therewith 
— the  problems  of  representation,  of  majority  rule,  of  rati- 


CONFERENCES  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE         335 

fication,  and  others — because  they  have  expected  to  be  able 
to  dispense  with  conferences  except  in  abnormal  times. 
The  great  value  of  the  Hague  Conferences  was  that  they 
inaugurated  what  was  by  implication  to  be  a  continuous  and 
permanent  series  of  such  conferences.  The  interruption 
of  1914  would  constitute  a  tremendous  catastrophe  indeed 
if  it  had  not  led  to  a  resumption  of  the  process  of  confer- 
ence in  a  fashion  and  on  a  scale  more  significant  even  than 
the  activities  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  the  Hague 
Conferences  themselves.  To  this  matter  we  shall  presently 
return.1 

1  Below,  Chaps.  XXI,  XXVII-XXIX. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PEACE  CONFERENCES;  THE  CONFERENCE  OF 

PARIS 

THE  origin  of  international  conferences  in  time  of 
peace  was  found  to  lie  in  deliberate  efforts  to  take 
thought  for  the  morrow  and  to  preserve  the  peace  in  the 
future  by  international  arrangements  made  in  advance  of 
the  actual  need  for  them.  Conferences  for  the  termination 
of  war  are  quite  different.  Such  conferences,  called  "peace 
conferences"  by  reason  of  the  object  directly  in  view, 
namely,  the  restoration  of  peace,  are  actually  held  in  time 
of  war  and  originate  in  the  practical  necessity  for  clearing 
up  the  problems  at  issue  between  or  among  two  or  more 
states  whose  interests  have  clashed  and  whose  peaceful 
relations  have  actually  been  interrupted  by  the  outbreak 
of  war.1 

It  would  be  possible,  of  course,  for  belligerents  merely 
to  stop  fighting,  and  to  go  on  into  the  future  without  con- 
cluding a  formal  treaty  of  peace,  and  this  has  happened 
several  times  in  the  modern  history  of  international  rela- 
tions.2 Such  a  method  of  terminating  war,  known  as 
" simple  cessation  of  hostilities,"  is,  however,  very  unsatis- 
factory to  all  concerned.  The  belligerents  themselves  are 
left  in  doubt  regarding  each  other's  intentions.  Hostili- 
ties may  be  resumed  without  warning.  A  constant  attitude 
of  defense  and  suspicion  is  rendered  inevitable.  Neutrals, 
again,  or  states  which  would  be  neutral  if  war  really  ex- 

1  On  peace  conferences  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  21. 
*Phillipson,  Termination  of  War,  3-8. 

336 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  337 

isted,  are  left  uncertain  regarding  their  rights  and  duties 
toward  the  belligerents. 

Finally,  the  status  of  occupied  territory  is  ambiguous. 
The  termination  of  war  by  the  conquest  or  complete  subju- 
gation of  one  party  by  the  other  might  leave  no  room  for 
doubt.1  Even  here,  however,  both  logic  and  convenience 
require  some  formal  notice  to  the  world  by  the  conquering 
power  declaring  its  intention  respecting  the  conquered 
territory.  And  where  merely  a  portion  of  the  territory  of 
an  opposing  belligerent  has  been  occupied  it  is  doubly  de- 
sirable for  the  status  of  that  territory  to  be  defined  and 
made  known  to  all  the  members  of  the  society  of  nations. 
Where  hostilities  have  long  ceased  and  positive  acts  of 
peaceful  intercourse  have  been  performed  by  the  recent 
enemies,  third  states  must  conclude  that  the  war  is  over 
and,  according  to  the  rule  of  uti  possidetis,  that  the  occu- 
pied territory  has  passed  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 
state  whose  forces  are  in  possession  at  the  termination  of 
hostilities.  Obviously,  however,  it  would  be  better  for  all 
concerned  if  the  belligerents  would  clear  up  all  questions 
outstanding  between  them  in  a  formal  and  explicit  agree- 
ment or  treaty  of  peace.  The  superior  convenience  of  such 
a  settlement  has  led  to  the  practice  of  conference  for  the 
termination  of  war. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  such  conferences  are  far  older 
than  conferences  in  time  of  peace.  Indeed,  they  are  as  old 
as  international  relations  themselves,  since  war  and  the 
termination  of  war  are  equally  as  old.  From  the  immemo- 
rial dawn  of  tribal  and  interstate  conflict  belligerents  have 
met  together,  quite  naturally  and  simply  at  first,  deliber- 
ately and  ceremoniously  later,  to  patch  up  the  broken  fabric 
of  their  normal  relations  one  with  another.2  And  in  spite 
of  the  knowledge  that  the  peace  to  be  made  will  not,  in 

1Phillipson,  Termination  of  War,  9-19. 

2  See  treatment  of  jus  fetiale  in  Phillipson,  II,  Chap.  XXVI,  and  320-321; 
also  Bouche-Leelercq,  541-543. 


338 

all  probability,  be  permanent,  in  spite  of  the  memories  and 
feelings  of  war  which  still  dominate  men's  minds,  such 
meetings  have  never  failed  to  appeal  mightily  to  the  peo- 
ples suffering  from  the  hostilities,  and  in  some  degree  even 
to  the  cynical  professional  diplomat  who  could  but  suspect 
that  this  was  only  one  of  the  many  pacifications  hailed  as 
complete  and  definitive  at  the  time,  only  to  be  proved  hol- 
low and  transitory  in  the  event.  The  outburst  of  feeling 
throughout  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States  on  11 
November,  1918,  may  be  recalled  in  this  connection. 

Certain  notable  changes  have,  however,  come  over  the 
typical  peace  conference  in  the  past  century.  Of  these, 
three  deserve  notice  here. 

First,  there  has  occurred  what  might  be  described  as  a 
generalization  of  the  peace  conference  in  respect  to  the 
parties  who  are  concerned  and  who  are  therefore  invited 
to  participate.  Originally  the  peace  conference  included 
only  the  belligerents,  and  in  the  great  majority  of  cases 
only  two  belligerents.  This  form  of  peace  conference  still 
persists,  of  course,  and  is  illustrated  best  by  a  case  where 
the  belligerents  come  in  contact  and  conduct  their  confer- 
ence to  a  successful  conclusion  without  aid  from  any  third 
state,  as  happened  at  the  end  of  the  war  between  France 
and  Germany  in  1871.1  In  later  times,  however,  there  has 
appeared  a  tendency  to  expand  the  peace  conference  to  in- 
clude several,  and  indeed  many,  powers.  This  has  been  due 
partially  to  a  second  tendency,  discernible  still  farther 
beneath  the  surface  of  events,  whereby  wars  have  changed 
from  ''special"  wars  between  two  parties  to  "general" 
wars  involving  several  parties.  This  has  resulted,  in  the 
main,  from  the  increased  degree  to  which  the  interests  of 
all  nations  are  interwoven  in  modern  times,  and,  more 
especially,  from  the  practice  of  forming  alliances  for  the 
furtherance  of  these  interests.  So  long  as  all  of  the  par- 
ticipants in  the  peace  conference  are  belligerents,  there  is 

1  Phillipson,  Termination,  60. 


no  sharp  break  with  the  traditional  theory.  Very  early 
in  modern  international  relations,  however,  it  was  felt  to 
be  advisable  to  call  in  states  which  had  been  neutral  in  the 
war,  in  view  of  the  extent  to  which  their  interests  were 
involved  in  the  general  settlement.  This  happened  at 
Westphalia  in  1648,  at  Vienna  in  1815,  and  again  at  Paris 
in  1856,  to  name  only  three  famous  general  peace  confer- 
ences, and  it  marks  a  new  stage  in  international  constitu- 
tional development.1 

In  like  manner  the  questions  treated  in  peace  confer- 
ences have  been  generalized.  Originally  the  questions  at 
issue  between  the  belligerents  in  the  war  were,  alone,  put 
in  discussion.  With  the  expansion  of  the  area  of  conflict, 
however,  the  necessity  for  keeping  in  view  many  collateral 
questions  affecting  the  belligerents,  and  also  states  with 
whom  the  belligerents  were  in  mutual  relationships,  became 
evident.  Inasmuch  as  the  object  of  peace  conferences  soon 
came  to  be  that  of  making  a  permanent  peace,  and  not 
merely  patching  up  the  current  dispute,  this  necessity  grew 
greater.  In  the  end  what  was  involved  was  a  general  re- 
view and  settlement  of  all  outstanding  international  dis- 
putes, a  general  pacification.  The  peace  conference  thus 
approached  more  nearly  the  nature  of  the  conference  in 
time  of  peace,  that  is,  an  international  constituent  assembly 
of  general  jurisdiction.2  The  traditional  rule  to  the  effect 
that  only  questions  at  issue  between  the  belligerents  come 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  conference  is  still  put  for- 
ward by  neutrals  desiring  to  block  consideration  of  ques- 
tions affecting  them  and  by  belligerents  desiring  to  avoid 
certain  embarrassing  problems.  None  the  less  the  ten- 
dency described  is  unmistakable  in  practice,  and  in  view 

1  Westphalia:  Satow,  II,  §441,  especially  7-8;  Vienna:  same,  77  (§461); 
Paris:  Phillipson,  120. 

*  See  Satow 's  distinction  between  "Congresses"  and  "Conferences"  in 
Chaps.  XXV  and  XXVI;  see  also  the  anxiety  of  the  Powers  in  1818  to  prevent 
other  states  from  thinking  that  the  forthcoming  meeting  at  Aix-la-Chapelle 
was  to  be  a  Congress  and  thus  prevent  ' '  the  intervention  of  other  princes  and 
cabinets"  (Satow,  §  462). 


340  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  the  fact  that  the  conference  has  no  authority  to  settle 
any  questions  except  by  the  consent  of  the  participants, 
and  that  such  a  method  of  settlement  may  as  well  be  ap- 
plied to  collateral  questions  as  to  the  main  issues  of  the 
war,  the  traditional  rule  is  to  be  regarded  merely  as  one 
of  convenience. 

Such  general  peace  conferences  as  are  here  under  dis- 
cussion have  tended  to  decrease  in  number  since  1648.1  In 
as  much  as  this  implies  a  decrease  in  the  frequency  of  gen- 
eral wars,  no  one  can  deplore  the  diminution  in  this  form 
of  international  organization  or  practice.  The  reasons 
for  this  change,  however,  are  more  complicated,  and  de- 
serve further  attention  at  this  point. 

General  wars  have,  indeed,  decreased  in  frequency  since 
1815,  and,  in  fact,  since  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. But  this  is  due  to  increasing  efforts  to  preserve  the 
peace  and  to  the  special  use  of  conferences  in  time  of  peace 
to  settle  outstanding  questions  likely  to  lead  to  war,  a  pro- 
cedure which  thus  indirectly  tends  to  diminish  the  number 
of  general  peace  conferences  which  are  necessary.  It  is 
due  further  to  another  device  which  is  of  still  greater  sig- 
nificance, of  greater  significance  even  than  the  general  con- 
ference at  the  termination  of  a  war,  and  which  also  consti- 
tutes the  third  way  in  which  peace  conferences  have  been 
generalized  in  recent  decades. 

As  was  pointed  out  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  settle- 
ments made  at  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  have  not  always 
been  the  embodiments  of  pure  justice  and  wisdom.  This 

1 A  list  of  the  more  important  of  such  conferences  follows : 

1648,  Westphalia  1772,  Fokchany;  Bukarest 

1659,  Pyrenees  1779,  Teschen 

1660,  Oliva  1797,  Eastadt 
1668,  Aix-la-Chapelle  1802,  Amiens 
1679,  Nijmegen  1814,  Chatillon 
1697,  Eiswick  1815,  Vienna 

1699,  Carlowitz  1818,  Aix-la-Chapelle 

1713,  Utrecht  1856,  Paris 

1721,  Cambray  1878,  Berlin 

1728,  Soissons  1919,  Paris 
1748,  Breda;  Aix-la-Chapelle 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  341 

has  led  not  only  to  the  holding  of  conferences  in  time  of 
peace  to  devise  in  advance  a  settlement  of  better  quality 
than  that  of  a  settlement  to  be  attained  at  the  end  of  a 
possible  war,  but  also  to  the  holding  of  conferences  in  the 
ensuing  state  of  peace  to  revise  settlements  already  made 
at  the  end  of  a  preceding  war.  Such  was  the  Congress  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1818;  such,  more  clearly,  was  the  Con- 
gress of  Berlin  in  1878 ;  and  the  action  of  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France  in  1895,  regarding  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki 
between  China  and  Japan,  is  of  the  same  type.1  It  was 
largely  the  failure  of  the  Powers  to  take  such  action  re- 
specting the  Balkan  settlement  of  1913  that  prepared  the 
ground  for  the  events  of  1914.2  The  peace  of  1919  was  sub- 
jected to  revision  by  Inter- Allied  conferences  during  the 
whole  of  1920  and  1921.  Considering  this  development 
along  with  the  establishment  of  the  conference  in  time  of 
peace  to  prevent  war,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  peace  con- 
ferences are  being  generalized,  not  only  as  to  parties  in- 
volved and  questions  discussed,  but  also  as  to  the  time  when 
they  are  held.  In  addition,  it  may  be  observed  that  such 
conferences  for  revision  of  peace  settlements  attest  fur- 
ther the  interest  taken  by  states  not  parties  to  the  war, 
especially  the  Great  Powers,  where  a  settlement  has  been 
made  by  minor  powers  which  appears  to  them  defective 
from  the  point  of  view  of  their  own  interests  or  the  balance 
of  power  and  the  general  peace. 

In  organization  and  procedure,  peace  conferences  do 
not  differ  materially  from  conferences  in  time  of  peace, 
and  a  brief  review  of  the  subject  will  therefore  be  sufficient. 

A  peace  conference  convenes  as  the  result  of  either 
direct  negotiations  between  the  belligerents  or  action  by  a 
third  state  in  providing  a  means  of  bringing  the  belliger- 
ents into  conference.3  Participation  is,  of  course,  wholly 

'Satow,  §§462,  467;  Seymour,  128. 
'Seymour,  243. 
•Phillipson,  75-93. 


342  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

voluntary,  and  depends  upon  calculations  of  the  results 
which  it  may  be  possible  to  obtain  from  such  a  conference 
in  contrast  to  those  to  be  obtained  by  continuing  the  war.1 

The  membership  of  the  peace  conference  has  already 
been  discussed.  It  should  be  recalled  that  at  times  the 
conference  is  attended  by  the  mediator,  if  it  happens  that 
the  war  has  been  brought  to  an  end  through  the  offices  of 
a  mediator.2  This  is  very  likely  to  happen  where  the  me- 
diator has  been  led  to  take  action  in  order  to  defend  cer- 
tain national  interests,  and  especially  where  the  mediation 
has  been  performed  by  one  or  more  of  the  Great  Powers  in 
defense  of  their  own  interests  or  the  general  welfare,  and 
where  the  small  powers,  belligerents  in  the  war,  have  been 
compelled  to  accept  such  mediation.3  In  all  cases,  however, 
the  belligerents  must  be  present;  a  peace  conference  with- 
out them,  even  with  mediators  or  conciliators  present, 
would  be  " Hamlet"  without  the  Prince. 

The  range  of  subjects  discussed,  or  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  conference,  has  also  been  described  in  another  connec- 
tion.4 A  further  set  of  considerations  must,  however,  be 
added  here. 

It  should  be  noted,  first,  that  the  jurisdiction  of  a  peace 
conference  must  be  defined  in  terms  of  subjects  or  ques- 
tions, not  in  terms  of  parties  or  territory.  The  conference 
has  no  legal  power  over  any  territory  or  property,  nor  has 
it  authority  over  any  persons  or  states.  More  important 
still,  the  powers  victorious  in  the  war  do  not  gain  thereby 
any  degree  of  legal  authority  over  the  vanquished  nor 
over  his  possessions. 

In  the  second  place,  the  territory  of  one  belligerent  occu- 
pied by  another  is  not  thereby  acquired  in  full  sovereignty, 
even  where  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  the  enemy  is  so 

1  Example  in  Seymour,  229-230. 

'Attendance  of  French  mediator  at  conference  near  Belgrade  in  1739  at 
end  of  Turko-Austrian  war ;  Satow,  §  634. 

*  The  Great  Powers  were  in  complete  control  in  the  Conference  of  London 
in  1913  for  the  termination  of  the  first  Balkan  war;  same,  §496. 

4  Above,  323-327. 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  343 

occupied.1  In  this  case  only  a  cessation  of  resistance  and 
an  at  least  tacit  consent — albeit  "forced"  consent — to  an- 
nexation or  absorption  in  the  conquering  state,  accom- 
panied, probably,  by  a  proclamation  of  the  annexation  by 
the  latter  or  some  overt  act  testifying  to  the  same  intent, 
will  be  effective  in  the  eyes  of  other  states.  In  the  former 
case,  only  cession  in  an  international  agreement  or  consent 
to  the  retention  of  the  partially  occupied  territory  by  the 
state  at  the  time  in  possession  will  be  effective.  This  is 
one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  holding  a  conference  between 
the  belligerents  at  the  end  of  a  war. 

Military  victory,  moreover,  gives  to  the  successful  bel- 
ligerent no  legal  authority  to  dictate  terms  to  his  defeated 
enemy.  It  is  doubtful  whether  peace  can  ever  be  success- 
fully founded  upon  dictation;  it  is  certain  that  a  treaty 
cannot,  in  its  very  nature,  be  dictated  by  one  state  to  an- 
other. Not  only  must  the  conquered  be  taken  into  confer- 
ence, but  his  consent  must  be  secured,  to  render  valid  any 
changes  which  affect  his  rights  under  the  status  quo  ante.2 
A  state  may  find  it  necessary  to  accept  certain  changes  and 
to  agree  to  certain  terms  of  peace,  in  order  to  avoid  cer- 
tain other  results,  such  as  military  occupation  of  its  terri- 
tories, massacre,  or  what  not.  But,  after  all,  some  alterna- 
tive is  present  in  such  a  situation,  and  freedom  of  choice, 
in  a  sense  necessary  to  satisfy  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty, 
is  preserved.  Nor  is  this  merely  an  imaginary  freedom, 
for  a  state  might  prefer  to  go  on  with  the  war ;  cases  have 
been  known  in  which  states  have  refused  to  bow  the  knee 
even  when  all  seemed  lost.  The  choice  of  agreeing  to  the 
proffered  terms  or  continuing  to  resist  is  always  present, 
at  least  in  form. 

From  a  strictly  mechanical  viewpoint,  peace  confer- 
ences are  ordinarily  organized  much  as  are  conferences  in 

^hillipson,  9. 

3  See  recognition  of  this  by  Allies  in  1921 ;  New  York  Times,  30  January, 
1921,  §  1,  p.  1. 


344  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

time  of  peace.  They  are  based  on  credentials  and  full- 
powers  and,  ordinarily,  upon  the  principles  of  equality  of 
representation  and  voting  power,  and  they  operate  by 
unanimous  consent — the  consent  of  all  allies  must  be  ob- 
tained as  well  as  that  of  all  enemies.1  Presiding  officers 
and  secretaries  are  chosen,  plenary  sessions  and  sessions 
in  committee  are  held,  and  the  results  are  put  in  the  form 
of  a  treaty  and  signed. 

However,  peace  conferences  are  not  usually  as  well  or- 
ganized or  as  well  conducted  as  are  conferences  in  time 
of  peace.  They  are  composed  of  diplomats  in  the  narrowest 
sense  of  that  word,  and  the  personal  element  plays  a  very 
great  part  in  the  negotiations.  They  are  smaller  in  mem- 
bership; they  do  not  make  use  of  committees  and  commis- 
sions as  fully  as  do  the  conferences  in  time  of  peace ;  they 
operate  more  secretly;  they  go  less  upon  grounds  of  law 
and  economics  and  statistical  data  generally,  and  more 
upon  grounds  of  "policy,"  national  ambition,  and  the  per- 
sonal opinions  of  the  negotiators.  There  is  more  dickering 
behind  the  scenes,  extra-conference  agreements  are  more 
numerous,2  and  there  is  more  subterranean  "accommoda- 
tion" all  along  the  line.  Not  common  and  permanent  ad- 
vantages, but  exclusive,  direct,  and  immediate,  even  if 
temporary,  national  advantages,  are  pursued.  There  is  no 
fixed  program  or  agenda  to  be  followed  and  everything 
depends  on  the  turns  in  the  negotiations  from  day  to  day. 
The  result  is  that  the  atmosphere  is  very  unwholesome  and 
not  conducive  to  the  production  of  a  sound  settlement. 
Indeed,  the  questions  are  not  commonly  approached  as 
problems  to  be  settled  by  joint  efforts  to  discover  sound 
solutions,  but  as  contests  in  which  each  nation  must  seek 
to  outwit  the  other  in  securing  satisfaction.3  Another  way 

^hillipson,  111-129;  also  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §21,  espe- 
cially Satow,  Conferences. 

4Satow,  §  497,  gives  a  record  of  the  conference  at  Bukarest  in  1913  where 
this  appears  very  clearly. 

'Herbert  Adams  Gibbons,  writing  in  1917  of  the  possibility  of  a  peace 
based  wholly  on  the  military  situation  at  the  (prospective)  end  of  the  war, 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  345 

in  which  this  may  be  viewed  is  to  note  that  there  is  no  one 
present  to  represent  the  general  interest  of  the  society  of 
nations.  In  conferences  in  time  of  peace,  consideration 
of  the  general  welfare  need  not  be,  and  is  not,  entirely 
forgotten.  In  the  diplomatic  contests  in  a  peace  confer- 
ence it  usually  is.1 

The  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  in  1919  is  the  last  great 
peace  conference  on  record,  and  it  may  profitably  be 
studied  in  the  light  of  previous  conferences  of  the  same 
type.2 

The  Conference  was  brought  on  by  the  mediation  of  the 
United  States,  a  belligerent  state,  undertaken  at  the  re- 
quest of  Germany,  an  enemy  state,  to  secure  an  armistice 
on  certain  terms  from  its  co-belligerents,  unusual  as  such  a 
step  may  seem  to  be.  The  United  States  being  one  of  the 
belligerents,  this  might  be  regarded  as  a  case  of  direct 
negotiations  between  belligerents  without  the  interposition 
of  an  outside  power;  such  a  conclusion  must  be  qualified 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  communicated  her  request 
to  the  United  States  "to  take  steps  for  the  restoration  of 
peace"  and  "to  bring  about  the  immediate  conclusion  of  a 
general  armistice"  through  the  good  offices  of  Switzer- 
land.3 Both  the  good  offices  of  one  power  and  the  media- 
tion of  another  (one  of  the  belligerents)  were,  therefore, 
employed.  Moreover,  the  basis  of  the  requested  mediation 
was  to  be  a  set  of  statements  of  peace  terms  already  put 
forward  by  the  mediating  enemy  belligerent.  The  United 
States,  furthermore,  became  a  participant  in  the  Confer- 
ence itself  as  much  in  the  role  of  mediator  as  in  that  of 
enemy.  In  the  course  of  the  Conference,  the  United  States 

said:  "For  there  will  (in  such  a  case)  be  no  peace  problems.  The  victors 
will  refuse  to  consider  problems"  (my  italics)/  New  Map  of  Africa,  481. 

1  For  atmosphere  and  attitude  of  parties  at  great  peace  conferences  in  the 
past  see  Hazen,  entire  (Vienna,  Paris,  Berlin),  and  Hill,  II,  592-607   (West- 
phalia). 

2  On  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix 
B,  §  21. 

*  Documents  in  Temperley,  I,  448. 


346  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

played  the  role  of  mediator  at  times  very  strongly ;  at  other 
times  it  played  the  role  of  enemy. 

The  Conference  included  as  contracting  parties  not 
merely  enemy  belligerent  states,  but  states  not  enemies  in 
the  war,  states  not  belligerents,  and  belligerents  and  ene- 
mies not  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  states  stricto  jure. 
The  Conference  recognized  as  participants  autonomous 
colonies,  " states  in  process  of  formation,"  states  which  had 
merely  severed  diplomatic  relations  one  with  another,  and 
entirely  neutral  powers.1  The  basis  of  participation  was 
interest,  not  status  in  reference  to  the  war.  Neutral 
powers  and  states  in  process  of  formation  participated,  it 
is  true,  not  as  of  right,  but  upon  the  invitation  of  the  Prin- 
cipal Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  Nevertheless,  the  re- 
sulting treaties  were  signed  by  certain  of  the  latter,  in- 
cluding neutral  powers  "in  a  state  of  diplomatic  rupture" 
with  the  Central  Powers,2  and  even  the  lesser  belligerent 
nations  were  dependent  for  their  share  in  the  Conference 
upon  the  will  of  the  Great  Powers.  Moreover,  the  fact  that 
all  these  powers  did  actually  participate  in  the  delibera- 
tions and  settlement  is  more  important  than  the  decision 
of  a  hypothetical  legal  question  whether  and  by  whom  they 
might  have  been  excluded  if  it  had  been  desired  to  do  so. 
The  result  was  a  general  world  congress,  not  merely  a 
peace  conference.  Westphalia  and  Vienna  were  repeated, 
on  an  enlarged  scale,  covering  Europe,  Asia,  the  Americas, 
Africa,  and  Australasia. 

The  many  participants  were  grouped  in  the  Conference 
into  two  groups :  powers  with  general  interests,  and 
powers  with  particular  interests,  not  to  mention  further  the 
powers  not  strictly  belligerent.3  These  groups  and  the 
members  thereof  were  unequally  represented,  as  a  result 
of  the  decisions  of  a  self-appointed  Supreme  Inter- Allied 

1  Documents  in  Temperley,  I,  247. 

2  Same,  III,  105. 

8  Paris  Peace  Conference  Regulations  prescribing  organization  and  work  of 
the  Conference,  Art.  I,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  10. 


PEACE  CONFEEENCES  347 

Council,  composed  of  those  Great  Powers  which  were  de- 
termined to  insist  on  this  arrangement  and  upon  having  the 
largest  numbers  of  delegates  under  it.  At  the  same  time 
the  delegations  voted  as  units — as  a  result  of  unescapable 
political  forces — and  the  number  of  delegates  counted 
chiefly  as  a  matter  of  prestige  and  influence.1 

The  rule  of  unanimous  consent  was,  of  course,  respected 
in  form.2  At  the  same  time,  individual  states  voluntarily 
11  yielded,"  as  they  sometimes  said,  "to  the  majority."3 
More  important  still,  the  smaller  Allied  states  were  in  no 
position  to  challenge  the  decision  of  the  Principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  from  the  point  of  view  of  either 
physical  power  or  reason  and  justice,  seeing  that  all  power 
and  responsibility  was  inevitably  concentrated  upon  the 
Great  Powers  in  point  of  fact,  and  both  sides  were  thor- 
oughly well  aware  of  this.4  It  was  said  by  one  critic,  half 
in  jest,  but  half  in  earnest,  that  the  peace  was  dictated  not 
only  to  Germany  but  to  the  lesser  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers.  At  all  events,  the  rules  of  equality  and  unanimity 
were  not  effective  in  fact,  except,  in  a  mild  way,  among  the 
Great  Powers  themselves.  The  United  States, — Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan, — particularly  the  first 
three,  controlled  the  Conference. 

It  is,  however,  necessary  at  this  point  to  examine  more 
precisely  the  way  in  which  certain  of  the  participating 
powers  did — and  did  not — make  their  appearance  in  Paris 
toward  the  end  of  1918  and  the  beginning  of  1919,  and  the 
effect  which  this  behavior  had  upon  the  Conference. 

When  the  German  request  of  6  October,  1918,  for  an 
armistice  and  a  peace  conference  was  submitted  to  the 

^emperley,  I,  248. 

*  Same. 

8  Clemenceau  is  quoted  as  having  said  to  Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
at  one  time:  "Since  I  am  in  a  minority  I  must  bow  to  your  decision."  New 
York  Times,  18  September,  1921,  §  7,  p.  8. 

4  See  the  protest  of  the  smaller  powers  in  the  plenary  session  of  25  January, 
and  the  reply  thereto  of  President  Clemenceau,  in  New  York  Times,  26  Jan- 
uary, 1919,  pp.  1-2. 


348 

Allies  by  the  United  States,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Allies, 
including  the  United  States,  to  discuss  that  request.  The 
request  was  therefore  taken  up  by  the  Inter- Allied  Supreme 
War  Council,  a  body  created  by  and  among  the  Allies  in 
November,  1917,  for  cooperation  in  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
and  consisting  of  the  " Heads  of  State"  of  the  four  Great 
Powers  (Allies)  and  the  Foreign  Ministers  or  their  repre- 
sentatives, in  each  case,  assisted  by  1 1  Military  Advisers. ' ' 1 
The  German  request  was  granted  by  the  Allies  upon  the 
advice  of  that  body,  and  the  armistice  was  concluded  under 
the  control  of  that  body  on  11  November.2  There  followed 
an  interval  of  two  months  during  which  slow,  irregular, 
and  informal  steps  were  taken  in  bringing  the  Conference 
into  being.  No  official  invitation  or  call  to  the  Conference 
was,  apparently,  sent  out.  The  Supreme  Inter-Allied 
Council,  acting  in  part  as  the  War  Council,  in  part  as  a 
new  body  for  the  maintenance  and  supervision  of  the 
armistice  and  for  the  establishment  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence, continued  to  function  during  the  whole  of  the  period 
of  the  Conference  in  this  capacity.3  "  Meanwhile, "  as  it 
is  casually  described  in  the  most  authoritative  history  of 
the  Conference,  "there  gradually  assembled  at  Paris  the 
host  of  Delegates  and  Officials  who  were  to  constitute 
the  Conference."4  Plans  for  the  organization  and  pro- 
cedure of  the  Conference  were  worked  out,  under  pressure 
of  the  situation  as  it  developed,  by  the  Supreme  Inter- 
Allied  Council  according  to  the  views  and  policies  of  the 
five  Great  Powers,  and  these  were  communicated  to  one 
another  through  oral  conferences  among  representatives 
on  the  ground  in  Europe  or  through  the  ordinary  diplo- 
matic channels. 

One  of  the  earliest  decisions  taken  was  that  the  Con- 

1"The  Supreme  War  Council,"  in  League  of  Nations,  I,  388   (October, 
1918),  especially  note  1. 

1  Temperley,  I,  457,  458. 
'Same,  279-357. 
4  Same,  243. 


PEACE  CONFEBENCES  349 

ference  about  to  open  should  not  include  representatives 
from  the  Central  Powers.1  The  Conference  as  it  con- 
vened in  January,  1919,  was,  therefore,  a  "Preliminary 
Inter- Allied  Conference ' '  on  the  conditions  of  peace,  whose 
object  was  to  draft  a  proposed  treaty  for  submission  to  the 
enemy.  It  was,  nevertheless,  the  real  Peace  Conference 
in  many  respects,  in  that  the  principal  conditions  of  peace 
were  determined  and  the  bulk  of  the  work  in  formulating 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  was  done  there.  Moreover, 
President  Poincare,  in  opening  the  sessions,  on  18  Janu- 
ary, described  the  meeting  as  "the  Conference  of  Paris"2 
and  the  "Regulations"  governing  the  work  of  the  Confer- 
ence were  so  phrased  as  to  indicate  that  there  was  to  be 
only  the  one  (preliminary)  conference,  whose  task  would 
be  to  frame  a  treaty  to  be  signed  by  the  enemy.3 

The  reasons  for  this  step  and  its  results  were  manifold. 

In  the  first  place,  there  were  so  many  powers  and  so 
many  problems  involved  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  alone 
that  it  was  feared  that  dissensions  might  arise  which  would 
be  dangerous  to  the  interests  of  individual  Allied  Powers, 
to  the  common  cause  of  the  Allies,  and  to  the  general  peace, 
unless  questions  at  issue  among  them  were  composed  by  a 
conference  unhampered  by  the  presence  of  enemy  dele- 
gates. Attempts  had  already  been  made  by  the  four  lead- 
ing Allied  Powers  to  come  to  an  understanding  on  the  de- 
sirable terms  of  peace  in  conferences  held  in  London  on 
4-6  December,  1918,  but  with  no  great  success.4  The  bulk  of 
the  negotiating  to  be  done  in  Paris  therefore  was  to 
be  done  by  and  among  the  Allies.  Moreover,  as  the  choice 
of  Paris  rather  than  Geneva  or  some  other  neutral  city  as 
the  scene  of  the  Conference  indicates,  Allied  opinion  was 
averse  to  a  free  debate  with  Germany  on  the  terms  of 
peace. 

1  Same,  241-242,  248. 

'International  Conciliation,  No.  139  (June,  1919),  813. 

1  Paris  Peace  Conference  Regulations,  as  cited,  Arts.  I,  V. 

*  See  Woolf ,  55,  on  significance  of  these  preliminary  conferences. 


350  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  results  of  this  step  were  unfortunate.  While  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  insisted  upon  an  agreement  by  Germany 
that  nothing  was  to  be  open  for  negotiation  but  the  "  prac- 
tical details  of  the  application"  of  the  principles  embodied 
in  the  Fourteen  Points  and  other  speeches  of  the  President 
on  the  terms  of  peace,  he  clearly  had  in  mind  a  full  dis- 
cussion of  those  details.1  He  accordingly  opposed,  al- 
though ineffectively,  the  exclusion  of  German  representa- 
tives from  what  was  in  effect  the  real  conference,  just  as 
England  had  opposed,  in  this  case  with  success,  the  pro- 
posal to  exclude  France  from  the  discussions  at  Vienna  in 
1815.2  The  treaty  as  framed,  on  the  other  hand,  had  the 
appearance  of  a  peace  dictated  to  Germany,  even  in  the 
details.  The  element  of  dictation  was  greater  than  it  had 
been  in  the  settlements  of  1815  and  1871,  or,  indeed,  in  any 
modern  case.  Moreover,  in  the  discussions  attendant  upon 
the  formulation  of  the  treaty  there  was  lacking,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  enemy  delegates,  that  competition  and  balance  of 
ideas  and  demands  which  alone  can  insure  sound  and  just 
conclusions,  no  matter  how  wise  and  righteous  the  repre- 
sentatives of  any  one  party  to  a  controversy.  This  judg- 
ment has  since  been  confirmed  in  many  ways.3  And  if  it 
be  admitted,  as  it  probably  must  be,  that  any  other  course 
was  impossible  in  the  circumstances,  this  merely  confirms 
the  conclusion  that  it  is  impossible  to  secure  sound  and  just 
settlements  of  international  affairs  in  conferences  during, 
or  at  the  conclusion  of,  war.  This  is  particularly  true 
when  national  propaganda  is  employed  as  extensively  as  it 
is  today  with  the  object  and  result  of  stimulating  public 
feeling  and  opinion  against  the  enemy  to  a  point  where 
full  and  free  conference  is  impossible. 

The  Conference  among  the  Allies  proceeded  in  its  work 

1  Notes  of  8  and  23  October,  1918 ;  Temperley,  as  cited,  450,  455. 

1  Satow,  §  461,  at  76. 

a  Thus,  it  was  discovered,  in  1920,  that  the  reparations  question  could 
only  be  satisfactorily  treated  by  oral  conferences  with  the  Germans;  New  York 
Times,  5  July,  1920,  p.  4. 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  351 

during  most  of  the  time  from  18  January  to  7  May,  1919, 
when  the  draft  treaty  was  handed  to  the  Germans.1  Pre- 
liminary discussions  among  the  Principal  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Powers  had  resulted  in  a  set  of  "Regulations"  gov- 
erning the  organization  and  work  of  the  Conference,2  based 
originally  upon  a  French  memorandum  which  was  sub- 
mitted on  12  January  to  the  Supreme  Inter- Allied  Council,3 
— known  from  now  on  as  the  Council  of  Ten,  two  Japanese 
representatives  being  added  to  the  original  eight  on  13 
January.  These  regulations  provided  for  representation 
in  the  Conference,  as  already  described.  In  addition,  pro- 
visions were  made  for  precedence  in  the  Conference  "ac- 
cording to  alphabetical  order  in  French"  of  the  names  of 
the  Powers.4  It  provided  for  the  opening  meeting,  verifi- 
cation of  credentials,  choice  of  permanent  officers,  a  secre- 
tariat, the  sessions  of  the  Conference,  procedure,  and  the 
making  and  publication  of  records.5 

The  regulations  implied  that  plenary  sessions  were  to 
be  the  rule,  committee  work  the  exception.8  In  the  event 
the  Conference  actually  met  in  plenary  session  but  six  times 
prior  to  a  meeting  with  the  Germans  on  7  May.7  This 
was  due  to  the  same  causes  which  led  to  the  decision  to 
hold  a  preliminary  Inter-Allied  conference  in  the  first 
place,  to  the  increasing  need  for  speed  in  the  work  of 
making  peace,  to  the  difficulty  anticipated  by  all  of  main- 
taining secrecy  under  such  conditions,  and  to  the  desire 
of  the  Great  Powers  to  keep  matters  in  their  own  hands  for 
settlement. 

Work  by  committees  and  commissions  and  the  Supreme 
Council  therefore  became  the  usual  thing,  plenary  sessions 

Temperley,  I,  252-268. 
'Above,  p.  346,  note  3. 

8  Temperley,  as  cited,  247. 
*  Begulations,  Art.  IV. 
•Same,  Arts.  V-XV. 

9  Same,  Arts.  X  and  XIV. 

T  Temperley,  as  cited,  249. 


352  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  exception.  The  bulk  of  the  work  was  done  by  the 
Supreme  Council,  at  first  a  Council  of  Ten,  later  a  Council 
of  Five,  when  the  Foreign  Ministers  were  separated  into 
a  Council  by  themselves  to  act  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  Coun- 
cil of  Five,  later  a  Council  of  Four,  when  the  Japanese 
ceased  to  attend,  and  at  one  time  a  Council  of  Three,  while 
the  Italians  were  out  of  the  Conference.1  The  three  lead- 
ing members  of  the  Conference — Clemenceau,  who  had 
been  elected  "President  of  the  Conference"  and  who  was 
also  "President"  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  its  many 
forms,2  Wilson,  and  Lloyd  George — thus  controlled  the 
decisions  of  the  Conference  as  a  whole. 

The  many  committees  and  commissions,  sub-committees 
and  sub-commissions,  of  the  Conference,  appointed  in  part 
by  the  plenary  Conference,  in  part  by  the  Supreme  Council, 
and  dealing  with  the  many  subjects  in  debate,  met  continu- 
ously.3 They  were  assisted  by  the  "experts"  attached  to 
the  various  delegations,4  and  they  prepared  data  and  rec- 
ommendations for  the  Supreme  Council  and  the  Confer- 
ence. It  is  still  impossible  to  describe  with  accuracy  and 
assurance  the  full  array  of  these  bodies.  Their  work, 
moreover,  was  always  subject  to  the  decisions  of  those 
whom  they  served,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  their  reports 
were  in  most  cases  turned  over  to  the  Secretariat  for  such 
use  as  the  Supreme  Council  might  choose  to  make  of  them. 

The  rules  of  procedure  set  forth  in  the  Regulations  were 
severely  enforced  in  the  plenary  sessions — with  such  altera- 
tions as  circumstances  seemed  to  him  to  require — by  M. 
Clemenceau  as  President.5  They  had  no  application,  how- 

1  Temperley,  249,  263,  268 ;  as  a  matter  of  terminology  it  should  be  noted 
that  the  Council  of  Foreign  Ministers  was  called  the  ' '  Council  of  Five ' '  and 
that  the  Council  of  Heads  of  States  was  never  known  as  a  council  of  five  inas- 
much as  the  Japanese  representative  dropped  out  simultaneously  with  the 
separation  of  the  Ten  into  two  bodies.  Temperley,  as  cited,  499. 

*On  Clemenceau 's  position  see  Lansing,  E.,  10-36,  especially  16,  25. 

•Temperley,  I,  500. 

4  Same,  244. 

'Lansing,  as  cited,  110. 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  353 

ever,  in  the  work  of  the  Councils  and  the  commissions,  and 
are  therefore  of  little  or  no  importance.1 

The  work  of  the  Secretariat,  including  the  really  mar- 
velous performance  of  the  official  interpreter,  needs  only 
to  be  mentioned.2  The  keeping  of  records  was  rendered  a 
stupendous  task  by  the  decentralization  of  the  Conference, 
but  the  French  Foreign  Office,  with  an  eye  for  the  value  of 
such  records  of  what  was  going  on  day  by  day,  was  in- 
defatigable in  this  direction.3 

In  keeping  with  the  irregular  and  informal  way  in  which 
the  members  of  the  Conference  assembled,  the  verification 
of  credentials  was  delayed  until  a  late  date,  contrary  to 
usual  practice.4  The  sum  and  substance  of  this  was  that 
political  power  and  influence,  rather  than  legal  authority, 
determined  the  place  occupied  by  individual  delegates  in 
the  rather  amorphous  conference  going  on  in  hotels  and 
offices  all  over  Paris. 

The  problem  of  publicity  in  international  conferences 
has  already  been  fully  discussed.5  Next  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  German  delegates,  the  partly  successful  attempt  to  pre- 
vent any  real  publicity  regarding  the  discussions  in  process 
probably  exerted  more  influence  upon  the  character  of  the 
result  than  any  other  one  thing,  apart,  of  course,  from  the 
national  demands  and  personal  influences  operating  in  the 
negotiations  themselves.  The  discussions  did  not  enjoy 
the  benefit  of  any  wide  scrutiny  until  they  had  emerged  in 
the  form  of  a  treaty  too  complicated  and  extensive  to  be 
substantially  changed.  Moreover,  the  Allies  actually  at- 
tempted to  keep  the  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  secret, 
while  issuing  an  official  summary  of  it,  after  it  was  handed 

1  They  are  not  printed  at  all  in  Temperley. 

•Temperley,  I,  250. 

1  Lansing,  as  cited,  113. 

4  The  matter  was  not  taken  up  until  the  signing  of  the  German  treaty 
became  imminent.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  subject  is  nowhere  treated  in 
Temperley. 

6  See  Temperley,  I,  254,  for  a  temperate  statement  of  the  problem  in  con- 
nection with  the  Paris  Conference. 


354  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

to  the  Germans  on  7  May.1  The  intention,  doubtless,  was 
to  make  the  treaty  public  only  after  signature,  pending 
ratification.  In  a  narrow  sense  of  the  phrase  this  would 
have  satisfied  the  requirement  for  open  covenants  openly 
arrived  at,  because  the  critical  step  of  approval  and  con- 
sent to  ratification  would,  in  such  circumstances,  be  taken 
in  the  open,  but  only  in  that  very  narrow  sense. 

The  Germans  were  told  on  7  May  that  they  would  have 
three  weeks  in  which  to  make  "observations"  in  writing 
upon  the  provisions  of  the  proposed  treaty,  but  that  oral 
discussions  would  not  be  permitted.2  What  was  wanted 
were  merely  " practical  suggestions"  regarding  the  appli- 
cation and  enforcement  of  the  terms.  Premier  Briand  said 
in  a  statement  upon  a  similar  occasion  some  two  years  later 
that  it  must  be  well  understood  that  by  proposals,  he  meant 
"acceptance  pure  and  simple"  of  the  Allied  terms  as  well 
as  "an  arrangement  of  the  methods  and  manner"  of  per- 
formance.3 Such  was  the  case  in  1919. 

Upon  this  action  the  same  comments  must  be  made  as 
have  been  made  upon  the  exclusion  of  German  representa- 
tives from  the  preliminary  discussions  connected  with  the 
framing  of  the  treaty.  The  method  of  written  discussion, 
if  it  may  be  so  called,  considered  in  conjunction  with  the 
short  time  available, — even  when  the  three  weeks  allowed 
were  extended  to  six, — was  totally  inadequate  to  the  needs 
of  the  case.  Indeed,  the  Allies  did  not  intend  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  of  peace  at  all,  but  to  dictate  a  settlement.  They  con- 
ceived of  themselves  as  acting  on  behalf  of  international 
society  in  punishing  a  convict.  Yet  they  possessed  no  legal 
jurisdiction  over,  and  therefore  were  compelled  to  secure 
the  consent  of,  Germany,  and  this  made  a  treaty  necessary, 
at  least  in  form.4  Moreover,  the  moral  or  psychological 

1  Temperley,  I,  270. 
"Same. 

1  New  York  Times,  2  May,  1921,  p.  2. 

*  See  admission  of  this  in  securing  changes  in  the  reparations  plan  in  1921, 
New  York  Times,  30  January,  1921,  §  1,  p.  1,  and,  in  contrast,  the  expression 


PEACE  CONFERENCES  355 

value  of  a  signed  ''agreement"  was  not  to  be  despised.  The 
Germans,  their  feelings  aggravated  by  the  methods  used  in 
drafting  the  treaty,  quite  apart  from  its  contents — and  this 
was  a  needless  obstacle  which  the  Allies  frequently  raised 
up  for  themselves — criticized  the  treaty  bitterly  and  ex- 
tensively in  the  next  six  weeks,  but  in  the  end  accepted  the 
terms,  which  were  substantially  unchanged  as  a  result  of 
the  "discussions"  of  May  and  June,  and  on  28  June,  1919, 
signed  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.1 

The  objects  of  the  Conference  as  it  met  in  January, 
1919,  had  been  three :  to  revise  the  peace  settlements  made 
in  1918  between  the  Central  Powers  on  one  side  and  Eussia 
and  Roumania  on  the  other ; 2  to  make  peace  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers;  and  to  create  an  international  organization 
of  some  sort  to  maintain  the  peace  when  it  had  been  made. 
The  creation  of  the  League  of  Nations,  an  attempt  to  attain 
the  final  purpose  of  the  Conference,  will  be  discussed  in  the 
next  chapter.  The  first  object  was  accomplished  as  part  of 
the  second,  namely,  through  treaties  of  peace  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  of  which  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  the  first.8 
During  the  remainder  of  1919  and  the  whole  of  1920  the 
Peace  Conference,  reduced  to  its  essential  organ,  the  Inter- 
Allied  Council,4  with  the  delegations  of  other  interested 
powers  in  irregular  attendance,  maintained  the  armistice 
and  attempted  to  keep  Europe  in  order 5  while  drafting 
treaties  with  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and  Turkey,  and 
these  treaties  were  signed  at  St.  Germain-en-Laye,  Neuilly- 
sur-Seine,  the  Trianon  palace  at  Versailles,  and  Sevres, 
on  10  September  and  27  November,  1919,  and  4  June  and  10 
August,  1920,  respectively.6  During  the  later  stages  the 

of  Briand,  in  speaking  of  the  question  of  reparations  in  May,  1921:  "Ger- 
many must  yield  or  be  in  a  state  of  rebellion, ' '  same,  6  May,  1921,  p.  1. 

1  Temperley,  I,  271. 

1  Texts  in  same,  III,  42,  and,  with  other  documents,  in  Boumanian  Peace, 
Eussian  Peace,  Ukraine  Peace,  as  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  21. 

*  For  example,  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Art.  292,  in  Temperley,  I,  253. 

*  Now  the  Council  of  Five  Foreign  Ministers;  same,  I,  499. 
•Same,  I,  279-357. 

•Same,  III,  28,  36,  41. 


356  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Conference  degenerated  even  further  into  irregular,  infor- 
mal, and  ineffective  negotiations  of  very  ambiguous  types. 
The  conclusion  of  this  study  of  the  Peace  Conference  of 
Paris  is  simple,  although  the  explanation  is  highly  com- 
plicated. The  Conference  of  1919  was  far  inferior  in  or- 
ganization and  methods  to  the  meetings  at  Berlin  in  1878 
and  Paris  in  1856,  not  to  mention  such  conferences  in  time 
of  peace  as  those  at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  1907.  The  per- 
formance at  Vienna  in  1815  was  probably  a  little  worse. 
But  when  we  examine  the  Regulations  which  embody  the 
original  ideas  of  the  leading  Powers  regarding  the  way  in 
which  the  Paris  Conference  should  be  organized  and  oper- 
ated, we  realize  the  extent  of  the  debacle  of  the  succeeding 
months.  This  collapse  of  method  was  due  primarily  to  the 
intensity  of  national  and  personal  demands  and  feelings, 
to  political  and  economic  exigencies  and  desires,  inflamed 
by  war  and  propaganda.  To  a  certain  extent  the  situation 
was  hopeless,  as  it  must  be  in  all  such  cases.  The  collapse 
was  due,  in  the  second  place,  to  the  immaturity  of  the  art 
of  international  government.  Here  was  a  need  for  a  set 
of  forms  and  procedure  capable  of  receiving  and  recon- 
ciling and  satisfying  all  the  contending  forces  at  play  in 
the  scene,  as  legislative  forms  and  procedure  serve  to  re- 
solve similar  conflicts  among  contending  interests  in  the 
state.  Nothing  adequate  was  available.  Having  been  un- 
able, for  lack  of  adequate  international  governmental 
methods,  to  prevent  the  war,  the  world  was  unable  for  the 
same  reasons  to  bring  it  to  a  firm  conclusion.  Having 
been  unable  to  preserve  international  law  and  order  in 
1914,  the  world  was,  in  1919  and  1920,  unable  to  contrive 
a  firm  peace. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  PEACE  AND  ITS  RELATION 
TO  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

IT  has  not  been  a  very  long  time  since  any  person  who 
confessed  to  an  interest  in  the  problems  of  international 
organization  was  in  grave  danger  of  being  regarded  as  a 
pacifist  and  lumped  indiscriminately  in  a  group  with  those 
timid  souls  who  demanded  peace  at  any  price.  Interna- 
tional organization  was  regarded  as  a  proposed  reform, 
designed  to  eliminate  war  and  bring  peace  to  the  world, 
and  it  was  presumably  to  be  studied,  if  at  all,  because  of 
this  potential  service.  Now  as  we  have  seen,  international 
organization  is  not  merely  a  reform  to  be  accomplished  in 
the  future  but  an  established  phase  of  the  actual  historical 
development  of  the  world,  and  is  entitled  to  attention  as  a 
part  of  present  political  reality  on  a  par  with  national, 
state  or  provincial,  and  local  or  municipal  government. 
It  is,  nevertheless,  closely  related  to  the  creation  and  main- 
tenance of  world  peace,  also,  and  we  must  now  examine 
the  precise  nature  of  that  " peace"  which  is  so  much  dis- 
cussed and  so  little  understood,  and  its  relation  to  inter- 
national government.1 

Peace  may  be  conceived  entirely  as  a  negative  thing,  as 
the  condition  which  exists  when  there  is  no  war.  Even  this 
simple  description,  however,  requires  some  analysis,  for 
"war"  also  is  a  concept  not  commonly  analyzed  and  de- 
fined with  precision.  War  may  be  defined  as  general  mili- 
tary action  by  an  organized  group  of  people,  ordinarily 
forming  a  state,  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  vindicating 

1  On  peace  movements  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  22. 

357 


358 

what  it  believes  to  be  its  public  rights  against  another 
state  or  other  states.1  Direct  action  of  a  limited  sort — • 
retorsion,  reprisals — may  be  undertaken  for  the  defense 
of  certain  limited  rights  without  bringing  on  a  state  of  war 
in  the  full  sense  of  the  term.  Military  action  may  be  under- 
taken by  certain  individuals  or  groups  for  private  rights 
without  the  result  of  creating  a  state  of  public  war. 
Finally,  if  joint  military  action  is  taken  by  several  states 
not  for  the  purpose  merely  of  protecting  their  own  rights 
directly  but  also  common  international  law  or  the  general 
peace,  we  have  something  which  does  not  deserve  to  be 
regarded  as  "war"  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  term.2 

Peace,  then,  while  excluding  international  war  proper, 
does  not  necessarily  exclude  all  military  action.  The  oc- 
currence of  sporadic  outbursts  of  individual  violence,  of 
piratical  marauding  or  civil  rioting,  does  not  disturb  the 
peace  from  an  international  viewpoint.  Likewise,  the 
military  action  of  an  international  organization  for  the 
enforcement  of  international  law  would  not  amount  to  a 
breach  of  the  peace.  On  the  contrary,  such  action  would  in 
reality  constitute  a  step  taken  for  the  maintenance  of  ulti- 
mate peace. 

Let  us  see  how  this  comes  to  be.  If  the  absence  of  inter- 
national war  would  mean  peace,  then,  obviously,  peace 
might  conceivably  be  brought  about  by  each  nation  volun- 
tarily abstaining  from  the  use  of  military  action  to  vindi- 
cate its  rights,  preferring  peace  to  justice.  Such  a  peace  of 
inaction,  of  weakness,  of  resignation,  deserves  all  the  scorn 
heaped  upon  it — or  upon  peace  in  general — by  the  militarist 
and  the  jingo  nationalist.3  The  peace  of  the  cemetery,  the 

1See  discussions  of  the  nature  of  war  in  Hall,  §§  15,  16,  and  the  cases  of 
Gray  v.  United  States,  1886,  21  Ct.  of  Cls.,  340;  Hooper  v.  United  States, 
1887,  22  Ct.  of  Cls.,  408. 

*  Hall,  §  95.  No  claim  is  made  that  such  action  is  taken  for  ' '  altruistic ' ' 
reasons,  nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  conclusion,  so  long  as  the  interests  defended 
be  common  interests. 

*"A  just  war  is,  in  the  long  run,  far  better  for  a  nation's  soul  than  the 
most  prosperous  peace  obtained  by  an  acquiescence  in  wrong  or  injustice." 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  359 

peace  of  death,  has  no  claim  to  respect.  The  peace  move- 
ment has  been  injured  by  nothing  else  as  much  as  by  the 
spread  of  a  concept  of  peace  typified  by  a  milk-white  dove 
bearing  inanely  before  it  a  silly  twig  of  olive  leaves. 

A  nation,  like  an  individual,  may,  of  course,  calculate 
that  the  inconvenience  and  expense  of  enforcing  its  rights 
will  be  greater  than  the  values  to  be  obtained  by  that  step, 
and  decide  to  refrain  from  action.  This  may  go  the  length 
of  deciding  that  war  is,  in  general,  a  method  of  action  so 
terrible  and  expensive  that  no  values  which  can  be  obtained 
through  its  use  can  conceivably  compensate  for  the  suffer- 
ing and  cost  which  it  entails.1  To  make  war  would  then 
be  weakness  and  folly.  That  is  not  what  is  in  mind  here. 
The  undesirable  thing  is  an  attitude  in  making  the  fore- 
going calculation  which  gives  undue  weight  to  inconven- 
ience and  expense  and  trouble,  which  unduly  fears  the  harsh 
realities  of  conflict  and  undervalues  the  interests  of  right 
and  justice. 

We  encounter  at  this  point  the  vast  polemical  literature 
for  and  against  war,  describing  it  as  useful,  beneficial,  and 
inevitable,  or  the  opposite.2  That  war  is  inevitable  so 
long  as  certain  conditions  of  mind  and  certain  international 
political  conditions  persist  is  certain.  The  former  are,  how- 
ever, changing  notably  in  recent  times ; 3  the  latter,  as  we 
now  see,  may  soon  be  changed  radically  in  certain  particu- 
lars. As  for  the  utility  of  war,  that  also  must  be  considered 
not  by  itself  but  in  relation  to  the  alternatives  available,  in 
particular  the  alternatives  in  international  procedure  about 
to  be  described. 

Granting,  then,  that  the  effect  produced  by  a  general 

Roosevelt,  Message  to  Congress,  4  December,  1906,  Ho.  Doc.  1,  59  Cong.  2  Sess., 
LV. 

The  commendation  of  war  in  general  and  the  condemnation  of  peace  in 
general  ("Wars  are  terrible,  but  necessary,  for  they  save  the  state  from  social 
putrefaction  and  stagnation")  is  a  different  thing,  of  course. 

*Angell,  Great  Illusion,  28-49. 

'Krehbiel,  16-35   (bibliography). 

"Angell,  155-221. 


360  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

willingness  on  the  part  of  the  nations  to  obtain  peace  by 
sacrificing  their  rights  would  be  demoralizing,  how  is  the 
enforcement  of  those  rights  to  be  reconciled  with  the  main- 
tenance of  peace?  Granting,  further,  as  we  must  grant, 
that,  even  if  peace  by  inaction  were  desirable,  the  nations 
are  unwilling  to  surrender  their  rights  generally  for  the 
sake  of  peace,  how  may  the  same  problem  be  solved!  There 
is  presented  here  a  task  of  political  engineering  deserving 
serious  study.  Peace  cannot  be  attained  by  aspiration 
merely,  by  crying  "let  us  have  peace";  for,  contrary  to 
the  old  adage,  it  only  takes  one  state  to  make  war  but  it 
takes  two,  three — all — to  keep  the  peace.  It  must  be  at- 
tained by  international  organization  for  the  definition,  ad- 
ministration, and  enforcement  of  the  rights  of  individual 
states  so  as  to  relieve  them  of  the  necessity  of  self-help  in 
this  regard.  Peace  must  be  attained  indirectly,  and  inter- 
national organization  may  be  regarded  as  the  means  to  the 
end.1 

With  this  in  mind,  peace  becomes  not  a  weak  condition 
of  inaction  and  dissolution,  but  a  condition  where  the  ade- 
quate power  of  the  community  maintains  the  common  law 
and  common  justice,  and  public  order  reigns.  The  peace  of 
the  court  room  is  the  peace  to  be  sought  and,  if  possible,  ob- 
tained by  international  government.  These  general  prin- 
ciples remain,  however,  to  be  worked  out  in  detail,  .and  it 
is  most  convenient  to  make  the  beginning  in  connection  with 
the  international  conferences  discussed  in  the  last  two 'chap- 
ters. 

It  has  been  seen  that  war  may  be  terminated  by  a  sim- 
ple cessation  of  hostilities  or  by  treaty.  It  was  noted  that 
the  former  method  left  matters  in  an  inconvenient  state  of 
uncertainty.  More  important  here  is  the  fact  that  it  leaves 
open  many  questions  likely  to  lead  to  a  renewal  of  'war. 
For  that  reason  the  method  of  concluding  war  by  treaty 
is  of  much  greater  value  for  preserving  the  peace,  in  that 

1Krehbiel,  150-165,  on  types  of  pacifism. 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  361 

it  provides  for  the  mutual  satisfaction  of  claims  outstand- 
ing between  the  parties. 

When  this  task  is  undertaken  the  peace  conference  is 
led,  first  of  all,  to  revert  to  the  causes  which  originally 
brought  on  the  war.  The  discussion  of  international  rela- 
tions must  be  resumed  where  the  discussion,  and  where 
those  relations,  speaking  generally,  were  broken  off  by  the 
event  of  war. 

The  most  natural  question  suggested  by  this  obvious 
but  commonly  neglected  fact  is  the  question  why,  if  this 
be  so,  the  discussion  was  broken  off  originally,  and  what 
assistance  has  been  derived  from  the  intervening  war  in 
the  settlement  of  the  issues  at  stake.  The  reply  is  ex- 
tremely complicated  and  varies  with  the  nature  of  the 
issues. 

In  general  terms,  it  may  be  said  that  diplomatic  dis- 
cussions are  broken  off  and  military  action  begun  in  such 
cases  because  of  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  parties  to 
come  to  agreement,  or,  more  specifically,  the  failure  of  one 
party  to  secure  from  the  other  a  satisfactory  degree  of 
compliance  with  its  demands  by  the  use  of  diplomatic  ar- 
gument. But  what  is  that  "argument"  the  failure  of  which 
brings  war?  It  is  the  presentation  of  alternatives  from 
which  the  other  state  will,  it  is  claimed,  suffer  as  a  result 
of  refusing  the  demands  of  its  neighbor.  Those  argumen- 
tative alternatives  may  be  of  many  forms,  such  as  warnings 
of  the  loss  of  reputation  or  the  loss  of  favor  in  the  eyes 
of  the  state  making  the  demand,  and  of  other  states,  result- 
ing indirectly  in  material  loss ;  physical  attack  by  the  state 
making  the  demand  (or  by  others,  or  both),  with  the  ob- 
ject of  seizing  the  object  of  the  demand,  if  that  be  feasible, 
or  other  things  to  be  held  for  exchange ;  or  with  the  object 
of  securing  power  over  the  state  resisting  the  demand — 
over  its  property,  territory,  people,  and  government — in 
order  to  demand  satisfaction  as  the  price  of  continued  free 
existence.  And,  the  arguments  being  unconvincing,  the 


362  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

action  threatened  is  taken  in  fact.  So  far  as  war  does 
not  come  about  merely  from  excitement  and  confusion,  this 
is  the  rational  theory  of  the  event.1 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  the  value  of  war  in  the 
settlement  of  the  current  dispute  is  as  remote  from  view 
as  ever.  When  we  examine  the  case  again  we  find  that 
what  the  first  state  has  done  is  to  take  action  having  no 
bearing  at  all  upon  the  merits  of  the  issue  in  dispute.  So 
far  as  that  state  is  victorious  in  war,  it  secures  satisfaction 
for  its  demands  without  reference  to  the  merits  of  the  issue ; 
the  issue  is  therefore  not  " settled"  in  any  rational  sense, 
but  remains  in  dispute  in  the  minds  of  the  parties ;  for  the 
second  party  has  yielded,  not  from  conviction  on  the  merits 
of  the  issue,  but  as  a  price  of  existence.  If  the  second  party 
is  victorious  the  same  result  follows:  the  original  demand 
is  refused,  with  as  little  reference  to  the  merits  as  in  the 
preceding  case.  Now  if  the  war  should  be  a  drawn  battle, 
the  only  recourse  is  to  resume  negotiations  where  they  were 
dropped,  for  no  new  factors  have  entered  the  situation  at 
all.  Where,  as  most  often  happens,  there  is  a  partial  vic- 
tory for  one  party,  the  situation  is  a  mixture  of  cases  one, 
two,  and  three,  but  in  none  of  these  cases  does  the  war 
facilitate  in  any  way  the  solution  of  the  dispute  on  the 
merits. 

It  is  partly  for  this  reason  that  peace  conferences,  held 
at  the  conclusion  of  war,  are  of  little  value  for  the  cause 
of  international  peace  and  justice.  The  atmosphere  and 
temper  of  the  time  is,  of  course,  bad.  But  more  important 
is  the  fact  that  such  conferences  are  based  upon  the  status 
quo  at  the  time.  They  treat  the  disputes  between  the  par- 
ties by  reference  to  the  perhaps  temporary  preponderance 
of  military  force  of  one  power  at  the  time,  not  by  reference 
to  the  permanent  conditions  of  power  between,  and  the  rela- 

1  For  description  of  the  law  and  practice  relating  to  the  beginning  of  war 
see  Wilson  and  Tucker,  §  97,  and  Prise  Cases,  67  U.S.  635;  also  Hershey, 
§§338-342,  with  references. 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  363 

live  needs  of,  the  two  states.  The  result  may  easily  be  the 
reverse  of  what  it  should  be  in  the  interests  of  the  common 
welfare,  of  justice,  and,  therefore,  of  permanence.  They 
produce  artificial  solutions  capable  of  being  maintained 
only  by  the  constant  use  of  military  force.  They  do  not 
deal  with  the  issue  as  it  stood  on  the  merits  at  the  out- 
break of  war. 

It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  critical  point,  the 
point  upon  which  attention  must  be  focused  in  an  effort  to 
find  a  method  of  really  solving  international  disputes, 
is  the  point  where  negotiations  were  broken  off.  New 
issues  arise  during  the  war,  partly  connected  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  and  partly  independent  of  it.  But  when 
these  issues  come  to  be  discussed  in  the  peace  conference 
it  is  similarly  true  that  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  war 
has  no  more  bearing  upon  the  merits  of  those  issues  than 
upon  the  original  issues.  In  attempting  to  deal  with  the 
problem  of  war  or  national  action  by  military  force  to 
vindicate  national  rights  we  must  revert  to  the  nature  of 
those  rights  or  demands,  or,  in  familiar  terms,  the  causes 
of  war. 

The  causes  of  war  are,  of  course,  too  complicated-  for 
complete  analysis  here,  but  they  may  be  described  as  falling 
under  one  or  the  other  of  two  heads,  either  violations  of 

A^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^MMk 

legal  rights  or  actions  notcoyered  by  international  law  at 
ait.^  "Tneiormer  may  take  the 


citizens  abroad,  violation  of  territorial  sovereignty,  and 
many  other  actions.  The  latter  are  still  more  varied,  con- 
sisting in  commercial  rivalry,  political  rivalry,  and  what 
not.  The  conclusions  significant  for  our  purpose  flow  from 
the  twofold  classification  itself,  not  from  the  detailed  de- 
scription of  the  two  classes. 

What  are  the  outstanding  features  of  these  two  forms 
of  the  causes  of  war?     The  first  is  the  failure  to  define 

1  On  causes  of  war  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  22  j  see  also, 
for  the  legal  aspect,  Hall,  §  16,  Par.  2. 


364  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

legally  the  interests  included  in  the  latter  group  of  causes, 
thus  leaving  great  discretion  to  the  individual  state  in  its 
decision  regarding  supposed  violations  of  its  "rights." 
It  is  a  testimony  to  the  respect  for  law  among  the  nations 
that  the  "rights"  demanded  are  invariably  portrayed  as 
legal  rights  wherever  possible,  but  this  effort  is  not  in 
most  cases  very  successful.  The  second  is  the  freedom  left 
to  individual  states  even  to  decide  whether  their  legal 
rights  have  been  violated.  The  third  is  a  failure  to  provide 
the  state  with  any  means  of  enforcing  its  rights  except  self- 
help  in  carrying  out  the  law  and  securing  justice  according 
to  its  own  opinion.1  It  is  to  these  features  of  the  situation 
that  international  government  must  be  applied  if  it  is  to 
accomplish  anything  for  the  cause  of  peace. 

In  accordance  with  this  conclusion,  the  conferences  held 
in  time  of  peace  with  the  purpose  of  preventing  war  turn 
first  to  the  definition  of  the  rights  of  the  states  participating 
in  them.  Such  conferences  have  a  greater  chance  of  success 
than  conferences  at  the  end  of  war  because  the  temper  of 
the  time  is  better,  the  alignment  of  the  forces  in  the  scene  is 
normal,  and  the  common  interest  may  conceivably  be  kept 
in  view.  National  advantage  is  here  sought  through  the 
common  advantage,  benefit  is  now  sought  not  at  once  but  in 
the  long  run,  and  all  attention  is  directed  to  the  origin  of 
disputes,  not  to  the  results  thereof,  as  is  not  true  in  con- 
ferences in  time  of  war.  By  treaty  agreements  the  rights  of 
the  parties  regarding  territory,  commercial  privileges,  and 
all  the  interests  at  stake  in  the  situation,  are  defined.  The 
next  step  is  the  provision  of  machinery  for  adjudication 
upon  those  rights,  in  the  form  of  arbitration.  The  third 
step  would  be  to  provide  for  enforcement  by  the  community 
of  nations  participating  in  the  plan,  in  place  of  enforce- 
ment by  the  individual  state. 

Historically,  something,  but  not  a  great  deal,  has  been 
done  on  the  first  point,  in  formally  defining  international 

1  Hall,  as  cited,  Par.  1. 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  365 

rights.  For  the  most  part,  international  law  has  been  al- 
lowed to  grow  up  by  itself,  and  the  task  of  recording  and 
codifying  it  has  been  left  to  private  scholars.  Only  in  the 
last  fifty  years  have  official  conferences  for  the  statement 
of  the  law  met  with  any  frequency,1  and  these  have  dealt 
principally  with  the  conduct  of  war.  By  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  law  of  normal  intercourse,  covering  the  period 
when  war  is  not  being  carried  on,  yet  in  which  it  originates, 
is  left  untouched.  The  reason  for  this,  as  well  as  the  reason 
for  the  same  action  by  private  scholars  in  recording  first  the 
common  international  law  of  war,  is  that  the  law  has  been 
set  down,  not  so  much  deliberately  with  the  object  of  effect- 
ing a  world  government  and  preventing  war  in  the  future, 
as  with  the  object  of  recording  retrospectively  the  methods 
of  making  war,  of  avoiding  disputes  concerning  these 
methods,  and,  if  possible,  of  ameliorating  these  methods.2 
At  present,  the  great  need  for  an  effort  to  set  forth  the  law 
of  international  relations  in  complete  and  official  form  is 
being  realized.3 

Provisions  for  the  adjudication  of  disputed  rights  have 
also  been  made  in  the  past,  as  the  history  of  arbitration 
shows,  and  the  steps  taken  in  this  direction,  although  not 
very  well  coordinated  before  the  end  of  the  last  century, 
have  been  more  numerous  and  consistent  than  those  taken 
for  the  definition  of  the  law.  This  has  been  due  to  the 
fact  that  it  has  seemed  simpler  to  reconcile  such  a  pro- 
ceeding with  the  idea  of  state  independence  than  the  dec- 
laration of  law  binding  for  the  future,  and  to  the  greater 
intrinsic  difficulty  of  the  latter  task.  It  is  intrinsically 
difficult  to  find  legal  formulas  capable  of  doing  justice  to 
all  parties,  and  a  law  which  works  injustice  is  worse  than 

1  Above,  Chap.  XII. 

*On  law  regarding  conduct  of  hostilities  see  Wilson  and  Tucker,  §§  101- 
116,  127-140;  also  Hershey,  §§  351-444,  448-515,  with  references;  also  Baker 
and  Crocker,  Land  Warfare,  and  Martin  and  Baker,  Maritime  Warfare,  as 
cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  12. 

3  See  criticism  of  the  League  of  Nations  because  it  neglects  this  task,  in 
Hill,  Present  Problems,  120-124. 


366  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

a  political  bargain  which  does  not.  This  is  the  fundamental 
human  obstacle  to  the  development  of  international  law, 
the  lack  of  such  knowledge  of  international  relations  as 
would  enable  us  to  write  fairly  and  completely  the  law  of 
those  relations.1  But  the  movement  for  the  judicial  settle- 
ment of  international  legal  disputes  is  now  well  on  its  feet. 

The  last  step  to  be  taken  in  providing  for  peaceful  world 
government  is  to  provide  for  community  enforcement  of 
international  rights,  and  not  much  has  been  done  in  this 
direction  in  the  past.  A  state  could  look  only  to  its  own 
right  arm  for  the  enforcement  of  its  rights  under  inter- 
national law;  to  such  an  extent  was  this  true  that  the  nor- 
mal attitude  to  be  taken  by  third  states  in  the  face  of  a  dis- 
pute between  two  others  was  that  of  neutrality.2  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  such  action  demands  a  degree  of 
international  organization  not  deemed  practicable  or  de- 
sirable, in  view  of  the  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty  and 
independence.3  The  actions  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  be- 
tween 1825  and  1860  provide  the  best — and  almost  the  only 
— illustration  in  history  of  such  a  procedure.  We  are  now 
coming  to  new  proposals  leading  in  this  direction  which 
promise  greater  results.  This  will  form  the  subject  of  the 
remaining  chapters. 

For  if  community  enforcement  of  international  rights  is 
to  be  established,  such  action  must  be  provided  through  the 
creation  of  an  international  federation  of  some  type.  The 
states  of  the  world,  working  as  individuals,  might,  and 
indeed  have,  generated  a  rather  extensive  system  of  com- 
mon international  law.  The  states  of  the  world,  acting  by 
twos  and  threes,  might,  and  have,  elaborated  a  rather  ex- 

1  See  Prince  von  Billow 's  remark :  ' '  Germany  has  not  found  any  formula 
that  will  meet  the  great  diversity  which  characterizes  the  geographical,  the 
economic,  the  military,  and  the  political  positions  of  the  various  countries," 
in  reference  to  the  proposals  at  the  Hague  in  1907  for  obligatory  arbitration, 
made  in  an  address  in  the  Reichstag,  30  April,  1907;  see,  above,  Chap.  XVI, 
277,  256-258. 

1  Theory  in  Hershey,  §§445-447,  with  references;  practice  and  allega- 
tions of  principles  in  Neutrality  Proclamations,  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  22. 

*  See,  also,  above,  at  256,  and  note  3. 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  367 

tensive  body  of  treaty  law.  They  could,  and  did,  develop 
the  practice  of  arbitration  very  far  in  the  same  simple 
manner,  by  bilateral  agreements.  But  community  enforce- 
ment could  come  only  by  multi-party  combinations,  and 
in  its  full  sense  only  by  a  combination  of  substantially 
all  of  the  members  of  the  society  of  nations.  Moreover,  the 
processes  of  stating  and  adjudicating  international  rights, 
while  they  could  be  carried  on  in  an  elementary  way  without 
such  a  general  organization,  would  gain  greatly  in  the 
breadth  and  stability  of  their  foundation  and  in  their  in- 
fluence upon  international  life  by  being  performed  under 
the  auspices  of  a  general  international  league. 

For  this  there  are  highly  specific  reasons,  revealed  by 
the  history  of  international  relations  in  all  modern  times. 
Special  and  temporary  conferences  and  acts  of  adjudication 
must  be  replaced  with  general  and  continuous  conferences 
and  courts. 

Special  conferences  are  defective  in  two  ways.  They 
deal  only  with  one  or  more  limited  topics,  whereas  the 
actual  state  of  affairs  demands  attention  to  a  considerable 
range  of  questions  at  once.  In  modern  times  specific  prob- 
lems in  international  relations,  affecting  two  states  im- 
mediately, are  found,  upon  examination,  to  ramify  into 
many  collateral  questions  and  to  affect  many  nations  at 
once.  Special  conferences  of  two  states  to  deal  with  limited 
questions  therefore  become  increasingly  inadequate.1 

In  the  same  manner,  temporary  conferences,  called  on 
the  spur  of  the  moment,  are  inadequate.  The  process  of 
international  life  is  continuous ;  the  process  of  international 
government  must  be  equally  continuous  to  be  effective. 
Disputes  arise  constantly,  and  if  no  conference  is  in  session 

1  When  it  was  proposed  to  call  a  conference  on  the  limitation  of  naval 
armaments  in  Washington  in  1921  attended  by  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  it  was  discovered  that  Pacific  problems  and 
land  armaments  would  also  have  to  be  taken  up  and  perhaps  the  status  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  that  Portugal,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  perhaps 
other  powers,  must  needs  be  invited.  New  York  Times,  September-October, 
1921,  especially  5  October,  1921,  p.  17. 


368  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

it  is  difficult  to  convene  one.  Moreover,  even  if  a  conference 
is  in  session  it  will  have  been  called  for  some  other  purpose 
and  will  not,  as  things  now  stand,  possess  any  jurisdiction 
over  the  new  dispute.  A  new  conference,  or  a  new  grant 
of  authority  to  the  old  one,  would  be  necessary  in  any 
case.  And  just  that  task  of  securing  a  conference  after 
the  dispute  has  arisen  is  the  most  difficult  task  of  present- 
day  diplomacy;  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  it  was 
failure  just  here  that  brought  war  in  1914.1 

The  position  is  the  same  regarding  arbitration.  It  is 
difficult  to  secure  agreement  to  arbitrate  after  the  dis- 
pute has  arisen,  because  of  the  state  of  feelings  aroused, 
because  the  disadvantage  of  losing  seems  more  vivid  when 
the  concrete  case  has  emerged,  and  because  at  least  one 
party  probably  has  reason  to  be  mistrustful  of  the  outcome. 
It  is  more  difficult  to  get  agreement  to  arbitrate  in  the 
future  all  cases  as  they  arise,  or  all  cases  of  a  certain  type. 
Likewise,  it  has  been  more  difficult  still  to  secure  agreement 
to  a  standing  conference  which  shall  have  jurisdiction  over 
all  questions  arising  in  the  future  or  over  all  questions 
of  a  certain  type.  This  is  because  of  the  desire  to  preserve 
the  sovereign  independence  of  the  state  in  point  of  prin- 
ciple, to  the  amount  of  the  concrete  loss  which  might  be 
sustained  in  the  future  by  defeat  in  the  deliberations  of 
the  conference,  and  also  to  the  fact  that  the  risk  of  defeat 
seems  great  in  advance.  But  in  both  cases  the  difficulty  of 
securing  consent  in  advance  to  conferences  and  courts  has 
resulted  in  a  more  fundamental  sense  from  the  fact  that  the 
question  has  been  studied  entirely  with  reference  to  speci- 
fic disputes,  actual  or  potential.  When  the  general  desira- 
bility of  conference  and  adjudication  in  place  of  war,  from 
sheer  practical  considerations  of  profit  and  loss,  is  realized, 
as  it  is  coming  to  be  realized  today,  the  demand  arises  for 

1  Above,  Chap.  XX;  it  may  also  be  noted  that  the  Peace  Conference  of 
Paris  haa  been  prolonged  into  1921  by  the  continued  meetings  of  the  Supreme 
Council. 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  369 

arrangements  prior  to  the  appearance  of  the  dispute, 
to  avoid  delay  and  possible  collapse  at  the  time  of  the 
crisis,  in  other  words,  for  continuous  courts  and  con- 
ferences. 

It  is  obvious  that  such  defects  can  be  cured  and  such 
remedies  provided  only  by  some  general  and  permanent 
international  organization.  At  whatever  point  the  prob- 
lem of  international  government  is  opened  for  examination, 
the  indications  all  point  in  one  direction,  toward  the  crea- 
tion of  a  permanent  world-wide  federation  of  states  for 
the  performance  of  the  minimum  services  of  definition,  ad- 
judication, and  enforcement  of  national  rights  in  interna- 
tional relations.  In  no  other  way  can  law  and  order,  peace 
and  justice,  be  secured. 

At  this  point  a  question  may  be  raised  which  refers  back 
to  an  earlier  stage  of  the  discussion  and  again  forward  to 
the  idea  of  the  enforcement  of  international  rights.  Stated 
very  simply,  the  question  runs  thus :  if  war  is  the  result  of 
the  use  of  armaments  by  nations,  would  not  a  destruction 
of  armaments,  would  not  disarmament,  pure  and  simple, 
bring  peace?  Stated  more  subtly,  it  is  asked  whether, 
seeing  that  great  armaments  lead  to  an  excessive  boldness 
and  to  excessive  demands  on  the  part  of  the  nations  pos- 
sessing them,  a  limitation  of  armaments  would  not  be  bene- 
ficial all  round.  This  view  is  usually  combined  with  the 
theoretical  attack  upon  war  as  such,  bitterly  criticizing  its 
alleged  utility,  and  representing  its  cost  and  its  sorrow  at 
their  maximum.  The  literature  of  the  peace  movement 
deals,  not  so  much  with  the  practical  methods  of  political 
engineering  which  may  be  taken  to  reduce  the  chances  of 
war,  as  with  the  beauty  of  peace  and  the  ugliness  of  war. 
A  reproduction  of  the  picture  "The  Spirit  of  '76"  is 
placed  beside  a  photograph  of  the  mutilated  and  gangrened 
face  and  jaws  of  a  wounded  soldier  and  the  title  "The 
Glory  of  War"  is  placed  under  the  two.1  To  such  an  atti- 

1  Crile,  Mechanistic  View  of  War  and  Peace,  100,  102. 


370  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tude  the  reply  is  direct:  peace  will  not  come  and  war  will 
not  disappear  by  wishing  it  so,  by  dwelling  on  the  beauty 
of  peace  and  the  horror  of  war.  More  effective  steps  must 
be  taken  than  mere  aspiration. 

The  second  question  is,  would  disarmament  or  limitation 
of  armament  be  effective  in  the  desired  direction?  Suppose 
that  the  nations  were  to  abandon  all  military  armaments  at 
a  stroke,  would  the  result  be  peace?  The  result  would,  on 
the  contrary,  be  the  outbreak  of  piracy  at  sea  and  disorders 
on  the  land  on  the  part  of  anti-social  individuals  and 
groups  with  which  the  community  would  be  impotent  to 
deal.  So  long  as  this  sort  of  violence  is  latent  in  society, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  such  a  complete  destruc- 
tion of  engines  of  violence  that  some  weapons — clubs, 
knives,  explosives — would  not  be  available,  or  that  persons 
ready  to  use  them  would  be  entirely  absent,  some  degree  of 
armament  for  the  protection  of  the  peaceful  and  orderly 
individual  members  of  society  is  essential.  Moreover, 
disarmament  would  be  most  difficult  to  carry  out  in  pre- 
cisely the  cases  of  those  most  likely  to  misuse  the  arms 
which  they  were  able  to  retain.  This  applies  among  indi- 
viduals in  society.  It  also  applies  among  the  nations.  Dis- 
armament would  be  most  difficult  to  obtain  from  imperial- 
istic powers.  The  result  is  that  any  attempt  at  disarma- 
ment must  hamper  the  better  elements  in  international 
society  in  dealing  with  the  worse  elements.  The  nations 
loving  peace  and  justice  would  thus  abandon  all  possible 
means  of  upholding  law  and  order  in  the  world.  Further- 
more, it  is  simply  impossible  at  the  present  time  to  secure  a 
general  consent  to  disarmament,  and  this  means  that  dis- 
armament, if  undertaken  at  all,  would  have  to  be  under- 
taken by  those  individual  nations  most  attached  to  the 
ideal  of  peace,  with  the  result  just  described. 

Even  these  more  enlightened  nations  are  not,  however, 
willing  to  take  such  a  step.  This,  perhaps,  is  due  in  part 
to  their  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of  peace 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  371 

and  order  in  the  world.  It  results,  more  specifically,  from 
their  unwillingness  to  put  themselves  at  the  mercy  of 
the  more  designing  ones,  and  this  brings  us  to  the  reason 
for  the  general  unwillingness  to  disarm.  That  reason  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  national  rights  are  still  ill-defined, 
that  no  sure  method  of  adjudication  upon  those  rights 
except  self-adjudication  is  available,  and  no  method  of  en- 
forcement but  self-enforcement.1  We  are  back  to  the  defi- 
ciencies of  international  government  as  the  chief  cause  of 
huge  armaments.  The  only  method  available  for  producing 
a  state  of  mind  in  the  nations  such  that  they  will  be  willing 
to  disarm  is  to  provide  them  with  a  system  for  securing 
definition,  application,  and  enforcement  of  their  rights 
without  arms.  It  need  not  be  pointed  out  again  that  this 
can  only  be  done  by  a  general  international  organization 
for  the  purpose. 

If  we  return  to  the  proposal  for  a  mere  limitation  of 
armaments,  the  same  conclusions  apply,  with  even  greater 
cogency.  The  amount  of  reduction  possible  would  depend 
upon  the  forces  needed  to  maintain  peace  and  order  on  the 
seas  and  in  civil  society.  The  amount  of  reduction  for 
each  power  would  have  to  be  carefully  calculated  in  order 
to  prevent  many  undesirable  possibilities.  Those  states 
most  willing  to  accept  limitations  would  be  precisely  the 
ones  which  should  not  be  asked  or  allowed  to  take  such 
action.  The  states  upon  which  the  most  severe  limitations 
should  be  placed  are  the  ones  which  it  would  be  most  diffi- 
cult to  persuade  to  accept  any  limitations  at  all.  Finally, 
these  facts  are  all  accentuated  because  the  deficiency  of  in- 
ternational government  is  felt,  not  in  defining  the  maximum 
size  of  forces  needed  to  preserve  domestic  peace,  a  matter 
in  which  the  peaceful  nation  needs  powers  as  great  as  any, 
but  in  deciding  upon  the  possibility  of  any  curtailment  at 

*See  the  reason  assigned  by  the  United  States  for  taking  up  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  questions  in  the  conference  on  limitation  of  armaments  in  the 
third  paragraph  of  the  official  invitation  of  Secretary  Hughes  to  this  confer- 
ence, 11  August,  1921,  in  New  York  Times,  12  August,  1921,  p.  1. 


372  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

all,  just  the  point  where  the  peaceful  nation  has  the  weakest 
case. 

What  is  probably  the  greatest  difficulty,  however,  would 
arise  after  it  is  agreed  to  accept  some  limitation  of  arma- 
ments. How  great  shall  the  reduction  be?  Shall  it  be 
the  same  for  all  states  f  How  shall  it  be  enforced  ?  If  the 
reduction  is  to  be  the  same  in  all  cases  it  must  be  less  than 
the  size  of  the  armament  of  that  one  of  the  present  powers 
whose  armament  is  smallest;  otherwise  some  state  will  be 
left  without  any  forces  for  preserving  domestic  peace.  In 
a  general  agreement  for  the  limitation  of  armaments  in- 
tended to  include  all  nations  this  procedure  would,  of 
course,  be  ridiculous  in  its  application  to  the  Great  Powers 
— another  evidence  of  the  unwholesome  effect  on  interna- 
tional relations  of  the  existence  of  inequality  among  the 
nations.  Evidently,  reductions  must  be  unequal  or  the  ac- 
tion must  be  confined  to  the  Great  Powers.  But  it  is  often 
the  smaller  powers  with  armaments  excessive  for  their 
size,  with  less  sense  of  responsibility,  which  precipitate 
international  conflict ;  they  are,  moreover,  among  the  states 
in  position  to  gain  most  by  the  saving  incident  to  limitation 
of  armaments.1  Hence  it  appears  that  the  proposed  reduc- 
tions may  have  to  be  unequal,  a  thing  hard  to  present  in 
an  acceptable  light  to  those  powers  now  in  a  position  of 
relative  supremacy  regarding  their  armed  strength. 

The  whole  matter  is,  moreover,  very  difficult  to  reduce 
to  exact  figures,  and,  of  course,  it  must  be  reduced  to  exact 
figures,  for  after  a  certain  stage  general  considerations 
are  of  absolutely  no  use.  Probably  the  only  sure  basis  for 
computing  the  armaments  needed  by  individual  powers  is 
the  force  needed  to  maintain  domestic  law  and  order.2 
Even  here  the  relative  state  of  society  in  one  nation  and 
another  makes  the  adoption  of  a  uniform  standard  im- 

1  See  debates  at  Second  Assembly  of  League  of  Nations  and  views  of 
France  and  Great  Britain;  New  York  Times,  3  October,  1921,  p.  1. 

1  This  is  also  the  conclusion  of  Col.  Vestal  in  his  work  on  the  Maintenance 
of  Peace,  end. 


possible,  though  the  experience  of  the  past  and  the  judg- 
ment of  those  responsible  for  the  performance  of  the  task 
are  substantial  foundations  to  build  on.1  All  of  this 
assumes — an  assumption  justified  with  difficulty  in  view 
of  the  facts — that  a  reliable  unit  of  computation  can  be 
found.  Perhaps  a  complex  unit  can  be  devised,  a  unit  made 
up  from  the  number  of  persons  in  the  armed  forces  of  a 
state,  the  number  and  caliber  of  arms  in  stock,  the  amount 
of  ammunition  on  hand,  the  number  and  tonnage  of  vessels 
in  commission,  and  other  factors. 

It  is  obviously  impossible  to  settle  such  questions  here. 
It  is  not  difficult,  however,  to  discover  the  truth  that  the 
very  complexity  of  the  problem  makes  a  certain  method  of 
procedure  inevitable.  Some  sort  of  a  conference  is  needed 
to  secure  the  primary  adoption  of  any  plan,  as  joint  action 
is  essential  in  the  nature  of  the  case.  Careful  conference 
is  necessary  for  the  selection  of  the  particular  plan  to  be 
utilized,  and  for  the  construction  or  selection  of  a  unit  of 
computation  to  be  employed.  Finally,  joint  administration 
and  enforcement  are  needed  if  the  plan  is  to  be  carried  out 
successfully.  Inevitable  ambiguities  which  will  develop  in 
the  process  of  execution  must  be  interpreted,  attempts  at 
evasion  must  be  detected,  and  the  whole  matter  must  be 
watched  over  from  the  very  beginning.  If  the  administra- 
tive experience  of  national  governments  in  similar  situa- 
tions is  any  guide,  partial  limitation  of  armaments  would 
need  such  supervision  even  more  than  complete  disarma- 
ment because  it  would  be  more  complicated  and  easier  to 
evade.2  Moreover,  the  work  would  never  be  entirely  com- 
pleted and  such  supervision  would  have  to  be  maintained 
permanently.  If  any  changes  were  to  be  made  in  the 
ratios  of  reduction,  if  any  further  progress  in  limitation  of 
armaments  were  desirable  and  feasible,  they  could  only 

1See  the  fixing  of  such  figures  for  Germany  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
Arts.  159-213. 

'  Hall,  Constitutional  Law,  §  169. 


374 

be  had  by  the  same  process  of  conference  and  cooperation 
which  was  necessary  at  first.  And  it  does  not  need  to  be 
repeated  that  for  the  limitation,  as  for  the  abandonment, 
of  armaments,  a  definition  of  national  rights  is  essential  to 
prepare  the  ground,  and  that  such  a  result  can  only  be 
had  by  conference.  Moreover,  when  we  reflect  that  some 
joint  enforcement  of  international  rights  would,  on  the  one 
hand,  be  necessary  to  secure  any  consent  to  a  limitation  of 
national  armaments  for  national  use,  and  that  it  would, 
on  the  other  hand,  mean  military  cooperation  for  this  pur- 
pose, it  is  not  wholly  fanciful  to  say  that,  when  worked 
out  in  actual  practice,  national  disarmament  really  becomes 
a  pooling  of  armaments,  or  the  internationalization  of  arma- 
ments. 

It  may  appear  that  the  subject  has  been  argued  over 
much.  If  so,  it  will  be  useful  to  note,  on  one  side,  that  peace 
is  desired  by  the  peoples  today  as  never  before,  that  dis- 
armament is  demanded  as  never  before  in  modern  times, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  nationalism  and  resistance  to 
international  supervision  were  never  more  pronounced,  in 
spite  of  external  appearances  to  the  contrary.  The  situa- 
tion is  one  of  the  great  internal  conflicts  of  history:  the 
desire  for  international  peace  against  the  assertion  of 
national  power.  The  conflict  is  real,  and  a  choice  must  be 
made;  either  common  peace  or  individual  power  may  be 
enjoyed,  not  both. 

The  discussion  of  the  proposals  for  disarmament  has, 
however,  thrown  the  emphasis  where  it  does  not  belong. 
The  principal  conclusion  to  be  drawn  in  this  chapter  has 
been  stated  already,  namely,  that  permanent  peace  is,  in 
its  essence,  and  depends  for  its  existence  upon,  the  defini- 
tion and  satisfaction  of  national  rights  through  common 
international  action  by  the  creation  of  an  international 
organization  to  perform  the  functions  of  legislation,  adjudi- 
cation, administration,  and  enforcement  on  behalf  of  all 
members  of  the  society  of  nations.  That  such  a  step  would 


PEACE  AND  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  375 

also  be  essential  for  the  successful  working  of  any  plan 
for  partial  disarmament  is  collateral  evidence  of  the  sound- 
ness of  this  conclusion.  If  space  permitted  it  would  be 
simple  to  demonstrate  that  the  attempt  made  so  earnestly 
during  the  years  1860-1910  to  mitigate  the  severity  of  war 
and  restrict  its  incidence  was  largely  unsuccessful  because 
it  needed  for  its  success  precisely  the  method  of  procedure 
described  for  the  effective  limitation  of  armaments  and 
was  deprived  of  that  procedure.  That  movement  sometimes 
received  the  scorn  of  the  pacifists  who  declared  that  war 
could  not  be  tamed  but  must  be  destroyed.  This  resulted 
partly  from  their  desire  to  accomplish  the  greater  good 
and  partly  from  a  reluctance  to  take  the  procedural  steps 
necessary  to  the  end  in  view.  This  reluctance,  further,  was 
dictated  somewhat  by  temperament,  but  also  by  an  un- 
willingness to  be  mixed  up  in  international  politics  which 
was  quite  innocent  and  understandable  in  many  ways  but 
wholly  irreconcilable  with  the  end  in  view.  Nothing  is  more 
ridiculously  inept  than  the  combination  of  pacifism  or  oppo- 
sition to  war  and  national  armaments,  on  one  side,  and 
a  refusal  to  participate  in  international  cooperation  on  the 
other.  And,  while  international  organization  and  interna- 
tional order  probably  will  come  as  a  result  both  of  the  nega- 
tive movement  for  disarmament  and  peace  and  the  affirma- 
tive movement  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  war  by  settling 
international  disputes  likely  to  lead  to  war,  it  will  certainly 
not  come  solely  from  the  efforts  to  secure  disarmament  or 
restrict  war  on  the  part  of  those  who  dwell  on  the  beauties 
of  peace  and  the  horror  of  war  without  provision  for  prac- 
tical conference  and  cooperation  for  that  end. 


PAET  VH 
INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  JURISTIC  THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION 

UP  to  this  point  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  way 
in  which  the  modern  state-system  has  been  formed, 
to  its  nature,  and  to  six  special  forms  of  international 
organization,  namely,  diplomacy,  treaty-negotiation,  inter- 
national law,  arbitration,  international  administration,  and 
international  conferences.  Some  attention  has  been  given 
to  the  relations  which  exist  among  different  members  of 
this  series,  as,  for  example,  between  treaty-negotiation  and 
international  administration.  But  it  has  been  found  that, 
except  by  the  accidents  of  history,  or  by  virtue  of  the  way  in 
which  they  are  employed,  these  practices  are  not  coordi- 
nated into  any  one  system  of  international  government. 
They  are,  indeed,  coordinated  and  employed  by  the  foreign 
offices  of  individual  nations  as  one  body  of  diplomatic 
practice,  capable  of  serving  the  national  interests.  When 
so  used,  however,  they  constitute  an  arm  of  national  ser- 
vice, not  a  system  of  international  government.  Only  by 
deliberately  assuming  the  world  point  of  view  can  they  be 
so  regarded. 

To  gather  these  activities  together  into  one  system  of 
international  government  is,  therefore,  the  first  step  for- 
ward. To  do  this  it  is  necessary  to  gather  the  national 
states  upon  which  these  practices  at  present  rest  into  one 
federal  system  and  thereby  unify  the  activities  of  these 
states  in  their  relations  one  with  another.  This  is  inter- 
national organization,  in  the  most  precise  and  significant 

379 


380  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

meaning  of  that  phrase.  This  is  the  final  step  in  the 
process  of  creating  international  government. 

Such  a  step,  however,  raises  the  fundamental  question  of 
the  nature  of  the  national  state  and  of  the  juristic  nature 
of  the  relations  among  the  national  states  today.  It  brings 
us  in  touch  with  the  most  difficult  problem  in  international 
organization,  namely,  the  reconciliation  of  international 
organization  with  national  sovereignty.  To  that  problem 
we  now  turn.1 

Much  effort  is  being  expended  today  in  attempting  to 
evade  or  circumvent  the  classical  doctrine  regarding  the 
sovereignty  of  the  state.  These  efforts  are  being  put  forth, 
first,  by  those  persons  who  desire  to  curb  the  state  in  its 
relations  with  individual  citizens  and  groups  of  citizens 
within  the  state,  and  who  are  impatient  with  severe  theory 
at  any  point  and  feel  that  all  rigid  and  simple  doctrines  in 
political  science  belie  the  rich  complexity  of  lif  e.  Such  are 
the  pluralists  in  the  political  philosophy  of  constitutional 
government.  These  efforts  are  also  being  made  by  people 
who  desire  to  curb  the  state  in  its  relations  with  other 
states,  and  who  believe  that  the  classical  doctrine  is  unten- 
able in  view  of  actual  practice  and  the  facts  of  contem- 
porary world  relations.  Such  are  the  internationalists 
and  the  pacifists  of  all  types,  emotional  or  scientific,  prac- 
tical or  theoretical. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  all  this  expenditure  of  energy 
is  entirely  justified.  The  classical  doctrine  of  state  sover- 
eignty must  either  be  met  directly  and  those  who  hold  it 
satisfied  by  direct  replies,  or  the  theory  must  be  simply 
ignored.  If  it  is  mentioned  at  all  in  relation  to  international 
federation,  it  must  be  given  an  adequate  hearing;  to  men- 
tion it  only  to  evade  the  issue  is  worse  than  to  ignore  it 
entirely. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  the  issue  cannot  safely  be 

1  On  juristic  theory  of  international  federation  see  literature  cited,  below, 
Appendix  B,  §  23. 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION   381 

ignored.  For  practical  political  reasons  this  is  impossible 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  those  in  power  in  all  the  leading 
states  of  the  world  adhere  to  the  orthodox  theory  and  are 
supported  in  their  position  by  the  peoples  of  those  states. 
In  the  immediate  future,  at  least,  the  idea  of  national  sover- 
eignty will  not  be  scrapped  and  must  be  met  by  anyone  who 
proposes  to  create  an  international  federation.  Among 
European  states  at  the  present  time  the  need  for  such  a 
federation  is  so  great,  and  is  felt  so  keenly,  and  the  influence 
of  abstract  forms  of  political  theory  in  everyday  govern- 
mental life  is  so  weakened  by  the  practice  of  parliamentary 
government,  that  not  much  is  said  or  heard  regarding  state 
sovereignty  as  an  obstacle  to  international  organization. 
In  Asia  and  Africa,  and  Latin  America  likewise,  the  issue 
is  not  sharply  raised.  But  in  the  United  States  the  issue  is 
sharply  raised  and  must  be  met,  whether  the  reasons  for 
raising  it  have  been  sincere  or  insincere,  flowing  from  par- 
tisan politics  or  from  patriotic  solicitude  for  the  national 
welfare.  Moreover,  the  issue,  so  long  as  it  is  not  definitely 
settled,  might  be  raised  by  politicians  elsewhere  whenever 
the  tactics  of  the  diplomatic  battle  demanded  it. 

Evasion  is  the  less  justifiable  when  the  path  of  direct 
attack  seems  plain.  It  does  not  appear  to  be  at  all  impos- 
sible to  reconcile  the  concepts  of  international  federation, 
international  federal  government,  world  government, 
world  state,  super-state — making  the  concept  as  strong  as 
possible — with  the  concept  of  state  sovereignty,  as  long  as 
wre  keep  scrupulously  in  mind  the  exact  steps  in  the  process 
of  creating  such  an  international  federation  or  world  state. 

It  will  be  profitable  to  begin  by  reverting  to  the  most 
elementary  stages  in  the  development  of  international  or- 
ganization, the  stages  of  personal  diplomacy  and  the  nego- 
tiation of  treaties.  In  those  early  phases  two  or  more 
states,  none  of  which  owe  any  degree  of  allegiance  one  to 
another  or  to  any  state  or  body  of  states,  enter  into  a  prac- 
tice of  discussing  matters  of  common  interest  through  the 


382  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

medium  of  personal  agents.  Disputes  are  settled  and  ar- 
rangements made  for  the  future  by  voluntary  agreements 
recorded  in  more  or  less  formal  diplomatic  documents,  the 
most  formal  of  which  is  the  treaty  proper.  Such  agree- 
ments derive  their  authority  from  the  voluntary  participa- 
tion of  the  two  or  more  states  entering  into  them. 

These  elementary  proceedings  are  not  felt  to  constitute 
a  violation  of  state  sovereignty,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  they  are  entered  into  continually  by  states  which  at  the 
same  time  do  not  concede  any  loss  of  sovereignty  and  are 
not  regarded  by  others  as  having  suffered  such  loss.  And 
rightly  so.  The  action  of  making  a  diplomatic  agreement  or 
concluding  a  treaty  is  sometimes  described  as  the  accept- 
ance of  a  self-imposed  limitation  upon  sovereignty.  No 
state  may  dictate  the  terms  of  a  settlement  or  a  treaty  to 
another,  and  consent  alone  can  create  a  binding  diplomatic 
agreement.  The  treaty  is,  therefore,  certainly  not  more 
than  a  self-imposed  limitation.  It  is,  indeed,  only  partially 
that.  It  is  at  least  as  much  a  positive  action  of  sovereignty 
in  asserting  a  demand  and  securing  recognition  of  it.  If 
the  act  be  regarded  as  a  unit,  it  must  be  considered  an  act 
of  self-expression  or  self-direction  as  much  as  an  act  of 
self -limitation.  The  very  common  rule  that  only  independ- 
ent sovereign  states  may  conclude  treaties  may  be  men- 
tioned in  partial  confirmation  of  the  tacit  acceptance  of 
this  position  in  international  law.1 

The  case  of  the  state  "compelled"  to  accept  a  treaty 
"by  force"  has  already  been  discussed.2  Here,  as  in  all 
similar  situations  in  human  affairs  where  it  is  said  that  we 
do  not  wish  to  do  a  certain  thing  but  that  we  must,  what 
we  really  mean  is  that  we  would  not  wish  to  do  a  certain 
thing  if  things  were  not  as  they  are,  but  that,  things  being 
as  they  are,  we  do,  after  all,  prefer  to  sign  on  the  dotted 
line.  We  have  a  choice  which  any  reasonable  person,  living 

1  Hall,  §  108. 

*  Above,  Chap.  X. 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION    383 

under  the  common  conditions  of  human  life,  would,  indeed, 
decide  in  only  one  way,  but  his  decision  would  be  needed  to 
make  the  choice;  if  conditions  varied  from  the  normal  the 
decision  also  would  vary.  The  freedom  of  consent  is  there 
in  ample  degree  to  satisfy  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty. 

When  the  treaty  has  been  concluded,  however,  and  after 
it  has  continued  in  operation  for  some  time,  the  situation 
appears,  superficially,  to  have  changed.  When  a  state  is 
held  to  performance  of  a  treaty  obligation  incurred  twenty 
or  thirty  years  before,  it  appears — to  that  state,  and  to  some 
presumably  disinterested  students  of  the  matter — that 
state  sovereignty  has  been  lost. 

To  such  a  conclusion  there  are  several  replies. 

First,  as  in  the  initial  negotiation  of  the  treaty,  so 
here,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  all  states  come  to  stand,  in  the 
course  of  events,  in  precisely  this  position,  and  yet  their 
public  representatives  do  not  consider  that  they  have  lost 
their  sovereignty,  nor  are  they  considered  by  the  public 
officials  of  other  states  to  have  suffered  such  impairment. 
This  certainly  proves  that  such  a  conclusion  is  not  war- 
ranted in  the  minds  of  the  high  priests  of  state  sovereignty 
themselves. 

Again,  it  is  to  the  source  and  creation  of  the  current 
obligation  that  we  must  look,  not  to  its  incidence.  The 
obligation  flows,  and  can  only  flow,  from  the  original  act  of 
consent  of  the  state;  it  can  be  traced  to  no  other  state  or 
body  of  states.  This,  by  itself,  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
doctrine  of  sovereignty.  The  state  may  appear  to  be  bound 
to  act  against  its  present  will ;  if  so,  it  is  a  case  of  one  act  of 
the  state 's  own  will,  made  at  a  previous  point  in  time,  over- 
riding a  later  act  of  will,  and  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty 
certainly  does  not  pretend  to  bar  such  a  process  within  the 
area  of  operations  of  the  will  of  a  single  state. 

Third,  it  is  not  even  accurate  to  say  that  a  state  is  bound 
against  its  present  will.  What  happens  is  that  the  state 
acts  upon  the  dictates  of  a  general  policy,  rather  than 


384  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

those  of  a  specific  policy.  It  wills  to  act  to  uphold  the  sanc- 
tity of  treaties,  rather  than  to  express  a  policy  of  commer- 
cial discriminations.  Or  it  acts  upon  the  will  to  preserve 
the  friendship  of  the  cosignatory  party,  or  the  will  to  secure 
advantages  corresponding  to  the  concessions  rendered,  or 
upon  some  similar  ground.  Again,  it  is  one  act  of  the 
state's  own  will  overriding  another;  but  both  are  acts  of 
will  of  the  same  state. 

Finally,  although  this  it  not  essential  to  the  validity  of 
our  conclusion,  the  state  is  not  bound  by  its  original  act  of 
consent  except  in  so  far  as  the  conditions  which  led  to  that 
original  consent  persist  and  thereby  justify  the  assumption 
that  that  act  of  consent  is  continued.  In  so  far  as  conditions 
change  and  render  the  arrangement  unjust,  there  arises  a 
right  of  denunciation  for  the  state  suffering  from  the  effect 
of  the  alteration  of  circumstances,  apart  from  any  explicit 
provision  in  the  treaty  for  denunciation  upon  notice.  Such 
action  may  precipitate  a  discussion  of  the  question  of  fact 
as  to  whether  this  principle  of  rebus  sic  stantibus  is  really 
applicable,  that  is,  whether  conditions  have,  in  point  of 
fact,  so  changed  as  to  render  denunciation  permissible,  but 
that  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  principle.  Indeed, 
the  principle  is  so  firmly  established  that  the  effect  is  rather 
to  weaken  unduly  the  obligation  of  treaties ;  there  certainly 
is  no  room  for  a  contention  that  sovereignty  is  lost  by  the 
conclusion  of  a  binding  treaty.1 

Suppose,  however,  that  conditions  have  not  changed, 
yet  one  of  the  states  party  to  the  treaty  desires  to  denounce 
the  treaty,  and,  not  acting  upon  any  higher  will  of  this  or 
any  previous  period  (such  as  a  provision  in  the  treaty  for 
denunciation  on  notice,  or  a  new  agreement  to  supersede 
the  treaty  in  question),  denounces  the  treaty  or  proclaims 
that  national  safety  compels  it  to  disregard  its  obligations 
under  the  treaty.  What  is  to  be  said  in  such  circumstances  ! 

For  one  thing,  whatever  else  is  true,  the  state  in  question 

1  On  the  rule  of  rebus  sic  stantibus  see  Moore,  Digest,  §  772. 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  385 

has  not  lost  its  sovereignty.  It  may  be  claimed  that  the 
state  had  no  right  to  act  in  such  a  manner,  and  this  is 
true,  for  reasons  soon  to  appear.  The  action  does  not, 
however,  evidence  any  greater  limitation  upon  sovereignty 
than  the  actions  already  examined — which  was  none  at  all; 
for  action  in  excess  of  one's  own  legal  rights  is  certainly 
no  greater  evidence  of  loss  of  sovereignty  than  action  in  ac- 
cordance with  those  rights.  In  reality,  both  are  irrelevant 
to  the  existence  of  the  rights  or  their  absence. 

The  state  whose  rights  under  the  treaty  have  been  de- 
nied is  in  a  different  position.  Without  action  and  without 
consent  on  its  part,  its  rights  are  denied  satisfaction.  The 
important  point,  however,  is  that  they  are  not  destroyed. 
In  many  cases  this  may  even  be  admitted  by  the  state  refus- 
ing to  carry  out  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  or,  at  all  events,  not 
explicitly  denied;  the  principal  point  of  the  recalcitrant 
state  in  the  situation  now  under  discussion  is  that,  although 
it  is  under  certain  legal  obligations,  it  cannot  safely  per- 
form them.  If  it  did  not,  at  least  by  inference,  admit  the 
validity  of  the  obligations,  there  would  be  no  cause  for 
taking  the  position  described.  In  any  event,  the  rights 
which  are  unsatisfied  remain  intact,  and  if  they  cannot  at 
present  be  enjoyed  or  exercised,  this  is  due  to  a  deficiency 
of  international  government,  not  of  legal  right.  It  is  not 
sovereignty  and  legal  rights,  but  courts  and  executives  for 
the  enforcement  of  those  rights,  that  are  inadequate. 

If,  now,  we  turn  to  the  third  and  succeeding  stages  in  the 
development  of  international  organization  these  conclusions 
will  be  applicable  to  the  end. 

From  diplomatic  settlements  and  treaties  at  large  cus- 
tomary or  common  international  law  was  steadily  developed 
by  the  states  of  Western  Europe  in  the  years  after  1648, 
and  this  law  has  been  extended  to  America,  Asia,  and  Africa 
in  more  recent  times.  This  common  international  law  is 
held  to  be  binding  upon  the  individual  state.  Is  this  not  a 
loss  of  sovereignty? 


386  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Once  more  the  test  of  usage  is  to  be  applied.  The  states, 
or  those  in  a  place  to  speak  for  them,  while  recognizing  the 
binding  force  of  common  international  law,  do  not  admit  a 
loss  of  sovereignty  thereby.  Nay,  they  do  not  even  suggest 
that  there  might  be  any  such  result.  Sovereignty  does  not 
preclude  subjection  to  law.  It  precludes  only  subjection  to 
law  made  by  another,  to  law  dictated  from  an  external 
source,  subjection  to  the  will  of  another. 

Such  subjection  is  not  present  in  common  interna- 
tional law.  That  law  is  based  upon  the  consent  of  the 
members  of  the  society  of  nations  as  evidenced  by  the  diplo- 
matic records,  treaties,  arbitral  decisions,  and  so  on,  which 
they  have  left  behind.1  Even  national  judicial  decisions — in 
cases  in  prize,  admiralty,  criminal,  civil,  and  constitutional 
law — and  also  national  diplomatic  and  legal  instructions 
and  opinions,  are  valuable  as  showing  the  consent  or  agree- 
ment yielded  by  the  states  to  various  rules  of  the  law. 

When  a  rule  which  has  received  the  specific  consent  of 
a  certain  state  is  invoked  against  that  state,  the  case  is, 
therefore,  entirely  simple ;  the  binding  force  of  the  rule  is  in 
the  prior  consent,  and  no  sovereignty  is  impaired.  Suppose, 
however,  that  a  commonly  accepted  rule  is  invoked  against 
a  state  which  has  not  specifically  consented  to  it  or  has 
definitely  repudiated  it. 

In  the  first  alternative,  the  rule  is  binding  and  derives 
its  binding  effect  from  the  action  of  the  state  in  joining  the 
society  of  nations.  The  state  sought,  received,  and  accepted 
admission  into  that  international  community  under  the 
commonly  accepted  standards  of  admission.  One  of  these  is 
responsibility  under  common  international  law  to  the  other 
members  of  the  community  of  nations.  The  new  state  is 
now  bound  by  that  law  as  a  result  of  its  own  conscious  as- 
sumption of  the  obligation  covering  all  the  commonly  ac- 
cepted rules  of  the  law. 

In  the  second  alternative,  the  rule  is  also  binding.    The 

1  The  Antelope,  1825,  23  U.S.  66,  120-122. 


reasoning  is  the  same  as  in  the  previous  case  up  to  the 
point  where  the  state  in  question  attempts  to  repudiate  the 
rule.  If  the  state  had  simply  refused  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  rule,  while  not  denying  its  binding  force,  nothing 
would  be  proved  one  way  or  another,  as  was  seen  in  the  case 
of  the  treaty  whose  terms  were  defied  by  a  signatory  party. 
If,  however,  the  state  yields  "unwilling"  obedience  to  the 
rule,  while  denying  its  legal  validity,  the  case  is  on  a  par 
with  that  of  the  treaty  obeyed  under  similar  circumstances. 
If  we  agree  with  the  state's  own  contention  that  the  rule  is 
not  binding,  no  problem  of  loss  of  sovereignty  is,  of  course, 
left.  If  we  deny  that  contention,  our  denial  will  be  based 
upon  the  reasoning  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  If  we 
attend  simply  to  the  action  of  the  state  alone,  it  might 
appear  at  first  that  we  have  "unwilling  obedience,"  a 
supposedly  sovereign  state  constrained  to  act  against  its 
will.  The  reality  of  the  matter  is  that  the  state  does  desire, 
does  will,  to  obey  the  rule — in  order  either  to  keep  in  line  on 
the  general  issue  of  obedience  to  international  law  or  to 
avoid  retaliation  or  for  other  purposes.  This  is  not  a 
"fiction"  as  it  has  been  called;  the  fiction  is  the  "unwilling- 
ness ' '  which  in  fact  does  not  prevent  the  action.  Obedience 
proves  consent;  action  is  more  decisive  evidence  than  pro- 
testation. 

It  ought  not  to  be  overlooked  that  the  idea  that  a  state 
is  "compelled"  to  do  a  given  thing  is  susceptible  of  in- 
finite variation  to  suit  the  needs  of  the  moment.  In  the 
simplest  situation  confronting  a  state,  where  an  opportunity 
is  presented  to  the  state  to  secure  a  great  advantage  at  little 
cost,  the  diplomats  will  often  say  "we  were  compelled  to 
take  advantage  of  the  opportunity,"  or  "we  were  compelled 
to  act  quickly,"  or  something  of  the  same  sort.  The  com- 
pulsion in  such  cases  is  not  fanciful.  It  is  just  as  real  as  the 
compulsion  bearing  upon  an  individual  to  protect  himself 
from  the  rain,  a  compulsion  to  act  for  one 's  best  interests. 
But  it  does  not  derive  from  any  particular  outside  human 


388  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

source;  it  derives  from  the  general  posture  of  affairs, 
human,  political,  or  natural  and  non-political,  and,  more 
specifically,  from  the  reaction  of  the  individual  or  state  to 
that  situation.  The  same  is  true  when  "we  are  compelled" 
becomes  an  excuse  for  demanding  what  is  expected  to  be 
an  unwelcome  act,  as  when  a  state  says:  "We  are  com- 
pelled to  insist  upon  satisfaction  of  our  claims."  The 
reality  is  that  we  will  to  do  thus  and  so,  and  we  hope  you 
will  appreciate  the  reasons  why  and  will  yield  gracefully. 

In  like  manner,  the  effort  to  get  back  of  a  prior  act  of 
consent  is  often  real,  sincere,  and  deserving  of  respect. 
But  it  does  not  affect  our  argument.  A  state  may  wish  that 
it  had  not  become  party  to  a  certain  prior  agreement,  and 
may  be  unable  to  get  out  of  it.  That  means  only  that  acts 
of  will  are  often  the  result  of  poor  judgment  or  ignorance 
and  that,  nevertheless,  the  hands  of  the  clock  cannot  be 
turned  back.  The  binding  force  and  the  unwelcome  effect 
is  in  the  march  of  events  and  in  the  part  in  that  process 
played  by  this  state  as  the  result  of  a  decision  made  some 
time  ago,  not  in  the  will  of  the  other  state  which  is  now  in 
position  to  profit  by  present  conditions.  The  doctrine  of 
sovereignty  does  not  pretend  to  stay  the  march  of  time. 

"When  international  arbitration  and  administration  and 
conference  are  reached  the  process  becomes  still  more  com- 
plicated, yet  it  is  no  less  clear.  Let  us  state  the  conclusions 
briefly  for  each  of  these  forms  of  international  government 
in  turn. 

Where  two  or  more  states  agree  to  submit  a  dispute  to 
arbitration  and  to  abide  by  the  result,  the  result  is  binding 
because  of  the  original  agreement.1 

Where  two  or  more  states  agree  to  create  an  administra- 
tive commission  and  to  abide  by  its  actions,  in  practice  the 
binding  force  of  the  subsequent  action  of  the  commission 
derives  from  the  original  convention  creating  the  commis- 
sion and  giving  it  authority. 

lThe  La  Ninfa,  1896,  75  Federal  Reporter,  513:  "The  award  is  to  be 
construed  as  a  treaty  which  has  become  final." 


THEOEY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION    389 

Where  two  or  more  states  agree  to  a  conference  wherein 
decisions  shall  be  taken  by  majority  vote,  the  binding  force 
of  the  decisions  taken  flows  indirectly  from  the  original 
agreement. 

In  no  instance  is  there  any  loss  of  sovereignty.  These 
cases  are  vivid  because  of  the  fact  that  the  representa- 
tives of  a  given  state  may  vote  openly  for  one  thing  and 
the  arbitral  decision,  the  administrative  ruling,  or  the 
settlement  actually  reached  by  the  conference,  may  be  ex- 
actly the  opposite.  The  state  is  then  bound,  not  in  the 
absence  of  any  expression  of  will,  but,  apparently,  in  spite 
of  a  clear  expression  of  will.  Yet  there  is  no  loss  of  sover- 
eignty, for  the  binding  force  of  the  decision  flows  not  from 
any  legal  authority  inhering  in  the  wishes  of  the  majority 
by  virtue  of  its  own  existence,  but  in  the  agreement  origi- 
nally made  to  use  the  device  of  the  majority  vote  to  decide 
questions  in  the  court,  the  commission,  or  the  conference. 
Without  such  agreement,  the  majority  vote  would  have  no 
value.  Given  that  agreement,  the  majority  vote  takes  on 
a  value  it  would  not  otherwise  have.  The  clear  expression 
of  the  present  will  of  this  state  must  be  checked  up  against 
the  equally  clear  expression  in  the  past  of  a  general  will 
still  operative  in  the  present  case. 

If  all  this  be  true,  there  is  no  obstacle  in  national  sov- 
ereignty to  the  creation  of  an  international  federation  with 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  functions,  for  that  re- 
sult would  be  obtained  by  merely  gathering  together  into 
one  system  the  various  organs  or  institutions  of  interna- 
tional government  already  existing  on  independent  founda- 
tions. To  effect  this  integration  is,  indeed,  the  immediate 
end  for  which  an  international  league  is  desirable  today. 
From  this  action  to  the  extension  of  the  machinery  and  the 
powers  of  the  league  to  any  desired  extent  by  the  creation 
of  new  organs  of  government  and  the  delegation  of  new 
powers  to  these  new  organs  or  to  organs  already  in  exist- 
ence, is  merely  a  matter  of  quantitative  expansion.  So  long 


390  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

as  the  process  of  expansion  and  intensification  goes  on  by 
means  of  the  original  form  of  action,  the  consent  by  all 
members  of  the  league,  the  power  of  the  league  may  be  in- 
creased indefinitely  without  violating  the  sovereignty  of 
any  state.  By  what  may  be  called  the  doctrine  of  the  orig- 
inal agreement,  we  may  reconcile  national  sovereignty  and 
the  world  state.  If  this  appears  to  reduce  sovereignty  to 
a  vassal  condition,  if  it  appears  to  amount  to  the  subjuga- 
tion of  sovereignty,  the  phenomenon  is  startling  only  be- 
cause of  a  common  neglect  to  observe  the  things  which 
sovereignty  may,  and  often  does,  do  with  or  to  itself,  and 
because  of  failure  to  realize  that  what  we  have  here  is 
merely  a  case  of  sovereign  power  acting  upon  itself. 

At  this  point  three  supplementary  questions  will  natu- 
rally be  raised,  and  all  deserve  attention.  First,  have  we 
not  committed  ourselves  to  the  principle  of  unanimity,  and 
is  that  not  an  almost  un surmountable  handicap  to  effective 
international  federal  government  f  Second,  why  is  this  con- 
cession necessary?  Finally,  is  the  doctrine  of  original 
agreement  powerful  enough  to  support  the  creation  of  a 
fixed  or  perpetual  union? 

The  necessity  for  unanimity  lies  in  the  fact  that,  in  their 
original  condition,  states  stand  toward  each  other  in  a 
state  of  entire  independence.  In  the  absence  of  any  agree- 
ment among  them,  no  state  has  any  right  or  jurisdiction 
over  another.  There  are  no  natural  grounds  of  superiority 
or  supremacy  giving  any  state  the  right  to  lay  down  the 
law  for  another.  This  condition  is  often  described  by 
saying  that  all  states  are  equal,  and  in  this  sense  the  prin- 
ciple is  sound,  and  has  received  universal  assent.1  It  may 
be  maintained  that  there  is  a  common  bond  of  humanity 
and  natural  justice  connecting  the  states  of  the  world.  It 
may  also  be  argued  that  reasons  of  natural  justice  imply 
or  demand  the  supremacy  of  greater  and  more  advanced 

1  Classical  statement  by  Marshall,  in  The  Antelope,  as  cit«d :  "No  prin- 
ciple of  general  law  is  more  universally  acknowledged  than  the  perfect  equality 
of  nations.  Russia  and  Geneva  have  equal  rights.  It  results  from  this  equality 
that  no  one  can  rightfully  impose  a  rule  on  another." 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  391 

nations  over  lesser  and  backward  ones.  It  is  still  true  that 
until  the  principles  of  that  natural  justice  are  recognized 
and  defined  by  agreement  among  the  states,  it  can  have 
no  effective  contact  with  human  affairs,  no  binding  force 
upon  international  relations ;  and  in  this  process  of  defining 
natural  justice,  and  until  it  is  defined,  no  state  has  any 
particular  ground  for  jurisdiction  over  another. 

This  means,  indeed,  that  the  initial  establishment  of 
any  international  government,  and  the  initial  creation  of 
any  bonds  of  authority  among  the  nations,  demands  unani- 
mous consent,  and  that  any  international  federation  must 
lack  all  jurisdiction  over  the  nations  which  do  not  partici- 
pate in  its  formation.1  This  is  unescapable,  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  whether  it  be  bad  or  good.  It  may  also  be 
suggested  that  too  much  impatience  is  at  times  manifested 
in  this  connection  by  persons  who  desire  to  make  headway 
quickly,  without  being  required  to  secure  from  all  concerned 
consent  for  the  schemes  or  actions  which  they  propose. 
The  real  trouble  is  not  so  much  in  the  unanimity  rule  as  in 
the  inability  or  unwillingness  of  the  peoples  to  come  to 
accord  on  subjects  of  common  interest.  In  other  walks  of 
life  much  "unanimous  consent  business"  is  carried  along 
successfully.  Unanimous  consent  at  the  initial  stage  is 
neither  an  unreasonable  nor  an  impossible  requirement. 

Where  the  need  for  unanimity  is  an  intolerable  burden 
is  in  the  later  operation  of  international  government,  in  its 
application  to  concrete  questions.  But  the  necessity  for  an 
initial  unanimity  does  not  involve  a  like  necessity  beyond 
that  point.  There  is  no  reason  in  law  or  jurisprudence  why 
the  members  of  a  group  of  states  should  not  provide  by 
original  agreement  for  the  operation  of  any  organs  of  the 
federation  which  they  are  in  the  act  of  creating  by  three- 
fourths  votes,  two-thirds  votes,  or  simply  majority  votes.2 
Thereafter  the  decisions  of  the  league  need  not  be  unani- 

1  Compare  Covenant  of  League  of  Nations,  Art.  XXVI,  below,  Appendix 
A,  Document  No.  15. 

2  Examples  of  such  procedure  in  Sayre,  155-157. 


392  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

mous;  yet  all  members  will  be  bound  thereby,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  no  violation  of  state  sovereignty  will  take  place, 
because  of  the  continuing  effect  of  the  original  agreement, 
which  is  an  integral  element  in  the  authority  of  each  sub- 
sequent decision. 

Suppose,  however,  that  the  federal  agreement  is  made 
for  an  indefinite  period,  and  that  no  method  is  provided 
for  withdrawal  from  the  league  or  for  amendment  of  its 
terms.  Does  not  this  result  in  a  loss  of  sovereignty  by  the 
member  states  ? * 

To  this  there  are  many  replies. 

In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  observed  that  many  simple 
treaties  have  been  concluded  in  the  past  without  any  pro- 
vision for  a  definite  period  of  operation  and  without  any 
provisions  for  withdrawal  or  denunciation.2  Yet  they  have 
not  usually  been  regarded  as  involving  a  loss  of  sovereignty. 

In  the  second  place,  we  must  not  forget  that  such  trea- 
ties are  susceptible  of  denunciation  by  the  principle  of  al- 
tered circumstances,  and  there  is  no  juristic  reason  why  that 
process  could  not  justifiably  be  applied  to  a  treaty  creating 
a  federal  league.3  If  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
had  been  solely  a  treaty  among  states,  acting  in  that  capac- 
ity, denunciation  or  secession  would  have  been  juristically 
feasible.  It  was  the  fact  that  the  Constitution  was  not 
solely  a  treaty  among  states,  but  also  a  fundamental  law 
resting  upon  the  action  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
as  a  unit, — in  other  words,  it  was  the  unitary  element  in  the 
foundation  of  the  Constitution, — which  placed  that  instru- 
ment beyond  the  action  of  single  states.4 

1  Hall,  §  4 ;  note  that  Hall  protects  his  statement  by  stipulating  that  the 
union  shall  "subject  the  external  action  of  a  state  to  direction  by  a  will  other 
than  its  own. ' ' 

8 So  the  international  administrative  unions  generally;  see,  for  example, 
the  Sanitary  Convention  of  1905,  Malloy,  2144. 

*  So  the  action  of  the  United  States  in  1921  in  denouncing  this  Convention. 

*See  the  statement  of  this  dual  character  of  the  Union  in  The  Federalist, 
[No.  39;  Marshall's  exposition  of  the  national  element  in  the  Union  in 
McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  1819,  17  U.S.  316;  and  the  application  of  this  doc- 
trine to  the  problem  of  secession  in  Texas  v.  White,  1869,  74  U.S.  724. 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION    393 

Third,  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that,  even  if  there  were 
a  loss  of  sovereignty,  it  would  be  a  voluntary  surrender 
of  sovereignty,  not  its  destruction  or  violation  at  the  hands 
of  another  state  or  states.  Now  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty 
does  not  insist  that  all  sovereign  states  which  ever  come 
into  being  shall  remain  in  existence  forever.  It  merely 
requires  that  so  long  as  a  state  exists  as  such,  and  desires 
to  continue  to  exist  as  such,  it  shall  be  free  from  outside 
interference.  Voluntary  surrender  of  sovereignty  is  there- 
fore entirely  compatible  with  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty. 
It  has  been  said  that  slavery  is  no  less  slavery  because 
entered  willingly.  If  we  set  aside  the  emotional  nuance 
surrounding  such  a  declaration,  it  will  appear  that  the 
essence  of  slavery  is  precisely  the  element  of  compulsion, 
and  that  where  freedom  of  choice  exists  in  taking  up  cer- 
tain duties — indefinite  in  extent,  and,  perhaps,  running 
into  an  indefinite  future, — precisely  that  element  of  com- 
pulsion is  lacking.  It  may  also  be  added  that  such  a  volun- 
tary surrender  not  only  escapes  the  description  ''violation 
of  sovereignty"  at  the  time.  It  also  makes  impossible  any 
violation  of  sovereignty  in  the  future  by  bringing  about 
the  consolidation  of  that  sovereignty,  or,  rather,  by 
merging  it,  in  practice,  in  the  common  power  of  the  league. 

The  issue  must,  however,  be  met  still  more  directly. 
Does  such  an  agreement  really  involve  a  loss  of  state 
sovereignty,  irrespective  of  past  opinion,  disregarding  the 
rule  of  rebus  sic  stantibus,  and  admitting  that  surrender, 
not  violation,  is  in  question?  It  does  not  seem  so,  for 
various  reasons. 

It  should  always  be  remembered  that  the  critical  stage 
at  which  the  test  must  be  made  is  not  the  resultant  situa- 
tion, but  the  stage  of  the  original  agreement.  Why?  Be- 
cause the  whole  question  relates  to  the  origin,  source,  or 
basis  of  authority,  and  that  can  be  discovered  only  by 
going  back  to  the  process  of  creation.  Without  such  a 
method  of  analysis,  the  simplest  treaty  or  diplomatic  agree- 


394  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ment  would  be  susceptible  of  being  interpreted  as  a  destruc- 
tion or  loss  of  sovereignty,  the  simplest  contract  as  slavery. 
And  when  such  a  method  is  employed,  the  voluntary  char- 
acter of  the  original  agreement  covers  and  obliterates  any 
apparent  compulsion  emerging  at  a  later  stage — even  into 
a  perpetual  future. 

A  most  illuminating  and  vivid,  yet  very  simple,  example 
is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of  an  international  agreement, 
without  time  limits,  not  to  exercise  the  treaty  power,  not 
to  make  a  certain  sort  of  treaty,  such  as  a  treaty  of  peace. 
Such  agreements  are  common  in  the  history  of  interna- 
tional relations.  Both  of  the  objectionable  elements  are 
present:  permanence,  and,  apparently,  a  surrender  of  a 
peculiarly  essential  sovereign  power.  Yet  such  agreements 
have  not  been  regarded  as  destructive  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  contracting  parties  or  as  involving  a  loss  or  surrender 
of  that  sovereignty.1 

Furthermore,  the  unalterable  character  of  the  agree- 
ment, and  not  merely  the  content  of  the  agreement  which 
is  made  unalterable,  is  itself  the  result  of  the  will  of  the 
state.  The  element  of  irrevocability  and  permanence,  like 
a  specific  promise  to  pay  money,  derives  its  juristic  reality 
from  the  continuing  sovereign  power  of  the  state  which  for 
its  own  self  wrote  that  element  into  the  agreement.  It  can- 
not then  result  in  a  loss  of  that  sovereign  power,  for  such  a 
result  would  deprive  the  agreement  of  its  own  authority 
upon  this  particular  point.  The  permanence  of  the  ar- 
rangement depends  upon  the  persistence  of  sovereignty  in 
the  states  which  decree  that  it  shall  be  permanent. 

Finally,  the  unalterable  membership  in  the  union  and 
the  unalterable  specific  terms  of  union,  the  duties  assumed 
by  the  member  state,  are  likewise  embodiments  of  the 

1  For  an  old  example  where  a  sovereign  power  is  contracted  away  by 
pledges  not  to  exercise  the  treaty-making  power  see  Treaty  of  Alliance  between 
United  States  and  France,  1778,  Art.  VIII,  in  Malloy,  481 ;  for  recent  exam- 
ples see  the  Inter-Allied  Pact  of  London,  of  1914,  whereby  the  signatory  parties 
promised  not  to  make  peace  separately,  and  the  Covenant  of  League  of  Nations, 
Art.  XX,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  NO.  15, 


THEORY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  395 

sovereignty  of  that  state,  not  acts  of  surrender.  Construe 
them  as  such,  and  all  the  foundation  for  their  future  au- 
thority is  destroyed.  What  the  state  has  done  is  to  per- 
form a  permanent  action  of  sovereign  power,  to  achieve  a 
perpetual  act  of  sovereignty,  as  when  an  individual  chooses 
to  become  a  lawyer  or  teacher  or  member  of  some  other 
profession  or  association.  Other  states  have  done  the 
same  thing,  and  these  simultaneous  acts  bring  into  exist- 
ence as  a  joint  product  a  federal  league  wherein  are 
funded  and  exercised  for  the  future  the  united  sovereign 
powers  of  all  the  constituent  states. 

At  times  it  appears  that  it  is  precisely  this  process  of 
practical  cooperation  which  is  really  opposed  by  the  sup- 
porters of  the  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty;  sometimes  it 
seems  that  the  doctrine  is  used  merely  to  cloak  with  an 
ideal  moral  value  a  policy  of  opposition  to  international 
cooperation,  of  national  action  for  immediate  and  exclusive 
national  advantage.  For  this  reason  it  has  seemed  neces- 
sary to  argue  the  case  on  the  issue  of  national  sovereignty. 
It  might  occur  to  some  students  of  the  problem  that  if  the 
advantages  and  benefits  of  international  organization  in 
the  concrete  are  such  as  to  justify  its  adoption,  then  any 
conflict  which  is  apparent  between  such  a  step  and  the 
preservation  of  national  sovereignty  shows  that  the  latter 
is  a  useless,  and  even  harmful,  doctrine.  As  we  have  seen, 
however,  neither  the  violation  of  national  sovereignty  by 
others  nor  the  voluntary  surrender  of  sovereignty  by  the 
state  itself  is  involved  in  the  creation  of  a  federal  union. 
The  original  agreement,  on  the  contrary,  preserves,  during 
the  term  of  its  life,  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  which  enters 
the  league. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

EMPIRE,  DEFENSIVE  ALLIANCES,  AND  THE 
BALANCE  OF  POWER 

AT  the  beginning  of  this  study  the  development  of  the 
European  state-system  previous  to  1648  was  reviewed 
and  the  state-system  of  1648  was  described  as  the  founda- 
tion for  the  slow  growth  of  international  organization  from 
that  time  onward.1  It  is  now  desirable  to  review  briefly 
the  principal  events  in  the  development  of  the  modern 
state-systenTbetween  1648  and  1918,  as  a  foundation  for 
a  *stuc[y~of  attempts  to  create  a  new  and  more, elaborate 
international  organization  for  the  future.  We  shall  begin 
with  a  review  of  attempts  at  empire  since  the  Renaissance. 
During  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  as  has 
been  seen,  there  was  a  lull  in  the  story.  The  Papacy  and 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire  had  been  shattered,  and  no  other 
imperial  structures  had  risen  to  take  their  places.  The 
new  national  states  of  Western  Europe  were  still  busy 
consolidating,  or  attempting  to  consolidate,  their  internal 
.strength  for  the  new  age.  England  was  passing  through 
the  Wars  of  the  Roses,  after  having  been  forced,  as  a 

: result  of  the  Hundred  ^Year^War,  to  withdraw  from  her 
continental  possessions  in  France.  France  herself  was 
slowly  recuperating  from  the  long  struggle  with  England, 
and  Louis  XI  was  engaged  in  the  final  attempt  to  exclude 
Charles  of  Burgundy  from  interference  in  the  kingdom. 
Germany  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy.  The  historic  effort 
to  erect  imperial  structures  by  military  force  was  left  to 
be  resumed  anew  by  other  states  in  other  quarters  of 
Europe.2 

1  Chaps.  II-IV,  above. 

*0n  the  state-system  of  Europe  in  this  period  see  Schevill,  11-24. 

396 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     397 

From  the  ancient  seat  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire 
came  the-  first  modern  imperial  movement,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Ottoman  Turks.  Capturing  Constantinople  in 
1453,  the  Turks  added  to  their  older  possessions  in  Asia 
Minor  new  conquests  in  Syria  and  Northern  Africa  and 
great  stretches  of  Southeastern  Europe  up  to  the  very 
gates  of  Vienna.  The  Ottoman  Empire  did,  indeed,  begin 
to  lose  ground  after  the  great  period  of  Sulieman  the 
Magnificent  (1520-1566).  Various  territories  were  lost  to 
foreign  powers, — Ilungary  to  Austria  in  1699,  Tripoli  to 
Italy  in  1912,  Egypt  to  Great  Britain  in  1914.  Others  were 
lost  as  the  result  of  movements  for  national  independence 

— Greece  in  1830,  Serbia  in  1878,  and  so  on.    Neverthe- 
^**f**m*aKj0*aut *  «p«*»*is«p«fi«aiwi«  7 

less,  in  1918  the  Ottoman  state  was  still  great  in  its  extent 
and  of  the  Tfcrpical  imperial  jform.1 

To  the  north  of  the  Turkish  domains  rose  the  Russian 
Empire,  beginning  at  Moscow,  the  ancient  seat  of  the  fam- 

***^^"*— """""''^^^••^•••^•"^'^^^(••^ 

ily  of  Romanoff,  as  a  center,  and  spreading  gradually  in  all 
directions,  partly  by  the  process  of  natural  growth,  but  also 
largely  by  means  of  military  conquest.  As  Byzantium  had 
claimed  to  succeed  Rome  after  the  barbarian  invasions  in 
the  West,  so  Russia  claimed  to  succeed  Byzantium,  after 
the  Turkish  conquest,  as  the  legitimate  seat  of  the  Church 
and  the  Empire.  Ivfiix  IVV  * '  the  Terjribl& *  *  formally  took 
the  imperial  title  of  Tsar  (Caesar)  in  1547.  Bordering 
peoples  in  Finland,  Poland,  Ukrania,  Georgia,  and  central 
Asia  were  brought  under  subjection  to  a  despotic  imperial 
power  which  stretched  over  vast  areas  of  territory  and 
millions  of  subjects  until  well  into  1918.2 

The  only  other  empire  in  existence  in  1918  of  a  similar 
type  was  the  British.  Having  recovered  her  power  in  the 
later  sixteenth  century,  Britain  began  to  establish  herself 

1  On  the  rise  and  development  of  the  Turkish  Empire  see  Thorndike,  554- 
559,  Schevill,  13,  14  (note  1),  42,  43,  59,  64-65,  and  Maps  Nos.  1,  4-8, 
and  Shepherd,  93,  124,  164. 

a  On  the  development  of  the  Kussian  Empire  see,  Schevill,  215-229,  400-407, 
and  Shepherd,  138,  170. 


398  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

in  America,  in  India,  in  Africa  and  Australasia.  Long 
before  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  and  reaching  down  to  our 
own  day,  her  power  extended  into  all  the  five  continents 
and  all  the  seven  seas.  It  must  be  clearly  noted,  however, 
that  Britain  differed  greatly  from  Turkey  an4  BftEfEd^Jff 
the  methods  pursued  in  achieving  empire,  although,  super- 
ficially, tne  resuft  was  the  same.  In  a  few  cases — South 
Africa  and  Ireland  among  them — the  method  of  conquest 

CJ  ,  .A 

was  employed.  But  the  bulk  of  the  British  imperial  do- 
minions came  by  movements  of  exploration  and  settlement 
of  not  only  an  innocent  but  an  admirable  type.  More  im- 
portant, so  far  as  the  result  is  concerned,  Great  Britain 
had,  in  1918,  gone  far  to  develop  schemes  of  local  autonomy 
within  the  Empire  calculated  ultimately  to  destroy  the 
normal  effect  of  empire  upon  the  state  system  of  the  world. 

*"  ^^^*^**^*^w%M'*^M**^*1l*|l***'***^Cto»B«r^'*^V*l— >"te*^fci«W^V*'1^"** 

Finally,  the  British  Empire  has  been  a  maritime  empire, 
composed,  not  of  subject  continental  states,  but  of  trans- 
oceanic colonies,  and  has  thereby  constituted  less  of  a 
threat  to  the  European  state-system  than  would  otherwise 
have  been  the  case.1 

Another  empire  of  the  same  type  was  that  of  jSgain 
prior  tothetime^f  Charles  _V.  As  a  result  of  the  work  of 
her  explorers  and  colonizers,  Spain  gained  dominion  over 
vast  areas  in  the  Americas  and  in  further  Asia.  These  she 
held  more  or  less  firmly  until  well  into  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. But  it  was  not  for  her  transmaritime  colonies  that 
Spain  was  regarded  as  a  threat  to  the  liberties  of  European 
states.  In  the  last  century  even  those  colonies  were  lost,  to 
take  their  places  in  the  modern  state-system  in  their  own 
names.2 

The  real  dangers  to  the  liberties  of  the  European  states 
in  the  past  four  centuries  have  come  principally  from  two 

~~  a  On  the  development  of  the  British  Empire  see  Schevill,  163-199,  248 -2G.'i, 
and  Shepherd,  128,  136,  170.  On  devolution  in  the  Empire  with  reappearance 
of  independent  states  see  Keith,  Imperial  Unity,  entire,  especially  510-529; 
also  works  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  24. 

3  On  the  Spanish  Empire  see  Schevill,  21-22,  59-67,  102-116,  and  Shepherd, 
128,  136. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     399 

other  soprces.  Russia  .aadLTnikey  threatened  and  subju- 
gated only  peoples  who  were,  relatively,  backward  in  their 
growth  and  who  dwelt  upon  the  fringes  of  Europe.  Britain 
and  Spain  built  empires  beyond  the  seas.  In  the  main,  it 
was  not  these,  but  other,  imperial  efforts  which  were  the 
objects  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  nations  seeking  to 
preserve  their  freedom.  The  imperial  menace  in  the  heart 

of  Europe  in  recent  times  came  from  Austria,  from  Ger- 

___  -1  ' 

many,  and  from  France. 

The  Hapsburg  Charles  I  of  Spain,  heir  to  the  domains  /<S  I 
of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  was  chosen  in  1519,  as 
Charles  V,  to  rule  over  the  Holy  Eoman  Empire.1  The 
Empire  had  recovered  some  unity  and  power  under  his 
immediate  predecessors,  and  Charles  claimed  to  rule  over 
not  only  Spain  and  her  world-  wide  colonies,  but  the  Empire 
in  Central  Europe,  the  Netherlands,  Naples,  and  Sicily. 
From  this  time  onward  for  four  centuries  the  house  of 
Hapsburg  maintained  its  claim  to  imperial  power.  The 
Protestant  Reformation  in  Germany  made  upon  the  im- 
perial unity  deep  inroads  which  ended  only  in  the  Peace  of 
Augsburg  and  the  failure  and  abdication  of  Charles  in 

1555  and  1556;  but  his  son  Philip  II  of  Spain  took  up  the 

••  •*•  A  L 

task  in  Spain,  and  nis  brother  Ferdinand  in  Central 
Europe.  Until  the  defeat  of  the  Armada  the  Spanish  effort 
threatened  to  be  successful,  and  the  Austrian  Hapsburgs 
built  up  an  empire  in  the  valley  of  the  Danube  which  held 
in  subjection  Poles  and  Czechs,  Magyars  and  Rumanians, 
Italians  and  Southern  Slavs,  down  to  the  end  of  1918.2 

The  French  threats  to  European  national  liberty  were 
made  under  two  great  rulers,  Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon. 
The  former,  during  the  years  f  rom, 


to  conquer  additional  dominions  for  France  in  the  Nether- 
lands and  in  the  valley  of  the  Rhine.    More  important  still, 

1  See  table  in  Schevill,  435. 

2  On  the  Hapsburg  Empire  see  Schevill,  40-41,  43-46,  141-160,  and  else- 
where, and  Shepherd,  119,  131,  155,  167. 


400 

he  attempted  with  some  success  to  secure  for  France  a 
political  hegemony  in  Europe  which  amounted  to  an 

empire  of  influence  and  power,  if  not  of  possession.1 
Xapoleon,  a  century  later,  capitalized  the  fervor  of  the 
Revolution,  and  the  resentment  against  those  powers  which 
had  attempted  to  suppress  that  movement,  for  his  imperial 
purposes,  and  embarked  on  a  dazzling  career  of  conquest. 
There  were  suggestions  of  national  liberty  and  free  inter- 
national federation  to  come,  when  hostile  and  reactionary 
dynasties  had  been  destroyed.  But  at  the  time  his  per- 
jformance  resembled  nothing  in  the  minds  of  European 

•MMfcMM0MV*0AMAMMW*    *-'  • 

I  statesmen  so  much  as  that  of  Charles  V,  Philip  II.  and 

f 

(  Louis  XIV.  and  the  end  was  St.  Helena.2 

... , ~^<j  i  iMiMMr          .  .     ,  _ 

The  latest  imperial  movement  came  from  Hohenzollern 
Prussia.  Beginning  as  a  rather  small  state  built  up  chiefly 
by  military  measures  on  the  sandy  plains  of  North  Central 
Europe,  progressing  through  a  very  skilful  and,  on  the 
whole,  admirable  movement  for  the  unification  of  the 
scattered  fragments  of  Germany  North  and  West  of  the 
Erzgebirge,  Prussian  Germany  emerged  in  the  end  as  a 
very  formidable  embodiment  of  the  imperial  idea.  Terri- 
tories were  taken  from  Denmark,  Austria  was  expelled 
from  influence  in  that  section  of  Europe  where  the  new 
Empire  was  to  be  established,  and  the  preliminary  work 
was  consummated  with  the  defeat  of  France  and  the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  remaining  period 
down  to  1918  was  filled  with  renewed  efforts  at  expansion 
in  Europe,  in  Asia  Minor — in  cooperation  with  imperial 
Austria — and  in  the  African  colonial  world.  In  1918 

* 

Germany  was  the  center  of  what  appeared  to  be,  notwith- 
standing democratic  opposition  at  home  and  Russian, 
French,  and  British  competition  in  the  colonial  field,  the 

center  of  the  most  powerful  imperial  impulse  in  the  world. 

*  A  •»•  —t 

1  On  the  imperial  career  of  Louis  XIV  see  Schevill,  200-214,  and  Shepherd, 
126. 

"On  the  Napoleonic  Empire  see  Schevill,  304-332,  and  Shepherd,  150-157. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     401 

Germany  boasted  that  at  home  she  was  a  federal  state, 
resting  upon  the  free  consent  and  voluntary  leadership  of 
Prussia.  It  is  also  true  that  her  empire  was,  like  the 
British,  mainly  a  colonial  empire  and  did  not  rest  upon 
subjugated  peoples  in  Europe,  as  did  the  Russian,  Turkish, 
and  Austrian  imperial  structures.  But,  like  France  under 
Louis  XIV,  the  tone  and  attitude  of  imperial  domination 
were  present  in  all  their  force.1 

These  successive  imperial  movements  in  Europe  from 
the  fifteenth  to  the  twentieth  centuries  constitute  one  of 
the  two  principal  threads  of  development  in  the  history  of 
the  modern  state-system.2  Yet  they  have  all  failed. 

V  V 

Amerongen,  St.  Helena,  and  the  Siberian  monastery  where 
the  last  of  the  Tsars  perished, — these  are  symbols  of  the 
defeat  of  imperial  power  and  pretensions.  There  are  new 
scEemes  of  empire  in  the  minds  of  some  dreamers  still,  but 
in  actual  fact  the  world  is  back  where  Europe  stood  in  the 

^^^**i~*^'*M*'***'^l^»^^^^Ba*&*R&'<l**llB0ltB*BlMpllfflBplRHfRBlttttft*' 

fifteenth  century,  and  no  great  strong  empire  dominates  the 
liberKes'of  Ihe  free  national  states  of  Europe,  nor,  indeed, 
of  any  part  of  the  world.  The  explanation  lies  in  the  sec- 
ond of  the  two  threads  of  modern  international  history, 
namely,  in  the  development  of  defensive  alliances  and  of 
the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power. 

Tf  individual  man  is,  in  truth,  a  political  or  social  ani- 
mal, and  by  his  very  nature  craves  the  society  of  his  fellows, 
it  would  also  appear  that  collective  man,  the  state,  is  a 
social  creature,  if  habitual  behavior  is  any  guide.  The 
behavior  of  states  from  the  time  when  states  first  made 

iOn  the  modern  German  Empire  see  Schevill,  230-247,  380-389;  Seymour, 
Chaps.  II-V,  VII-IX,  XI,  XII;  and  Shepherd,  160,  161,  166,  174. 
*  Chronological  table : 

f    1453-1918  Ottoman  Empire. 
1462-1918  Russian  Empire. 
1603-1918  British  Empire. 
1516-1918  Hapsburg  Empire  (Austrian). 
1556-1821  Hapsburg  Empire   (Spanish). 
1667-1714  Louis  XIV. 
1795-1815  Napoleon  I. 
1618-1918  Prussian  German  Empire. 


402  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

their  appearance  in  the  world  indicates  that  they  stand  in 
need,  and  realize  that  they  stand  in  need,  of  the  society  and 
cooperation  of  their  fellows.  Speaking  carefully,  and 

.  •Mi.  *•«*.  .11  "id"*"i.B»3»»gyiSS8fcfc 

weighing  not  the  gross  indications  of  nationalist  rhetoric 
but  the  net  evidence  of  actual  practice,  we  may  say  that 
stales  have  never  manifested  a  desire  to  live  independently 
in  cither  the  economic  or  political  spheres.  Some  degree  of 
international  cooperation  is  found  as  far  back  as  we  find 
national  independence;  the  two  are  correlative  modes  of 
;  national  life. 

The  simplest  form  of  international  political  union  is  the 
alliance,  which  may  be  defined  as  an  association  of  two  or 
more  otherwise  independent  states  for  a  common  purpose.1 
Political  units  which  do  not  have  control  of  their  own  inter- 
national relations, — which  are  not,  in  other  words,  inde- 
pendent states  in  full  right, — have  no  power  in  law  to 
conclude  alliances,  and  this  rule  is  observed  in  actual 
practice.2  Where  an  alliance  does  exist  the  common  pur- 
pose is  usually  defined  in  a  treaty  of  alliance  or  equally 
definite  diplomatic  agreement  stating  the  terms  of  the 
cooperation  both  as  to  the  objects  sought  and  the  means  to 
be  employed  in  the  process.3  In  many  cases  the  details  re- 
garding military  or  naval  cooperation  by  the  allies  are 
settled  in  subordinate  agreements  made  to  supplement  the 
principal  treaty,  and  these  agreements  are  frequently  en- 
trusted to  military  or  naval  officers  for  elaboration.4 

Two  points  deserve  special  notice  here. 

In  the  first  place,  the  alliance  is  a  definite  first  step  in 
the  process  of  international  federation.  This  is  recognized 

L.       - 

in  many  notable  documents.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  provides  that  no  state  shall  make  any 

1  On  alliances  in  general  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  24. 

"On  capacity  to  contract  alliances  see  Calvo,  §§1616-1618,  and  Hershey, 
147. 

•Example  in  the  Triple  Alliance;  text  in  "The  Background  of  the  War," 
in  League  of  Nations,  I,  216  (April,  1918). 

*  League  of  Nations,  I,  219-220. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER    403 

"treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation."1  The  fact  is  also 
recognized  by  Calvo,  the  great  Latin-American  jurist,2  and 
by  Phillipson,  in  his  study  of  "Treaties  and  Alliances"  in 
Greece  and  Borne.3  Indeed,  every  treaty  constitutes  an 
alliance  or  a  confederation  pro  tanto.  The  treaty  of  friend- 
ship and  commerce  concluded  in  1778  between  the  United 
States  and  France  on  the  same  clay  which  saw  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  military  alliance  between  those  two  states  spoke 
of  the  parties  as  "the  confederates."4  An  alliance  and  a 
treaty  are  to  be  distinguished  in  that  ordinarily  a  simple 
treaty  does  not  provide  for  joint  action  by  the  parties  for 
execution  of  the  agreement,  while  an  alliance  does. 

In  the  second  place,  the^alliance  may  be  distinguished 
from  the  federation  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word  by  the 
fact  that  there  is  no  common  organ  of  government.  The 
activities  of  the  allies  are  coordinated  but  not  unified,  and 
they  are  coordinated,  usuallv,  not  by  a  standing  body  but 

J  J  1  J  O  J 

by  diplomatic  consultations  ad  hoc.5 

The  objects  of  alliances  are  as  manifold  as  the  interests 
which  states  may  have  in  common,  and,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  subject  matter  of  treaty-negotiation,  no  purpose  is  to 
be  served  by  a  long  enumeration  of  those  objects,  by  the 
pedantic  enumeration  of  treaties  of  alliance  and  guarantee, 
of  treaties  of  alliance  and  assistance  or  subsidy,  and  so  on.6 
Nor  would  it  be  profitable  to  dwell  upon  the  different  varie- 
ties of  alliances  by  reference  to  the  motives  which  lead  to 
their  original  formation,  and  to  speak  of  alliances  of  blood, 

1  Constitution,  Art.  I,  §  10,  Par.  1. 

2  Calvo  avers  that  offensive  and  defensive  alliances  are  most   frequently 
found  among  sovereign  states  linked  by  federal  bonds  as  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  of  America;  as  cited,  §  2008.     He  adds  that  such  alliances  are 
one  essential  element  in  any  federal  union. 

'International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and  Eome,  II,  Chaps. 
XX,  XXI. 

4  Art.  XXIII,  in  Malloy  476. 

6  This  may  explain  the  unusual  importance  attached  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
to  the  formation  of  the  Inter-Allied  Supreme  Council  in  November,  1917; 
quoted  in  League  of  Nations,  I,  348  (October,  1918). 

Attempt  to  classify  alliances  by  objects  in  Calvo,  as  cited,  §§  2006-2008, 


404 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


of  faith,  of  interest.1  All  alliances  are  alliances  of  interest 
and  the  interests  are  too  many  to  be  listed  singly.  A  few 
of  the  more  important  and  more  common  objects  may  be 
noted,  as  well  as  a  few  general  inferences  regarding  the 
whole  matter. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  an  elementary  rule  of  sound 
policy  to  provide  at  the  outset  a  clear  and  specific  state- 
ment of  the  objects  sought  by  the  alliance.  Alliances  in 
general  terms  are  often  called  alliances  "pure  and  simple." 
Such  alliances  are,  on  the  contrary,  neither  pure  nor  simple. 
They  are  bound  to  be  sources  of  continual  disagreement 
between  the  parties.  They  are  "entangling  alliances" 
par  excellence.  They  are  agreements  of  indefinite  liability 
for  the  'parties  and  are  certain  to  cause  friction  and  mis- 
understanding later.  Moreover,  the  objects  as  stated  in  a 
treaty  of  alliance  must  in  fact  coincide  with  the  real  inter- 
ests of  the  parties,  for,  otherwise,  they  will  be  ineffective 
when  the  time  comes  to  invoke  the  obligations  of  the  pact. 
The  parties  will  not  support  with  men  and  money  the 
^fanciful  objects  stated  in  the  text. 

The  most  common  purpose  of  alliances  is  to  provide 
for  military  cooperation,  defensive  or  offensive,  or  both. 
It  is  common  to  deride  the  idea  that  an  alliance  may  be 
purely  defensive.  As  to  that,  it  may  be  said,  first,  that,  in 
point  of  fact,  it  is  not  impossible  to  point  out  alliances 
which  have  operated  entirely  in  that  role.2  Moreover,  in 
so  far  as  defensive  alh'ances  tend  to  become  offensive  in 
character  this  is  due  to  causes  much  deeper  than  the  alli- 
ance itself.  Parties  to  a  defensive  alliance  engage  to  pro- 
tect one  another  in  what  they  believe  to  be  their  legitimate 
rights  and  interests.  That  this  leads  to  offensive  action  at 
times,  and,  more  commonly  still,  to  stronger  action  by  the 
parties  in  defining  and  pressing  for  the  satisfaction  of  these 

'Calvo,  as  cited,  §§  2014,  2015,  2022,  2028. 

/  *For  example,  that  between  Italy  and  Austria,  of  1882;  it  was  an  attempt 
/  by  Austria  to  use  this  alliance,  as  renewed  in  1887,  1892,  1903,  and  1912,  for 
I  offensive  purposes,  that  wrecked  it  in  1914. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWEB     405 

rights,  in  reliance  upon  the  support  of  the  alliance,  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  international  government  is  still  so  rudi- 
mentary  as  to  leave  to  individual  nations  almost  entirely 
the  business  of  defining  and  obtaining  satisfaction  for  their 
rights.  It  is  this  which  induces  in  the  defensive  alliance 
its  offensive  character,  just  as  the  same  factor  tends  to 
make  war  always  offensive  in  actual  fact  unless  attention 
is  focused  on  the  superficial  question  as  to  which  party 
first  undertakes  military  action. 

The  objects  of  alliances  are  commonly  stated  in  the 
preambles  of  the  treaties  creating  them.  Often  there  is 
a  profession  of  solicitude  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
justice  by  means  of  the  alliance.1  This  is,  in  part,  but 
another'  reflection  of  the  situation  just  described.  It  is 
also  true  that  for  the  real  character  of  the  alliance  recourse 
must  be  had  to  the  body  of  the  treaty,  just  as  it  is  true  that 
many  treaties^Ti^Oieir  texts  are  examined,  prove  to  be  in 
fact  alliances  although  they  are  not  called  so  by  name.2 
But  it  may  safely  be  averred,  further,  that  the  professions 
of  solicitude  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  justice  by 
means  of  the  alliance  are  entitled  to  a  considerable  measure 
of  respect,  and  this  for  a  very  definite  reason,  namely,  that 
practically  every  alliance  aims  at  the  support  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power,  without  which  there  can  be,  in  reality, 
neither  peace  nor  justice. 

Before  turning  to  this  subject  of  the  balance  of  power, 
however,  two  other  matters  are  to  be  considered,  namely, 
the  leeralaspects  of  alliances  and  the  question  of  member- 

m     "  "•"      '    •  nmfc      ii  '    •  ' '  •"•"ii  ii    m.m  ^.. 

ship. 

In  common  with  all  treaties,  treaties  of  alliance  involve 
many  questions  of  law  respecting  the  original  power  of  the 
signatories  to  conclude  the  treaty,  tiie  dura'tionand binding 
effectiveness  of  the  pact,  the  scopeoT^neobligations  as- 

•  - 

1  Example  in  preamble  of  treaty  cited  in  note  3,  p.  402,  above. 
'Example  in  the  Anglo-French  Entente  of  1904:  in  League  of  Nations, 
I,  227-233. 


406  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

sumed,  and  the  effect  of  the  treaty  upon  other  treaties  and 
other  parties.  Because  of  the  fact  that  definite  action,  and 
military  action  at  that,  is  commonly  called  for,Hie  question 
of  foe  scoye  of  the  obligation  of  the  treaty,  of  the  appear- 
ance  of  the  occasipnfor^ac^ioji  under  the  treaty,  called  the 
casus  fcedens,  is  especially  vital.  It  is,  however,  a  strictly 
legal  question,  and  the  student  must  be  referred  for  its 
|  adequate  treatment,  as  well  as  for  treatment  of  all  the 
/various  legal  questions  relating  to  alliances,  to  the  treatises 
upon  international  law  proper.1 

As  to  membership  alliances  may  be  bi-lateral  or  multi- 
lateral, dual,  triple,  quadruple,  and  so  on.  They  may  also 
be  "  general"  in  form,  including,  that  is,  a  substantial  num- 
ber  of  all  the  states  of  Europe,  or  of  the  world.  At  this 
point  we  begin  to  reach  the  final  stages  of  the  development 
of  alliances  as  instruments  of  international  government. 
It  requires  a  broader,  a  more  general,  interest  to  bind  three 
states  together  than  two,  four  than  three,  and  so  on.  Like- 
wise, it  requires  a  more  permanent  interest  to  create  an 
alliance  of  long  term  than  an  alliance  for  a  short  period, 
and  it  requires  a  permanent  interest  to  justify  an  alliance 
for  an  indefinite  term.  It  requires  a  very  general  and  a 

.  -  --    ••  •-•  -  •*•   *»••-..  —  ~^n*tK**a,»<«  **•*>• 

very  permanent  object  to  establish  a  permanent  general 
alliance,  an  international  federation.  Such  an  object,  again, 
(is  found  in  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power.     To 
I  that  we  now  turn. 

The  "  balance  of  power"  is  a  concept  respecting  the 
an(j  alignment  of  the  states  in  the  political  scene 
in  Europe,  in  Asia,  or  in  whatever  region  it  is  applied.2 
A  balance  of  power  would  exist  where  no  one  state  was  in 
V          a  position  to  dictate,  to  other  states  according  to  its  will. 
Out  of  this  concept  a  rule  olF  'lawjaaight  be  iggde,  to  the 
effect  that  no  state  may  legally  claim  or  hold  such  a  posi- 
tion.   Or  tEeTmatter  might  be  stated  as  a  practical  prob- 

•w* 

*  See,  for  example,  Calvo,  as  cited,  and  Pradier-Fodere",  §  934  and  following. 
2  On  the  balance  of  power  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  24. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     407 

ability:  no  state  will  be  allowed  to  obtain  and  hold  such  a  / 

*««*w~M»^B»w««»i«l»».«/"«»«M«w*WV««W»«WiM<»«w<*iW<IW«<U»^ 

position.    Finally,  we  might  turn  the  idea  into  a^ statement 
of  policy:  no  state  should  be  permitted  to  attain  such  a 
position,  and  such  a  balance  must  be  preserved  as  to  pre-  \ 
vent  such  a  result. 

As  embodied  in  a  statement  of  law,  the  formula  leaves 
much  to  be  desired.  It  is  vague  and  difficult  to  apply.  It  y^ 
appears  to  imply  that  states  may  not  legally  expand  in 
power  and  possessions  and  political  influence,  which  is  not 
accurate.  On  the  other  hand,  the  formula  does  reflect  a 
familiar  and  an  accepted  principle,  namely,  that  no  state 
may,  of  right,  lay  down  the  law  for  others.  It  consists  of 
"an  attempt  to  insure  the  maintenance  of  that  principle  by 
action  in  the  world  of  physical  facts.  It  is  not  a  principle 
or  rule  of  law  but  a  role  of  action  designed  to  refiifofce 
and  vindicate  the  lawTr^mToeoutside. 

The  formula  as  a  statement  of  probability  is  of  more 
value.    Surveying  thTTong  courseof international  relations          , 
from  Thucydides  to  Clemenceau,  it  is  clear  that  the  states 
will  not,  if  they  can  prevent  it,  permit  such  a  predominance   £ 
oil  the  part  of  one  state  as  will  endanger  their  own  liberties.        J & 
As  a  scientific  statement  of  habitual  and  characteristic  be- 
havior, as  a  law  of  the  descriptive  type,  it  is  well  supported 
by  the  evidence.1 

It  is  as  a  rule  of  policy  >  however,  that  the  doctrine  may 
be  regarded  to  best  advantage.    On  the  surface  it  is  a  rule 
of  national  policy,  serving  as  a  guide  for  each  individual 
state.    At  a  second  stage  it  is  an  international  policy,  a 
generally  recognized  principle  of  public  interest.    As  both, 
it  has  been  proclaimed  and  supported  consistently  from  the 
earliest  times.     It  is  generally  felt  to  be  necessary  as  a 
practical  support  for  the  observance  of  public  law;  in  the  v 
absence  of  an  international  police  for  the  vindication  of  the  ^ 
law,  free  combinations  for  security  are  necessary.2  y^" 

1  On  the  balance  of  power  in  history  see  Phillimore,  Part  IV,  Chap.  I,  §  II, 
and  Wilson  and  Tucker,  82-83. 
1  Bernard,  97,  99. 


< 
/ 


/ 


408  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  concept  of  the  balance  may  take  any  one  of  several 
distinct  forms  which  vary  considerably  among  themselves1 

value. 

e  simplest  form  of  the  balance  is  found  where  two 
states  are  somewhere  nearly  equal  in  power  and  are,  by 
force  of  circumstances,  balanced  one  against  another  so 
that  neither  possesses  a  predominance  over  the  other.  This 
form  of  balance  is  most  unstable  and  precarious.  In  its 
mechanical  aspect  it  resembles  a  see-saw,  or  the  beam  of  a 
^pair  of  scales,  which  will  tip  violently  if  a  slight  weight  is 
cast  into  one  side  of  the  balance.  It  is  bound  to  result  in 
an  agonizing  competition  between  the  parties  to  prevent 
one  from  securing  advantages  over  the  other.  It  leads  to 
the  practice  of  "partition"  whereby  the  rivals,  by  a  "cal- 
culus of  lands  and  souls,"  divide  equally  the  possessions  of 
a  weaker  neighbor  and  thus  grow  in  greatness  yet  preserve 
the  balance.  It  leads  to  attempts,  on  one  side  and  the  other, 
to  secure  the  protection  of  alliances,  counter-alliances, 
and  cross-alliances,  resulting  in  a  veritable  "nightmare 
of  alliances,"  haunting  the  minds  of  all  parties  and  creat- 
ing a  super-sensitive  and  suspicious  atmosphere  among 
them. 

Some  improvement  is  made  in  the  second  form  of  the 
balance,  where  a  third  state^  not  permanently  allied  to 
either  of  the  rivals,  holds  the  balance  of  power  between 
them.  This  state,  acting  from  time  to  time  as  a  make- 
weight, has  the  power  to  exert  a  moderating  influence  upon 
the  other  parties  and  to  reassure  each  that  he  will  be  pro- 
tected in  his  legitimate  interests.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
situation  leads  these  rivals  to  curry  favor  continually  with 
the  third  state^and  it  allows  the  third  state  itself  to  main- 
iPaTn^rTs^su^remacy  by  dividing  the  rivals  and  playing  upon 

i*their  fears,  and  to  assume  an  attitude  of  dictation  checked 
only  by  the  possibility  that  the  rivals  may  make  common 
^cause  against  the  dictator.    While  greatly  superior  to  the 
primitive  form  of  the  balance,  in  view  of  the  presence  at 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     409 

the  fulcrum  of  a  stabilizing  weight  which  will  tend  always 
to  redress  the  balance,  it  is  not  entirely  satisfactory. 

Thedesirable  form  fljF  foe,  balance  is  f  Qund  where  three 
or  more  states  are  substantially  equal  and  are  not  grouped 
in  any  particular  or  exclusive  alliances  one  with  another. 
This  is  the  mechanical  form  of  the  equilateral  triangle  or, 
if  the  comparison  is  permissible,  of  the  fi^\|i^tg]^fifliyjByB- 
There  is  at  once  greater  stability  and  greater  flexibility  in 
this  form  of  balance  than  in  the  simpler  forms.  It  is  not 
so  easily  upset,  because  it  has  the  capacity  to  adjust  itself 
more  readily  to  stresses  and  strains  from  without  and 
within.  There  is  a  condition  not  so  much  of  balance  as  of 
general  equilibrium.  "Where  these  conditions  exist,  among 
not  merely  three  but  four  or  five  or  a  larger  number  of 
spates,  the  ideal  condition  exists.  We  then  find  ourselves  v 
back  upon  the  familiar  principle  that  a  condition  of  general  V" 
equality  among  the  states  is  what  is  most  to  be  sought.  v/O 

a&*i**li**l**BfHtt*uitgie*tgM9!i^*i*r*  *-' 


jf\ 

Wealso  find  ourselves  demanding  that  exclusive  alliances   0^     S 
shall  be  dropped,  as  they  tend  to  destroy  the  general  equi- 
librium.    The  latter  demand,  however,  leads  to  a  more  / 

detailed  consideration  of  the  relations  between  the  alli- 
ances described  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  chapter  and  the 
balance  of  power,  and  likewise  of  the  part  played  by  these 
factors  in  the  problem  by  the  imperial  movements  wit- 
nessed in  Europe  from  the  fifteenth  to  the  twentieth 
centuries. 

The  idea  of  the  balance  of  power  was  not  unknown  in 
thejShci'ent  and  medieval  periods. 

The  Greek  states  lived  constantly  in  a  condition  of  eqni- 
librium  such  that  no_  .single  state  could  secure,  or  at  all 
events    long    retain,    a    predominance    over    the    others. 
Athens,  Sparta,  and  Thebes  were  constantly  struggling  for 
hegemony,  attaining  it,  and  losing  it  again.     The  Greeks  \ 
recognized  this  condition  of  affairs  and  sought  to  perpetu-  \ 
ate  it.    Thus  the  growing  power  of  Athens  called  for  oppo-    I 
sition  from  Sparta  and  other  Peloponnesian  states  in  the  / 


\ 

.' 
.  j 


410  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

last  half  of  the  sixth  century  B.C.  The  power  of  Sparta 
was  checked  by  Athens  and  Thebes,  and  that  of  Thebes  in 
turn  by  Athens  and  Sparta  during  the  later  years  of  the 
fourth  century. 

It  has  therefore  been  said  that  the  balance  or  equilib- 
rium among  the  Greek  states  was  exceedingly  delicate  and 
unstable.  By  this  it  is  meant  that  the  states  were  suf- 
ficiently unequal  to  make  attempts  at  conquest  possible,  yet 
sufficiently  equal  to  make  resistance  a  hopeful  enterprise, 
and  that  constant  competition  was  the  result.  In  reality, 
however,  beyond  this  margin  of  competition  the  equilibrium 
was  exceedingly  stable,  for  extensive  or  permanent  upsets 
were  very  difficult.  The  Greeks  maintained  the  struggle 
among  the  states  as  a  permanent  condition  of  life.1 
"  So  successful  were  the  Greeks  in  this  direction,  however, 
that,  when  Macedon  came  upon  the  scene,  the  independence 
and  self-reliance  of  the  Greek  states  were  too  perfectly 
developed  to  allow  that  degree  of  cooperation  which  was 
necessary  to  repel  the  invader.  It  would  have  been  better, 
where  a  threat  from  an  external  source  existed,  to  forego 
such  an  intense  application  of  the  principle  of  balance  that 
no  disciplined  cooperation  could  develop.  Tfoo  great  sus- 
picion  and  jealousy  had  inhibited  the  spirit  of  confidence 
and  mutual  help.2 

Rome  was  consistently  able  to  escape  the  operations  of 
the  policy  of  balance  and  was  therefore  able  to  build  up  her 
empire  successfully.  Certain  of  her  victims  saw  the  neces- 
sity for  cooperation  in  defense,  but  saw  it  too  late  to  per- 
suade others  to  take  effective  action.  By  following  a  rule 
later  employed  by  other  empire  builders  with  marked  suc- 
cess, the  rule  divide  ct  iinpcra,  Home  was  able  to  con- 
quer singly  states  wEich  mighFnave  preserved  the  balance 
by  making  common  cause  against  her.3 

1  On  the  balance  of  power  among  the  Greek  states  see  Phillipson,  as  cited, 
II,  101-110. 

1  On  the  lack  of  a  balance  against  Macedon  see  same,  108. 
1  On  the  absence  of  a  balance  against  Eome  see  same,  110-114. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     411 


From  the  establishment  of  the  Empire  of  Rome  to 
time  of  the  Renaissance  the  idea  of  the  balance  of  power 
was  lost.    Empire  seemed  the  natural  course  of  events,  and 
even  a  desirable  condition.    Then  came  the  revival  of  inde-   S  ^^ 
pendent  statehood  and  with  it  a  rediscovery  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  balance  of  power. 

It  is  to  Italy  that  we  must  ^  turn  for  this^event.  The 
situation  in  the  peninsula  was  similar  to  that  of  ancient 
Greece:  many  independent  states  of  substantially  equal 
power  existed  side  by  side  and  were  engaged  in  active  rela- 
tions one  with  another,  and  all  were  anxious  to  preserve 
their  respective  independence.  It  was  quite  natural  that 
some  keen  politician  and  some  wise  student  of  current 
interstate  relations,  such  as  Lorenzo  de  Medipi  and  the 
historian  Guicciardini,  should  rediscover  and  restate  the 
old  principle  for  the  new  age.1 

If  we  tB^^tojGuicciardini's^stajggjg^j;  we  find  a  clear 
indication  of  the  function  of  alliances  in  preserving 
the  balance  of  power  against  military  conquests.  Said 
Gfuicciardini  :  "The  peace  which  Italy  enjoyed  at  that  time 
was  the  effect  of  different  causes,  and  especially  of  the 
cleverness  of  Lorenzo  de  Medici.  .  .  .  This  celebrated 
citizen  of  Florence,  .  .  .  ,  now  governed  the  Republic 
.  .  .  ;  a  short  time  back  he  had  conceived  the  policy  of 
uniting  his  family  by  an  alliance  with  Pope  Innocent  VIII. 

For  Lorenzo  understood  .  .  .  that  it  was  necessary  to 
oppose  the  aggrandizement  of  the  principal  powers  of 
Italy  and  to  preserve  among  them  a  just  balance,  as  well 
for  the  safety  of  the  Republic  of  Florence  as  for  his  own 
position.  The  sole  means  of  preserving  that  equilibrium 
was  to  preserve  the  peace.  .  .  ."2 

The  operation  of  this  principle  from  1500  to  1815  may 
be  briefly  outlined. 


1  On  the  rediscovery  of  the  doctrine  in  fifteenth  century  Italy  see  Nyg, 
Origines,  165-168,  especially  167. 
'Quoted  in  Nys,  167-168. 


\/ 


412  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

During  the  first  years  of  the  sixteenth  century  England 
and  France,  under  Henry  VIII  and  Francis  I,  allied  them- 
selves together  (152:6)  against  Charles  V.     Soon  Francis 
was  led  to  conclude  (1535)  an  alliance  with  the  Asiatic  infi- 
del, the  Mohammedan  Turk,  for  the  same  object.     Thus 
could  the  principle  of  the  balance'  of  power  reverse  the 
spirit    of    the    Crusades!      At    the    same    time    (1526—) 
j   \  Francis  was  attempting  to  act  against  Charles  as  an  ally  of 
^  the  Papacy  and  likewise  (1535 — )  of  the  Protestant  Princes 
of  Germany.     Nothing  but  the  principle  under  discussion 
could  explain   or  justify   such  combinations   of  alliances. 
vThe    policy    of    coalition   was,    however,    successful,    and 
/yp  /          ^Charles  went  down  to  final  defeat  in  1555.1 

Against  his  son  Philip  II  France  took  up  the  campaign 

""i    y*      (1556),   in   alliance   with   the   Pope.    When  Philip   again 

seemed  to  be  on  the  verge  of  success,  England  once  more 

f   **J  (1585)  joined  the  campaign  by  assisting  the  Dutch  against 

the  Spanish  monarch,  and  Henry  IV  of  France  joined  them 

(1595)  in  the  fighrwhich  finally  ended  (1598)  in  Philip's 

defeat.2 

During  the  first  part  of  this  period,  from  1519  to  1555, 
England  provided  two  striking  illustrations  of  the  action 
of  a  third  state  in  holding  and  exercising  a  balance  of 
power    between    two    rivals.      Henry    VIII    acted    with 
<^5^  Charles  V  against  Francis  I  in  1521,  but  swung  to  the  side 

of  France  in  1526  and  back  to  Charles  in  1543  when  Francis 

" 

Jt        threatened  to  become  too  successful.     He  definitely  pro- 
S  claimed  that  this  was  his  policy  and  that  he  to  whom  his 

I   ^*  A,     V         JW_ 

*y\aid  was   given   would   triumph   in   the   end — cui   adhcsro 
S[f*       pr&est.3    It  must  be  recognized,  of  course,  IhaT"  Henry 
•f^M"  j^     nfffflffThands  witE  whomsoever  appeared  to  be  the  highest 
bidder.      But    this    meant,    taking    into    account    probable 
ability  and  willingness   to   redeem  the  pledge,   the  more 

^chevill,  40-41,  43-46. 
'Same,   63-64,  113-115. 

•See  Bacon's  description  of  the  policy  of  Henry  VIII,  quoted  in  Nys, 
as  cited,  168. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER     413 
needy  rival.    Beside  this,  the  worst  conceivable  use  of  the 

^••PMrif ,r'.--'--' 

alliance  for  the  state  contemplating  alliance,  is  to  become 
an  ally  of  the  stronger  of  two  rivals,  for  the  result  would 
be  a  victory  not  greatly  due  to  the  assistance  rendered  by 
the  ally,  a  victory  so  decisive  as  to  kill  all  feelings  of 
moderation  in  the  victor  and  to  relieve  him  of  any  feeling 
of  obligation  to  his  friend  and  helper.  If  the  ally  is  also 
weaker  than  the  victor  in  his  triumph,  the  ally  is  likely  to  / 
become  merely  the  next  victim  of  him  whom  he  assisted. 
During  the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
principle  was  again  embodied  in  the  coalition  between 
France  and  the  Protestant  Princes  against  Ferdinand  II, 
and  in  the  assistance  brought  by  Sweden  against  the  im- 
perial pretensions  of  the  Hapsburgs.1  ?Me  "Peace  of 
Westphalia  (1648),  the  foundation  of  the  modern  Euro-v^/f  ^  ff 
pean  state-system,  constituted  a  definite  recognition  of  the 
principle  as  the  corner-stone  of  modern  international  v 

tvlMHMvK/--.i  •...-., 

relations.2    The  Italians  of  the  fifteenth  century  had  hoped 

»>*     ,  --•----..-......  .  ................. 

to  preserve  the  balance  by  preserving  peace  and  preventing 
wars  for  conquest ;  modern  Europe  was  to  preserve  peace 
by  preserving  the  balance.  The  Empire  and  the  Papacy 
being  no  longer  available  as  frames  or  forms  into  which 
the  states  of  Europe  might  be  fitted  in  orderly  peace,  this 
new  cadre  was  adopted  for  the  future.  The  feudal  system 
had  covered  all  Europe  with  a  fabric  of  authority  which, 
complicated  and  irregular  as  it  was,  had  preserved  a  sem- 
blance of  unity  among  the  many  petty  political  units  of  the 
time;  the  balance  of  power  was  now  to  serve  to  hold  in 
order  the  more  powerful  states  coming  on  the  scene  sub- 
ject to  no  unified  control  such  ^J^^Q^J^Q^^^^S^Sf- 
itv  of  the  previous  age.3 

Peace  the  balance  of  1648  did  not  bring.    The  states  of 
Europe  were  too  new  and  their  positions  too  unsettled  to 

'Schevill,  144-156,  especially  151,  155. 
2  Phillimore,  as  cited,  §  cccxcvii. 
'Walker,  141. 


414  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

produce  a  stable  alignment.    In  addition  to  this,  the  activi- 
ties  of   Louis   XIV   and   the   manifold   repercussions   in 
Europe  of  the  colonial  competition  in  America  and  Asia 
prevented  any  settled  peace.    The  end  of  the  century  saw  a 
v    succession  of  coalitions  against  Louis,  as  earlier  periods 
sf  \had  seen   successive   alliances   formed  to   check   Charles, 

NPhilip,  and  Ferdinand.    Such  were  the  Triple  Alliance  of 
''  Britain,  Sweden,  and  the  Netherlands,  in  1667;  the  alliance 
of  the  Emperor,  Germany,  the  Dutch  and  the  Spaniards  in 
<  (**  1673 ;  the  feutch,  Spain,  the  Emperor,  and  Britain  in  1688 ; 

JX,«  ^Nlft         • ~i   -Jf4^~      -'  -~ri/»"~^lt -8fc»^BaBaa»ae*^^« 

T.  and   the   Grand   Alliance, — Britain,   the   Dutch,   Germany, 
and  the  Emperor,— -of  170LJ- 

The  succeeding  century  witnessed  a  continuation  of  the 
same  process ;  in  various  treaties  the  policy  was  set  forth 
again  and  again.2  \  I  $1  ¥•  ^A  r/jL*M4*>  f 

At  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  during  the 
years  preceding  the  rapid  development  in  international  re- 
lations which  was  to  set  in  after  1815,  there  appeared  a  new, 
factor  in  the  projC££H;5jjJ[L^^ 

This  was  the  practice  of  agreed  paHmolC'wlSic^rwhile  it 
resulted  from  the  common  and  familiar  anxiety  of  rivals 
to  keep  abreast  one  of  another,  and  has,  therefore,  already 
been  mentioned  in  that  connection,  also  involved  a  new 
element,  the  idea  of  preserving  peace  and  the  balance  at 

"^•fc  S*********ll*'*'l>**(<fcM|»^^!«<^Mfc*Wll^l*li*^11*'1*^ 

^  ,_.  irr ,\      one  and  the  same  time  by  international  agreements  to  avoid 

war  and  secure  national  advantages  by  peaceful  action. 
P/       /  The  most  striking  example  of  this  was  the  partition  of 

Poland,  in  1772-95.8  That  action  is  usually  characterized 
in  tne  most  condemnatory  terms.  Viewed  from  the  stand- 
point of  Poland,  it  was  undoubtedly  nothing  but  imperial 
conquest  by  three  confederates,  and  worse  than  conquest 
by  some  single  stale  under  wnicn  national  unity  might  have 
been  preserved  even  if  independence  were  lost.  It  could  be 

'Schevill,  204-213. 

'Hassal,  entire;  Phillimore,  as  cited,  end;  for  text  of  treaty  of  alliance 
for  preserving  the  balance  of  power  see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  11. 
1  On  the  partition  in  general  see  Schevill,  227-229. 


ALLIANCES  AND  THE  BALANCE  OP  POWER     415 

justified  as  between  the  individual  despoilers  and  Poland 
by  no  legal  or  moral  right.  It  was  naked  physical  seJZHJe.1 
But  the  action  should  be  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
annexing  states  also,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  Europe  A>  +*l 

q^^fMMWMftBMaBMBHQtiMM  l^**M*MtoM>|MMMWl4f'*''*      ^J   A  i^.  f^I 

as  a  whole.    If  the  partition  had  not  been  made  it  is  highly  "' 
proTbablo'  that  war  would  have  followed  between  Austria, 
Prussia,  and  Russia,  ending  in  a  conquest  and  division  of 
Poland  in  any  event.    For  Europe  it  may  have  been  better 

,  .,  -,  CT-       M  j.-  •  i    x  •     j  i 

done  as  it  was  done.  Similar  actions  in  a  later  period  have 
not  been  regarded  in  the  same  light,  partly  because  the 
direct  profits  of  the  participants  have  been  less,  the  world 

^"*IW^  -IX  1  A.'  '**¥*"*l*^t0*tf^-t  /,  ,, 

more  accustomed  to  such  action,  and  solicitude  tor  the 
general  peace  greater. 

Before  following  the^development  of  this  practice  into 
the  Concert  of  Europe,  however,  it  remains  to  note  that  the 
opening  of  the  last  century  witnessed  another  case  of  alii-     * 
ances  and  coalitions  to  preserve  and  recreate  the  balance  of  <t  J 

*r3k 

power  in  the  traditional  manner.    It  was  the  Grand  Alii-  \s 

!*MiVg*PM^«^^^«*iM*£MVM0^lMMWM*ct.  "         W  *r*»  WSK  *>Jwi 

ance  of  1814  between  Britain,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Eussia 
which  finally  accomplished  the  defeat  of  Napoleon,  as  an- 
other Grand  Alliance,  also  formed  under  British  leader- 
ship, a  century  before,  had  balked  the  designs  of  another  ^ 
French  sovereign.2 

And  at  Vienna  an  attempt  was  made  to  redistribute  the     /p  / 
increments  or  elements  of  power  in  Europe  so  as  io  create   i- 
a  condition  of  equilibrium  \\hich  would  serve  as  a  founda-    •'  •' 
tion  f  or  peaceful  international  relations  In  the^lirFiire/    tn     /»  f 
tlmt  process  jrwo  ^^  tun^amential  '  '^|^j-ft^y"  'w^' 


experience  with  French  power  and  French  policy  in  the 
preceding  fifteen  or  twenty  years  was  allowed  to  induce  the 
Allies  to  make,  in  all  their  calculations,  errors  in  one  direc- 

1  Schevill,  228,  gives  the  familiar  characterization. 

'  On  the  action  of  the  Grand  Alliance  in  1814  see  Schevill,  328-332,  and 
document  cited,  above,  in  note  2,  p.  414. 

*  On  the  balance  of  power  at  Vienna  see  Phillimore,  as  cited,  §  cccxcviii, 
citing  Convention  of  1814  among  the  Allies  which  defined  the  purpose  of  the 
meeting  at  Vienna  to  be  that  of  establishing  the  peace  of  Europe  "upon  a 
just  distribution  of  power  among  the  states  which  compose  it." 


416  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tion,  namely,  errors  against  France  and  in  favor  of  them- 

•  "•       . 
elvos,   errors  which   could,  in  the   end,   only  weaken  the 

nent.  The  Allies  also  performed  their  calculations 
>ol>'ly  m^ terms  of  land  and  people  and  neglected  to  take 
into  account  the  spiritual  forces  of  nationality  and  liberty 
which  had  been  unleashed  by  the  Revolution.  This  also 
weakened  their  settlement.  But  the  essential  fact  is  that 


iSl^ne  defeat  of  Napoleon  and  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  free  European  state-system  were  again  based, 
and  must  have  been  based,  upon  an  alliance  topreyenj;  jm- 

perial  conquest  and  an  attempt  to  provide  a  condition  of 
equilibrium  among  the  five  Great  Powers  which  should 
insure  the  liberties  of  the  nations  in  the  future. 


^   l$.%rf»}*', 


CHAPTEE  XXV 

THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE,  THE  CONCERT  OF 
EUROPE,  AND  METHODS  OF  INTER- 
NATIONAL CONTROL 

THE  experience  of  the  Napoleonic  period  served  to 
reinforce  all  the  convictions  concerning  the  necessity 
for  a  just  and  stable  distribution  of  power  in  Europe  which 
had  been  developing  since  the  beginning  of  modern  times. 
Here  was  the  most  elaborate  and  the  most  successful  effort 
yet  made  at  universal  European  empire,  and  it  had  been 
defeated  only  by  a  system  of  defensive  alliances  which  had 
approximated  a  league  of  public  safety  for  the  reestablish- 
inent  of  equilibrium  and  national  freedom  in  Europe. 

Naturally,  therefore,  as  it  seems  to  us  now,  the  Allies 
of  1814  determined  to  take  care  that  their  work  should  not 
have  been  done  in  vain;  they  determined  to  guard  and 
maintain  the  newly  created  equilibrium  in  the  uncertain 
future.  And  this  was  a  real  step  forward.  The  principle 
of  the  balance  of  power,  far  from  being  dropped,  was  now 
placed  for  enforcement  and  administration  in  the  hands 
of  a  permanent  organ  of  international  government,  instead 
of  being  left  to  individual  states  or  temporary  alliances  for  / 
its  defense  and  support.  The  result  was  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance of  1815. 1 

It  is  the  fashion  today  to  criticize  and  abuse  the  Holy 
Alliance  and  its  activities,  along  with  the  principle  of  the 
balance  of  power  itself.  Such  criticism  must  be  reexamined 

1  On  the  Holy  Alliance  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  25.  On 
the  aims  in  the  formation  of  the  Holy  Alliance  see  Phillips,  148-156,  especially 
151.  For  text  of  the  Holy  Alliance  see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  12. 

417 


& 


(ff      418  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

here  to  discover  its  true  value,  for  the  principles  of  the 
Alliance  and  of  the  balance  are  present  in  recent  efforts 
at  international  government,  just  as  they  were  a  century 
ago. 

It  will  be  noted,  first,  that  opposition  to  the  Alliance 
and  to  the  balance  has  usually  arisen  from  hostility  to  the 
perversion  by  the  Alliance  of  the  principle  of  balance  to 
serve  the  ulterior  designs  of  the  individual  parties  to  the 
Alliance  and  from  aversion  to  the  methods  employed  by  the 
former  for  the  maintenance  of  the  latter.  In  the  days  of 
the  partition  of  Poland  it  was  the  fact  that  the  three 
Powers  took  over  j?olish  territory  for  themselves  and  that 
they  divided  Poland  without  reference  to  Polish  consent, 
not  the  idea  of  balance,  nor  the  idea  of  alliance  and  co- 
operation to  maintain  that  balance,  that  roused  criticism. 
So  in  the  case  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  balance  after 
1815,  it  was  the  fact  that  the  Allies,  particularly  Austria, 
supported  dynastic  legitimism  rather  than  the  principle  of 
international  equilibrium  itself  that  has  given  rise  to  the 
criticism  of  the  work  of  1815-25,  and  the  fact  that  they 
employed  military  force  for  the  suppression  of  national 
aspirations,  not  the  central  idea  of  international  equilib- 
rium and  international  cooperation  in  support  of  that 
equilibrium. 

This  leads  us  deeper,  however,  into  the  question  whether 
such  equilibrium  could  ever  be  maintained,  and  how  it 
o  could  be  maintained,  without  stifling  legitimate  national 
activities  and  national  growth.  This  question  will  answer 
itself  if  we  examine  more  closely  the  nature  of  the  threats 
raised  against  the  equilibrium  of  Europe  in  the  years  fol- 
lowing 1815  and  the  nature  of  the  methods  employed  for 
its  preservation. 

There  is  no  need  to  describe  in  detail  the  nationalistic 
movements  of  the  early  nineteenth  century.  We  have  seen 
how  the  force  of  nationalism  operated  in  the  creation  of 
new  states  in  Europe  from  the  end  of  the  Medieval  period 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  419 

to  the  French  Revolution.1     This  principle  of  action  was 
powerfully  reinforced  by  the  doctrines  of  government  by  £^t  J »  ^ 
consent  which  were  brought  forward  by  the  Revolution, 
and  it  remained  to  challenge  the  work  of  the  Alliance  as  it 
had,  in  an  earlier  age,  challenged  the  strength  of  the  Em- 
pire.    In  the  period  from  1789  onward  the  nationalistic 
movement  appeared  to  its  supporters  to  be  the  embodiment 
of  progress  and  justice  struggling  against  the  forces  of 
death  and  tyranny.    To  the  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance  , 
it  appeared  to  be  a  force  of  anarchy  pure  and  simple.    For  , 
this  reason  they  employed  every  available  agency  against  it.  y 
The  principal  agency  of  international  control  used  by  J^ 
the  Alliance  was  intervention.2     Of  course,  when  any  diffi-  +       cf    J 

•"•••^ •**^*****1**  ylL-t  JL.  +>  mj     * 

culty  arose  the  first^step  was  (conference,  with  or  without'  * 

participation  by  the  offending  parties,  and  conference  was 
followed  by  a  recommendation  regarding  the  action  to  be 
taken  in  the  interests  of^  ffiffifti  fiBl!  VT^fe1*  Such  recom- 
mendation, if  adopted,  could  be  embodied  in  an  agreement 
which  would  settle  the  matter  once  and  for  all.  But  in  the 
last  resort,  where  voluntary  acceptance  of  the  mediatory 
suggestions  was  not  forthcoming,  collective  intervention 
with  the  use  of  military  or  naval  force — intervention  which 
might  take  the  simple  forms  of  invasion  and  occupation,  or 
the  more  complex  form  of  pacific  blockade — was  always  in 
the  background.3  A  threat  might  be  sufficient,  but  whether 
force  was  actually  employed  or  only  threatened,  the  juristic 
nature  of  the  proceeding  was  the  same. 

Now  according  to  common  or  customary  international  ^ £,, 
law  individual  nations  are  free  to  follow  their  own  policies 
in  spite  of  the  views  of  other  nations,  except  in  so  far  as 
they  have  limited  themselves  by  the  adoption  of  certain 
customary  or  conventional  rules  and  principles  for  the 
regulation  of  international  relations.  Each  state  is  free 

1  Above,  Chap.  IV. 

aOn  the  methods  of  the  Alliance  see  Phillips,  159-266.     On  intervention 
see  Hodges,  and  Stowell,  Intervention,  entire. 

1  On  pacific  blockade  see  Hogan,  entire,  as  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  25. 


420  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

to  judge  for  itself  of  the  nature  of  those  limitations  and 
their  effect  upon  its  own  action.  _N°  state  may  enforce  the 
rules  of  law  upon  another,  but  may  only  demand  voluntary 
obedience  to  those  rules,  threatening  various  actions  if  the 
demand  is  not  met,  actions  which  may  vary  from  economic 
retaliation  to  the  most  serious  steps  known  to  international 
law.  The  aggrieved  state  is  entitled,  in  the  last  resort,  to 
go  to  war  for  the  satisfaction  of  its  rights,  and  it  can  be 
said  that  the  first  state  is,  from  the  beginning,  under  legal 
obligation  to  satisfy  those  rights.1  Does  this  apply  to  the 
Alliance  and  intervention  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
balance?  Is  this,  on  the  other  hand,  the  most  that  can  be 
said  in  describing  the  power  and  action  of  the  Alliance  in 
the  years  1815-25? 

It  is  certainly  true  that  the  Alliance  enjoyed,  and  could 
enjoy,  no  right  of  general  supervision  over  the  actions  of 
individual  states.  It  could  not,  as  of  right,  claim  any  such 
wide  jurisdiction  over  even  its  own  members.  Much  less 
could  it  claim  such  jurisdiction  over  outsiders.  Nor  could 
it,  a  fortiori,  claim  any  general  right  of  intervention  to 
make  good  such  supervisory  jurisdiction.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  so  far  as  the  Alliance  or  its  members  merely  de- 
/  manded  the  observance  of  established  rules  of  international 
law,  it  was  wholly  within  its  rights,  even  when  it  threatened 
to  back  up  that  demand  by  physical  force.  Moreover,  the 

/individual  states  to  whom  such  a  demand  was  addressed 
were  under  legal  obligation  to  submit  to  that  demand.    It 
is  frequently  forgotten  that  in  demanding  its  rights — pro- 
.  viding  that  what  is  demanded  really  is  an  established  right 
/  — a  state  is  not  assuming  to  dictate  to  another,  but  is  simply 
acting  under  a  system  of  law  deriving  its  authority  from 
other,  broader,  sources,  including  the  consent  of  the  state 
upon  whom  the  demand  is  made. 

In  actual  historical  fact  the  Holy  Alliance  was  demand- 

1  On   methods  of   securing  redress   at  international  law,   in   general,   see 
Hall,  §§  118-122. 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   421 

ing   the    observance    of   the   principle    of   legitimacy,    ofv 
hereditary   succession  to  political  and  territorial   sover-  * 
eignty,  and  opposing  the  principle  of  popular  revolution  or  i, 
a  claim  to  a  right  to  set  up  independent  states  and  govern-  y/*1 
ments  by  force  in  defiance  of  accepted  constitutional  law.  ,v 
It  is  no  great  help  to  say  that  this  meant  interference  in 
"domestic"  affairs  and  "constitutional"  questions,  for  at 
the  time  under  consideration  the   "law  of  nations"   or 
"public  law  of  Europe"  covered  both  what  we  now  con- 
sider purely  international  questions  and  certain  subjects 
among  what  we  now  consider  purely  domestic  questions. 
And  surely  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  new  states 
was  an  international  question.    It  is  no  great  help,  more- 
over, merely  to  say  that  the  Alliance  was  trying  to  fly  in 
the  face  of  progress,  to  strangle  at  birth  the  elementary 
forces  of  democratic  national  life.     If  the  Alliance  was 
standing  upon  the  law  of  nations  as  it  existed  at  the  time, 
then  the  Alliance  was  in  the  right,  from  a  legal  point  of 
view,  and  its  aim  was  largely  that  maintenance  of  inter- 
national  law  and  order  which  is  not  without  merit  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world  today.    The  Alliance  was,  in  truth,  en- 
gaged in  trying  to  minimize  the  use  of  military  force  for 
international  reorganization,  in   a  period  like   our   own, 
when  force  had  already  been  used  too  extensively  for  that 
purpose. 

Does  this  mean  that  the  maintenance  of  the  interna- 
tional equilibrium  inevitably  commits  us  to  such  action  as 
the  suppression  of  progress,  the  prevention  of  growth  and 
change  in  the  state-system?  Is  not  such  a  task  impossible? 
How  can  we  prevent  the  increase  of  power  of  a  progressive 
state,  the  break-up  of  mature  or  even  decrepit  states? 
How  can  we  hope  to  regulate  and  control  international 
birth,  life,  and  death  in  the  interest  of  world  peace  and 
order? 

If  the  problem  had  to  be  faced  in  just  this  form  it  would    7 
be  impossible  of  solution.     If  order  and  progress  were    * 


422  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


^ 


necessarily  conflicting  elements  in  the  international  prob- 
lem the  outcome  would  be  perpetual  conflict.  National 
growth  must  and  will  go  on,  and  some  attempts  to  preserve 
order  will  always  be  made  by  those  states  which  stand  to 
benefit  by  the  established  order.  But  if  we  turn  again  to 
the  behavior  of  the  Holy  Alliance  it  will  appear  that  the 
conflict  between  progress  and  order  in  that  day  was  brought 
about  by  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Alliance  to  recognize 
that  the  existing  settlement  might  be  unjust,  that  it  might, 
in  reality,  be  unstable  and  unbalanced,  not  stable  and  well 
balanced,  and  that  it  could — and  even  must — be  revised 
while  still  preserving,  and  even  in  order  to  preserve — a 
condition  of  equilibrium  in  Europe.  The  real  object  of  the 
anxieties  of  the  Allies  was  not,  it  would  appear,  the  preser- 
vation of  a  condition  of  equilibrium  in  Europe  but  the 
i preservation  of  that  order  of  things  which  profited  them  at 
the  time.  Serving  that  object,  they  betrayed  the  cause  of 
peace  and  order  and  paved  the  wa}^  for  revolution  and  war. 
The  balance  of  power  or  the  equilibrium  of  Europe  was 
sacrificed  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  alterations  in  the  exist- 
ing status  by  gradual  processes  of  revision  and  reorganiza- 
tion. 

The  solution  of  the  apparent  conflict  between  the  ideal 
of  order  and  equilibrium  and  the  fact  of  change  lies,  there- 
fore, in  the  practice  of  constant  reorganization  by  consent. 
Every  settlement,  every  order  of  things,  every  status  quo, 
is  in  some  measure  unjust,  unbalanced,  almost  as  soon  as  it 
is  made.  It  must  be  rectified  and  the  balance  corrected  by 
constant  revision,  not  by  force  so  much  as  by  consent  ap- 
plied in  the  recognition  of  new  and  changing  facts.  In 
asking  whether  such  a  process  is  feasible  and  whether  such 
consent  is  obtainable,  we  may  profitably  turn  to  the  efforts 
made  for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  order  in  Europe 

rafter  the  failure  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
i         The  Concert  of  Europe  grew  up  in  the  second  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century  on  the  ruins  of  the  Alliance  and 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  423 

on  the  basis  of  the  claim  put  forward  by  the  Alliance  to 
speak  in  the  name  of  all  Europe.1  The.  Concert  supervised 
the  liberation  of  Greece  from  Turkey  2  and  of  Belgium  from 
the  unwelcome  union  with  the  Netherlands,3  and  attempted 
to  guide  the  developmental:  Jbhe  Eastern  question  in  general 
from  1825  "onward.4 After  the  middle  of  We  century  it 
began  to  weaken.  The  Italian  problem  worked  itself  out  in 
1859  with  little  control  by  the  Concert;  here  nationalism 
won  without  its  aid.  The  Polish  question  of  1863  was 
allowed  to  drift  on  in  its  own  course ;  here  nationali sm  lost, 
with  the  Concert  impotent  to  prevent  that  result.  Confer- 
ences in  London  in  1852-64  did  not  prevent  Prussia  and 
Austria  from  taking  Schleswig  and  Holstein  from  Den- 
mark, nor  Prussia  from  expelling  Austria  from  Germany 
in  1866.5 

From  this  time  onward  the  game  was  hopeless.  The 
year  1867  saw  a  successful  action  by  the  Concert  in  the  case 
of  Luxembourg,  but  this  is  explained  by  sudden  fear  of 
war  on  the  part  of  France  and  Prussia,  rather  than  by  any 
great  skill  or  strength  on  the  part  of  the  Concert.6  During 
the  years  from  1870  to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914  the 
increasing  division  of  Europe  into  two  hostile  alliances 
wrecked  the  Concert  completely.  On  the  one  side,  the 
agreement  between  England  and  France  controlled  the  out- 
come of  the  Egyptian  controversy  rather  than  any  views  of 
the  Concert  as  a  whole,  and  the  rivalry  between  France  and 
Germany  prevented  any  really  concerted  action  regarding 
Morocco.7  To  the  competition  of  alliances  which  gradually 
supplanted  the  Concert  we  shall  turn  in  a  later  chapter.8 
It  remains  here  to  notice  why  the  Concert  succeeded  where 

1  On  the  Concert  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  25,  especially 
Holland,  Concert,  and  Dupuis,  114-513. 
1  Holland,  4-33. 

*  Dupuis,  199-230. 
4  Holland,  4-322. 

•  Dupuis,  291-307,  308-316,  316-329. 
8  Same,  340-349. 

'Same,  411-443,  444-492. 
8  Below,  Chap.  XXVII. 


424  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

./  /the  Alliance  failed  and  how,  in  detail,  the  Concert  actually 
\did  its  work.    Why  it  also  failed  will  be  discovered  later. 

The  Concert  succeeded  where  the  Alliance  failed  be- 
cause it  made  provision  for  changes  in  the  existing  state- 
system  in  accord  with  the  needs  of  the  time.    Greece  and 
jlBelgium  secured  their  independence  as  they  could  not  have 
"done  under  the  principle  of  the  Alliance.    Not  that  there 
was  no  war.    The  prevention  of  .all  war  is  less  in  point  in 
this  question  than  the  promotion  of  such  a  development  of 
international  relations  as  will,  in  the  long  run  and  in  the 
Y  balance  of  calculations,  tend  to  eliminate  war  and  also 
satisfy  the  just  demands  of  the  states.     But  can  it  be 
maintained  either  that  the  Concert  preserved  the  balance 
of  power  or  that  it  operated  by  the  method  of  consent! 
If  a  balance  existed  before  the  achievement  of  Greek  inde- 
endence,  did  not  the  Concert  destroy  that  balance  f    If  the 
alance  was  lacking  until  the  action  of  the  Concert  was 
taken  in  each  case, — and  that  action  was,  it  may  be  men- 
tioned,  usually  undertaken  only  after  the  initial  movement 
had  been  made  by  an  outside  state  or  national  group, — did 
the  Concert  not  tolerate  conditions  of  instability  more  fre- 
quently than  it  attempted  to  remedy  them?    And  can  the 
sort  of  "consent"  yielded  by  Turkey  and  the  Netherlands 
be  made  the  basis  of  any  firm  assertions  or  conclusions 
whatever? 

The  first  question  implies  a  misconception  of  the  nature 
f  the  balance  or  equilibrium  of  power.  What  is  to  be 
maintained  is,  not  any  given  status  or  alignment,  but  such 
a  status  or  distribution  of  power  that  each  state  may  be  in 
a  position  freely  to  live  its  own  life.  This  means  that  as 
time  passes  a  given  status — a  given  distribution  of  terri- 
tory or  population,  of  allegiance  and  sovereignty — may  be- 
come obsolete  and  press  for  change.  The  balance  or  equi- 
librium of  things  is  then  to  be  served,  not  by  a  vain  attempt 
to  preserve  the  existing,  or,  rather,  the  pre-existing,  bal- 
ance, but  by  revising  the  legally  established  order.  What 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCEET  OF  EUROPE   425 

the  Concert  commonly  did  was  to  re-define  the  balance; 
it  did  not  destroy  a  condition  of  balance  in  favor  of  a  con- 
dition of  unbalance,  but  rather  it  supplanted  an  increas- 
ingly inadequate  formula  of  equilibrium  with  a  new  and 
accurate  formula ;  it  did  not  deliberately  tolerate  conditions 
of  unbalance,  but  moved  to  remedy  them  when  evidence 
appeared  that  such  conditions  existed.  The  Concert  did 
not,  indeed,  engage  in  preventive  action  as  freely  as  it 
might  have  done.  This  is  due  mainly  to  the  lack  or  uncer- 
tainty of  its  jurisdiction  and  to  the  tradition  that  interim-  j^S 

*****^^»«^^^*^^*»*»^*l^^i^^^^i^^^*^*<**-          ^feS% 

tional  cooperation  should  take  place  only  upon  direct  and 
immediate  provocation,  not  for  general  purposes.  But 
when  problems  had  once  arisen,  it  did  attempt  to  devise 
solutions  which  would  last,  and  it  had  the  courage  and 
judgment  to  recognize  the  facts  and  act  upon  them. 

This  may  appear  to  amount  to  commending  the  Concert 
for  accepting  every  change  that  came  along ;  it  may  appear 
to  reduce  the  task  of  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  to 
the  job  of  keeping  pace  with  the  upsets  which  constantly  \/ 
overtake  that  mythical  condition.     In  the  sense  that  the 
decisive  facts  in  the  problem  are  to  be  found  outside  the 
realm  of  diplomacy,  politics,  and  law,  and  that  the  existing 
political  and  legal  balance  is  either  upset  or  not  upset  as 
a  result  of  economic  and  social  forces  working  independ- 
ently of  it,  this  is  true.    The  task  of  law  and  government  in  •. 
this  problem  is  to  register  and  embody  the  forces  of  a  non- 
political  nature, — the  growth  of  population,  the  increase 
of  wealth,  of  intelligence,  01  national  feeling.    The  balance  \? 
of  power  in  the  sense  of  the  actual  distribution  of  power  ** 
will  always  be  what  in  fact  it  is,  and  no  diplomatic  leger-  v 
demain  can  alter  the  facts  of  nature. 

The  suggestion  is  probably  true  also  in  another  sense. 
It  must,  apparently,  be  admitted  that  it  is  finally  impossible 
to  prevent  the  expansion  and  development  of  any  given 
state  which  is  in  a  natural  position  to  develop  its  power  and 
might.  If  the  preservation  of  the  international  equilibrium 


426  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

depended  upon  the  stifling  of  natural  growth  it  would  be 
both  an  unrighteous  and  a  futile  task.  How  then  can  the 
equilibrium  be  preserved?  If  states  are  to  be  allowed  to 
develop  as  they  can,  and  new  states  to  come  into  being  if 
natural  forces  demand  it,  how  can  we  prevent  a  disruption 
of  the  public  peace  and  order,  and  consequent  danger  to  the 
rights  and  interests  of  existing  states'?  The  answer  to 
these  questions  may  be  found  by  again  observing  the  be- 
havior of  the  Concert,  particularly  upon  the  question  of 
obtaining  the  consent  of  the  interested  states  to  the  neces- 
sary changes  in  the  existing  state-system. 

*  Q  The  consent  of  the  interested  states  was  obtained  by  the 

VMX^X  vl  Concert  by  a  process  which  may  be  described  as  the  fund- 
ing or  generalization  of  interests  or  rights,  accompanied  by 
a  correlative  funding  or  generalization  of  power.  Turkey 
would  be  injured  by  the  creation  of  independent  Greece, 
would  refuse  consent,  oppose  it,  and  have  a  right  to  oppose 
v}  it,  and,  probably,  would  be  able  to  oppose  it  successfully  if 

*l  *  the  question  were  allowed  to  remain  a  Greco-Turkish  ques- 
tion alone.  But  when  it  was  asserted  and  recognized  that 
^e  Questi°n  of  Greek  independence,  with  all  that  it  in- 
volved, interested  all  the  Powers  and  affected  their  peace 
and  safety  and  the  public  peace  and  justice  of  Europe  gen- 
erally,  the  way  was  ojpen  £o~take  care  of  the  problem  so 

^^w^****  ^^^^*^^'^^*lf******f*****'l*'^^^*i^^m^lt'i*9*fmt*&*^^^**^*^t^&*>^*0*rSif**il*i*^^^***i^^*i^^*^^*^*f 

as  to  satisfy  all  interests  and  demands.  Turkish  consent 
could  be  obtained — that  type  of  consent  which  emerges 
from  a  balancing  of  alternatives  in  all  such  situations — by 
bringing  forward  considerations  which  would  set  the 
Turkish  loss  in  one  direction  off  against  gains  in  another 
direction,  such  as  continued  support  from  the  Powers  which 
would  otherwise  be  lost.  Turkish  rights  must  be  considered 
lin  conjunction  with  the  rights  of  the  Powers  to  act  in  de- 
( f ense  of  their  own  peace  and  safety.  Turkish  power  to 
deny  Greek  demands  must  be  weighed  in  conjunction  with 
the  power  of  the  whole  Concert.1 

1  The  Greco-Turkish  case  is  best  discussed  in  Holland,  4-13.     The  consent 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUEOPE   427 

So  it  is  in  all  cases  where  a  change  in  the  status  quo  is 
involved.  The  case  just  discussed  involved  no  danger  to 
the  existing  states  except  Turkey,  apart  from  t£L^£E^ISJ 
danger  of  continued  injustice  and  consequent  unrest  and 
war  in  the  Balkans.  If  the  change  had  involved  an  expan- 
sion of  power  for  one  state,  such  as  would  have  been  con- 
sidered a  threat  to  neighboring  states,  the  same  method  of 
generalization  of  rights  and  power  could  be  employed  to 
take  care  of  the  situation.  Thus,  assuming  that  the  Con- 
cert had  been  able  to  function  properly  in  1908  when 
Austria-Hungary  annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  what 
would  have  happened  1  The  question  would  have  been  rec- 
ognized to  be  one  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  all 
the  Powers  were  involved  and  in  whose  settlement  they 
therefore  had  a  right  to  a  voice.  And  if  the  annexation 
appeared  to  be  dictated  by  sound  principles  of  international 
political  relations, — if,  for  example,  it  had  been  based  upon 
the  economic  interests  and  the  desires  of  the  people  of 
Bosnia  and  had  been  recognized  and  agreed  to  as  such, — 
the  consequent  expansion  of  power  for  Austria-Hungary 
would  have  worn  a  different  aspect.  Such  an  expansion 
with  the  consent  and  approval  of  the  Concert  would  not  be 
the  menace  which  it  would  be  in  contrary  circumstances. 
It  is  arbitrary,  artificial,  and  forced  expansions  of  power 
that  disturb  the  natural  distribution  of  forces  in  the  state- 
system  and  provide  incitement  and  precedents  for  similar 
forced  expansions  in  the  future,  that  are  dangerous  to  the 
peace  and  safety  of  other  states.  A  great  state  based  upon 
natural  facts,  not  upon  dynastic  imperialism,  composed  of 
contented  instead  of  rebellious  peoples,  is  not  a  menace  to 
its  neighbors.  Moreover,  the  Concert,  functioning  as  such, 
would  be  ample  enough  and  powerful  enough  to  assimilate 
and  take  up  into  its  complex  constitution  the  expanded 

of  Turkey  was  obtained,  ostensibly,  in  1829,  by  military  action,  war  pleno  jure, 
by  Eussia  (Holland,  11)  ;  this  action  must  be  considered,  however,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  activities  of  France  and  Britain  in  conference  with  Eussia. 


428  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Austria.  No  such  effect  could  be  hoped  for  if  the  indi- 
vidual states,  or  even  limited  combinations  of  those  states 
joined  in  the  old  type  of  alliances  for  mutual  defense,  were 
left  to  face  the  new  Austria  depending  on  their  own 
strength  alone.  Finally,  if  the  expansion  were  not  dic- 
tated by  sound  principles  the  Concert  would  be  in  a  posi- 
tion effectively  to  veto  the  expansion  where  individual 
states  or  limited  alliances  would  not  be — and  in  the  actual 
conditions  of  Europe  in  1908  were  not — so  able.1 

The  final  form  of  international  combination  for  preserv- 

j  ing  the  equilibrium  of  power  is,  therefore,  the  general  m- 

ternational  concert;  and  the  final  form  of  Ihe  equilibrium 

j  itself  is  at  the  same  time  to  be  found  in  the  generalization 

\  of  power  in  this  international  concert. 

It  has  been  said  that  intervention  was  the  method  of 
control  commonly  employecTby  the iHoly  Alliance  and  that 
such  action  could  only  be  justified  on  other  grounds,  such 
as  defense  of  national  rights  and  interests.  In  the  later 
period,  from  1825  to  1865,  there  came  a  change  on  both  of 
these  points.  The  Concert  did  not  commonly  resort  to 
intervention,  but  more  frequently  employed  other  methods 
V  of  control.  Similarly,  there  developed  a  general  recogni- 
tion of  the  claim  of  the  Concert  to  act  as  a  committee  of 
public  safety  in  Europe — a  development  which  also  ex- 
plains, in  part,  the  fact  that  the  Concert  did  not,  and  did 
not  need  to,  intervene  by  force  as  frequently  as  did  the 
Alliance.  At  the  same  time  the  Concert  developed  methods 
V^of  operation  deserving  attention  in  their  own  name. 

The  initial  step  taken  by  the  Concert  in  all  cases  was 
discussion  or  conference,  with  or  without  the  participation 
of  the  state  or  group  involved  in  the  question  under  ex- 
amination. The  next  step  was  to  intervene  diplomatically 
and  make  recommendations  in  the  premises.2 

1  For  description  of  the  Bosnian  case  as  it  actually  worked  itself  out  see 
Seymour,  179-182. 

*  For  a  typical  act  of  intervention  and  recommendation  by  the  Concert  see, 
below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  13. 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   429 

So  far  the  Concert  followed  the  Alliance  in  its  methods. 
Like  the  Alliance,  it  might  go  on  to  support  its  diplomatic 
intervention  by  force  of  arms.  This  it  did  not  need  to  do 
very  frequently.  But  diplomatic  intervention,  whether  or 
not  carried  out  by  force  of  arms,  if  successful,  must  pro- 
duce certain  results  in  the  realm  of  politics  and  law,  such 
as  consent  to  a  cession  of  territory,  or  the  granting  of  cer- 
tain rights  to  certain  persons.  The  next  step  was  to  at- 
tempt to  render  these  results  permanent.  For  this  purpose 
the  Powers  might  resort  to  the  device  of  the  guarantee, 
embodied  in  a  treaty  of  guarantee  or  in  a  clause  in  the 
treaty^  of  ^settlement.1  Such  a  treaty  defines  tEe  rights  v 
guaranteed, — for  example,  rights  of  jurisdiction,  commer-v~ 
cial  or  fishing  rights,  or  dynastic  rights  and  privileges,  and  v- 
the  action  to  be  taken  for  the  protection  of  that  guarantee,  v-- 
As  in  the  case  of  ordinary  alliances — for  this,  in  fact, 
closely  resembles  an  alliance — the  execution  of  the  guar- 
anty bond  is  a  delicate  and  of tenTa Avfewarcljmalftelr.'  ^Jtticb 
doubt  may  be  raised  regarding  the  obligations  of  the  parties 
to  act  under  the  treaty,  and  to  act  singly  or  in  concert ;  for 
guarantees  may  be  unilateral  or  mutual,  single  or  col- 
lective, joint  or  several.  Waiving  such  questions  of  appli- 
cation, however,  the  treaty  of  guarantee,  as  used  by  the 
Concert,  and  emboo!ymg^alf  it  Hoes"  a  clear  right  to  inter- 
vene for  its  execution  in  the  future,  is  very  nearly  the  last 
word  in  the  creation  of  international  control.  Indeed,  one 
experienced  student  of  international  organization  appears 
to  consider  it — rather  extravagantly — the  whole  story 
international  government.2 

If  any  criticism  is  to  be  made  of  the  treaty  of  guarantee, 
it  is  that  automatic  action  for  enforcement  is  not  obtain- 
able, and  that  the  enforcement  of  the  guarantee  depends 
upon  the  interest  and  willingness  of  the  guarantors  to  act 

1  On  treaties  of  guarantee   see   Milovanovitch,   entire.     For   example  see, 
below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  ,14. 
'Sayre,  as  cited,  Chap.  I.     »\ 


v 


430  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

when  the  time  comes,  and  not  upon  any  broader  basis^  such 
as  action  by  all  states.  For  this  reason  more  definite  re- 
sults may  be  oKtaine3  where  it  is  possible  to  create  by  an 
executed  agreement  a  status  which  then  remains  fixed  as 
recognized  by  all  the  world.  The  merit  of  such  a  step  is 
that  an  air  of  accomplished  fact  is  given  to  the  situation 
and  all  the  world  is  made  party  to  the  settlement.  This  is 
peculiarly  true  where  all  states  derive  certain  benefits  from 
the  status  created. 

Among  the  varieties  of  status  which  may  be  created 
and  guaranteed  are,  first,  territorial  possessions  and  inde- 
pendence. Such  a  guarantee  extends  only  to  existing  pos- 
sessions and  the  existing  degree  of  independence  and  does 
not  cover  new  additions  of  territory  or  new  rights  subse- 
quently acquired.  It^  nee  d  not  p^ejfejit  jvoljanj:arV-  changes 
in  the  existing  status.  It  involves  an  approval  of  that 
status,  and,  indirectly,  it  implies  a  ruling  upon  the  proper 
bases  of  territorial  jurisdiction  in  general  ;  and  it  depends 
for  its  success  in  the  end  upon  the  justice  of  the  status 
guaranteed.  Yet  even  a  supremely  just  status  needs  recog- 
nition and  support  against  isolated  parties  who  may  oppose 
/it;  territory  and  independence  may  need  defensive  action 
f  for  their  protection  in  the  future,  for  they  may  be  at- 
\  tacked  by  outside  parties,  or  even  by  one  of  the  guarantors 
themselves.  If  carried  to  its  logical  extreme  and  applied 
generally,  this  method  would  lead  to  nothing  more  —  and 
nothing  less  —  than  cooperation  by  all  states  for  mutual 
defense,  a  general  international  guarantee  of  existing  pos- 
sessions and  independence  against  violent  attack. 

Where  the  status  created  is  of  a  different  type,  differ- 
ent, and  more  beneficial,  results  may  be  expected.  Thus 
the  status  of  territorial  neutrality,  which  is  usually  created 
mainly  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  certain  states  from 
attack,  may  be  calculated  to  enlist  at  least  the  defensive 
efforts  of  those  states.  Neutralization  as  applied  to  stra- 
tegic areas,  such  as  Switzerland  and  Belgium,  is  a  form  of 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   431 

stabilization  which  rests  upon  the  real  necessities  of  cer- 
tain imperiled  nations  and  will  enlist  their  support  for  its 
defense.1 

The  most  advanced  type  of  status  to  be  guaranteed  by 
the  nations, — most  advanced  because  most  directly  useful 
and  most  effective  and  secure, — is  internationalization,  or 
the  orjening  of  territory  or  of  certaTn  rights  to  the  use  of 
all  nations.  Thus  the  high  seas,  after  being  claimed  in 
whole  or  part  by  various  nations  for  centuries,  are  inter- 
nationalized by  common  international  law  and  practice,  as 
are  the  principal  international  straits.  International 

^BMlitfHttMMfeMMB^flf0''^^VVJ^^ 

rivers  are  being  increasingly  placed  in  the  same  condition 
By  treaty  agreements ;  *  the  same  is  true  for  such  canals-^K..^^^.^ 
as  those  at  Kiel,  Suez,  and  Panama.    The  public  maritime 
highways  of 'Hie  world  are  tnus  made  a  symbol  of  public 
international  authority.3 

Similarly,  colonial  territories  are  being  placed  in  a  con- 
dition where  all  states  may  enjoy  equal  opportunities^ 
therein  for  investment  and  trade.  The  jnandate  system 
established  in  connection  with  the  League  of  Nations  is  a 
notable  embodiment  of  this  idea  of  the  open  door  and  equal 
opportunity.  How  this  attempt  will  work  out  in  the  future 
remains  to  be  seen.  But,  whether  or  not  it  is  successful  as  ;_ 
an  application  of  the  principle,  it  constitutes  another  effort  ** 
to  establish  international  control  in  the  field  of  otherwise 
free  international  competitive  struggle.  In  all  parts  of  the  v" 
world  to  which  this  treatment  is  applied  the  door  is  de- 
clared open  and  national  monopoly  forbidden.  In  these 
cases,  moreover,  the  parties  benefited  by  the  arrangement 
are  so  increasingly  numerous,  and  the  benefit  is  so  real, 

1  On  status  in  general,  and  neutralization  in  particular,  gee  Wicker,  entire, 

especially  70-72;  for  example  of  neutralization  see,  below,  Appendix  A,  Docu-  \ 

ment  No.  5. 

'See,  for  example,  Chamberlain,  Danube,  cited  below,  Appendix  B,   §  25.   \s 
"On  freedom  of  international  waterways  see  Hall,    §§39-42,   and,  more^ 

generally,    Duggan,    Chaps.    XII    and   XIV    (Chamberlain    and    Gettell)    and 

references. 


432  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

that  a  violation  or  overturn  of  the  status  created  is  less  and 
less  likely.1 

It  should  be  noted,  in  passing,  that  in  the  end  neutraliza- 
tion and  internationalization  come  to  be  one  and  the  same 
thing.  Guaranteed  neutrality  usually  involves  a  surren- 
der of  certain  rights  of  offensive  and  defensive  military 
action  by  the  guaranteed  state  and  an  acceptance  of  pro- 
tection from  the  guarantors,  that  is,  a  subjection  of  that 
state  to  a  more  or  less  limited  international  control. 
Moreover,  perfect  neutralization  is  obtained  only  when  all 
states  join  in  the  action;  and  this  is,  in  effect,  interna- 
tionalization. Where  the  process  of  neutralization  is  ap- 
plied to  uninhabited  territories,  or  to  bodies  of  water,  it 
amounts  to  opening  these  areas  to  free^Tntermftimiai  use, 
which,  again,  is  internationalization.  It  may  also  be  men- 
tioned that  it  has  been  found  useful  to  neutralize  certain 
territories  in  the  process  of  bringing  them  under  the  con- 
trol of  international  administration.2  The  destruction  or 
removal  of  unilateral  national  rights  over  a  territory  or  a 
water  area  is  almost  certain  to  result  in  the  substitution 
of  affirmative  international  jurisdiction  over  it ;  and  as  in- 
ternational cooperation  develops  further  and  further  this 
type  of  action  will  probably  be  resorted  to  with  increasing 
frequency. 

In  the  fifty  years  prior  to  1914  the  international  concert 
was,  in  spite  of  the  increasing  employment  of  all  these  de- 
vices, largely  ineffective.  The  agencies  of  conference  and 
intervention,  guarantee,  neutralization,  and  international- 
ization, were  of  little  use  in  preserving  public  order  and 
justice  in  the  world.  On  one  hand,  there  developed  an  in- 
creasing interest  in,  and  knowledge  of,  international  affairs, 

1  On  freedom  of  access — and  the  extent  to  which  it  exists — see  Duggan, 

Chap.  XI   (Borchard),  and  references;  fororigin  of  the  mandate  system  and 

/     its  relation  to  the  open  door  &ee  Biship7*Tp4907  19^  49y,  "an5"for~nmndate 

system  ifi  general  see  \iovenani,  Art.  A.XII    (below,  Appendix  A,  Document 

No.  15)  and  Levermore  (texts)  59-69. 

'  As  in  the  case  of  the  Cape  Spartel  lighthouse ;  Sayre,  48. 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   433 

and  an  increasing  inclination  to  accept  and  promote  some 
form  of  international  concert  and  control.  While  the 
traditional  opposition  to  any  general  right  of  intervention, 
based  upon  the  doctrine  of  state  independence,  was  main-  ... 
tained,  the  idea  of  the  responsibility  and  authority  of  the 
leading  powers  for  the  peace  and  order  of  the  world  grew 
stronger  and  stronger.  On  the  other  hand,  certain  forces  •  •"' 

came  into  operation  which  more  than  equaled  this  develop- 
ment and  nullified  its  effects.  It  remains  to  examine  what, 
in  general,  were  the  forces  which  defied  the  best  efforts  of 

0  -••  7**"  '  — r«i»»in*h*«JBaBfc 

the  Concert  and  all  its  agencies  of  international  control. 

At  the  center  of  the  resistance  was  the  simple  and 
familiar  force  of  nationalism  which  has  been  encountered 
so  frequently  in  the  course  of  this  study,  both  as  a  friend 
and  a  foe  of  international  organization.  National  con-  -,r^  jf 
sciousness  and  the  nationalist  spirit  are  still  so  strong  ' 
among  the  newer  states,  the  experience  of  independence 
is  still  so  novel  for  some  nations,  that  there  is  often  little 
patience  with  ideas  of  the  common  international  welfare, 
or  even  with  notions  of  permanent  if  indirect  national 
benefit  as  against  immediate  if  temporary  advantage ;  and 
hence  there  is  little  desire  for  international  organization. 
Contrary  to  common  impressions,  itj.s  in  the  smaller  and 
newer  states  that  nationalism  is  found  in  its  worst  forms. 
A  secure  and  satisfied  nationalism  is  a  stable  factor  in  inter- 
national relations  and  a  good  basis  for  international  co- 
operation, but  an  insecure  and  still  sensitive  nationalism 
is  not. 

The  excesses  of  the  nationalistic  spirit  have  led  to  a 
reaction  against  it  in  the  minds  of  many  students  of  world 
affairs  in  recent  years.  That  reaction  has  already  been 
discussed  as  it  has  leaned  to^^ar^cosmopolitanism.1  They 
have  led  also  to  a  supersophistical  reaction  toward  em- 
pire as  a  means  of  bringing  peace  and  order  in  a  too, 
too  nationalistic  world.  This  reaction  likewise  has  been 

1  Above,  Chap.  I. 


434  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

noted.1  During  the  years  prior  to  1914  both  of  these  reac- 
tions found  vigorous  expression.  Suddenly,  with  the 
breaking  of  the  spell  which  had  rested  upon  Europe  since 
1870,  the  force  of  nationalism  burst  forth  again — with  all 
of  its  objectionable  features  present,  it  is  true,  but  also 
with  all  its  promise  of  stability  later.  In  one  sense  it  was 
the  pressure  of  these  nationalities  demanding  liberation 
from  imperial  oppression  that  gave  its  tone  to  the  period 
preceding  1914.  The  pathos  of  the  situation  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  great  breakdown  came  largely  because  of  the 
necessity  for  that  liberation  of  suppressed  nations  which 
by  itself  would  have  made  such  a  breakdown  unnecessary 
if  it  had  been  achieved  earlier.2 

The  operation  of  the  force  of  nationalism  in  bringing  on 
the  catastrophe  of  1914  was  indirect.  The  war  did  not 
come  as  a  direct  result  of  rebellion  in  Poland  or  Bohemia 
or  Ireland.  It  came  directly  as  a  result  of  German  impe- 
rialism. Yet  the  latter,  in  its  Prussian  and  Austrian  em- 
bodiments, was,  on  one  hand,  the  product  of  an  earlier 
nationalistic  development  and,  on  the  other,  was  merely 
given  its  current  form  by  those  in  a  position  to  profit  from 
a  use  of  its  power  in  conflict  with  newer  nationalist  move- 
ments which  they,  in  turn,  sought  to  stifle.  Germanic 
nationalism  had  become  nationalistic  imperialism.3  The 
monarchs  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  were  attempting  to  use 
/  nationalism  for  imperialistic  objects,  as  had  Napoleon  a 
'  century  before.  Ironical  and  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem, 
empire  was  to  be  built  upon  the  foundation  of  nationalism. 
Closely  allied  to  this  development  was  the  movement 
of  commercial  imperialism  which  bulked  so  large  in  the 
same  generation.  Commercial  imperialism  may,  of  course, 
be  discovered  in  the  colonizing  movement  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  But  with  the  increase  of  population  at  home,  the 

1  Above,  Chap.  I. 

2  On  nationalism  as  a  cause  of  the  War  see  Toynbee,  entire,  especially 
1-20,  476-500. 

8  On  national  imperialism  in  Germany  see  Lair,  entire. 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   435 

improvement  of  means  of  transportation,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  machine  processes  of  manufacture,  the  demand 
upon  the  newer  territories  of  the  earth  for  food,  raw  ma- 
terials, and  markets  became  so  overmastering  as  to  lead  to 
a  great  wave  of  commercial  imperialism  in  the  years  after 
1878,  such  as  is  best  exemplified  in  the  partition  of 
Africa.1  An  attempt  was  made  at  the  Berlin  Conference  ,- 
in  1884-85  to  apply  to  this  movement  vthe  methods  of  con- 
cert, and  more  success  was  attained  than  might  have  been 
expected, — more,  also,  than  could  have  been  hoped  for  ten 
or  twenty  years  later.2  Yet  the  best  that  can  be  said  is  that ' 
the  precarious  balance  was  preserved  by  a  process  of  par- 
tition without  much  reference  to  anything  but  financial 
profits  and  national  power.  The  fundamental  forces  at  the 
bottom  of  things  were  left  untouched. 

Such  empire  is  better,  of  course,  than  empire  over 
advanced  peoples.  It  is  even  possible  to  talk  with  sincerity 
of  carrying  civilization  to  the  natives,  and  to  arouse  the 
noblest  as  well  as  the  lowest  minds  in  the  cause.  Even  the 
laboring  class  will  respond  to  the  idea  of  coloring  further 
sections  of  the  map  red  or  white  or  blue,  and  popular  sup- 
port may  readily  be  secured  for  a  war  to  carry  democratic 
liberties  and  the  benefits  of  progress  to  oppressed  and 
backward  peoples.  Something  of  this  motive  entered  into 
the  American  war  with  Spain.  A  sort  of  popular  or  demo- 
cratic imperialism  may  be  developed,  working  upon  the 
basis  of  the  democracy  of  the  Revolution,  even  as  national- 
istic imperialism  utilizes  Revolutionary  nationalism  as  its 
motive  power.3 

Rising  still  higher  in  the  scale,  nationalism  turns  into 
pan-nationalism, — pan-Slavism,  pan-Germanism  and  so  on.4 
Such  movements  vary  from  pan-Germanism,  with  its  ad- 

1  On  the  partition  of  Africa  see  Gibbons,  entire,  especially  maps  at  32,  64. 
'Same,  27-33. 

*On  "democratic  imperialism"  see  Seilliere,  entire. 

*Leger,  L.P.M.,  " Le  Panslavisme."  Andler,  C.  (transl.  by  J.  S.),  " Pan- 
Germanism.  ' ' 


436  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

mixture  of  commercialism,  militarism,  and  dynastic  impe- 
rialism, to  Anglo-Saxonism,  with  its  reliance  upon  senti- 
ment and  voluntary  cooperation  for  mutual  assistance.1 
Yet  all  alike,  in  one  degree  or  another,  presented  difficul- 
ties and  obstacles  to  the  Concert  and  have  retarded  inter- 
national organization  in  general.  They  may  offer  quicker 
and  more  certain  returns  in  the  way  of  international  co- 
operation for  those  nations  and  peoples  participating  in 
them,  but  in  the  end  they  tend  to  obstruct  general  inter- 
national friendship  and  cooperation. 

No  mention  has  here  been  made  of  certain  types  of  state 
expansion  which  have  grown  up  along  with  these  principal 
^movements  of  nationalistic  and  commercial  imperialism, 
{  such  as  the  protectorate,  the  suzerainty,  and  the  sphere  of 
V influence;  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  Japanese  policy  in 
the  Far  East.2  All  such  activities  have  tended  in  the  past 
to  prevent  free  international  cooperation.  Concrete  evi- 
dence of  this  is  found  in  the  fact  that  it  was  felt  to  be  neces- 
sary to  recognize  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  basis  of  the 
mildest  of  these  movements,  as  an  exception  to  the  full 
application  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.3 
In  reviewing  the  agencies  of,  and  the  obstacles  to,  inter- 
national organization  and  international  cooperation  as  they 
have  developed  in  the  past  half -century,  such  devices  must 
be  placed  in  the  same  class  with  territorial  conquests  and 
imperial  domination  generally.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  es- 
capes from  this  class  in  so  far  as  it  is  merely  the  procla- 
mation of  a  policy  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
prevent  conquest  or  intervention  in  Latin  America.  In  so 
far  as  it  amounts  to  a  claim  to  a  general  sphere  of  interest 
in  those  regions,  it  is  on  a  par  with  Japanese  hegemony 
in  China  or  British  domination  in  Southern  Asia  as  a  hin- 

1  Kennedy,  S.,  "The  Pan-Angles." 

'On  protectorates  and  spheres  of  influence  see  Engelhardt,  entire;  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  Hart,  entire. 

'Covenant,  Art.  XXI,  and  Duggan,  301-303  (Kimball),  and  references. 


HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE   437 

drance  to  full  and  free  international  cooperation.  Even  so, 
we  may  prefer  to  maintain  the  Doctrine  and  let  the  world 
and  world  harmony  go  by  the  board.  Let  us,  however,  face 
the  problem  squarely  and  settle  it  with  open  eyes. 

We  have  now  reviewed  the  nature  and  development  of 
international  alliances  and  concerts  since  early  modern 
times,  and  their  more  or  less  ineffective  efforts  to  provide 
a  system  of  international  control.  These  efforts  inevitably 
suggest  the  creation  of  a  formal  international  league  or 
federation,  and  to  that  subject  we  now  turn. 


b 
^> 


PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION 

HE  repeated  proposal  of  projects  for  international 
federation  since  the  dawn  oTmodern  times  furnishes 
evidence  of  a  general  and  persistent  conviction  that  a  more 
comprehensive  scheme  of  international  government  is 
needed.  The  multiplication  of  such  proposals  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  and  in  the  opening  years  of  the  present 
century  indicates  an  intensification  of  that  conviction.  It 
is  worth  while  to  make  an_  analysis,  at  this  point,  of  the 
foundations  of  that  belief  and  of  the  purposes  of  those 
bringing  forward  various  schemes  for  international  f edera- 
Jtion.1 

_TheJbasic  idea  underlying  all  such  plans  is  the  simple 
and  elementary  truth  that  the  nation  is  npt.  as  such,  a  self- 
sufficient  unit,  and  that  there  is  a  constant  and  general  need 
»  for  international  cooperation  in  all  phases  of  world  affairs. 

/  'That  idea  is  so  simple  and  so  commonplace  that  it  is  usu- 
j  ally  passed  over  in  silence.  It  deserves,  however,  to  be 
\  put  in  the  very  forefront  of  any  discussion  of  the  problem 
•  of  international  federation. 

More  specifically,  the  cause  which  has  led  to  the  elabo- 
ration of  various  schemes  for  international  federation  is 
jf  the  insufficiency  of  the  existing  SYsiem  of  international 

t>  ij  government.  Even  if  the  need  for  cooperation  among  the 
nations  be  granted,  there  would  be  no  occasion  for  devising 
and  publishing  a  plan  for  world  federation  if  the  histori- 
cally existent  set  of  institutions  and  practices  were  not 

1  On    projects   for    international    federation    see    literature    cited,    below, 
Appendix  B,  §  26. 

438 


PROJECTS  FOB  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  439 
inadequate  to  the  needs  of  the  case.    The  system  of  inter- 


Marine  past  nas  been  too  loose,  too 
disjointed;  the  world  has  remained  unorganized  too  long 
and  too  widely.  The  alliances  of  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth, 
and  eighteenth  centuries,  and  the  system  of  the  balance  of 
power  of  which  they  were  the  embodiment ;  the  Holy  Alii- 
ance,  the  Concert  of  Europe,  and  even  the  cooperation  of 
the  nations  for  arbitral  and  administrative  purposes,  have 
been  judged  and  found  wanting.  By  their  meager  fruits 
it  is  known  that  they  have  not,  and,  by  their  nature  it  is 
seen  that  they  cannot,  possess  the  power  to  provide  a 
wholly  satisfactory  world  government.  The  alliances  of 
earlier  days  and  the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power  did 
not  prevent  international  relations  from  breaking  down  in 
repeated  wars,  and  Jjhey  did  not  provide  that  state  of  jus- 
tice, order,  and  safety  which  the  world  needed.  The  Holy; 

*Mf"p-       4AHHMM       **i-  --         OP*^***»  •  •  • '  **"•  '-•• 

Alliance  constituted  a  certain  slight  advance  in  the  right 
direction,  and  the  Concert  of  Europe  embodied  the  essen- 
tial principle  which  must  be  acted  on  if  any  results  are  to  j 
be  had  and  for  some  years  gave  that  principle  adequate  • 
expression  in  a  few  rather  narrow  cases.  And  the  latter 
part  of  the  past  century  saw  the  development  of  certain 
organs  of  government  of  still  greater  import.  When  the 
situation  between  Austria  and  Serbia  developed  as  it  did 
in  1914,  however,  these  steps  did  not  suffice.  The  critical 
test  of  those  days  in  July  and  August  brought  out  clearly 
the  fact  that  the  existing  system  of  international  govern- 
ment was  defective  and  incapable  of  conducting  inter- 
national relations  past  such  a  storm.  It  is  true  that  the 
main  obstacle  to  a  just  and  peaceful  settlement  in  1914, 
namely,  the  determination  of  the  Prussian  diplomatic  and 
military  chiefs  to  make  a  bid  for  imperial  conquests,  was 
such  that  it  may  appear  unduly  exacting  to  demand  a 
system  of  international  control  capable  of  taking  care 
of  such  a  crisis.  And  yet,  after  all,  the  situation  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  utterly  impossible.  A  solution  or  a 


440  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

method  of  securing  a  solution  was  very  nearly  obtained  at 
!)ta.  W*.IL     one  stage  of  the  crisis.1    And  the  important  point  is  that, 
whether  or  not  a  solution  could  have  been  obtained  in  that 
crisis  or  in  any  similar  crisis,  in  the  face  of  a  will  to  con- 
quest such  as  that  manifested  by  the  Prussian  diplomatic 
&KJ  and  military  group,  the  best  and,  indeed,  the  only  practi- 

cable method  for  obtaining  that  solution  was  not  available. 
The  existing  scheme  of  international  government  was  defi- 

f  M  ••*  i  ••      -•*^*»&fc  iii         »•        •  <•  —  i  ^  —• . 

J  (v/iv*  •  cient  at  the  most  vital  point  in  that  it  neither  provided 
in  advance  for  any  international  conference  to  take  up  such 
a  conflict  as  that  which  arose  between  Austria  and  Serbia, 
nor  offered  any  sure  method  of  obtaining  such  a  conference. 
The  solution  was  left  to  depend  completely  upon  the  possi- 
bility of  securing  the  consent  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute 
to  an  international  conference  on  the  question  after  the  Dis- 
pute had  arisen  and  when  the  atmosphere  was  of  precisely 
that  character  to  leave  the  parties  least  inclined  to  compro- 
mise and  conciliation.  The  proposals  for  international 
federation  which  appeared  in  1915  and  1916  reflect  this 
revelation  of  a  condition  of  international  anarchy. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  serious  student  of  the  problem  of 
world  government  realizes  that  this  condition  of  anarchy 
can  be  cured  only  by  taking  into  consideration  the  con- 
ditions jvhich  have  j)rodnced_it.  The  simplest  solution 
which  might  suggest  itself  is  thejsonceptof  the  world  .state. 
Yet,  except  in  so  far  as  the  proposed  world  state  should  be 
organized  in  a  federal  form,  such  a  plan  would  be  fantastic. 
The  nations  are  too  new,  too  young,  too  vigorous,  people 
are  too  firmly  attached  to  their  national  states  to  be  willing 
to  see  them  swallowed  up  in  a  unified  world  state.  If  na- 
tionalism is  so  powerful  as  to  present  an  obstacle  to  the 
\/  simpler  forms  of  international  cooperation,  how  much 
more  of  an  obstacle  does  it  present,  not  only  to  cosmopoli- 
tanism, as  has  been  seen,  but,  a  fortiori,  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  unified  and  centralized  world  state !  Federation 

1  Seymour,  264-270. 


PROJECTS  FOE  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  441 

is  the  only  practicable  form  of  world  political  organization. 
Even  that  may  not  be  practicable.  Certain  it  is  that  nothing 
higher  in  the  scale  of  state  forms  would  be  practicable.  Mr. 
Wells  is  impatient  with  a  world  organization  which  retains 
as  its  foundation  the  national  state-system.1  Such  a  posi- 
tion, it  must  be  said,  with  all  due  respect,  is  sheer  nonsense, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  sincere.  To  scorn  international  federation 
and  cry  after  a  unified  world  state  is  to  deny  support  to  an 
attainable  improvement  over  the  present  anarchy,  and 
waste  it  upon  an  unattainable  ideal. 

This,  then,  is  the  case  for  international  federation :  the^N 
nation  is  insufficient  by  itself  and  some  system  of  interna-  / 
tional  cooperation  is  needed ;  the  previously  existing  system  L 
of  international  government  is  inadequate  to  the  needs  of  1 
the  case ;  a  unified  world  state  is  impossible.  The  conclu-  J 
sion  is  obvious.  3jUtJir^oC£i  o>v  ? 

Moreover,  we  have  the  benefit  of  much  actual  historical 
experience  in  the  practice  of  international  federation.    It 
is  possible  to  review  the  record  of  international  federation 
in  the  past  and  learn  therefrom  not  only  its  practicality 
but  its  essential  prerequisites,  its  weaknesses  and  its  poten- 
tialities for  service,  and  this  by  itself  is  a  great  advantage 
for  this  form  of  political  organization.2     To  such  a  re-  < 
view  we  now  turn,  beginning  with  Greek  experiments  in    ' 
this  direction. 

As  far  back  as  the  early  part  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.  /J  C  « 
the  Delian  Confederacy  in  Greece,  under  Athenian  leader- 
ship, achieved  a  large  measure  of  success  in  the  field  to 
which  it  confined  its  activities.3  The  succeeding  centuries 
down  to  the  Christian  era  were  filled  with  activities  of  a 
similar  character.  The  Peloponnesian  League,  the  Boeo- 
tian League,  and  the  Athenian  Confederacy,  in  turn,  played 
their  part  in  interstate  organization  among  the  Greeks  in 

1  Salvaging  of  Civilization,  Chap.  I. 

8  On  history  of  federation  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  26. 

3  Fowler,  285-286;  Greenidge,  189-190;  Hart,  30;  Phillipson,  II,  13-17. 


442  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  period  before  the  Macedonian  invasion,1  and  lasted 
until  the  invader  arbitrarily  dissolved  such  federal  unions 
as  then  existed.2  After  the  breakdown  of  Macedonian  con- 
trol in  the  third  century  B.C.  the  movement  was  resumed. 
?he  ^Etolian  and  Achaean  leagues  succeeded  the  earlier 
efforts  at  interstate  federation,  and  the  latter  reached  such 
a  point  of  development  that  it  remained  until  the  end  of  the 
^  Medieval  period  the  highest  form  of  political  organization 
Imown  in  the  history  of  Europe.3  A  federal  foreign  policy 
was  evolved  by  this  League,  a  federal  military  organization 
was  created,  and  a  federal  executive  and  administrative 
system,  including  a  federal  budget,  was  instituted.  A  com- 
mon scale  of  weights  and  measures  was  adopted  and  like- 
wise a  common  currency.  There  were  present  also  the 
elements  of  a  federal  judiciary. 

After  the  final  invasion  and  conquest  of  Greece  by 
Rome  in  146  B.C.  interstate  federation  suffered  a  long 
eclipse.  Apart  from  the  feudal  system,  with  its  many  inter- 
state ties,  legal  and  political,  which  resembled  federalism 
only  very  indirectly,  we  must  turn  to  the  modern  world  for 
the  next  period  of  federal  experimentation  and  federal 
government.  The  Swiss  Confederation  arose  in  Medieval 
times,  but  did  not  attain  great  power  or  prestige  until  well 
into  the  modern  period.  The  Italian  leagues  of  the  four- 
teenth and  fifteenth  centuries  were  comparatively  petty 
things.  For  these  reasons,  and  for  other  reasons  not  im- 
portant enough  to  be  recited  here,  it  is  better  to  turn  to 
the  eighteenth  century  and  the  experiment  begun  in 
Philadelphia  in  1774,  1781,  and  1789  for  the  rise  of  modern 
federalism. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  American  adventure  the 
spread  of  federalism  has  been  rapid.  Switzerland  has  de- 
veloped her  federal  system  since  the  Napoleonic  period.4 

1  Fowler,  290-292;  Greenidge,  204-207;  Phillipson,  II,  19-24. 
•Fowler,  302. 

•Same,  302-305;  Hart,  31-32;  Phillipson,  II,  26-28. 
«Ogg,  559-563. 


PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  443 

Germany  found  the  federal  form  useful  in  1815,  again  in 
1871,  and  continued  under  that  form  when  a  new  con- 
stitution was  framed  in  1919.1  In  Australia,  in  South 
Africa,  and  in  Canada  the  federal  form  has  proved  of 
great  service.2  Several  Latin  American  nations  are  fed- 
erations of  otherwise  independent  states.3  Within  the  past 
year  the  Central  American  states  have  attempted  to  re- 
create their  sorely  tried  federal  union.4  Finally,  the  devel- 
opment of  colonial  empires  has  led  to  the  elaboration  of 
systems  of  state  organization  which  are  federal  in  every- 
thing but  name.  This  is  especially  true  where  the  metro- 
politan state  is  itself  organized  in  the  federal  form,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  United  States  and  her  colonies. 

The  United  States  of  America  still  remains  the  greatest  \ 
experiment  in  international  or,  to  be  very  strict  in  terrain-  | 
ology,  interstate  federation.  Previously  independent  colo-/ 
nies,  later  states,  combined  gradually  in  1774,  in  1781, 
and  finally  in  1789,  first  to  cooperate  without  any  formal 
union,  then  to  create  and  operate  a  confederacy,  and  then 
to  create  and  operate  a  federal  union.  Now  forty-eight 
states  maintain  this  union  and  enjoy  the  dual  advantages 
to  be  derived  from  that  form  of  organization.  The  legisla- 
ture, the  executive  system,  and  the  judiciary  all  reflect  in 
their  composition,  their  powers,  and  their  procedure,  the 
federal  character  of  the  nation.  Interstate  disputes  are 
settled  by  a  supreme  tribunal  according  to  the  constitu- 
tional law  of  the  union  if  possible,  and  according  to  common 
international  law  if  need  be.  The  United  States  thus  pre- 
sents the  greatest  example  of  interstate  federation  in  his- 
tory.5 

It  is  commonly  objected,  when  the  example  of  the  United 

'Ogg,  610,  619,  723. 

"Egerton,  entire;  for  constitutional  documents  see  collection  made  by  the 
writer  in  Carnegie  Endowment,  Division  of  International  Law,  Pamphlet  No.  33. 

3  Macy  and  Gannaway,  Chap.  LIX,  Eowe,  entire. 

4  New  York  Times,  11  October,  1921,  p.  20. 

5  Scott,  The  United  States  of  America:  A  Study  in  International  Organi- 
zation. 


c 


444  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

States  is  cited  in  this  connection,  that  we  are  not  here  deal- 
ing with  national  differences  reconciled  by  international 
federation  but  with  something  a  great  deal  simpler.  That 
is  true  in  some  comparisons ;  New  York  and  Pennsylvania 
differed  less  in  1774,  1781,  and  1789,  and  they  differ  less 
today,  than  do  Germany  and  China.  It  is  untrue  in  others ; 
Rhode  Island  and  Mississippi,  Delaware  and  Wyoming, 
differ  more  than  do  France  and  Spain,  France  and  Belgium, 
not  to  mention  Colombia  and  Venezuela.  Moreover,  the 
important  thing  at  this  point  is  not  to  decide  by  the  facts 
upon  the  feasibility  of  international  federation  but  to  ex- 
amine the  thgflrv  of  federalism  and  define  the  standards  to 
be  applied  in  deciding  upon  the  facts.  It  is  especially  useful 
in  this  day  when  international  federation  is  beng  proposed 
right  and  left  to  have  a  clear  idea  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  federation  is  proper  and  desirable.1 

The  most  elementary  antecedent  condition  of  affairs  for 
such  a  step  is  found,  of  course,  where  several  independent 
states  exist  side  by  side.  The  question  then  arises  whether 
or  not  a  federal  union  shall  be  created.  This  question  is 
to  be  answered  in  the  affirmative  only  where  the  mass  of 
interests  common  to  all  the  states  is  so  great  as  to  demand 
common  organs  of  government  to  take  care  of  them.  Par- 
ticular interests  must  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  local 
states.  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  anyone  proposing  fed- 
eral union,  an  obligation  to  show  that  a  central  government 
is  needed  in  addition  to  the  local  governments,  a  central 
/  government  beyond  any  cooperative  efforts  which  may  be 
made  by  concurrent  state  action,  by  alliances,  or  by  any 
form  of  association  short  of  federal  government. 

There  are  no  objective  mechanical  means  of  measuring 
this  mass  of  common  interest.  It  is  possible  for  the  student 
to  compute  the  amount  of  commerce  which  goes  on  among 
the  states  of  the  group  in  question,  to  record  the  amount 
of  interstate  travel  and  communication  in  existence  among 

1  On  the  theory  of  federation  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  26. 


PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  445 

them,  and  to  picture  the  degree  to  which  a  cosmopolitan  or 
interstate  life  has  developed.  When  that  is  done  some  light 
will,  indeed,  have  been  thrown  upon  the  advisability  of  cre- 
ating a  federal  union.  The  final  decision,  however,  depends 

•••••••tMMM^BMMMMhM^* 

upon  the  judgment  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  live  in  the  various  states.    After  all, 
it  is  impossible  to  anticipate  exactly  the  net  result  of  con- 
venience and  inconvenience  which  will  flow  from  creating  or 
failing  to  create  a  federal  union.    Those  who  are  to  live  \ 
un'der  the  union  must  decide,  more  or  less  at  a  venture,  as  J 
to  its  probable  utility.  />- 

Not  uncommonly,  the  decision  is  made  in  a  fashion  far 
less  precise  than  this.    Where  a  condition  of  cosmopolitan- 
ism  has  begun  to  develop  among  the  members  of  a  group  I *s*^    s 
of  states  the  simpler  forms  of  interstate  association — diplo-  j 
macy,  treaty  practice,  alliances — will  already  have  made  I        • 
their  appearance.    The  question  then  presents  itself  in  a 
familiar  form,  namely,  whether  or  not  the  loose  forms  of  \ 
association  existing  shall  be  converted  into  a  federal  union. 
More  frequently  still  the  degree  of  association  increases 
imperceptibly  until  federation  is  reached  unconsciously. 

The   problem   then   becomes    a   purely    scientific    one, 
namely,  to  discover  whether  or  not  federalism  has  actually ) 
made  its  appearance.    To  a  certain  extent  this  is  wholly  a ' 
problem  of  terminology,  but  it  is  of  a  degree  of  importance 
not  usual  in  problems  of  terminology.    After  all,  federal- v^ 
ism  is  the  decisive  first  stage  in  the  organization  of  a  single  V 
state  and  deserves  to  be  marked  out  carefully  as  it  occurs,  v^ 

The  most  useful  test  which  can  be  employed  to  discover  . 
the  existence  of  a  federal  union — most  useful  partially  be- 
cause of  its  ease  of  application — is  the  test  of  established 
organs  of  government.    Where  there  is  no  established  com- 
mon organ  of  government  there  is  no  federal  union  of  any 
degree,  as  in  the  case  of  the  alliance.    Where  there  is  a  \ 
common  organ  of  government,  no  matter  how  limited  its  \ 
power,  there  exists  a  federal  union  for  the  purposes  defined  / 


*          o       e  susan 
f  $.*£'      Jt  (      A  second  t 
simpler  form 
:•  confederation 
'I  S^  /dence  and  sou 


Ho* 


446 

by  the  powers  entrusted  to  the  common  governmental  body. 
Thus  the  international  administrative  union  exercising  gov- 
ernmental power  appears  to  be  a  federal  state  to  the  extent 
of  the  substantive  jurisdiction  entrusted  to  its  care. 

A  second  test,  which  serves  to  mark  the  passage  from  a 
of  federation  to  federation  proper,  from 
to  federation  itself,  is  the  test  of  the  nici- 
/dence  and  source  of  governmental  power.  If  the  authority 
of  the  established  organ  of  government  falls  only  upon  the 
states  which  are  members  of  the  union  in  their  official  ca- 
pacity the  union  has  not  passed  far  from  the  level  of  the 
alliance.  When  the  common  organs  of  government  operate 
/directly  upon  the  individual  members  of  the  states  of  the 
\union  without  action  by  the  individual  states  as  such,  the 
last  stage  of  federal  development  has  been  reached.  So 
long  as  the  states  remain  in  existence  and  the  authority  of 
the  central  government  rests  upon  their  consent  —  as  re- 
vealed by  the  character  of  the  process  in  force  for  amending 
the  federal  constitution  —  the  federal  character  of  the  union 
remains.  If  the  central  government  should,  in  addition  to 
exercising  its  power  directly  upon  the  people  of  the  union 
as  a  whole,  draw  its  power  directly  from  the  jgeppjte  of  the 
entire  union,  irrespective  of  state  lines,  the  federal  charac- 


tor  of  the  union  gives  wav  to  that  of  the  unified  state. 

.    -          -     .  -jw*  -— 

The  reassuring  thing  about  all  this  is  that  the  steps 
described  are  all  optional,  in  so  far  as  any  steps  in  human 
life  are  optional.  All  powers  enjoyed  by  a  federal  gov- 
ernment are  delegated  to  it  from  the  members  of  the  union. 
That  is  not  accidental,  nor  is  it  peculiar  to  one  federal 
system  or  another.  It  is  necessarily  true  in  the  nature  of 
the  case.  In  the  beginning  there  is  no  central  government. 
It  must  be^created  and  it  must  be  endowed  with  life  and 
power.  Hence  the  expansion  and  intensification  of  its 
powers  are  dependent  upon  action,  upon  tacit  acquiescence 
at  the  very  least,  by  the  members  of  the  union.  Even  if 
the  members  should  at  once  by  constitutional  grant  confer 


PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  447 

upon  the  central  government  all  power  in  so  many  words,  1 
such  a  step  would  still  remain  an  action  of  delegation  and  I 
therefore  subject  to  revision  or  revocation. 

Once  a  federal  union  has  been  created  by  constitutional 
action,  these  questions  of  revision  and  revocation,  of  con-  A 
stitutional  amendment  and  withdrawal  from  membership, .  . 
become  the  most  critical  phases  of  the  problem.  The  de- 
gree of  permanence  of  the  union  depends,  apparently,  on  a 
denial  of  the  right  of  withdrawal.  So  long  as  a  right  of 
withdrawal  upon  notice  is  allowed,  the  life  of  the  union  is 
potentially  limited  to  the  extent  of  the  notice  period. 
The  powers  enjoyed  by  the  central  government  are  po- 
tentially subject  to  destruction  by  the  action  of  constitu- 
tional revision.  A  permanent  and  firmly  established  federal 
union  should  have,  apparently,  a  constitution  not  subject 
to  amendment  and  a  membership  not  subject  to  diminution 
by  withdrawal. 

A  little  reflection,  however,  will  serve  to  qualify  those 
conclusions.  It  is,  it  must  be  admitted,  of  great  importance 
in  the  creation  of  a  federal  union  to  have  the  processes  of 
constitutional  change  and  of  withdrawal  clearly  defined  and 
not  left  to  interpretation  and  implication.  The  United 
States  suffered  her  greatest  misfortune  largely  through  the 
failure  of  the  fathers  to  take  up  and  settle  explicitly  in  the 
text  of  her  fundamental  law  the  vital  question  of  secession. 
The  right  should  be  definitely  denied  or  affirmed  and  the 
conditions  under  which  it  may  be  exercised  should  be  ex- 
plicitly stated.  This  is  very  far  from  saying  that,  in  the 
interests  of  permanence,  such  a  right  should  be  denied.  To 
deny  such  a  right  is  to  risk  the  appearance  of  converting 
the  federal  government  from  servant  into  master,  as  far 
as  the  individual  state  is  concerned,  albeit  a  master  volun- 
tarily accepted  in  the  first  instance.  To  deny  the  possibility 
of  constitutional  revision  appears  to  convert  the  govern- 
ment from  servant  into  master  for  all  the  members  of  the 
union.  This  may  not  be  wholly  disastrous,  if  the  original 


448  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

action  in  creating  the  federal  union  and  in  defining  the 
nature  of  the  government  was  supremely  wise.  But  it  im- 
poses upon  the  federal  state  and  government  the  burden 
of  not  only  the  current  difficulties  of  state  practice  at  any 
one  time  but  the  cumulative  difficulties  of  all  time,  seeing 
that  it  is  impossible  to  cure  a  fault  when  once  that  fault 
arises  or  escape  from  its  consequences.  Besides,  where 
withdrawal  is  impossible,  where  even  revision  in  coopera- 
tion with  other  member  states  is  impossible,  it  is  rather 
hazardous  to  rely  upon  the  original  act  of  consent  as  evi- 
dence of  the  voluntary  character  of  the  union.  The  states 
of  the  union  in  such  case  appear  to  become  not  much  more 
than  provinces  in  a  state  whose  power  they  cannot  escape. 
Beyond  these  fundamental  problems  of  structure,  how- 
ever, rise  the  more  practical  questions  of  governmental 
^action  from  day  to  day,  the  question  of  the^djs^butionjojf 
>owers.  Assuming  that  the  member  states  retain  their 


scretion  in  granting  or  withholding  powers  from  the 
federal  government,  the  problem  of  sovereignty  is  amply 
cared  for.  But  the  various  questions  of  utility  and  conven- 
ience which  demand  settlement  are  not  to  be  avoided  in 
any  way. 

The  principle  to  be  followed  is  as  simple  as  its  applica- 
tion is  difficult.    Such  powers  are  to  be  given  to  the  central 
government  as  will  enable  it  to  care  for  those  interests 
•  which  led  originally  to  the  formation  of  the  union.    Such 

. .  .v.  - .  .          " 

matters  as  thejregulation  of  interstate  commerce  will  thus 
naturally  go  to  the  central  government.  The  remaining 
subjects — those  which  do  not  affirmatively  call  for  regula- 
tion from  the  center — naturally  remain  where  they  were  in 
the  first  place. 

^.^  It  is  easy  to  render  this  problem  of  distribution  difficult 

by  assuming  that  it  is  necessary  or  desirable  to  traverse 
the  whole  field  of  governmental  power  and  to  decide  deliber- 
ately in  advance  upon  each  item  of  power,  as  to  whether 
it  should  go  to  the  central  government  or  to  the  states.  In 


practice  this  is  not  what  happens,  nor  is  it  necessary  or 
natural.  What  does  happen  is  that  certain  powers  or  sub-  si 
jects  cry  aloud  for  transfer  to  the  central  jurisdiction, 
others  suggest  such  a  transfer,  but  merit  further  study, 
while  still  others  are  by  tacit  consent  allowed  to  remain 
within  the  local  jurisdiction.  As  in  the  original  delegation 
of  power  in  the  abstract,  so  in  the  definition  of  jurisdiction 
in  the  concrete,  the  burden  of  argument  is  on  him  who  sug- 
gests that  a  certain  power  be  conferred  upon  the  central 
government. 

That  burden  will  be  heavy  or  light,  as  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  change  with  time.  The  advisability  of  confer- 
ring a  given  power  on  the  central  government  changes  from 
decade  to  decade.  In  a  sense,  this  development  through 
history  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  the  problem  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  powers.  There  seems  to  be  a  general  tendency, 
as  time  passes, — as  population  increases  in  each  state  and 
in  the  union,  as  communication  becomes  more  active  and 
extensive, — for  more  items  of  government  and  power  to 
deserve  to  be  transferred  to  the  central  government.  The 
process  of  centralization  seems  to  be  general,  continuous, 
and  persistent.  History  records  no  example  of  a  federal 
union  in  which  this  process  has  not  manifested  itself,  or  of 
a  given  power  once  entrusted,  on  reasonable  grounds,  to 
the  central  government  which  has  been  returned  to  the  local 
government. 

As  may  easily  be  imagined,  the  definition  of  jurisdiction 
cannot  be  so  clear  that  disputes  over  jurisdiction  between 
the  central  government  and  the  local  governments  will  not 
arise.  Hence  the  urgent  necessity  of  providing  some  in- 
stitution or  some  method  for  settling  such  disputes.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that,  as  time  passes,  the  central  govern- 
ment is  led  constantly  to  aggrandize  itself  at  the  expense  of 
the  local  governments,  this  is  especially  necessary.  A 
court  of  some  sort  to  decide  upon  conflicts  of  authority  is 

^^tfl^^^B^M^MM^^MMMBMWfeA  ^tfMMfc 

Tnoispensable  unless  disputes  regarding  jurisdiction  are 


450  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

^Sto  be  threshed  out  in  the  field  of  usage  and  practice  at  the 
vrisk  of  great  excitement  and  violent  disturbances. 

Granted  that  the  federal  system  is  created  on  due  cause, 
that  the  power  conferred  upon  the  central  government  is  of 
the  proper  amount,  and  that  the  problems  of  revision,  of 
withdrawal,  and  of  conflicts  are  duly  cared  for,  federalism 
is,  considered  as  a  mechanical  device,  the  highest  form  of 
state  organization.  It  is  more  flexible  than  a  unitary  form 
of  organization,  and  it  offers  the  means  of  greater  power 
than  is  possible  in  a  unitary  state,  unless  the  latter  is  to 
become  so  huge  as  to  become  unmanageable.  The  federal 
system  reconciles  local  variety  and  general  uniformity.  It 
harmonizes  central  government  and  local  individuality, 
power  and  freedom,  unity  and  multiplicity.  It  provides  the 
means  of  marshaling  the  powers  of  many  states  without  im- 
perial conquest.  It  performs  in  the  sphere  of  interstate 
relations  the  great  synthesis  of  authority  and  liberty  which 
is  the  heart  of  the  problem  of  government. 

This  is  not  to  deny  that  difficulties  are  involved.  Feder- 
alism is  a  complicated  and  delicate  political  form,  where  it 
is  not  positively  cumbersome  and  awkward.  A  federal 
state  moves  slowly  and  may  be  disconcerted  where  a  unitary 
state  would  be  confident.  The  larger  the  federation  the 
greater  these  difficulties.  In  a  competition  of  wits  and 
strength  the  unitary  state  may  easily  have  the  best  of  it  at 
the  start  and  in  all  the  tight  places. 

This  implies,  of  course,  that  the  unitary  state  would 
be  more  effective  as  a  state,  and,  judging  by  absolute  stand- 
ards, this  must  be  admitted  at  once.  The  unitary  state, 
/  where  it  is  feasible,  the  unitary  state  in  its  proper  place, 
7  is  more  effective  than  the  federal  union.  The  important 
thing  for  us  is  that  international  conditions  are  not  ripe 
for  the  unitary  state.  We  thus  come  back  to  the  original 
proposition.  If  all  variety  and  local  feeling  were  to  vanish, 
the  centralized  or  unitary  state  would  be  in  perfect  place. 
With  things  as  they  are,  it  is  not  only  impossible  but  highly 


PEOJECTS  FOE  INTEENATIONAL  FEDEEATION  451 

undesirable.  Federalism  is  the  only  available  form  of 
political  organization  for  the  world  state  in  our  day. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  students  who  have 
attempted  to  devise  plans  for  world  government  in  the  past 
have  generally  adopted  the  federal  form  on  which  to  build 
their  plans.  Since  the  thirteenth  century,  at  least,  various 
schemes  have  been  brought  forward  for  leagues  and  asso- 
ciations of  nations,  in  more  or  less  conscious  emulation  of 
the  leagues  of  classical  Greece.  These  schemes  may  now  be 
briefly  examined. 

It  would  be  worse  than  useless,  however,  to  review  here 
the  details  of  the  plans  of  Podiebrad,  Cruce,  Franklin, 
Ladd,  and  others.1  In  their  details  these  various  plans 
betray  the  idiosyncrasies  of  their  authors  and  are  based  on 
generous  but  impractical  hopes  rather  than  sound  states- 
manship and  they  are  deceptive  in  what  they  imply  regard- 
ing the  conditions  of  the  problem.  Moreover,  no  single  plan 
is  of  decisive  importance,  inasmuch  as  no  one  of  these 
various  plans  has  ever  been  adopted  as  such  by  the  states. 
The  chief  value  which  these  schemes  have  today  for  the 
student  of  international  organization  is  the  light  which  they 
shed,  in  their  main  outlines,  upon  the  development  of  the 
idea  of  world  government  since  the  Eenaissance.2 

These  plans  have  commonly  been  based  upon  one  or 
more  of  four  rather  distinct  foundations,  namely,  selfish 
national  advantage,  historical  development  in  international 
relations,  previous  plans  of  the  same  sort,  and  abstract 
justice.  These  foundation  principles  may  best  be  examined 
iii  the  reverse  of  the  order  as  named. 

Every  would-be  architect  of  world  government  naturally 
professes  to  aim  at  justice  and,  through  justice,  peace ;  and 
in  a  large  measure  every  reformer  who  has  suggested  a  plan 
for  international  federation  really  has  tried  to  serve  these 

1  On  classic  projects  see  literature  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §  26,  especially 
York,  entire. 

2  Ter  Meulen,  entire. 


452  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ends.    Howe^vej^^when  the  ends  of  justice  and  peace  are 

sought  directly  the  result  is  likely  to  be  unfortunate.    The 

^ » . .  - .  . 

ideal  of  peace  by  itself  induces  on  the  part  of  its  possessor 
a  quietism  and  a  willingness  to  accept  almost  any  settle- 
ment for  the  sake  of  peace.  The  ideal  of  justice,  on  the 
other  hand,  taken  by  itself,  leads  to  a  meddlesome  dissatis- 
faction with  all  things  as  they  are,  which  is  as  bad  on  its 
side  as  is  quietism  on  the  other.  In  the  end,  plans  which 
attempt  to  serve  these  abstract  ideals  directly  are  inco- 
herent and  unstable. 

The  simplest  method  which  can  be  adopted  for  the  cor- 
rection of  such  errors  is  the  comparison  of  plans  which 
other  students  have  worked  out  in  previous  ages.  In 
recent  years  a  great  deal  has  been  done  in  collecting,  an- 
alyzing and  collating  the  classic  projects  for  international 
federation  worked  out  in  the  past.  A  most  valuable  form  of 
such  activity  is  found  in  the  practice  of  scrutinizing  the 
plans  for  international  courts  and  conferences  which  have 
previously  been  proposed  or  adopted  when  the  occasion 
arises  for  creating  a  new  court  or  conference.  Thus,  the 
creation  of  the  Hague  Court  of  Arbitration  in  1899  and  the 
revision  of  the  plan  in  1907  were  both  based  upon  a  study 

•*•  HOH-&HM*  * 

of  prior  courts  of  arbitration  and  the  working  of  such 
courts,  including  the  Hague  Court  itself  between  1899  and 
1907,1  and  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  in 
preparing  for  the  Peace  Conference  of  1919  collected  much 
data  on  international  negotiation,  administration,  and  con- 
ference in  the  past.2 

The  action  last  described  carries  us  over  into  the  second 
method  of  drawing  up  such  plans,  namely,  building  the  new 
edifice  of  international  government  not  upon  paper  plans, 
but  upon  the  actual  historical  development  of  international 

federation  in  the  past.    Such  a  method  might  seem  to  pro- 

- 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  Chap.  VI. 

"Such  were  Chamberlain,  Danube;  Hershey,  Diplomatic  Agents;  Munro, 
Berlin  Congress;  Satow,  Conferences;  as  cited,  below,  Appendix  B,  §§8,  20,  25. 


PROJECTS  FOB  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  453 

vide  no  first  step  in  the  process,  and  to  make  success 
depend  upon  something  having  already  been  done  in  the 
desired  direction.  When  it  is  recalled,  however,  that  inter- 
national federation  must  grow  out  of  spontaneous  interna- 
tional cooperation  of  a  simpler  sort,  this  limitation  becomes 
less  important,  a  source  of  strength,  not  weakness,  and  in 
this  late  day  the  objection  to  confining  the  process  of 
drafting  an  international  constitution  to  the  reorganization 
and  improvement  of  institutions  which  have  proved  valu- 
able in  the  past  is  slight.  The  results  have  such  a  high 
degree  of  reliability,  in  comparison  with  schemes  not  based 
on  actual  experience,  that  this  method  is  the  only  one  to 
be  preferred.  The  development  of  the  Commission  of  In- 
quiry in  1899  and  1907  is  a  cardinal  example  of  this  sort  ] 
of  activity.1  The  best  of  the  private  plans  which  have  been 
put  forward  in  the  past,  as  that  of  St.  Pierre,  have,  like- 
wise, taken  careful  account  of  actual  historical  development. 
To  connect  the  proposed  plan  too  closely  with  actual 
political  life,  however,  is  to  fall  again  into  error.  Several 
plans  for  international  federation  proposed  in  the  past  have 
amounted  to  not  much  more  than  schemes  for  the  aggran- 
dizement of  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  nation  in  which 
they  have  originated.  Such  was  the — not  improperly  named 
— Great  Design  attributed  to  Henry  IV.  It  is,  of  course, 
not  to  be  assumed  that  a  given  plan  for  international  federa- 
tion is  necessarily  bad  because  it  peculiarly  satisfies  the 
interests  of  a  given  nation.  No  nation  will  accept  such  a 
plan  unless  it  does  serve  the  national  interest.  The  only 
requirement  which  can  be  made  is  that  the  national  in- 
terest which  is  served  shall  be  a,  non-competitive  interest, 
one  which  can  be  satisfied  without  injury  to  other  states. 
But  when  a  plan  for  international  organization  is  put 
forth  directly  with  the  calculation  that  it  will  serve  the  na- 
tional interest,  the  probabilities  are  that  the  plan  will  not 

1  Scott,  Conferences,  I,  265-273. 


454 

be  of  great  value  from  the  point  of  view  of  other  states 
and  of  the  common  international  welfare. 

Beyond  the  nature  of  the  motives  for  its  formulation, 
however,  the  value  of  any  plan  for  international  federation 
depends  also  upon  the  exact  provisions  which  are  written 
into  the  proposed  international  constitution.  These  will 
presumably  reflect  one  or  more  of  the  different  foundations 
upon  which  the  plan  may  be  based.  But,  after  all,  it  is  in 
the  text  of  the  plan  that  the  decisive  virtue  lies.  Here 
also  the  projects  put  forward  in  the  past  have  varied  con- 
siderably. 

The  earlier  projects  were  very  simple  and  highly  unified. 
Later  plans  have  been  more  compreh3nsive  and  more  an- 
alytical. Recent  proposals  cover,  as  any  feasible  proposal 
must  cover,  institutions  for  the  making  of  law,  for  its 
administration,  and  for  its  interpretation  in  case  of  doubt. 
Conferences,  commissions,  and  courts  are  essential  in  any 
international  government.  Earlier  projects  not  only  con- 
tained no  separate  provisions  for  such  bodies,  but  ignored 
the  distinction  between  the  different  varieties  of  work  to  be 
done  by  a  world  government.  With  the  growing  under- 
standing of  the  process  of  government  in  general  since  the 
seventeenth  century  plans  for  international  government 
have  similarly  improved  in  quality. 

There  is  still  some  temptation  to  visualize  world  govern- 
ment in  terms  of  some  particular  form  of  institutional  or- 
ganization. Thus,  a  few  years  ago  arbitration  or  judicial 
settlement  seemed  to  be  the  sum  and  substance  of  inter- 
national reform  and  an  international  court  the  equivalent 
of  international  government.1  At  another  time  "the  world 
in  alliance"  or  an  international  police  was  regarded  as 
the  essence  of  international  cooperation.2  In  recent  years 
international  administrative  unions  and  bureaus  were  taken 

1  Jones,  E.  L.,  International  Arbitration  as  a  Substitute  for  War. 
"Keen,  F.  N.,  The  World  in  Alliance,  A  Plan  for  Preventing  Future  Wars; 
V  Nijhoff,  War  Obviated  by  an  International  Police. 


PROJECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  455 

as  international  governing  bodies  par  excellence.1    Later, 
international  conference   seemed  to  be  most  important.2 
It   cannot   be   too   strongly   affirmed   that   any    adequate  } 
international  association  must  include  organs  of  all  types,  L 
constituent  and  legislative,  administrative,   and  judicial.  ( 
The  most  recent  projects  for  international  federation  rey 
spond  favorably  to  this  test.3 

Finally,  all  recent  plans  have  recognized  the  need  for 

9W^0MV4A04ft0^Bpt^rftMV*  *— 

control  in  operation  and  jx>r  adaptation  as  times  and  cir- 
cumstances change.  Earlier  plans  pretended  to  be  pana- 
ceas to  be  adopted  by  the  world  intact  and  left  as  originally 
framed.  In  some  cases  the  precious  scheme  was  to  be  im- 
posed upon  the  world  by  autocrats  and  maintained  in  place 
by  their  authority.  Modern  plans  do  not  pretend  to  be  in- 
fallible and  are  subject  to  amendment.  They  are,  in  the 
first  place,  to  be  adopted  by  voluntary  action  by  the  states  of 
the  world.  They  are,  further,  to  be  operated  by  responsible 
officials ;  their  virtue  is  to  depend  on  such  operation  rather 
than  upon  any  magic  quality  of  the  scheme  as  adopted ;  and 
they  are  to  be  open  to  constant  revision.4 

Needless  to  say,  this  last  view  is  of  great  importance. 
Combined  with  the  other  changes  in  approach  just  described     /^ 
it  has  brought  the  proposal  for  international  federation          ^ff*\ 
out  of  the  realms  of  religion  and  speculative  theory  into 
practical  politics.    International  federation  is  to  be  built   >^       ,    / 
up  gradually,  on  the  basis  of  what  has  gone  before,  to  meet 
the  actual  needs  of  this  cosmopolitan  world,  by  the  volun- 
tary cooperation  of  the  states  in  the  paths  of  conference, 
administration,  and  arbitration,  subject  always  to  revision      ^  / 
and  ^control  as  the  times  require.    Such  was  the  approach  S.  jr       / 
to  the  League  of  Nations  as  organized  in  1919. 

1Reinsch,  186. 
'Goldsmith,  Chaps.  IX,  X. 

'Minor  reveals  the  spread  of  this  conviction,  ix-xxxiii;  also  Woolf,  371- 
410,  especially  371-375. 
*  Minor,  Chap.  XVIL 


CHAPTEE  XXVH 
THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS, 

THE  nature  of  the  action  taken  at  the  Peace  Conference 
of  Paris  in  1919  for  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Na- 
tions was  determined  by  several  divergent,  if  not  conflict- 
ing, national  aims.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  such  projects 
commonly  reflect  either  an  idealistic  desire  for  abstract 
justice,  an  effort  to  obtain  national  advanja^es_Tinder^  a 
cloak  of  internationarreforS^^or^mofe  general  historical 
deveTopmenTHmbng  tne  family  of  nations  at  large.  The 
League  of  Nations  was  no  exception  to  this  rule.  President 
Wilson  aM  General  Smuts,' wmle T defending  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  and  South  Africa,  especially  their 
interests  in  the  maintenance  of  world  peace,  were  also,  and 
for  this  very  reason,  engaged  in  serving  certain  general 
ideals  of  international  cooperation  laudable  in  themselves. 
Clemenceau,  in  so  far  as  he  supported  the  program  of  a 
League  at  all,  did  so  to  secure  protection  for  France.  And 
beyond  these  motives  and  the  suggestion  of  conflict  between 
them  lay  a  more  comprehensive  aim,  shared  by  all  the 
belligerents,  namely,  to  supplant  the  inadecpiate  machinery 
for  regulating  international  relations  which  had  failed  in 

i  ii  —        i     ^j    i        ,  i    i,^ — i  0-*^~~m — **-~^^~^^r~ ^"i~- ,— ^^^^••— •"^^^"^"^^"-^^^"•--^^^^ 

1914  with  a  world  government  capable  of  insuring  that 
such  a  thing  should  not  happen  again.  It  was  the  failure 
of  the  Concert  of  Europe  in  1914  that  created  a  demand  for 
the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations  in  1919. 

The  failure  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  in^l914  and  the 
nature' of  the  resulf  must  be  studied  with  reference  to  the 
whole  of  the  period  from  1862  onward. 

The  course  of  events  in  1914  was  fairly  well  forecast  in 

456 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  457 

1864  and  1867  and  again  in  1871.  For  the  greatest  single 
cause  of  the  failure  of  the  Concert  in  1914  was  the  new 
German  Empire,  and  the  new  German  Empire  was  built  up 
in  the  years  1862-1914.1  In  1862  Bismarck  became  Prussian 
Chancellor.  In  1864  Schleswig  and  Holstein  were  con- 
quered by  Prussia ;  in  1867  Austria  was  excluded  from  com- 
petition with  Prussia  for  control  of  the  new  Germany ;  and 
in  1871  the  Empire  was  formally  and  ceremoniously  es- 
tablished on  the  strength  of  the  victory  over  France. 

The  years  from  1871  to  1914  saw  a  tremendous  develop- 
ment for  the  new  Empire.  The  disorganization  of  the  late- 
surviving  Medieval  anarchy  was  in  a  measure  replaced  by 
German  unity.  Industrial  and  financial  and  commercial 
power  in  the  new  nation  came  to  full  fruition.  In^the  later 
years  German  influence  in  the  colonial  world  grew  as  Ger- 
man colonies  multiplied  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  isles  of  the 
Pacific.  Until  the  turn  of  the  century,  and  for  a  little  while 
beyond,  Prussian  Germany  was  the  dominant  power  in 
Europe. 

This  development  was  soon  followed  by  the  inevitable 
result,  a  competition  of  alliances.2  Already  in  JftTi)  Ger- 
many had  attempted  to  secure  herself  against  possible  ene- 
mies by  an  Austrian  alliance,  defensive  in  terms  but  general 
in  its  effect.  In  1882  Italy  was  drawn  in  to  complete  the 
Triple  Alliance.  The  powers  stretching  across  the  center 
of  Europe  formed  a  firm  bloc  and,  either  for  good  or  ill, 
absolutely  dominated  the  political  scene. 

British  statesmen  at  length  began  to  feel  the  danger. 
But  Britain  was  too  completely  preoccupied  with  colonial 
questions  and  domestic  social  and  political  questions  to  pay 
a  great  deal  of  attention  to  the  continent.  It  was,  therefore, 
France  who  moved  first  to  check  Germany.  In  1891-92 
a  defensive  alliance  with  this  aim  was  concluded  with 

1  Best  account  of  diplomatic  history  prior  to  1914  is  in  Seymour;  see 
especially  Chaps.  I-III,  VII,  VIII. 

2 ' '  The  Background  of  the  War ;  History  and  Texts, ' '  in  League  of 
Nations,  I,  173-251  (April,  1918). 


458  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Russia.  Fifteen  years  later,  after  Britain  and  France  had 
adjusted  thgjj  cnlo^ja]  rjvfil ry  in  Africa,  these  Powers 
drew  together  in  the  cordial  understanding  of  1904-07. 
The  Entente  was  further  strengthened  in  1907  when  Rus- 
sia and  Great  Britain  succeeded  in  clearing  up  their  mutual 
relations  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  Finally,  the  Triple 
Entente  was  strengthened  in  AsiaJjL  1911.  by  the  renewal 
of  the  Anglo-Japajie^eji^ 

The  result  was  a  balance  of  power  in  its  worst  form, 
that  of  a  see-saw.  Two  great  combinations  of  states  faced 
one  another  across  the  heart  of  Europe,  which  is  the  heart 
of  the  world,  and  ^  deta^^_ppwer_]3retended  to  watch 
over  and  help  maintain  that  balance.  The  precarious  bal- 
ance could  last  only  until  one  party  to  the  system  should 
attempt  to  force  the  issue.  Then  would  come  a  struggle, 
not  so  much  to  regain  the  position  of  balance,  as  to  gain  a 
position  of  dominance.  The  German  dominance  of  1871- 
1904  had  been  largely  lost,  replaced  by  a  balance  with  the 
Entente.  Then,  from  1907  to  1914,  Germany  might  well  feel 
that  the  balance  was  going  against  her  and  that  the  Entente 
,was  attaining  a  dominant  position.  The  only  remedy,  it 
might  well  appear,  was  to  force  the  issue  and  see  to  it  that 
Vthe  position  of  dominance  of  1871-1904  was  regained. 

Roughly  speaking,  that  is  what  happened  in  1914,  in 
connection  with  an  indirect  attack  on  Austrian  imperial 
unity  by  one  of  the  satellites  of  a  member  of  the  Entente. 
"Whpn  HIP  TfrnfpTif.pj  or  the  leading  member  thereof,  tried 
fn  apipprp  «  ppfUMyhij. adjustment  of  the  case  uermany  forced 
the  issue jfl, war.1  Possible  methods  of  adjustment  between 
tlk1  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente  and  between  or 
among  the  individual  nations  members  thereof  were  de- 
feated by  Germany,  and  the  gage  of  battle  was  thrown 
down. 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  growing  danger  of  the  years 
1890-1914  had  been  perceived  in  Europe  and  that  efforts 

1  Seymour,  265. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  459 

had  been  made  to  provide  some  machinery  for  regulating 
international  relations  peaceably.  The  conferences  at  The 
Hague,  trivial  and  anemic  as  their  results  appear  when 
contrasted  with  the  tremendous  diplomatic  struggle  of  the 
alliances  with  which  they  were  expected  to  cope,  were  un- 
doubtedly intended  to  remedy  the  existing  diplomatic  situa- 
tion. The  years  from  1900  to  1914,  especially,  are  filled 
with  fear  and  appeals  for  reorganization  before  it  should  be 
too  late.1  As  has  also  been  seen,  the  full  success  of  the  * 
Hague  Conferences  was  blocked  by  German  and  Austrian 
opposition.  It  was  German  opposition  that  prevented  the 
adoption  of  compulsory  arbitration  at  the  conference  in 
1907!  Now,  in  1914,  it  was  precisely  this  deficiency  in  the 
existing  system  of  international  government  that  allowed 
Austria  to  press  her  attack  upon  Serbia  without  fear  of 
being  compelled  to  submit  to  arbitration  at  The  Hague 
as  Serbia  proposed.  The  ensuing  efforts  to  secure  a  con- 
ference on  the  issues  were  failures  in  the  same  way  and 
for  the  same  reasons.  Germany  and  Austria  took  advan- 
tage of  the  lack  of  any  international  machinery  for  com- 
pulsory adjudication  or  compulsory  conference  to  make  an 
attempt  to  secure  again  the  diplomatic  hegemony  of  Europe 
by  challenging  the  balance  of  power  in  1914. 
During  nearly  four  years  of  war  the  bala.np.fi 


fixed.  Through  the  last  weeks  of  1914,  through  1915,  1916, 
1TJ1Y,  and  the  first  half  of  1918,  the  war  was  at  a  stalemate. 
Both  parties  won  marked  victories  here  and  there  —  in  the 
march  into  Belgium  and  France;  at  the  Marne;  in  Shan- 
tung ;  in  East  Prussia  ;  and  all  along  the  eastern  front.  At 
one  time  and  another  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  joined  the 
Triple  Alliance,  Italy  and  Rumania  the  Triple  Entente. 
Yet  the  stalemate  remained. 

Then,  in  the  end  of  1917  and  the  beginning  of  1918,  the 
crisis  arrived.  Russia  went  out  of  the  fight,  as  a  result  of 
Czaristic  inefficiency,  the  wastage  of  war,  and  Bolshevik 

1  See  especially  Hanotaux,  Politique  d'fiquilibre,  generally. 


460  INTEKNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

policy.  The  Central  Powers  were  free  to  turn  to  the  West 
and  hurl  all  their  strength  against  the  British  and  French 
lines. 

The  lines  held.  A  breach  on  the  Western  front  in  the 
spring  of  1918  might  not  have  brought  the  end  at  once,  but 
it  very  possibly  would  have  been  the  beginning  of  the  end. 
In  the  event,  however,  the  German  bid  for  victory  failed, 
as  it  had  failed  in  1914,  and  the  balance  continued  intact. 

That  the  drive  of  1918  failed  was  due  in  part  to  the  ac- 
tion of  the  only  power  capable  of  turning  the  scales  of  the 
contest.  The  United  States,  harassed  in  her  neutral  com- 
merce since  1914  by  the  belligerents  on  all  sides,  had  been 
attacked  anew  by  the  German  submarines  in  the  begin- 
ning of  1917.  She  had  declared  war,  in  defense  of  her 
maritime  rights  and  of  the  international  law  on  which  those 
rights  were  based,  and  in  the  hope  of  securing  an  improve- 
ment of  the  international  political  and  legal  system  in 
general.  She  was,  accordingly,  able  to  help  considerably 
in  the  war  of  defense  of  May  and  June  of  1918,  and  tho 
balance  was  thus  preserved  against  the  German  attack. 

In  mid-July  of  1918,  in  the  face  of  continued  German 
attacks,  the  balance  was  still  unbroken.  Then  came  a  sharp 
turn  against  the  Central  Powers.  Beginning  on,  18  July 
the  Allies,  with  American  troops  forming  a  substantial  part 
of  the  spear-head  of  advance,  began  the  movement  which 
Y  led  to  the  breaking  of  the  stalemate,  the  destruction  of  the 
balance  of  power,  and  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles. The  Allied  troops  had  been  put  under  a  single  com- 
mand largely  as  a  result  of  American  insistence.1  The 
offensive  of  18  July  was  undertaken  directly  at  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  American  Commander,  General  Pershing.2 
And  in  November,  after  four  months  of  victory  as  consis- 

1  New  York  Times,  23  November,  1918,  p.  2,  column  8. 

'Statement  of  F.  E.  Kent  in  New  York  Times,  28  November,  1918,  p.  2, 
column  5;  Pershing 's  Report,  in  same,  5  December,  1918,  p.  3,  column  2 
("Seizing  this  opportunity  to  support  rny  conviction,  every  division  with  any 
sort  of  training  was  made  available  for  use  in  the  counter-offensive ' ')  ;  Grasty 
in  same,  9  March,  1919,  §  4,  p.  12,  column  1. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  461 

tent  in  their  character  as  had  been  the  preceding  four 
months  of  defeat,  an  armistice  was  concluded  under  Ameri- 
can mediation  which  left  the  Allies  absolutely  dominating 
the  diplomatic  scene.1  Never  before  had  one  power  or  one 
group  of  powers  been  placed  in  a  position  of  such  complete 
dominance  in  Europe;  never  before  had  the  balance  of  \ 
power  been  so  completely  destroyed. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances,  and  as  a  result  of 
these  causes,  that  the  plan  of  the  League  was  drafted.  It 
remains  to  review  the  processes  by  which  the  Covenant 
was  drawn  up  and  accepted  as  the  new  constitution  of  the 
world  state. 

When  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  met  in  January 
of  1919  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations  was  felt  to  be 
one  of  the  principal  tasks  to  be  undertaken.2    Accordmgjj^ 
the  three  leading  AlljMPjjjfflffii^came  armed  wTEnarafiT 
pfans 'i'loraTCe  igue.    President  Wiison'posaeSBe^ma^mnsTV^ 
be^caTTea  the  official  American  plan,  and  the  British  and  ^ 

lr*-"*-na  uantM'i  -"  mftnl*  -«— '  "**•  wdMBMCMBlfe 

French  possessed  officiaj^j^gJis  of  their  own.     General  V"" 
Smuts  carried  a  pla,n  which  he  had  worked  out  independ-v^ 
ently.3     Tjiese^  projects  varied  considerably  in  the  extent 
to  which  they  had  been  worked  out  in  detail.    The  official 
British  and  French  plans  had  been  worked  out  most  care-v"' 
fully,  while  the  plans  of  President  Wilson  and  of  General 
Smuts  were  still  in  the  form  of  general  principles.4    These 
four  projects  formed  the  basis  of  the  work  of  the  Confer- 
ence on  this  subject. 

On  25  January,  1919,  at  the  second  plenary  session  of 
the  preliminary  Inter-Allied  Conference,  there  was  ap- 
pointed a  Committee,  with  President  Wilson  as  chairman, 
to  draft  a  "constitution"  for  the  League.5  The  resolution 
adopted  by  the  Conference  did  not  attempt  to  guide  the 

1  Temperley,  I,  115-134,  373-386,  459-476.  ^^ 

2 Same,  III,  56  ( Resolution  of  25  January,  1919).  V^ 
'Same,  II,  24-25. 
4  Same,  II,  25,  and  III,  52-54. 

6  Same,  III,  56  (Eesolution  of  Peace  Conference),  and  54-55  (personnel 
of  Commission). 


462 

Committee  in  its  work  beyond  the  declarations  that  the 
League  should  be  *  *  open  to  every  civilized  nation  which  can 

^MkMMl^BVM|VM**MVMIMOT^Mi«MiM«M****>*^liVMM^ta^Ml'*^^*iWnMOK««urf(lMMkAI 

be  relied  on  to  promote  its  objects,"  and  that  ''the  members 
of  the  League  should  periodically  meet  in  international 
conference  and  should  have  a  permanent  organization  and 
secretaries  to  carry  on  the  business  of  the  League  in  the 
intervals  between  the  conferences." 

Between  this  date  and  3  February  President  Wilson, 
General  Smuts,  M.  Bourgeois,  and  Signor  Orlando  met  in- 
formally and  drew  up  a  preliminary  plan  based  upon  the 
projects  brought  to  the  Conference  by  various  delegates.1 
This  preliminary  plan  was  discussed  at  daily  meetings  of 
the  Committee  from  the  time  of  its  first  meeting  on  3 
February  until  13  February,  when  a  tentative  draft  was 
adopted.2  This  tentative  draft  was  reported  to  the  third 
plenary  session  of  the  Conference,  on  14  February,  and  at 
/once  published  to  the  world,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  had 
Vnot  yet  been  signed  and  was  still  in  a  very  tentative  form.3 
Whether  or  not  the  draft  of  14  February  is  now  regarded 
as  sound,  the  circumstances  were  such  at  the  time  that  its 
publication  inevitably  elicited  a  flood  of  enthusiasm  and 
also  a  hot  fire  of  criticism.  While  the  President  made  his 
trip  to  America  and  the  Committee  was  inactive  the  pro- 
posed constitution  was  scrutinized  and  praised  and  censured 
by  all  sorts  of  groups  and  all  sorts  of  persons  in  all  parts 
of  the  world.4 

On  18  March,  after  the  return  of  the  President  to  Paris, 
the  Committee  reconvened  and  spent  some  four  or  five 
weeks  in  revising  the  text  of  the  Covenant,  with  the  more 
or  less  willing — but  also  the  more  or  less  reluctant — co- 
operation of  friends  of  the  League  of  all  political  factions 
and  parties.5  On  28  April  the  final  text  of  the  Covenant  was 

1  House  and  Seymour,  Chap.  XVII  (Miller),  407-412. 

2  Same,  410. 
'Temperley,  III,  12. 

*  House  and  Seymour,  412-414;  Temperley,  II,  28. 
6  House  and  Seymour,  414-423 ;  Temperley,  II,  28-29. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  463 

submitted  to  the  fourth  plenary  session  of  the  Conference 
and  at  once  adopted.1    Two  months  later  the  Covenant  was 
included  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and,  on  28  June,  signed 
as  such  by  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  and  Germany.2    Subsequently  the  Covenant  was  in- 
cluded in  the  treaties  signed  with  Austria,  Hungary,  Bul- 
garia,  and   Turkey.3     During  the  later   part   of   1919   a  ^ 
number  of  nations  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  thus  ^ 
brought  into  legal  effect  the  new  constitution  of  the  world  ^ 
state.4 

If  we  examine  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
as  adopted  in  1919  we  shall  find  that  it  corresponds  rather 
indifferently  to  the  purposes  of  its  authors,  and  that  it  is 
related  in  a  rather  haphazard  way  to  the  historical  back- 
ground on  which  it  must  be  assumed  to  have  been  based. 

President  Wilson  undoubtedly  intended  to  construct  a 
League  which  should  constitute  a  general  concert  of  the 
nations  in  the  room  of  the  old  balance  of  power  as  that 
balance  had  existed  from  1907  to  1914.5  j^nis  the  League, 
as  created  in  1919.  cfoes  no^  <j[o.  The  power  was  concen- 
trated in  the  hands  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  to , 
tlie  exclusion  of  Germany,  Austria,  Russia,  and  other  ; 
states  not  trusted  by  the  Allies.  This  was  natural  and  de- 
sirable, things  being  as  they  were  in  1919;  it  would  have 
been  sheer  madness  and  betrayal  of  the  cause  of  interna- 
tional cooperation  to  have  attempted  to  base  such  coopera- 
tion at  that  time  upon  German  and  Bolshevik  participation. 
Political  organization  and  government  must  normally  be 
the  creations  of  the  dominant  group,  wiiether  in  the  na- 
tions themselves  or  among  the  nations.  The  result  none 
the  less  constitutes  a  divergence  from  the  ideal  of  the  con- 
cert of  power.  The  League  of  1919  did  not  accurately  reflect 

1  Temperley,  III,  18. 

2  Same,  111-123. 

"Scott,  Introduction,  212,  229,  and  following. 

*  Temperley,  III,  31. 

B  Manchester  address  of  30  December,  1918;  Temperley,  III,  59. 


464  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  ideal  of  a  concert,  did  not  even  embody  the  idea  of  a 
balance,  but  rather  the  idea  of  a  monopoly,  of  international 
I  ££•£££'     ^na^  means  that  the  League,  if  created  in  1919, 
\  must  necessarily  have  been  little  more  than  a  cloak  for  the 
victors  of  1918,  and  must  have  been  so  regarded  by  Ger- 
many, Russia,  and  all  excluded  powers.1 

That  the  League  as  created  did  not  embody  a  balance  of 
power  was,  of  course,  in  keeping  with  Wilson's  desire. 
In  so  far  as  it  embodied  some  degree  of  a  concert  among 
those  nations  who  were  admitted  to  membership,  it  met  his 
ideal  still  further.  J5ut  the  exclusion  of  certain  states  de- 
prived this  last  fact  of  any  significance,  and  since  1919  a 
balance,  or  conflict,  or,  perhaps,  several  conflicts  of  power 
have  sprung  up  within  the  League  itself.  This  is  bound  to 
happen, — especially  when  the  excluded  states  are  admitted, 
— and  it  is  desirable  that  it  should  happen.  It  will  mitigate 
or  destroy  any  monopoly  of  power  by  certain  members,  and 
the  general  concert  will  come  to  rest  neither  on  artificial 
harmony  nor  on  monopoly  partnership,  but  upon  a  painstak- 
ing and  careful  harmonization  of  interests.  Until  the  full 
<^  development  of  an  equilibrium  of  power  within  the  League 
the  monopolistic  condition  of  1919  will  persist. 

This  conclusion  may  suggest  the  thought  that  the  League 
should  not  have  been  set  up  in  1919  at  all,  but  rather  in  a 
time  of  peace,  a  time  when  fierce  international  rivalry  and 
the  domination  of  the  victors  would  not  be  present  to  distort 
the  results.  In  the  sense  that  a  better  League  could  have 
been  created  in  1907  than  was  created  in  1919,  this  is  prob- 
ably sound,  assuming  that  any  League  at  all  could  have 
been  created  in  1907,  and  in  the  sense  that,  if  created  in 
1930,  the  League  would  be  better  in  form  than  one 
created  in  1919.  The  difficulty  with  such  a  suggestion  is 
that  any  attempt  to  create  a  League  in  1907  would  have 
met  with  defeat,  in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  Germany, 

1 ' '  Comments  by  German  Delegation  on  Conditions  of  Peace, ' '  Part  I,  Sec. 
ii,  (3),  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  143,  1215  (October,  1919). 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  465 

inasmuch  as  the  same  opposition  which  defeated  the  pro- 
posals for  compulsory  arbitration  at  The  Hague  would  have 
been  used  to  defeat  any  plan  for  a  League.  Moreover, 
the  evffect  of  the  war  on  public  opinion  was  such  in  1919  as 
to  make  a  League  peculiarly  desirable  at  that  time  —  al- 
though that  effect  has  so  worn  off  as  to  make  difficult  the 
operation  of  the  League  since  1919,  and  to  suggest  to  some 
observers  that  another  catastrophic  war  is  needed  and 
needed  quickly  to  convince  the  peoples  and  governments 
of  the  world  once  and  for  all  of  the  need  for  international 
government.  It  would  have  been  risky  to  deny  that  demand 
in  1919;  it  might  not  exist  in  the  piping  times  of  peace. 
Moreover,  with  a  general  international  resettlement  in  proc- 
ess there  was  all  the  more  need  for  a  body  to  sanctify  and 
guarantee  the  status  created  by  the  treaties. 

That  work  the  Leaffiifi  r^ff*1*  h*"7^  hqpn  ffiven  to  dp, 
thus  making  it  definitely  the  embodiment  of  the  power  and 
witt~of~  Ihtj  vicluib,  meeting  fully  the  French,  desire  for 
satisfaction  and  protection.1  This  conception  of  the  League 
likewise  failed  of"  complete  execution.  In  a  number  of  points 
the  power  and  support  of  the  League  were  not  placed  be- 
neath the  treaty  settlement,  notably  in  the_case  of  the  repa- 
rations. In  some  cases  this  was  due  to  the  desire  of  Presi- 

••fcfi^**™  * 

dent  Wilson  to  prevent  the  League  from  being  regarded 
merely  as  the.  sheriff  of  the  victorious  Powers.  In  other 
cases,  significantly  enough,  it  was  due  to  the  reluctance  of 
France  to  entrust  her  interests  in  the  settlement  to  the 
League  for  enforcement.  The  result  is  that  since  IQl^he 
Supreme  Allied  Council,  the  Separations  Commission,  and 
other  similar  bodies,  have  continued  to  function  alo'llgiSTde 
of  tne  .League.  Failing  to  constitute  a  complete  concert  oF 


power,  and  tailing  to  restore  a  balance  of  power,  the  League  > 
likewise  failed  to  create  completely  a  legal  hegemony  for^ 
the  Allies. 

The  relations  between  the  League  and  the  terms  of  the 

1  House  and  Seymour,  412-413. 


466  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

^treaty  settlement  are  correspondingly  ambiguous.  On  one 
hand,  the  League  has  been  hailed  as  the  machinery  for  re- 
vising the  terms  of  that  settlement  in  so  far  as  they  need 
revision.1  On  another  hand,  it  has  been  censured  as  re- 
sponsible for  unsatisfactory  or  unjust  terms  which  it — 
presumably — sanctifies  and  guarantees.2  Still  again,  it 
has  been  lauded  as  free  and  untrammeled  by  the  wicked- 
nesses of  the  settlement,  the  one  pure  spot  in  the  work  of 
the  Conference.3 

_In  truth  the  League  is  all  three  of  these  things,  in 
varying  measure.  In  so  far  as  it  becomes  the  legal  and 
governmental  embodiment  of  the  existing  society  of  nations, 
the  League  must  recognize  and  protect  the  existing  status. 
In  so  far  as  it  has  power  it  may,  happily,  remedy  defects  in 
fv)  that  status,  and  will  be  held  responsible  for  inaction  in  the 
face  of  such  defects.  That  the  League  is  hampered  in  such 
action  by  the  rule  of  unanimity  is  part  of  the  general  handi- 
cap of  international  procedure  as  we  know  it ;  it  is  a  price 
paid  for  support  which  could  not  be  had  for  a  League  per- 
mitted to  operate  by  less  than  unanimous  consent.  The 
League  in  its  relations  to  the  settlement,  as  in  its  member- 
ship,  embodies  a  compromise,  or  a  transitory  treatment 
of  problems  which  will  have  to  be  dealt  with  definitely  be- 
fore the  League  will  be  on  firm  ground.  The  problems  and 
alignments  of  the  war  must  be  superseded,  the  settlements 
of  the  peace  must  be  rendered  fair  and  therefore  acceptable 
and  accepted  by  all  parties,  before  the  League  can  be 
free  to  go  forward  with  its  own  work. 

An  examination  of  the  final  text  of  the  Covenant  and 
a  comparison  of  that  Covenant  with  the  tentative  draft  of 
14  February  will  reveal  the  main  outlines  of  the  League  as 
created  in  1919.  The  League  was  to  be  composed  originally 

1  Scott,  Introduction,  282;  statement  of  General  Smuts  in  Temperley, 
III,  at  75. 

'Keynes,  259-260. 
"Harris,  209. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  467 

of  the  signatories  of  the  treaty  containing  the  Covenant.1 
At  the  same  time,  certain  friendly  or  neutral  states  were 
invited  to  accede  to  the  Covenant — not  to  the  whole  treaty — 
and  all  of  these  accepted  the  invitation.2    Membership  in 
the  League  was  left  open  to  all  the  states  of  the  world,  in- 
cluding, it  should  be  noted,  autonomous  colonies.3    Mem-  v 
bership  was,  however,  made  to  depend  on  election  at  theV* 
hands  of  the  states  already  members,  and  a  two-thirds  vote  •/ 
is  needed  in  the  electing  body.4    Moreover,  guarantees  of 
good  faith  respecting  outstanding  international  obligations 
might  be  required  as  conditions  of  election,  and  limitations 
might    be    imposed    upon    the    armaments    of    the    new 
member.5 

These  provisions  reflect  an  intention  to  restrict  rather 
severely  admission  to  the  League  of  former  enemy  states 
and  of  Russia,  including  new  states  made  from  parts  of  the 
territory  of  the  former  Russian  empire.     The  required 
guarantees   will  probably  never  be   asked  for  formally,     -, 
and  the  limitation  of  armaments  here  mentioned  logically   ' 
depends  on  prior  action  for  disarmament  among  the  exist- 
ing members  of  the  League.    But  election  of  outsiders  will, 
nevertheless,  proceed  slowly. 

Members  might,  it  was  declared,  withdraw  on  two  years 
notice,  provided  all  outstanding  international  obligations 

are  fulfilled  up  to  date.6    The  decision  upon  whether  this 

***•      "*"""        ***^    *"**  **^* 

proviso  has  been  satisfied  must,  presumably,  be  left  to  the 

remaining  members  of  the  League.  No  provision  for  with- 
drawal appeared  in  the  tentative  draft ;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  worthy  of  note  that  in  the  tentative  draft  of  14  Febru- 
ary the  members  of  the  League  were  described  as  "  sig- 
natory parties,"  while  in  the  Covenant  they  are  called 

1  Covenant,  below,  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  15,  Art.  I,  Par.   1,  and 
Annex  to  Covenant,  part  first. 

2  Same,  and  Annex,  part  second. 
'Covenant,  Art.  I,  Par.  2. 

*  Same. 
6  Same. 
6  Same,  Par.  3. 


468  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

"members,"  a  much  more  fixed  and  stable  concept.1  A 
state  might  be  declared  to  have  forfeited  its  membership  in 
the  League  if  it  violated  any  article  of  the  Covenant.2 

The  League  was  to  act  through  a  Council,  an  Assembly, 
•  •  '•  • .  a  Secretariat,  a  Court,  and  two  or  more  Commissions.3 
The  Court  was  not  created  directly  by  the  Covenant.  In- 
stead, a  plan  for  a  Court  was  to  be  worked  out  and  adopted 
later.4  The  Commissions  were  likewise  created  only  by 
authorization.5 

By  another  part  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  there  was 
created  an  International  Labor  Office  and  this  body  was  to 
be  a  "part  of  the  organization  of  the  League."  6  The  mem- 
bers of  the  League  were  to  be  members  of  a  union  maintain- 
ing the  Labor  Office,  although  the  union  was  to  have  a  Con- 
ference distinct  from  the  Assembly  of  the  League.7  The 
Secretariat  of  the  League  was  to  assist  the  Labor  Office 
wherever  possible.8 

The  most  powerful  body  in  the  League  as  created  was 
the  Council.  This  body  was  to  be  composed  at  the  start 
*VV\M*s<Ujv«b  QJTfive  Allied  Powers  of  first  rank  and  four  friendly  powers 
of  second  rank,  the  former  holding  their  seats  permanently, 
the  latter  until  changed  by  the  Assembly.9  The  Council 
might,  with  the  approval  of  the  Assembly,  increase  the  num- 
bers of  both  these  categories.10  The  Council  should  meet 
at  least  annually ;  each  member  of  the  Council  possessed  one 
vote,  thus  recognizing  a  principle  of  political  equality  after 
(  neglecting  it  in  the  original  act  of  constructing  the 
\  Council.11 

'Arts.  I,  II,  III  of  draft  of  14  February,  in  Sen.  Doe.  46,  66  Cong., 
1  Sess.;  Art.  Ill  of  Covenant. 

*  Covenant,  Art.  XVI,  Par.  4. 

'Same,  Arts.  II,  IX,  XIV,  XXII,  XXIV. 

«Art.  XIV. 

•Arts.  IX,  XXII,  XXIV. 

6  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Part  XIII,  Section  I,  Preamble,  and  Arts.  387,  392, 
in  Temperley,  III,  314-315,  316. 

T  Same,  Arts.  387,  388,  392. 

'Same,  Art.  398. 

'Covenant,  Art.  IV,  Par.  1. 

10  Same,  Par.  2. 

u  Same,  Art.  IV,  Pars.  3  and  6. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  469 

The  Assembly  of  the  League  was  to  be  composed  of  rep- 
resentatives of  all  members  of  the  League,  to  meet  regu- 
larly, and  to  act  by  votes,  where  the  principle  of  equality 
should  be  observed.1 

In  all  voting,  except  in  questions  of  procedure,  decisions 
must  be  made  by  the  unanimous  consent  of  those  present. 
Apparently  the  absentees  were  bound  by  the  decision  of 
those  present. - 

The  Secretariat,  under  the  Secretary-General,  was  to 
act  as  a  secretarial  and  administrative  office,  and  to  main- 
tain its  bureau  at  Geneva,  Switzerland,  which  was  desig- 
nated as  the  seat  of  the  League.3 

The  chief  function  of  both  the  Council  and  the  Assembly 
is  to  be  that  of  discussing  current  international  problems, 
whether  or  not  these  problems  have  emerged  in  the  form  of 
international  conflicts,  and  to  try  to  suggest  methods  of 
settlement.  Thus  the  Council  was  authorized  to  devise  a 
new  plan  for  a  Court  of  Justice  and  submit  it  to  the  mem- 
bers, to  devise  plans  for  disarmament  and  submit  them  to 
the  members,  and  to  advise  the  members  regarding  the  „  .  j- 

*^t&&H&&tottiMfBt  *"^^i^BB^^0B^^^  ^-*\.  y^*^   *•  * 

control  of  the  armament  industry.4  In  cases  of  interna- 
tional disputes  the  Council  is  to  act  as  a  Commission  of 
Inquiry  and  a  Council  of  Conciliation.5  The  chief  defect  in 
the  practice  of  inquiry,  good  offices,  and  mediation  in  the 
past  was,  as  we  have  seen,  their  intermittent  character;  the 
Council  is  to  act  as  an  organ  for  continuous  inquiry,  good 
and  mediation.  It  has  power  to  make  its  inquiry? 


and  recommendations  on  the  motion  of  one  of  the  dispu-' 
tants,  and  its  findings  and  recommendations  are  to  be  pub- 
lished.    If  it  so  desires  the  Council  may  refer  the  dispute  to 
the  Assembly  and,  in  turn,  either  one  of  the  parties  may 
demand  such  action.    Even  where  the  Council  acts  to  se- 

1  Covenant,  Art.  Ill,  Para.  1,  2,  and  4. 
'  Same,  Art.  V,  Par.  1. 

2  Same,  Arts.  VI  and  VII. 

4  Same,  Art.  VIII,  Pars.  2  and  4. 
•Art.  XV. 


470  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

cure  cooperation  of  the  members  in  coercing  a  state  which 
has  refused  to  abide  by  certain  articles  in  the  Covenant,  it 
may  only  "advjge"  what  action  is  to  be  taken.1  It  may 
listen  to  complaints  and  may  discuss  problems  and  disputes 
at  will ;  it  cannot  settle  anything.  It  may  recommend  exec- 

^  utive  action  by  the  members;  it  cannot  itself  make  and 

v  carry  into  execution  any  decision  or  rule. 

The  point  at  which  the  Council  comes  nearest  to  the 

""  *    ^•Wp<>>*(<W(W*'^**— *^** **^****^B— ***l— *--****4&'"*BMHaM<(^^ 

j  exercise  of  real  discretionary  power  is  to  be  found  in  its 
power  to  refuse  to  excuse  a  member  from  an  armament  limi- 
tation which  that  member  has  itself  previously  adopted.2 
Even  here  the  source  of  the  binding  force  of  the  limitation 
is  the  prior  decision  of  the  state  itself.  So  injseveral  ojther 
places,  the  states  pledge  themselves  to  submit  disputes 
to  inquiry,  or  arbitration,  to  abide  by  awards,  to  respect 
each  other's  territorial  integrity,  to^jase^an  embargo  of 
commerce  and  military  force  where  necessary,  against  a 
recalcitrant  member,  to  reduce  their  armaments,  to  ex- 
change data  regarding  armaments,  and  to  permitthe^pas- 
sage  of  League  troops  through  their  territory?* But  no 
^ League  body,  not  even  the  Council,  can  itself  enforce  such 
\  pledges. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Council  may  make  certain 
decisions  of  a  purely  administrative  character,  and  so, 
indeed,  may  the  Secretary-General  himself.  Clerical  staff 
appointments  may  be  confirmed,  the  seat  of  the  League 
moved,  expenses  fixed  and  regulated,  and  so  on.4  The 
Secretary-General  may  likewise  summon  a  meeting  of  the 
Council,  publish  treaties  registered  with  the  League,  and 
perform  several  similar  functions.5  These  activities,  how- 
ever, though  discretionary,  do  not  normally  carry  any  poli- 
tical consequences  and  so  need  little  attention. 

1  Covenant,  Art.  X. 

1  Art.  VIII,  Par.  4. 

•  Art?.  VIII,  X,  XII,  XIII,  XVI. 

4  Arts.  V.  VI,  VII. 

6  Arts.  XI,  XVIH. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  471 

The  Assembly  bears  still  more  of  the  character  of  a 
debating  society.  Given  power,  like  the  Council,  to  take 
up  and  discuss  any  subject  of  international  interest,  it  has 
no  power  at  all  to  act,  except  in  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  the  League,  members  of  the  Council,  and  members 
of  the  Secretariat.1  It  may  advise  the  reconsideration  of 
treaties  or  conditions  threatening  the  peace  of  the  world,  but 
this  is  about  as  far  as  it  can  go.2 

The  Court  planned  for  establishment  under  the  League  N 
likewise,  as  has  been  seen,  depends  entirely  on  the  consent  ; 
of  the  parties  for  its  jurisdiction.    The  Council,  adhering  I 
strictly  to  the  text  of  the  Covenant,  refused  to  accept  and  ^ 
transmit  to  the  members  of  the  League  the  plan  of  the  i 
Committee  of  Jurists  providing  for  obligatory  arbitration.  J 

"With  the  consent  of  the  nations  supporting  the  exist- 
ing international  administrative  bureaus  and  commissions, 
the  League  may  take  over  the  forty  or  fifty  international 
bodies  of  this  type,  adding  them  to  the  armaments  commis- 

IW^BM.  ^^^J^M^W^^^V****^  ^•^^••^^•••k  •^•*-*w>**^w«»^"^i0'i*****^^*^**i-*y>1**** 

sion,  the  mandates  commission,  and  various  committees 
which  the  Council  and  the  Assembly  may  create  for  pur- 
poses of  investigation  and  report  on  special  topics.  Inter- 
national bureaus  and  commissions  to  be  created  in  the 
future  are  to  be  placed  under  the  League  in  like  manner.3 
The  position  of  the  administrative  bodies  just  mentioned 
is  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  already  existing  diplo- 
matic and  consular  systems,  the  practice  of  treaty  nego- 
tiation, the  existm^network  of  treaties,  the  body  of  com- 
mon international  law,  and  existing  courts  of  arbitration 

t       O 

or  treaties  providing  for  the  same.    All  of  these  standing 
institutions  of  international  government  are  to  continue 
to  operate  as  before,  more  or  less  in  connection  with,  and  \ 
more  or  less  independent  of,  the  League,  as  circumstances 
determine.     Thus  the  Covenant  assumes  the  continuation  . 

1  Covenant,  Arts.  I,  IV,  VI. 
•Art.  XIX. 
•Art.  XXIV. 


472 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


7s  '  intact   of  the   diplomatic   system.1     Treaties   inconsistent 

A/Vfrft  <^f  <~Cj  ^  ^^^^^W^*         ^^^^^^  •  T  T  1  IT  I  I* 


e  Covenant  are,  indeed,  abrogated,  new  treaties  are 
not  to  conflict  with  it,  and  all  treaties  are  to  be  binding  only 
after  registry  with  the  League ;  but,  apart  from  these  limita- 
tions, the  practice  of  treaty  negotiation  is  to  go  on  as 
before.2  One  of  the  objects  of  the  League  is  to  secure 
obedience  to  ' '  the  understandings  of ' '  existing  international 
law.3  Any  existing  court  of  arbitration,  including  the 
Hague  Court,  may  be  utilized  by  the  parties  under  the  Cov- 


The  final  text  of  the  Covenant  differed  at  several  points, 

in  addition  to  those  already  named,  from  the  tentative  draft. 

The  provision  requiring  unanimous  agreement  except  on 

questions  of  procedure  did  not  appear  in  the  tentative  draft. 

/The  provision  excluding  "domestic"  questions  from  the 

i  jurisdiction  of  the  League  was  new,  as  was  the  clause 

\permitting  withdrawal  on  two  years  notice.    The  provision 

declaring  that  the  Covenant  does  not  affect  the  validity  of 

international  engagements,  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration, 

or  regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for 

securing  the  maintenance  of  peace,  was  added  in  the  second 

draft.5 

Practically  all  of  these  changes  were  made  at  the  behest 
of  the  United  States,  acting  as  the  most  vigorous  champion 
of  national  sovereignty  and  independence  at  the  same  time 
that  we  were  acting  as  chief  supporter  of  international  co- 
operation. By  itself  such  a  combination  of  policies  is  not 
illogical.  But  the  action  as  taken  was  caused  primarily  by 
the  partisan  conflict  developing  between  President  Wilson 
and  the  Republican  party,  and  did  not  arise  primarily  from 
any  consideration  of  the  merits  of  the  case.  What  Britain 
and  France  could  accept  without  qualms  on  the  subject 

1  Covenant,  Art.  XIII,  Par.  1. 
•Art.  XVIII. 
1  Preamble. 
'Arts.  XII,  XIII. 
•Art.  XXI. 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  1919  473 

of  sovereignty  could  hardly  have  been  dangerous  for  the 
United  States.  If  the  motive  was  to  preserve  American 

^^^^^^^^^•^^^^0^M0^MMa00M^M^I^MVtfe^lMflV*MvMM>^*^0B^0|jH|P 

isolation,  so-called,  that  is  another  matter.    The  only  thing  v 
to  be  said  in  such  a  case  is  that  in  point  of  fact  we  are  • 
not  isolated  but  tied  up  very  closely  with  Europe  in  trade 
and  finance,  and,  therefore,  in  potential  political  interest.  • 
It  may  be   added,   moreover,   that   by   the   Covenant   we  "*"' 
surrender  no  single  item  of  discretion;  we  put  ourselves  V"*" 
in  position  to  be  subjected  to  no  single  rule  or  decision  to  '• 
which  we  have  not  specifically  consented  by  our  own  vote. 

No  penalties  are  provided  and  nothing  remotely  resem- 
bling  coercion  is  provided  in  the  Covenant  until  we  reach  J*S+ 
j£§±£gjg)^^  Penalties  are  then 

prescribed  in  eight  distinct  cases  where  the  members  dis- 
regard promises  made  in  the  Covenant.  Those  promises 
are  the  pledges  to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  and 

&&^*0^0&^0^r*^*^^^^0^i^^l^*0*^^ff&* 

political  independence  of  other  members,  to  refrain  from 

w^"""^^^^*"""*  *  ...  •»'*^WWM 

war  at  the  outbreak  of  an  international  dispute  and  submit 
the  dispute  to  inquiry  by  the  Council  or  to  arbitration  by 
a  court  acceptable  to  both  parties,  to  refrain  from  war  for 
three  months  after  the  report  of  the  Council  orTh^award  of 
the  court,  to  accept  the  awrard  of  the  court,  or,  at  least, 
not  to  go  to  war  either  to  enforce  a  demand  against  which 

•••^'^^^^'^^•••••ItfMBfcMMAMM^^tfM^^^fc^^^^^'MM^WMM^^I^riHMMQfVMfe  JM^^_      ^.w_r'"Xri*~i 

the  report  of  the  Council  is  unanimous,  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  excepted,  or  to  enforce  a  demand  in  opposition  to 
the  arbitral  award.1  "It'enalties^are  also  proviSe^for  dis-v 
regard  of  the  Covenant  in  general.2    In  the  last  case  for-  S 
feiture   of  membership  alone  is  inflicted  as   a  penalty.3 
In  the  first  case  the  Couricil  is  merely  to  advise  the  members 
what  to  do,  and  that  amounts  to  saying  that  the  members 
will  do  what  seems  best  to  them,  deriving  no  specific  author- 
ity from  the  Covenant  for  any  coercion  they  may  take, 
which  leaves  matters  precisely  where  they  were  before  the 

1  Covenant,  Arts.  VIII,  X,  XII,  XIII,  XVI. 
"Art.  XVI. 
3  Same,  Par.  4. 


474  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Covenant  and  the  famous  Article  X  were  concluded.  In  all 
other  cases  the  offending  members  will  have  to  suffer  the 
severance  of  commercial  and  financial  intercourse  with  the 
other  members,  and  eventually  military  coercion  if  the 
other  members  are  willing  to  exercise  such  power  on  the  ad- 
vice  of  the  Council.  To  what  end?  That  the  aforesaid 

*  pledges  may  be  carried  out.    Nothing  more.    At  no  point  is 

there  mediation  or  arbitration  without  voluntary  action  by 
S*f  the  state  involved.  At  no  point  can  Council  or  Court  decide 
on  the  merits  of  the  dispute,  so  as  to  give  the  decision  a 
binding  effect  unless  the  state  has  itself  voluntarily  ac- 
cepted arbitration.  At  no  point  does  the  League  or  any 
body  of  the  League  have  any  authority  over  the  subject 
matter  of  the  national  interests  of  its  members  except  such 
as  is  given  to  it  at  the  time  by  the  free  consent  of  those 
states. 

It  may  well  be  said,  however,  that,  in  view  of  this  state 
of  affairs,  the  thing  to  be  feared  is  not  judgment  and  execu- 
tion, but  the  influence  or  indirect  control  to  be  exerted  by 
the  League  through  the  Council  and  the  Court,  by  means  of 
inquiry,  report,  mediation,  and  publicity.  This  is  exactly 
the  case.  But  it  reveals  the  true  spirit  and  the  ultimate 
futility  of  the  opposition  to  such  a  body  as  the  League. 
The  real  power  of  the  League,  as  of  every  political  and  legal 
institution,  lies  in  the  extent  to  which  it  reflects  reality  and 
the  actual  interests  and  influences  of  political  life,  not  in 
the  literal  terms  of  the  law  on  which  it  is  based.  It  will 
be  successful  and  powerful  only  in  proportion  as  it  reflects 

J     • 1$  such  reality;  but  in  so  far  as  it  does  correspond  to  the  real 

needs  of  Hie  time  it  will  control,  even  beyond  the  letter  of 
the  Covenant.  Any  League,  be  the  Covenant  ever  so  re- 
stricted  and  limited  in  its  definition  of  power,  will,  so  long 
as  it  effectively  creates  a  central  body  for  inquiry,  confer- 
ence, advice  and  publicity,  govern  the  world  because  just 
such  a  body  and  just  such  a  procedure  is  precisely  what  the 
world  most  needs. 


475 

One  of  the  principal  tests  to  be  applied  to  any  federal 
constitution  in  order  to  discover  its  true  character  relates 
to  the  method  of  amendment.  The  Covenant,  being  a  treaty 
agreement,  may  only  be  altered  effectively  by  unanimous 
consent.  It  is  true  that  amendments  may  be  adopted  by 
the  consent  of  the  Powers  whose  representatives  at  the 
time  compose  the  Council,  acting  together  with  a  majority 
of  the  states  possessing  members  in  the  Assembly,1  but  it  is 
also  provided  that  ^dissenting  members  shall  not  be  bound 
by  such  changes  although  they  shall,  if  they  persist  in  dis- 
senting from  the  changes,  lose  membership  in  the  League.2 

/This  gives  to  the  Great  Powers  and  the  few  Powers  of      ft 
Second  Kank  represented  on  the  Council  a  powerful  veto    g 

\  over  all  amendments.  The  smaller  powers  represented  in 
the  Assembly  may  be  compelledto  accept  amendments  in 
many  cases  in  spite  of  their  national  wishes  or  be  content 
to  suffer  exclusion  from  the  League.  Taking  the  amend- 
ment of  the  Covenant  or  constitution  of  the  League  as  the 
test  of  the  location  of  sovereignty  or  control  within  the 

E-pi-i     •  •'      •  ._,— ^^r^f-       _     _    iMM»»*<Bl          • 

eague,  it  is  clear  enough  that  that  control  lies  in  the 

Council  or,  rather,  in  the  Powers  represented  in  the  Coun- 
cil, limited  by  their  ability  to  secure  the  concurrence  of 
enough  smaller  states  to  control  a  majority  in  the  Assem- 
bly, and  by  the  power  of  a  single  member  to  escape  from 
the  terms  of  an  amendment  and  from  the  League  itself  by 
persistent  defiance  of  the  former. 

Such  being  the  Covenant  and  the  League  as  projected 
in  1919,  a  few  general  conclusions  at  once  emerge.  The 
system  created  by  the  Covenant  is  comprehensive  and  sym- 
metrical, complete  and  adequate  in  range  and  scope.  The 
historical  institutions  of  international  government — diplo- 
macy, treaty-negotiation,  and  arbitration,  including  good 
offices  and  mediation — are  gathered  together  and  carried 
forward  into  the  future  in  close  coordination  one  with 

1  Covenant,  Art.  XXVI,  Par.  1. 
"Same,  Par.  2. 


J 


476  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

another  and  with  a  new  system  of  conferences  and  con- 
gresses more  ample  and  more  comprehensive  than  anything 
in  existence  before.  The  League  is  provided  with  charac- 
teristic  constituent,  legislative,  administrative,  and  judicial 
organs.  It  is  capable  of  expansion,  and  its  framework  is 
not  unsuited  to  the  development  of  all  varieties  of  commit- 
tees and  commissions  acting  under  the  Secretariat,  the 
Council,  and  the  Assembly. 

Admirable  in  organic  structure,  the  League  is,  however, 
in  a  dubious  position  as  far  as  its  membership  and  powers 
are  concerned.  Its  membership  still  shows  the  effect  of 
the  war  and  reveals  the  League  as  largely  a  league  of 
victors  for  perpetuating  a  position  of  diplomatic  dominance 
won  in  battle,  rather  than  a  general  concert  of  power  for 
common  benefits.  So  long  as  this  condition  of  affairs  con- 
tinues, as  it  must  until  the  le^cXe^j^ihftjjyar  are  liqui- 
dated, its  outlook  and  activities  must  necessarily  be  partial, 

,.„.-'  ""•""•*'^^^*S^T"  *  A 

if  not  partisan.  This  phenomenon  is  simply  one  angle  of 
the  manner  in  which  war  tends  to  wreck  the  nascent  fabric 
of  international  organization.  When  the  problems  of  the 
war  are  settled  the  League  may  turn  to  other  things.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  rather  perplexing  definition  and 
allotment  of  powers  in  the  Covenant  may  then  be  cleared 
up.  Is  the  Assembly  merely  a  debating  society?  To  what 
extent  is  the  Council  in  control?  Is  there  no  more  power 
of  compulsion  vested  in  the  League  than  such  as  rests  on 
political  and  moral  influence?  Can  the  nations  be  brought 
to  face  the  conditions  of  the  world  more  squarely  and  cour- 
ageously? Such  are  the  problems  left  open  by  the  Cove- 

Snaiit.  The  Covenant  was  devised  in  a  few  weeks  in  1919. 
It  may  "be  revised  through  decades  of  international  con- 
stitutional history. 


PART  VIII 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1920-1921 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF 

NATIONS  AND  THE  RESUMPTION  OF 

INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

THE  Treaty  of  Versailles  having  been  ratified  in  the 
closing  months  of  1919  by  a  sufficient  number  of  the 
signatory  parties  to  render  it  effective,  an  exchange  of 
ratifications  took  place  in  Paris  on  10  January,  1920. 
Three  days  later  the  first  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  was  summoned  by  President  Wilson,  acting  under 
Article  V  of  the  Covenant,  and  on  16  January  the  League 
was  formally  established  by  a  meeting  of  the  Council  in 
Paris.1 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Council  had  been  preceded  by  a 
considerable  amount  of  work  by  an  Organization  Com- 
mittee and  the  Secretary-General. 

The  Organization  Committee  had  been  created  by  a 
resolution  adopted  by  the  Peace  Conference  on  28  April, 
1919.  Starting  its  work  on  5  May  the  Committee  continued 
to  function  until  the  formal  establishment  of  the  League,  its 
task  being  to  supervise  the  organization  of  the  Secretariat 
and  prepare  for  the  meeting  of  the  Council. 

The  Secretary-General  had  been  named  in  an  appendix 
to  the  text  of  the  Covenant.  He  immediately  began  to  act 
in  accordance  with  the  intentions  of  the  Covenant,  although 
that  pact  was  not  yet  in  force.  Temporary  offices  were  es- 
tablished in  London.  Certain  undersecretaries  were  chosen. 
The  collection  of  books  and  papers  for  a  library  for  the 
Secretariat  was  begun.  In  these  actions  the  Organization 

1  Official  Journal,  I,  No.  1,  12,  17,  18.  On  the  early  history  of  the  League 
see  literature  cited,  below,  in  Appendix  B,  §  28. 

479 


480  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Committee  participated  to  the  extent  of  giving  advance 
approval  and  confirmation.  Indeed,  the  Secretary-General, 
in  all  of  his  preliminary  work,  acted  entirely  as  a  result  of 
a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Organization  Committee  on  5 
May  empowering  him  to  appoint  a  staff  and  establish  an 
office,  and  temporarily  fixing  his  salary. 

By  the  beginning  of  1920  plans  for  the  organization  of 
the  Secretariat  had  been  thoroughly  developed.  Delay  in 
the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  allowed  the 
plans  of  the  Secretariat  to  run  ahead  of  the  formal  estab- 
lishment of  the  League.  By  the  time  the  Council  met, 
therefore,  the  Secretariat  had  devised  a  plan  for  many 
"Sections"  and  "Commissions"  in  the  permanent  struc- 
ture of  the  League  which  could  only  be  definitely  created 
when  the  constituent  or  legislative  organs  of  the  League, 
the  Council  and  Assembly,  should  authorize  them. 

While  this  general  preparatory  work  was  being  carried 
out  by  the  Organization  Committee  and  the  Secretary- 
General,  there  was  established,  in  accordance  with  Part 
XIII  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the  International  Labor 
Organization  described  therein.1 

The  International  Labor  Organization,  as  has  been  seen, 
was  to  be  an  association  of  nations  separate  from  the 
League,  although  composed  of  the  same  members,  and  was 
to  operate  through  its  own  Governing  Body,  General  Con- 
ference, International  Labor  Office  and  Director,  and  a 
Commission  of  Inquiry.  When  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
was  framed  all  parties  expected  that  it  would  be  ratified 
promptly.  It  was  therefore  provided  that  a  temporary 
Organization  Committee  should  begin  work  at  once  in  prep- 
aration for  the  active  operation  of  the  Labor  Organization. 
In  the  treaty  itself  it  was  stipulated  that  President  Wilson 
should  call  the  first  meeting  of  the  General  Conference 
for  October,  1919,  in  Washington.2  As  things  worked  out, 

1  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Arts.  387-427. 
*Same,  Arts.  424-426,  and  Annex, 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         481 

these  provisions  brought  about  the  meeting  of  the  Con- 
ference created  by  the  Treaty  before  the  Treaty  itself  was 
effective ! 

The  Conference  met,  nevertheless,  at  the  appointed 
time,  and  carried  on  its  deliberations  with  the  result  that 
six  draft  labor  conventions  and  six  recommendations  were 
made  and  referred  to  the  constituent  nations.  The  Govern- 

H 

ing  Body  of  the  Labor  Organization  was  also  established, 
and  likewise  the  International  Labor  Office  with  its  Di- 
rector.1 The  offices  of  tiie  Labor  Organization  had  been  set 
up  at  first  in  London.  They  were  temporarily  moved  to 
Washington  in  the  end  of  1919,  but  were  returned  to  Lon- 
don later.  In  accordance  with  the  Treaty,  close  relations 
of  cooperation  were  at  once  established  between  the  Secre- 
tary-General of  the  League  and  the  Director  of  the  Labor 
Office,  and  it  soon  appeared  that  the  Labor  Organization  as 
such  was  simply  the  League  in  another  capacitv  and  that, 
as  the  Treaty  stipulated  should  be  the  case,  the  Labor  Office 
was  fast  becoming  part  of  the  nascent  organization  of  thev 
League. 

With  the  opening  of  1920,  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles,  the  formal  establishment  of  the  League, 
and  the  meeting  of  the  Council  in  Paris,  these  preliminary 
activities  of  the  Secretary-General  and  the  Labor  Organiza- 
tion took  their  legitimate  places  in  the  scheme  of  the 
League.  They  did  not,  however,  diminish  in  importance, 
but  continued  during  the  year  1920  to  develop  in  their  own 
way. 

The  Secretary-General  was  now  allowed  to  continue  his 
work  of  organization  unhindered.  Even  after  the  beginning 
of  the  meetings  of  the  Council  he  was  allowed  to  proceed 
largely  according  to  his  own  lights.  Not  until  May,  1920, 
when  the  Council  met  in  Eome  for  its  fifth  session,  did  the 
plan  of  organization  devised  by  the  Secretary-General  come 

1  Official  Journal,  I,  No.  1,  26. 


482  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

up  for  approval,  and  even  at  that  time  his  work  did  not  re- 
ceive any  very  elaborate  discussion.1  The  Secretary-Gen- 
eral was  therefore  able,  all  through  the  first  year  of  the 
League, — the  most  important  year,  for  this  purpose, — to 
organize  matters  as  he  thought  best.  While  changes  may 
be  made  in  the  future,  the  League  was,  by  the  freedom 
given  to  the  Secretary-General  in  1919  and  1920,  committed 
to  the  plan  by  him  first  created  and  established. 

That  plan  consisted  of  some  ten  1 1  Sections, ' '  as  follows : 

Political  Section :  a  bureau  of  correspondence  for  mem- 
bers of  the  League  on  all  political  problems, — such  as  those 
referred  to  in  Article  XI  of  the  Covenant, — and  a  research 
bureau  in  this  field  for  the  League  itself. 

Legal  Section:  a  corps  of  expert  advisers  dealing  with 
legal  problems  arising  in  the  work  of  the  Secretariat,  the 
Council,  and  the  Assembly,  or  in  the  relations  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  to  each  other  as  members,  and  to  the 
League  itself  by  virtue  of  either  the  Covenant  or  other  in- 
ternational treaties. 

Economic  and  Financial  Section :  to  deal  with  interna- 
tional commercial  and  financial  problems  by  collecting  data 
and  statistics  relating  thereto  for  the  information  of  the 
members  and  governing  bodies  of  the  League,  and  by  hold- 
ing general  international  conferences  to  deal  with  such 
questions. 

Administrative  Commissions  Section :  to  coordinate  and 
supervise  the  various  commissions  created  or  authorized  by 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  other  treaties  of  1919-20 
where  the  League  is  involved  in  the  execution  or  administra- 
tion of  these  treaties,  such  as  the  commissions  dealing  with 
the  Saar  region  and  Danzig ;  to  watch  over  the  execution  of 
the  provisions  of  the  treaties  respecting  the  protection  of 
minorities. 

Transit   and   Communications   Section:   to   serve   the 


1  Official  Journal,  I,  No.  4,  115. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE        483 

League  in  connection  with  its  duties  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national communications  by  providing  the  Council  and  the 
Assembly  with  data  on  the  subject,  making  recommen- 
dations, and  watching  over  the  execution  of  the  peace 
treaties  as  far  as  this  topic  is  concerned. 

Information  Section:  the  publicity  bureau  of  the 
League,  the  office  from  which  information  would  be  sent 
out  to  the  World  through  the  press. 

Mandates  Section:  a  correspondence  bureau  between 
the  'League  and  mandatory  powers  respecting  their  man- 
date territories ;  to  provide  the  League  with  data  to  facili- 
tate the  performance  of  the  duties  of  the  League  under 
Articles  XXII  and  XXIII  of  the  Covenant. 

International  Bureaus  Section :  to  constitute  the  link  to 
connect  the  League  with  such  of  the  forty  or  fifty  inter- 
national administrative  bureaus  as  are  placed  under  the 
League  in  accordance  with  Article  XXIV  of  the  Covenant 
and  such  administrative  bureaus,  not  otherwise  provided 
for,  as  shall  be  created  in  the  future  in  connection  with  the 
League. 

Registration  of  Treaties  Section :  to  receive  and  register 
treaties  transmitted  to  the  League  by  members  in  pur- 
suance of  Article  XVIII  of  the  Covenant,  and  provide  the 
texts  from  which  these  treaties  would  later  be  published 
by  the  League. 

Health  Section :  the  central  office  for  such  organizations     > 
as  are  created  by  the  League  to  deal  with  health  and  morals       *(&- 
under  Article  XXIII  of  the  Covenant  or  brought  under 
the  League  from  among  the  already  existing  international         / 
conferences  and  associations  dealing  with  such  subjects. 

In  addition  to  these  Sections  for  special  work,  the  Secre- 
tariat soon  came  to  possess  a  clerical  staff,  a  distribution 
office  for  routing  incoming  work  to  the  appropriate  Sec- 
tions, and  a  library  of  its  own.  It  took  charge  of  all  build- 
ings and  offices  of  the  League  at  Geneva,  and  began  to  man- 
age the  publications  of  the  League.  These  publications 


484  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

soon  included  the  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplements 
thereto,  the  Treaty  Series,  Reports  of  the  Work  of  the 
Council,  the  records  of  the  meetings  of  the  Assembly  of  the 
League,  a  Monthly  Summary  of  the  activity  of  the  League, 
and  certain  miscellaneous  documents  relating  to  the  Per- 
manent Court  of  International  Justice,  the  International 
Financial  Conference,  and  the  Secretariat  itself.  The  rec- 
ords of  the  First  Assembly  as  issued  at  the  time  consisted 
of  a  Journal,  a  Provisional  Verbatim  Record  of  the  Plenary 
Sessions  of  that  body,  Proces-Verbaux  of  the  meetings  of 
Committees,  and  hundreds  of  Documents  laid  before  the 
Assembly.1 

After  the  adjournment  of  the  Washington  conference, 
the  International  Labor  Organization  continued  to  operate 
through  1920  chiefly  by  means  of  its  permanent  organs, 
the  Labor  Office  and  the  Director.  Two  additional  confer- 
ences were  held,  however,  one  at  Genoa  in  June  and  July, 
dealing  with  the  labor  of  seamen,  and  a  smaller  conference 
on  the  same  subject  at  Geneva  in  November.  The  head- 
quarters of  the  Labor  Office  were  moved  to  Geneva  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  and  the  Labor  Or- 
ganization thus  placed  in  its  proper  relationship  to  the 
League  and,  particularly,  the  Secretariat.2 

When  the  first  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  League 
was  held  in  January,  1920,  it  was  hailed  with  far  more 
enthusiasm  by  supporters  of  the  League  than  had  been 
bestowed  upon  the  inauguration  and  development  of  the 
work  of  the  Secretariat  in  1919.  In  one  way  this  was  very 
unfortunate  and  quite  unjustified.  The  value  to  the  cause 
of  international  cooperation  of  the  unostentatious  and  pro- 
saic work  of  the  Secretariat  is  very  possibly  greater  than 

1  Lists  of  publications  are  given  in  the  Official  Journal.     The  definitive  edi- 
tion of  the  records  of  the  First  Assembly  omits  the  Journal  and  Documents, 
as  such. 

2  Official  Journal,  I,  No.  6,  377-388,  and  Beport  by  the  Secretary  General 
to  the  First  Assembly  of  the  League  on  the  Work  of  the  Council,  being  Docu- 
ment No.  37  of  the  First  Assembly,  17;   cited  hereafter  as  Eeport  to  First 
Assembly. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         485 

that  of  the  Council,  and  it  would  be  well  for  the  standing 
of  the  League  in  public  estimation  if  more  attention  could 
be  drawn  to  its  more  stable  and  less  sensational  aspects. 
In  another  sense,  however,  this  reaction  was  faithful  to  the 
facts  in  the  case,  for  the  League  did  not  come  into  legal 
existence  until  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  10 
January,  1920,  and  the  first  meeting  of  the  Council  sig- 
nalized the  beginning  of  the  career  of  the  most  powerful 
organ  of  the  League. 

Between  16  January,  1920,  and  the  end  of  the  year  the 
Council  met  in  independent  sessions  ten  times.1  An  addi- 
tional meeting  was  held  in  November  and  December  in  con- 
junction with  the  meeting  of  the  First  Assembly.2  The 
work  of  the  Council  for  the  year  1920  may  be  apprehended 
by  means  of  an  examination  of  the  records  of  these  meet- 
ings.3 

The  Council  met  first  at  Paris.  Subsequent  sessions 
were  held  at  London  in  February ;  at  Paris  again  in  March 
and  again  in  April;  at  Borne  in  May;  at  London  in  June 
and  again  in  July;  at  San  Sebastian  (Spain)  in  August;  at 
Paris  in  September ;  and  at  Brussels  in  October.  The  final 
meeting,  in  connection  with  the  sessions  of  the  First  As- 
sembly, was,  naturally,  held  at  Geneva.  The  first  session 
occupied  only  one  day,  while  the  seventh  session  occupied 
a  period  of  twelve  days.  The  Council  remained  in  Geneva, 
in  more  or  less  active  session,  during  the  whole  of  the 
period  of  the  meetings  of  the  First  Assembly,  from  15 
November  to  18  December.  At  the  first  session  one  item  of 
business  was  taken  up,  while  at  the  tenth  session  some 
twenty-two  items  were  dealt  with,  and  during  the  Geneva 
meetings  the  whole  field  of  the  work  of  the  League  was  up 
for  review  and  action. 


1  Report  to  First  Assembly,  7,  53-59. 

1  Official  Journal,  II,  No.  1,  5-27. 

'  The  following  account  is  based  on  Ecport  to  First  Assembly,  53-59. 


486  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  work  of  the  Council  during  the  first  year  may  be 
divided,  as  to  its  subject  matter,  into  three  classes,  namely, 
work  in  connection  with  the  organization  and  administra- 
tion of  the  League  itself,  political  and  legal  matters,  and 
humanitarian  work,  including  action  for  the  promotion  of 
international  cooperation  independent  of  the  League. 

In  League  organization  and  administration,  the  Council 
had  at  first  a  relatively  free  hand  and  a  relatively  severe 
task.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Secretariat,  the  structure  and 
methods  of  the  League,  so  far  as  they  related  to  the  Council, 
had  to  be  planned  and  created  entirely  on  the  meager  basis 
of  the  text  of  the  Covenant.  The  earlier  meetings  of  the 
Council  were  therefore  taken  up  largely  with  such  ques- 
tions. Throughout  the  meetings  down  to  May,  1920,  the 
Council  occupied  itself  with  such  problems  as  the  appoint- 
ment of  commissions,  rules  of  procedure,  the  organization 
of  the  Court  under  the  League,  accessions  to  the  League, 
'•  the  budget  of  the  League,  the  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly, 
and  the  organization  and  work  of  the  Secretariat.  Until 
the  very  end  of  the  first  year  such  questions  were  specially 
prominent  in  the  order  of  business  of  the  Council. 

The  result  was  a  rather  irregular  growth  of  subordinate 
administrative  bodies  under  the  Council,  some  temporary 
and  some  permanent,  some  large  and  some  small,  some 
deliberative  and  advisory,  some  of  the  nature  of  investigat- 
ing commissions  or  administrative  boards.1  Certain  of 
the  temporary  bodies,  such  as  the  Committee  of  Jurists 
appointed  in  February  to  draft  a  plan  for  the  Court  to  be 
created  under  the  League,  either  completed  their  work 
before  the  end  of  1920  and  passed  out  of  existence,  or  would 
.  shortly  do  so.  This  was  equally  true  of  certain  of  the  larger 

bodies  such  as  the  International  Financial  Conference,  al- 
though in  this  case  and  in  one  or  two  others,  a  permanent 
or,  at  least,  a  temporarily  continuing,  body  was  created  as 

1  Beport  to  First  Assembly,  11,  13,  19,  and  following. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         487 

a  result  of  the  Conference.  For  these  reasons  it  is  almost 
impossible  and  rather  unprofitable  to  try  to  define  the  exact 
structure  of  the  League  at  the  end  of  1920. 

There  appeared,  naturally,  a  great  degree  of  similarity 
between  the  jurisdiction  of  the  organs  subordinate  to  the 
Council  and  that  of  the  Sections  of  the  Secretariat.  Thus,  r\ 
the  International  Financial  Conference,  the  Advisory  Fi-  /  * 
nancial  Commission  created  in  October  at  the  Brussels 
meeting  of  the  Council  to  carry  out  the  recommendations  of 
the  Conference,  and  the  International  Credits  Commission, 
plans  for  which  were' approved  by  the  Council  in  December, 
correspond  with  the  Economic  and  Financial  Section 
of  the  Secretariat.  A  danger  that  the  structure  and  work 
of  Council  and  Secretariat  would  duplicate  one  another 
in  this  way  made  its  appearance,  but  if  the  Secretariat  re- 
mains a  merely  clerical  branch  of  the  League  this  danger 
will  be  avoided  and  the  correlation  between  organs  of  the 
Council  and  Sections  of  the  Secretariat  develop  quite  nat- 
urally and  helpfully. 

Certain  of  the  administrative  tasks  of  the  Council  led  it 
into  matters  outside  its  jurisdiction.  Thus,  the  practice  of 
obligatory  arbitration  in  the  organization  of  the  Court  un- 
der the  League  had  been  definitely  ruled  out  by  the  terms 
of  the  Covenant,  'and  the  Council  found  itself  restricted  in 
its  activities  by  that  fact.1  The  preparation  for  the  work 
of  the  Assembly  had  to  be  made  by  the  Council  with  thought 
not  only  for  the  terms  of  the  Covenant  but  also  for  the 
fact  that  the  Assembly  might  itself  have  certain  ideas 
regarding  its  own  organization  and  procedure  when  it  con- 
vened, and,  as  the  Council  was  in  part  subject  to  removal 
or  renewal  by  the  forthcoming  Assembly,  this  meant  that 
the  Council  must  act  with  serious  consideration  for  its  re- 
lations to  the  Assembly.  As  we  shall  see,  the  Council  did 
not  escape  all  embarrassment  on  that  score. 

1  Covenant,  Art.  XIV. 


488 

Furthermore,  certain  of  the  actions  of  the  Council  in 
the  field  of  administrative  organization  were  prescribed 
for  it  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  outside  of  the  Covenant, 
and  led  into  the  field  of  political  and  legal  problems.  Thus, 
the  first  official  action  of  the  Council,  taken  at  Paris  in 
January,  1920,  was  to  appoint  three  members  of  a  Saar 
Basin  Delimitation  Commission  as  prescribed  by  Article 
48  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  At  the  February  meeting, 
in  London,  the  Council  named  a  Governing  Commission 
for  the  Saar  Basin  and  a  High  Commissioner  of  the  League 
at  Danzig,  both  according  to  terms  of  the  Treaty.1  These 
organs  correspond  to  the  fourth  Section  of  the  Secretariat, 
illustrate  the  way  in  which  the  Council  is  implicated  in  part 
in  the  execution  of  the  Treaty,  and  lead  us  into  the  political 
work  of  the  Council. 

The  work  of  the  Council  in  the  political  field  has  at- 
tracted most  attention  because  of  its  dramatic  quality  and 
because  it  is  here  that  what  appear  to  be  the  greatest  powers 
of  the  Council  are  to  be  exercised.  Questions  such  as  those 
of  territorial  sovereignty,  and  jurisdiction  over  peoples  and 
races,  are  felt,  and  rightly  felt,  to  be  dynamic  and  sig- 
nificant in  a  peculiar  degree. 

Such  questions  increased  in  number  in  the  work  of  the 
Council  as  the  year  1920  wore  on.2  Apart  from  questions 
of  this  type  referred  to  the  Council  by  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles or  the  other  treaties  of  1919-20,  the  first  of  such 
problems  to  be  dealt  with  were  discussed  at  the  meeting  in 
Paris  in  March  of  1920,  namely  the  protection  of  racial 
groups  in  Turkey,  the  protection  of  Armenia,  and  the  Rus- 
sian question.  By  the  end  of  the  year  the  Council  was  con- 
cerned with  not  only  these  problems,  but  also  the  Persian 
situation,  the  Aaland  Islands  case,  the  Vilna  episode,  and 
several  others. 

Some  danger  is  involved  in  this  development,  and  yet  a 

*  Report  to  First  Assembly,  21-25,  53. 
'Same,  25-40,  53,  54,  and  following. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE        489 

danger  difficult  to  avoid.  On  the  one  hand,  such  questions 
as  these,  arising  in  those  ranges  of  international  relations 
where  generally  accepted  legal  principles  are  almost  en- 
tirely lacking,  must  be  settled  by  the  Council  either  by 
negotiating  a  compromise  between  the  disputants  or  dic- 
tating a  settlement  based  on  rather  general  ideas  of  equity 
and  common  sense.  In  either  case  the  Council  is  bound  to 
suffer  some  hostility  and  criticism ;  in  one  case  because  the 
substance  of  the  settlement  will  appear  to  flow,  not  from 
any  wisdom  or  power  of  the  Council,  but  from  the  willing- 
ness of  the  parties  to  keep  the  peace  by  compromise,  and 
in  the  second  case  because  the  losing  party  will  dispute  the 
inherent  justice  and  reason  of  the  settlement,  while  the 
Council  will  have  no  accepted  legal  rule  on  which  to  rely 
for  justification.  Yet,  as  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies 
gradually  ceases  to  function, — and,  after  all,  the  war  and 
the  alignments  and  groupings  of  the  war  will  be  over  some 
day, — more  political  problems,  not  fewer,  will  come  before 
the  Council.  The  Assembly  would  have  the  right  to  take  up 
and  discuss  such  questions,  but  would  have  little  success  in 
handling  them  because  of  the  infrequency  of  its  meetings, 
its  size  and  general  deliberative  character,  and  its  lack  of 
concentrated  power  and  influence.  The  Court  of  the 
League  would  only  be  able  to  deal  with  such  questions  by 
consent  of  the  parties,  and  not  only  will  it  be  difficult  to 
secure  such  consent  in  the  case  of  these  political  or  non-  j 
justiciable  questions,  but  the  Court  would  merely  step  into 
the  difficulties  of  the  Council  if  such  consent  were  obtained. 
The  whole  situation  shows  clearly  what  a  menace  to  gen- 
eral organized  cooperation  is  to  be  found  in  the  all  too 
numerous  phases  of  international  relations  for  which  no 
commonly  accepted  principles  and  rules  have  been  found.  /  ^ 
The  development  of  such  legal  standards  and  their  appli-  v 
cation  by  a  Court  is  the  only  permanent  relief  to  be  °b-^/r*S 
tained  from  this  dilemma.  V^ 

Contrasting  strongly  with  this  activity  in  political  ques- 


490  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tions,  and  less  likely  to  be  the  subject  of  hostile  criticism, 
was  the  humanitarian  relief  work  fathered  by  the  Council.1 
A  campaign  against  typhus  in  Poland  was  organized  and 
conducted,  relief  work  in  Central  Europe  was  promoted, 
and  war  prisoners  in  large  numbers  were  repatriated  from 
Russia.  This  work  might  be,  and  in  actual  execution  largely 
was,  undertaken  by  private  agencies,  but  the  activities  of 
such  agencies  must  be  coordinated  and  distributed.  Pri- 
vate international  organization  or  a  separate  official  or- 
ganization might  do  even  that,  but  if  the  principle  of  Article 
XXIV  of  the  Covenant  is  sound  these  activities  might 
better  be  conducted  under  the  League  once  and  for  all. 
The  Council  also  took  steps  in  1920  to  encourage  inter- 

/     national  cooperation  outside  of  the  League  or  in  only  in- 
i—    •    *  __  i —  __          i »  ••••  *••          — L_ rup^T^ 

direct  connection  with  it.2  The  Council  put  itself  in  touch 
with  several  already  existing  official  international  organiza- 
tions such  as  the  Health  Commission  and  the  Union  for 
Suppression  of  the  Traffic  in  Opium.  It  also  sent  a  repre- 
sentative to  meet  with  the  General  Conference  of  Red  Cross 
Societies  in  Geneva  and,  at  its  eighth  session,  voted  to  as- 
sure the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  of  its 
complete  moral  support  in  all  relief  work.  The  Union  of 
International  Associations  in  Brussels,  the  organization 
which  acts  as  a  central  office  for  some  three  hundred  pri- 
vate international  associations,  was  granted  a  subsidy  m 
support  of  its  publication  of  a  compendium  of  the  resolu- 
tions adopted  from  time  to  time  by  international  con- 
gresses. The  Federation  of  National  Associations  in  Sup- 
port of  the  League  of  Nations  was  given  a  message  of  sym- 
pathetic encouragement  at  its  meeting  in  Milan  in  the 
Autumn  of  1920. 

For  many  students  of  the  League  the  Assembly  remains, 
however,  its  principal  organ  of  government.  They  point 
out  that  the  Covenant  provides  for  an  "  Assembly  and  a 

1  Report  to  First  Assembly,  45-51. 
1  Same,  51. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         491 

Council,"  implying,  so  it  is  said,  that  the  former  is  to  be 
the  first  or  primary  organ  of  the  League  and  the  Council  a 
subordinate  body.1  They  point  out  that  the  principal  duties 
of  the  Council  as  specified  in  the  Covenant  are  admini- 
strative or  ministerial  in  character,  while  the  Assembly  is 
left  to  discuss  and,  presumably,  decide,  questions  of  policy.2 
The  Council  contains  representatives  from  eight  or  nine 
members  of  the  League  only,  the  Assembly  is  represen- 
tative of  the  full  membership.3 

However  the  case  may  stand  on  the  merits,  the  founders 
of  the  League  decided  otherwise,  and  no  meeting  of  the 
Assembly  was  called  until  the  Council  had  held  its  first 
ten  sessions  and  had  thus  secured  a  decided  handicap  on  the 
Assembly  in  the  possible  contest  for  control  of  the  League. 
'There  is  no  reason  why  this  should  necessarily  have  hap- 
pened. Indeed,  certain  provisions  of  the  Covenant,4  and 
the  plans  made  in  1919  for  the  establishment  of  the  League 
in  the  expected  event  of  early  American  ratification,5  jtll 
imply  that  it  was  the  Assembly  which  was  to  meet  first,  and 
to  meet  thereafter  most  frequently.  The  Council  was  to 
meet  "at  least  once  a  year,"  the  Assembly  "at  stated  in- 
tervals. ' ' 6  The  trouble  was  that  no  one  had  stated-  the 
intervals,  and  the  Assembly  therefore  waited,  perforce, 
until  it  was  called  into  being.  The  result  was  that  the 
Assembly  came  to  be  regarded  as  an  annual  legislative  or 
constituent  body,  the  Council  more  or  less  as  a  ministry. 

Yet  such  a  description,  if  left  to  stand  alone,  would  be 
somewhat  misleading.  The  Council  does  not  depend  upon 
the  support  of  the  Assembly  for  its  power  or  position.  No 
legislative  power  rests  in  the  Assembly.  The  Council  and 

1  Covenant,  Art.  II. 

1  Same,  Arts.  VIII,  XIV,  and  XV,  XIX. 

"Same,  Arts.  Ill,  IV. 

4  Same,  Arts.  II,  III,  VI. 

'Besolution  of  Peace  Conference  of  28  April,  1919,  and  letter  from 
Clemenceau  to  House,  dated  4  September,  1919,  quoted  in  "Three  Months  of 
the  League  of  Nations,"  in  League  of  Nations,  III,  1-96  (February -April, 
1920),  12,  35. 

8  Covenant,  Arts.  Ill,  IV. 


492 

'  Assembly  each  possess  powers  which  are  derived  directly 
from  the  Covenant  and  which  at  times  exactly  overlap,  at 
times  overlap  in  part,  at  times  are  quite  different  and  dis- 
tinct. No  more  could  the  Assembly  and  the  Council  be  re- 
garded as  lower  and  upper  houses  of  a  legislature,  because 
of  differences  of  power  too  numerous  to  escape  notice. 
As  soon  appeared,  when  the  question  was  later  discussed 
by  the  Assembly,  the  solution  of  this  problem  of  the  rela- 
tive natures  of  and  relations  between  the  Council  and  the 
Assembly  must  be  sought  in  practice  by  reference  to  the 
Covenant,  the  general  principles  of  international  law,  and 
the  convenience  of  the  case.1  What  happened  in  1920  was 
that  the  delegates  of  European  Governments,  accustomed 
to  government  by  Ministers,  with  the  support  and  advice 
of  Parliament,  naturally  expected  the  Assembly  to  take 
that  attitude,  and  no  more  than  that  attitude,  toward  the 
Council. 

It  is  well  to  note  that  the  Council  did  not  take  as  hostile 
an  attitude  as  it  might  have  taken  toward  the  Assembly  in 
regard  to  the  respective  powers  of  the  two  bodies.  In 
two  or  three  cases,  indeed,  the  Council  took  conciliatory 
action  not  strictly  required  under  the  Covenant.  Thus, 
the  draft  plan  for  the  Court  of  the  League  was  submitted 
to  the  Assembly  for  approval,  when  such  action  was  not 
called  for  by  any  provision  of  the  Covenant  and  when  the 
approval  of  the  Assembly  could  have  no  legal  effect  at  all.2 
Again,  the  budget  of  the  League  was  submitted  to  the  As- 
sembly and  approved  in  the  same  manner,  and  with  like 
effect.3  Where  a  dispute  did  arise  between  the  two  bodies, 
— over  a  olemand  by  the  Assembly  to  be  allowed  to  see  the 
draft  plans  for  the  forms  of  Mandate  C — it  was  due  to  a 
feeling  on  the  part  of  the  Council  that  certain  members 
of  the  Assembly  were  anxious  to  curb  the  Council  contrary 

1  Documents  15,  16,  159  of  the  First  Assembly. 
'Covenant,  Art.  XIV;  Proces-Verbaux,  No.  15,  4. 
•  Verbatim  Becord,  29th  Plenary  Session. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE 

to  the  explicit  terms  of  Covenant.1  In  view  of  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  Gfreat  Powers  represented  in  the  Council,  and 
in  view  of  the  long  handicap  enjoyed  by  the  Council  in  1920, 
this  was  a  natural  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  members  of 
the  Assembly,  but  it  could  hardly  be  expected  to  encounter 
any  reception  other  than  that  which  it  did  encounter,  and 
cannot  be  very  helpful  or  effective  in  the  future. 

The  First  Assembly  held  some  thirty  plenary  sessions 
between  15  November  and  18  December,  1920.  Forty-one 
states  were  members  of  the  League  at  the  time  of  the 
meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  number  of  delegates  sent 
to  Geneva  was  approximately  one  hundred,  although  the 
total  number  of  persons  connected  with  the  meeting  of  the 
Assembly  was  double  this  figure.2 

The  Assembly  was  provided  by  the  Council  with  a 
temporary  chairman,  and  provisional  rules  of  procedure 
were  suggested  to  it  from  the  same  source.  The  Assembly 
did  not  feel  inclined  to  take  any  different  action  of  its  own 
at  the  beginning  and,  while  electing  the  President  of  the 
Swiss  Eepublic  Honorary  President,  proceeded  to  elect  the 
President  of  the  Council  President  of  the  First  Assembly 
and  to  accept  the  code  of  rules  of  procedure  as  suggested 
by  the  Council  as  its  own,  pending  action  by  a  committee 
entrusted  with  the  task  of  drafting  a  permanent  set  of 
rules.3 

The  First  Assembly  then  proceeded  to  select  six  Com- 
mittees to  deal  with  the  following  problems :  constitutional 
organization ;  technical  bodies  attached  to  the  League ;  cre- 
ation of  the  Court  of  Justice ;  Secretariat  and  budget ;  ad- 
mission to  the  League ;  and  the  reduction  of  armaments,  the 
use  of  economic  coercion  under  the  Covenant,  and  man- 
dates. Each  committee  was  composed  of  representatives 
from  all  the  states  represented  in  the  Assembly,  in  order 

1  Verbatim  Record,  30th  Plenary  Session ;  Mr.  Balf our,  although  speaking 
as  a  member  of  the  Assembly,  was  really  voicing  the  opinion  of  the  Council. 

2  Verbatim  Record,  Plenary  Meetings ;  also  Levermore,  127. 

3  Official  Journal,  I,  Special  Supplement,  January,  1921,  6,  7,  9. 


494  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

that  the  views  and,  if  possible,  the  consent,  of  each  nation 
might  be  obtained  on  each  question  in  the  committee  stage. 
Each  committee  elected  its  own  chairman,  and  these  six 
chairmen,  with  the  President  and  Honorary  President  of 
the  Assembly,  and  six  additional  Vice  Presidents,  elected 
directly  by  the  Assembly,  composed  the  General  Com- 
mittee.1 

The  question  of  publicity  in  connection  with  meetings 
of  the  Assembly  and  its  committees  arose  at  a  very  early 
point  in  the  proceedings.  The  Council  had  carried  on  most 
of  its  discussions  in  private.  Was  the  Assembly,  and  wero 
its  committees,  to  do  likewise,  and,  if  so,  was  this  desirable  ? 
Apparently  there  was  no  question  about  plenary  meetings ; 
it  was  assumed  without  discussion  that  these  were  to  be 
public.  One  of  the  chief  functions  of  the  Assembly  was 
precisely  that  of  serving  as  a  public  forum ;  beside  this,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  preserve  any  valuable  de- 
gree of  secrecy  among  over  one  hundred  delegates.  The 
committees,  on  the  other  hand,  were  free  to  do  as  they 
pleased.  After  some  argument  back  and  forth  setting  out 
the  familiar  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  publicity 
and  secrecy,  the  Assembly  decided  to  permit  the  committees 
to  meet  and  deliberate  in  private  but  required  a  record  of 
their  debates  and  decisions  to  be  kept,  which  should  be 
always  available  to  members  of  the  Assembly  and  should 
be  published  as  soon  as  possible.2  As  the  Assembly  did 
not  positively  prohibit  public  committee  sessions,  the  meet- 
ings of  the  Sixth  Committee  were  frequently  open  to  the 
public.  The  minutes  of  the  meetings  of  the  other  com- 
mittees were  published  almost  immediately  after  the  meet- 
ings.3 The  principal  consideration  leading  to  the  decision 
to  permit  private  discussions  in  committee  was  that  the 

1  Official  Journal,  I,  Special  Supplement,  January,  1921,  5. 
a  Verbatim  Record,  3d  Plenary  Session. 

*Proces-Verbaux,    Second   Committee,    First  Session;    Fourth   Committee. 
Third  Session;  Sixth  Committee,  First  Session. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         495 

reports  of  the  committees  would,  in  any  event,  come  up  for 
public  discussion  later  in  the  Assembly. 

The  First  Assembly  dealt  with  many  subjects,  which 
may  be  arranged  as  subjects  having  primary  importance, 
subjects  given  secondary  consideration,  and  miscellaneous 
topics.1  In  the  first  class  came  the  review  of  the  work  of 
the  Council ;  relations  between  the  Assembly  and  the  Coun- 
cil ;  the  technical  organizations  of  the  Council  and  the  Sec- 
retariat; the  Court  of  International  Justice  to  be  created 
under  theTLeague;  amendments  to  the  Covenant;  and  the 
admission  of  new  stat*es! In  the  second  rank  came  the  qries- 
tions  of  disarmament ;  mandates;  economic  coercion;  and 
the  protection  of  Armenia.  Among  miscellaneous  details 
which  came  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly  were  the  pro-  .* 
posed  use  or  encouragement  of  Esperanto,  racial  equality, 
and  others.  On  the  last  two  classes  of  questions  nothing 
much  could  be  or  was  done;  indeed,  it  was  this  aspect  of 
practicality,  rather  than  the  intrinsic  importance  of  the 
subjects,  that  placed  them  in  second  and  third  place  in  the 
work  of  the  Assembly.2  In  connection  with  economic  co- 
ercion, where  as  decisive  action  was  taken  as  in  any  case 
in  these  classes,  the  result  was  only  to  diminish  the  amount 
of  control  and  power  exercised  by  the  League  under  the 
Covenant.  Even  on  questions  of  first  importance  many  of 
the  decisions  were  inconclusive.  It  was  recognized  that 
the  Covenant  needed  revision,  but  it  was  felt  that  the  time 
was  not  yet  ripe  for  amendments,  and  there  was  some 
doubt  as  to  the  proper  procedure  in  the  proposed  action.3 
The  organizations  of  the  Council  and  the  Secretariat  were 
given  approval,  but  doubts  were  felt  and  changes  sug- 
gested.4 So  for  relations  between  Council  and  Assembly; 
as  has  been  seen,  no  sharp  conclusion  was  reached  or  at- 

1  Official  Journal,  I,  Special  Supplement,  January,  1921,  9-34. 

2  See  record  of  resolutions  and  decision  of  First  Assembly,  Official  Journal, 
as  just  cited,  especially  the  wording  of  the  resolutions  on  12-22, 

3  Same,  4. 

4  Same,  24. 


496  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

tempted.  Six  new  states,  namely,  Albania,  Austria,  Bul- 
garia, Costa  Rica,  Finland,  and  Luxembourg,  were  ad- 
mitted to  the  League  in  1920 ;  but  the  vital  cases  of  America, 
Russia,  and  Germany  could  not  be  solved.1  The  plan  for 

^MMIIH^IIi^Bi^M" 

the  Court  was  apprpvedf  reluctantly — in  view  of  the  ab- 
sence of  obligatory  jurisdiction — although  such  approval 
could  have  no  legal  effect.2 

What  then,  did  the  First  Assembly  accomplish?  It  ac- 
complished the  principal  task  to  be  accomplished  by  the 
first  meeting  of  the  Assembly:  it  established  its  claim  to 
existence,  it  took  on  a  fixed  form,  it  became  an  historical 
fact.  The  Assembly  was  to  constitute  the  first  permanent, 
continuous,  regular  conference  of  the  nations  in  time  of 
peace  having  general  jurisdiction.  Such  an  organ  of  inter- 
national government  the  world  had  long  needed.  The  As- 
sembly supplied  that  need. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Assembly  in  1920  was  "ineffec- 
tual"— so  far  as  this  characterization  is  accurate  at  all — 
because  the  function  of  the  Assembly  is  not  to  be  effectual 
but  deliberative,  not  to  make  decisions  but  to  canvass  the 
issues,  reflect  opinion,  and  provide  for  an  expression  of  na- 
tional feeling  on  the  issues  of  international  life.  It  ap- 
peared "ineffectual"  in  comparison  with  the  Council  be- 
cause the  latter  is  supposed  to  be  effective  in  action  and 
really  fo  do  things,  and  because  the  Council  had  been  in 
action  for  ten  months  before  the  Assembly  met.  It  ap- 
peared "ineffectual"  in  the  larger  world  problems,  as, 
for  that  matter,  does  the  Council,  because  of  the  continued 
?:  existence  and  activity  of  the  Supreme  Allied  Council,  deal- 
iing  with  the  major  questions  of  the  war  and  the  peace — 
reparations,  Silesia,  and  so  on. 

Such  a  conclusion  suggests  a  further  observation. 
While  the  League  was  coming  into  being  and  into  active 

1  Official  Journal,  as  cited,  28 ;  Verbatim  Record,  25th  and  29th  Plenary 
Sessions. 

'  Official  Journal,  I,  Special  Supplement,  January,  1921. 


ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  LEAGUE         497 

operation  in  1920  the  standing  institutions  of  international 
government  outside  the  League,  all  of  which  may  eventually 
oe  absorbed  by  the  League,  but  which  continue  at  present 
£o  function  independently,  were  beginning  again  to  operate 
in  their  normal  manner.    International  organization  in  1920  "\ 
was  not  entirely  a  matter  of  the  League  and  will  not  be  for  / 
some  years  to  come. 

Thus,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies  continued  to 

^•"^^^^•'^•••••••^•^^••^•^CS^**^''"1"""""*"* <**'l*"i**W^"^*^*k 

meet  during  1920 — at  San  Remo  in  April ;  at  Spa  in  July ; 
at  London  in  November.  The  Council  of  Ambassadors, 
auxiliary  body  to  the  Supreme  Council,  and  descendant  of 

.  •  •  ^*"^ip»/^^^****%* 

the  Council  of  Foreign  Ministers  which  split  on  from  the 
Council  of  Ten  during  the  Peace  Conference,  continued  to 
meet  in  Paris  and  deal  with  such  matters  connected  with 
the  peace  settlement  as  were  referred  to  it  by  the  Supreme 
Council.  The  Reparation  Commission,  created  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  to  supervise  the  execution  of  the 
clauses  relating  to  reparations  by  Germany,  met  continu- 
ously to  perform  its  task.  An  Inter- Allied  Communications 
Conference  met  in  Washington  in  October  to  discuss  the 
disposition  of  German  cables  taken  from  Germany  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.1  And  out  beyond  these  inner  coun- 
cils the  ordinary  diplomatic  and  consular  services  were 
resuming  and  even  expanding  their  normal  activity,  and 
the  practice  of  treaty  negotiation  was  again  going  for- 
ward— as  was  indicated  by  the  sixty  or  seventy  treaties 
registered  with  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  and  pub- 
lished in  the  first  numbers  of  the  Treaty  Series  of  the 
League.2  Administrative  bureaus  were  continuing  their 
partially  interrupted  activities ;  private  international  asso- 
ciations resuming  their  meetings ;  and  the  whole  machinery 
of  international  political  life  commencing  to  operate  again 
after  the  anarchical  paralysis  of  1914-19. 

1  For  meetings  of  these  bodies  during  1920  see  I/evermore,  4,  6,  7,  9,  10, 
16,  25,  and  elsewhere. 
1  Treaty  Series,  I. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921 

AFTER  the  meeting  of  the  First  Assembly  of  the 
League  in  December  of  1920  there  followed  a  period 
of  nine  or  ten  months  in  the  history  of  international  organi- 
zation, ending  in  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly  at  Geneva 
in  September  and  October,  1921,  which  assumed  a  character 
of  its  own.  On  one  hand,  the  work  of  the  League  was  car- 
ried on  continuously  by  the  organs  established  in  1919  and 
1920.1  These  organs  had  acquired  a  feeling  of  security  and 
stability  and  routine.  They  had  cleared  out  of  the  way  the 
preliminary  work  of  organization,  as  well  as  a  number  of 
troublesome  special  questions  which  would  not  recur.  On 
the  other  hand,  public  attention  began  to  drift  away  as 
the  novelty  of  the  League  wore  off,  and  the  work  in  1921 
sometimes  seemed  to  suffer  from  public  indifference  and 
neglect.  Moreover,  in  certain  problems  the  League  had 
begun  to  reach  below  the  easy  first  stages  of  generalities 
and  'to  come  in  contact  with  the  contentious  questions  be- 
neath. Fewer  questions  were  before  the  League  but  these 
were  more  difficult  to  handle  than  those  already  settled. 

The  Secretariat  continued  to  be  the  backbone  of  the 
League.2  Its  organization  remained  substantially  as  it  had 
been  created  in  1919-20.  Its  staff  was  expanding  slowly, 
checked  here  and  there  by  complaints  that  too  many  British 
or  too  many  French  names  appeared  upon  its  lists.  In- 

1  Report  to  the  Second  Assembly  of  the  League  on  the  Work  of  the  Council, 
being  Document  No.  A.9.  1921  of  the  Second  Assembly,  dated  18  August, 
1921,  cited  hereafter  as  Report  to  Second  Assembly;  and  Proceedings  of 
Second  Assembly. 

'  Report  to  Second  Assembly,  83;  see  also  interesting  articles  by  Wam- 
baugh,  S.,  in  New  York  Times,  14  and  21  August,  and  4  September,  1921,  Sec- 
tion VII,  p.  2,  in  each  case. 

498 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921  499 

dividuals  of  all  nationalities,  including  several  Americans, 
were  to  be  found  at  work  in  the  Sections.     The  correspond- 
ence of  these  Sections  increased  fivefold  over  that  of  the 
previous  year.1     Some  estimate  of  the  relative  importance 
of  the  work  of  the  Secretariat  may  be  made  on  the  basis 
of  the  fact  that  the  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  for  1922 
were  expected  to  amount  to  one-third  of  the  total  expendi- 
ture of  the  League.2    Council  and  Assembly,  Labor  Organ- \ 
ization  and  Permanent  Court,  all  cluster  about  this  ex-  ) 
tremely  useful  branch  of  the  League  organization. 

The  Labor  Organization,  like  the  Secretariat,  has  be- 
come a  permanent,  non-political  department  of  the  League. 
The  third  General  Conference  of  the  organization  was  held 
in  1921  at  Geneva.  The  Labor  Office  continued  to  collect 
and  distribute  information  and  to  attempt  to  supervise  in- 
ternational labor  conditions.  Itjias  prepared  one  or  two 
questions  for  consideration  by  the  Permanent  Court  when 
that  "body  shall  meet.  But  it  is  handicapped  by  the  fact 
that  the  states  have  not  acted  with  any  great  eagerness 
upon  the  Draft  Conventions  signed  at  Washington  in  1919 
and  at  Geneva  in  1920,  and  by  the  present  abnormal  indus- 
trial conditions.  At  the  same  time  it  may  be  noted  that  the 
expenses  of  the  Labor  Organization,  which  are  paid  by  the 
League,  amount  to  another  third  of  the  expenditure  of  that 
organization,  or  the  same  amount  as  those  of  the  Sec- 
retariat, or  those  of  the  Council,  Assembly  and  other  de- 
partments combined.3 

The  Council  of  the  League  met  three  times  in  1921  be- 
fore the  second  meeting  of  the  Assembly,  as  follows: 
twelfth  session,  at  Paris,  in  February  and  March  (ten 
days) ;  thirteenth  session,  at  Geneva,  in  June  (eleven 
days) ;  fourteenth  session,  at  Geneva,  in  August  and  Sep- 
tember (thirty-five  days),  in  conjunction  with  the  second 

1  Report  to  Second  Assembly,  83. 

*  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,  October,  1921,  30. 
'Same.     An  audit  of  accounts  for  1920  is  to  be  found  in  Official  Journal, 
II,  No.  4,  377-379. 


500  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

session  of  the  Assembly.1  The  Council  thus  met  much  less 
frequently  than  in  1920.  On  the  other  hand,  its  meetings 
lasted  longer  each  time,  the  work  was  better  prepared 
before  the  meeting,  and  the  transactions  in  the  meeting 
were  carried  out  with  a  greater  dispatch  and  effectiveness. 
The  Council  is  to  meet  hereafter  exclusively  at  Geneva,  as 
a  result  of  a  request  of  the  Assembly  in  1920 ;  the  meeting 
at  Paris  in  February,  1921,  was  a  special  exception  to  this 
rule. 

The  Council  has  made  an  effort  to  give  greater  publicity 
to  its  deliberations  hereafter.2  Beginning  with  the  Paris 
meeting  just  mentioned,  complete  minutes  of  each  session 
have  been  published,  and  since  the  thirteenth  session  many 
public  meetings  have  been  held  not  for  ceremonial  purposes 
but  where  questions  of  special  public  interest  have  been 
discussed.  The  Assembly  was  quick  to  recognize  this  ac- 
tion in  suitable  terms  when  it  met  in  October.3 

The  composition  of  the  Council  remained  during  1921  as 
fixed  by  the  Assembly  in  December,  1920,  China  taking  the 
place  of  Greece,  along  with  Belgium,  Brazil,  and  Spain,  as  a 
rotating  member,  and  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and 
Japan  still  making  up  the  permanent  membership.  The 
Chairmanship  of  the  Council  regularly  passes  about  from 
the  chief  representative  of  one  state  to  that  of  another, 
session  after  session.  The  only  questions  still  open  are 
those  concerning  a  possible  standardization  of  changes 
among  the  rotating  members,  and  the  addition  of  new  per- 
manent members.  The  former  has  been  taken  up  by  the 
Assembly — for  the  Assembly  has  power  to  select  these 
rotating  members  according  to  its  own  best  judgment — the 
latter  will  be  taken  up  when  Russia,  Germany,  and  the 
United  States  approach  the  pale. 

During  1921  the  Council  dealt  with  a  large  number  of 

1  Official  Journal,  II,  Nos.  2,  7,  8. 

*  Beport  to  Second  Assembly,  51-52. 

8  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,      40. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921  501 

subjects,  as  in  1920.1  But  there  appeared  a  tendency  for  the 
agenda  of  the  Council  to  become  stereotyped.  Certain  sub- 
jects appeared  on  the  program  regularly  at  every  session. 
This  was  true  especially  among  the  first  and  third  groups 
of  subjects,  as  already  described — matters  of  administra- 
tive organization  and  humanitarian  questions.2  Appoint- 
ments to,  and  reports  from,  various  commissions;  man- 
dates; and  minorities; — these  administrative  questions 
came  up  at  every  session,  as  did  the  opium  traffic,  typhus, 
and  relief  work  in  general.  It  was  also  true  of  certain  sub- 
jects which  bulked  so  large  in  the  work  of  the  Council  in 
1921  as  to  deserve  to  be  regarded  as  a  separate  group, 
namely,  economic  and  financial  questions.3  As  the  economic 
and  financial  restoration  of  Europe  and  the  world  became 
increasingly  important,  the  Council  was  compelled  to  give 
more  and  more  attention  to  that  problem.  And  if  the 
matter  of  reparations  had  been  given  to  the  League,  as  it 
logically  should  have  been,  instead  of  to  a  special  Repara- 
tions Commission,  this  effect  would  have  been  still  clearer. 

The  political  problems  of  the  Council  did  not  diminish 
in  numbers  in  1921,  nor  did  they  increase,  despite  the  fact 
that  gradually,  one  after  another,  certain  political  prob- 
lems arising  out  of  the  war  were  finally  settled,  and  not- 
withstanding, on  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  Supreme 
Council  still  met.  The  former  cause  was  approximately 
neutralized  by  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  powers  to  seek 
the  aid  of  the  League  rather  than  that  of  the  Supreme 
Council,  and  by  the  action  of  the  latter  in  turning  the 
Silesian  matter  over  to  the  Council  itself.4 

Altogether,  it  may  be  said  that  in  the  field  of  political 
problems  the  Council  was  more  successful  as  time  went  on, 
and  that  the  danger  which  was  at  first  feared  in  this  con- 
nection did  not  materialize.  In  spite  of  lack  of  power  to 

1  Report  to  Second  Assembly,  6-82. 

•Same,  6-16,  34-38,  41-47,  49,  50,  51,  71,  73,  82. 

•  Reports  of  Sessions  in  Official  Journal,  II,  NOB.  2,  7,  8. 

*  Report  to  Second  Assembly,  17-34,  74. 


502  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

compel  obedience  to  its  decisions,  and  notwithstanding  that 
this  condition  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  the 
Council  made  great  progress  toward  the  settlement  of  the 
Aaland  Islands  case  and  the  cases  of  Vilna,  Albania,  and 
Silesia.1  This  seemed  to  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  most 
powerful  sanction  available — the  most  powerful  when  ef- 
fectively marshaled  and  applied, — namely,  public  opinion, 
was  given  its  chance  to  operate  by  the  action  of  the  Council 
in  taking  up  for  discussion  the  contentious  problems  in  dis- 
pute. What  was  needed  was  a  forum,  a  jurisdiction,  rather 
than  a  sanction.  The  Council  provided  the  hearing  and  the 
forces  of  opinion  and  economic  convenience  compelled  a 
settlement. 

For  the  rest,  the  Council  undertook  or  encouraged  such 
humanitarian  work  as  it  could,  and  lent  such  moral  sup- 
port as  it  was  able  to  private  international  projects  of 
promise.2 

Just  how  much  the  Council  accomplished  by  these  hu- 
manitarian activities  is  difficult  to  measure.  The  number 
of  prisoners  repatriated  may  be  numbered  in  hundreds  of 
thousands,  but  that  tells  little  of  the  ultimate  value  of  the 
work  in  misery  and  death  avoided.  The  relief  work  in 
Austria  and  Poland  is  likewise  hard  to  appraise.  All  that 
can  be  said  is  that  such  work  should  by  all  means  be  done, 
and  that  if  the  League  accomplished  the  task  effectively  it 
performed  a  valuable  work. 

Indeed,  such  an  estimate  must  still  be  accepted  for  most 
of  the  work  of  the  Council.  The  value  of  the  administrative 
work  of  that  body  obviously  depends  on  ulterior  results  in 
the  months  and  years  to  come.  Its  work  in  promoting 
internationalism  apart  from  the  League  depends  for  its 
value  in  part  upon  the  value  of  internationalism  as  such — a 
question  independent  of  the  value  of  the  Council  and  the 
League — and  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  Council  sue- 


1  Report  to  Second  Assembly,  17,  20,  29. 
•Same,  34-38,  49. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921  503 

ceeded  in  promoting  such  a  movement.  The  work  of  the 
Council  in  the  political  sphere  can,  as  such,  hardly  be  as- 
sessed at  all.  The  real  point  of  the  matter  is  that  inter- 
national government  of  this  general  type  is  needed  and  that 
the  work  which  the  Council  is  doing  seems  to  be  eminently 
suitable  for  performance  by  the  Council  within  its  general 
field,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  support  of  propa- 
ganda in  favor  of  the  League  itself,  and  with  a  reservation 
as  to  the  amount  of  attention  which  can  profitably  be  de- 
voted to  political  questions  as  such.  Only  when  more  time 
shall  have  elapsed  will  a  judgment,  not  upon  the  general 
issues  but  on  the  specific  content  of  the  work  of  the  Council, 
be  possible. 

When  the  Assembly  met  for  its  second  session  in  Sep- 
tember, 1921,  thirty-nine  members  answered  the  roll  call; 
of  nine  absentees,  three  appeared  during  the  session ;  three 
new  members  added  in  the  course  of  the  session  brought 
the  total  attendance  to  forty-five.1  It  may  not  be  without  *• 
significance  that  the  absentees — Argentina  and  Peru, 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Salvador — were  all 
from  South  and  Central  America. 

The  members  soon  found  that  much  work  had  been  pre- 
pared in  advance,  in  contrast  to  conditions  of  the  year  be- 
fore. Besides  the  official  call  and  agenda  sent  forth  by 
the  Council,  there  were  various  matters  to  come  up  from 
the  year  before  or  from  the  Council  under  the  terms  of  the 
Covenant.  The  result  was  that  the  Second  Assembly  was 
a  harder  working  body  than  the  First. 

A  further  result  was  a  diminution  of  the  number  of 
plenary  sessions  and  of  general  debate  in  the  Assembly 
and  an  increase  in  committee  work.    The  Assembly  created 
six  committees,  as  in  1920,  although  one  of  the  committees 
of  1920  had  dealt  with  the  Permanent  Court  and  was  not    . 
needed  in  1921.    Its  place  was  taken  by  a  Committee  on   / 
Humanitarian  and  Social  Questions,  not  appearing  in  the 

1  Monthly  Summary,  No.  6,  106. 


504  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

1920  list.  Otherwise  the  list  was  substantially  unchanged.1 
In  spite  of  the  reduction  of  the  plenary  sessions  and  the  in- 
crease of  committee  work,  less  protest  was  heard  concern- 
ing secrecy  than  in  1920,  partly  because  the  critics  were 
not  quite  so  sensitive  on  the  subject  in  regard  to  this,  the 
second,  meeting  as  they  had  been  with  respect  to  the 
first,  partly  because  the  matters  to  be  discussed  had  been 
rather  fully  considered  in  the  period  before  the  Assembly 
met,  but  chiefly  because  of  a  factor  noted  in  connection  with 
the  First  Assembly,  namely,  the  knowledge  that  all  matters 
must,  in  any  event,  come  up  foiTdebate  in  the  Assembly  be- 
fore final  action. 
•» 

The  attention  of  the  Second  Assembly  ranged  over  a 
very  wide  field.  The  matters  discussed  and  acted  upon  may 
be  grouped  under  the  same  heads  as  those  used  to  describe 
the  work  of  the  Council ;  questions  of  organization  and  ad- 
ministration in  the  League,  political  questions,  and  humani- 
tarian questions,  with  economic  and  financial  questions  a 
possible  fourth  group.  We  may  review  briefly  what  the 
Second  Assembly  accomplished  under  these  different 
headings. 

In  the  matter  of  amendments  the  Second  Assembly 
appeared  to  be  as  bold  as  the  First  had  been  timid.2  Many 
proposals  had  been  made  in  the  First  Assembly  and,  in 
writing,  to  a  Committee  on  Amendments,  which  had  sat 
during  the  year  and  was  now  ready  to  report.  Most  of  the 
proposals  were  fully  discussed  by  the  Second  Assembly  and 
some  twelve  distinct  resolutions  were  adopted,  by  three- 
fourths  votes  in  each  case,  proposing  to  the  Members  of  the 
League  changes  in  the  Covenant.  These  proposals  related 
to  Article  XXVI  itself  and  aimed  to  make  the  text  of  that 

*""^^HWMWHWMH^HHHMi^^^^MMi0i^V'V'NPM|MMIHIMBHHMiVfV"l^M*Wa>M'*1''^ 

article  less  ambiguous ; 3  to  Article  IV,  with  a  view  to 
defining  more  clearly  the  power  of  the  Assembly  over 

1  Monthly  Summary,  No.  6,  7-8. 

1  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,  October,  1921,  9-15. 

8  Same,  9. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921  505 

the  choice  of  the  rotating  members  of  the  Council ;  *  to 
Article  VI,  in  order  to  increase  the  power  of  the  Assembly 
over  the  amounts  to  be  paid  by  members  in  defraying  the 
League  expenses  and  to  redefine  those  contributions ; 2  to 
Articles  XII,  XIII,  and  XV,  so  as  to  provide  for  the  ad- 
dition of  the  Permanent  Court  to  the  means  of  settlement 
available  to  Members ; 3  and  to  Article  XVI,  so  as  to  give 
the  Council  considerable  power  to  invoke  the  economic 
weapon  of  the  League  (blockade)  when  necessary,  and  to 
supervise  and  regulate  its  application.4  At  the  same  time 
the  Assembly  refused  to  accept  the  radical  amendment  of 
Argentina  relating  to  membership  in  the  League,5  as  well 
as  less  radical  but  very  important  Scandinavian  proposals 
relating  to  the  plan  of  conciliation  under  the  League.6 
Finally,  the  Committee  on  Amendments  was  instructed  to 
continue  its  work  and  further  consideration  was  to  be 
given  at  the  next  Assembly  to  proposals  for  amending 
Article  X.7  Evidently,  and  this  is  a  hopeful  sign,  the  Cov- 
enant is  to  be  thoroughly  revised  from  time  to  time  if  the 
Assembly  can  have  its  way.  It  will  be  interesting  to  note 
the  reception  accorded  these  proposals  by  the  Members  of 
the  League  to  whom  they  are  referred  for  ratification. 

One  of  these  proposals,  it  will  be  noted,  relates  to  the 
power  of  the  Assembly  over  the  composition  of  the  Council. 
During  the  debate  it  was  quite  evident  that  the  Second 
Assembly  intended  to  exercise  its  power  under  the  Cov- 
enant to  the  full  extent,  and  in  reflecting  Belgium,  Brazil, 
China,  and  Spain  as  rotating  member  of  the  Council  the 
Assembly  took  an  attitude  which  left  no  doubt  as  to  who  y" 
was  master  in  the  situation.8  Yet  it  must  be  said  that,  in 

1  Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,  October,  1921,  10. 

"Same,  11. 

fSame,  12. 

*Same,  13-15. 

•Same,  10. 

•Same,  10,  14. 

'Same,  12,  15. 

'Same,  18. 


506  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

general,  the  relations  between  Assembly  and  Council  were 
better  in  1921  than  in  1920,  again  due  to  a  diminution  of  the 
sensitiveness  of  all  concerned,  and  to  the  cooperation  of  the 
preceding  months.  The  Assembly  made  certain  recom- 
mendations to  the  Council,1  but  no  open  dispute  appeared 
similar  to  that  of  1920  over  mandates. 

/  On  many  matters  the  Assembly  was  impotent  to  take 
I  any  decisive  action  and  could  only  make  suggestions  to  the 
V  Council  or  adopt  pious  resolutions  of  hope.2  In  one  or 
two  cases  such  as  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  petty 
states,  of  the  type  of  Monaco  and  Andorra,  to  the  League, 
the  Assembly  could  not  act  for  lack  of  data  and  under- 
standing. In  regard  to  the  technical  organizations  of  the 
Council  or  Secretariat,  such  as  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Commission,  and  the  Health  Organization,  nothing  could 
be  done  by  the  Assembly  because  no  decisions  were  due  to 
be  made  or  action  taken  in  any  case.  In  regard  to  the  work 
of  the  Armaments  Commission  fundamental  political  facts 
precluded  any  action  by  the  Assembly.  In  regard  to  Rus- 
sian relief,  in  the  Albanian  question,  and  in  several  other 
cases,  the  Assembly  could  but  hope  that  those  immediately 
in  charge  would  succeed  in  settling  the  difficulty.  Only 
where  it  was  given  definite  power  to  act — as  in  the  election 
of  Members  to  the  League  and  to  the  Council — could  the 
Assembly  strike  out  with  confidence.3 

It  was  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  of  election  that  the 
Second  Assembly  performed  its  next  most  important  task 
in  helping  to  create  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice.4  "When  it  became  apparent  that  the  Statute  of  the 

» Official  Journal,  Special  Supplement  No.  6,  October,  1921,  19-22,  28-34. 

1  Same,  entire,  for  resolutions  of  Second  Assembly. 

8  The  Second  Assembly  pretended  to  rule  upon  certain  purely  legal  ques- 
tions. In  this  connection  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  Assembly  could 
claim  formal  legislative  power;  only  the  future  will  reveal  the  force  of  the 
Assembly's  dicta  that  Article  XVI  of  the  Covenant  does  not  mean  that  a  state 
of  war  automatically  supervenes  in  the  case  described,  and  that  domicile,  not 
nationality,  is  the  test  to  be  employed  in  interpreting  the  first  paragraph 
thereof;  Official  Journal,  as  cited,  24,  26. 

4  Same,  41. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921   507 

Court  would  be  ratified  by  a  number  of  states  sufficient  to 
insure  its  effectiveness,  the  Council  had  called  upon  the 
nations  to  nominate  candidates  for  the  Court  and  these 
nominations  were  in  readiness  in  September.1  Cooperating 
with  the  Council,  meeting  at  the  time  across  the  Lake,  and 
in  constant  telephonic  communication  with  it,  the  Assembly 
now  helped  to  elect  the  eleven  judges  and  four  deputy 
judges  required  under  the  Statute  of  the  Court.2  As  was 
inevitable,  political  and  national  considerations  were  im- 
portant in  determining  the  voting.  In  the  result,  the  Span- 
ish element  became  very  prominent  in  the  Court — a  phe- 
nomenon noted  by  some  in  the  League  as  a  whole — and  the 
British  Dominions  did  not  secure  representation  on  the  f 
bench  at  all,  while  both  Roumania  and  Jugoslavia  did  so. 
On  the  other  hand,  substantially  every  important  legal  sys- 
tem and  legal  tradition  was  included.  The  possible  dis- 
agreement between  Assembly  and  Council  already  noted 3 
appeared  at  the  very  end,  in  the  choice  of  the  fourth  deputy. 
It  was  not  wholly  an  accident  that  the  contest  lay  between 
Alvarez  of  Chile  and  Descamps  of  Belgium,  or  that  the 
matter  was  settled,  by  means  of  the  Committee  of  Media- 
tion provided  in  the  Statute,  by  electing  Beichmann  of  Nor- 
way. Thus  the  Assembly  and  Council  accomplished  what 
the  Second  Hague  Conference  could  not  do;  it  chose  a  se- 
lected group  of  jurists  to  act  as  a  world  court. 

Again  exercising  its  powers  of  election  the  Second  As- 
sembly admitted  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  to  the 
League,  thereby  bringing  the  membership  up  to  fifty-one.4 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  Assembly  performed  its  most 
useful  work  in  the  field  of  organization.  That  is  account- 
able partly  by  the  fact  that  the  Assembly  was  created  pri- 
marily to  act  as  a  constituent  body,  as  the  lower  houses  of 

1  Official  Journal,  II,  No.  5-6,  418. 

'  For  the  text  of  the  Statute  as  finally  ratified  see  Same,  II,  No.  1,  14-25 
(January-February,  1921). 

•Above,  Chap.  XVI,  pp.  260-261. 
*  Official  Journal,  as  cited,  35. 


508  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

parliaments  act  in  Europe  today,  and  partly  by  the  fact 
that  it  has  no  executive  arms.  It  was  also  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  League  is  still  young  and  problems  of  organization 
still  bulk  large  in  the  work  of  the  League  and  in  the  work 
of  all  of  its  branches. 

During  1921  the  practice  of  international  government 
by  bodies  outside  the  League  continued  to  regain  its  normal 
scope  and  power. 

The  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies  met  at  Paris  in 
January  and  February,  at  London  in  February  and  March, 
at  London  again  in  April  and  May,  and  again  at  Paris  in 
August.1  The  principal  subjects  of  discussion  were  the 
disarmament  of  Germany,  the  payment  of  reparations  by 
Germany,  the  Greco-Turkish  war,  Austrian  financial  con- 
ditions, Silesia,  and  Russian  relief.  An  agreement  was 
reached  on  the  first  subject  in  January  and  the  agreement 
put  into  effect  through  the  Commission  in  charge  of  enforc- 
ing the  disarmament  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
The  reparations  problem  was  not  given  even  a  semblance 
of  effective  treatment  until  the  third  conference,  and  by 
the  end  of  1921  even  the  London  agreement  of  May,  1921, 
began  to  appear  of  doubtful  value  and  finality.  The 
Silesian  problem  was  finally  turned  over  to  the  Council  of 
the  League  for  settlement,  and  no  effective  settlements  were 
reached  with  regard  to  Turkey,  Russia,  or  Austria.  The 
Supreme  Council  naturally  lost  credit  somewhat  during 
this  succession  of  conferences,  and  the  League  tended  to 
gain  credit  by  contrast,  partly  because  of  its  successful 
handling  of  the  Silesian  question,  and  partly  because  it 
appeared  to  be  free  from  the  political  handicaps  which 
prevented  effective  action  by  its  rival. 

The  Council  of  Ambassadors  continued  to  meet  and 
deal  with  different  phases  of  various  questions,  such  as 
Silesia,  German  disarmament,  Albania,  the  Baranya,  and 

1  New  York  Times,  8  January,  8  February,  26  January,  21  March,  20 
April,  6  May,  5-13  August,  1921. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  1921   509 

others,  which  were  turned  over  to  it  by  the  Supreme  Coun- 
cil, or — in  the  case  of  Albania — by  the  Council  of  the 
League.1  The  Council  of  Ambassadors  was  still  unimpor- 
tant in  comparison  with  the  two  greater  councils,  the  Su- 
preme Council  and  the  Council  of  the  League,  and  in  those 
cases  where  it  was  found  to  be  specially  useful  this  resulted 
from  its  resemblance  to  the  latter  rather  than  to  the  former. 

The  Reparation  Commission  and  other  bodies  created 
by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  continued  to  carry  on  their 
work,  partly  in  cooperation  with  the  League,  partly  in 
competition  with  it.  In  October,  1921,  it  was  still  true 
that  several  problems  left  over  by  the  World  War  con- 
tinued to  demand  special  attention  and  continued  to  exert 
their  distracting  influence  upon  normal  international 
cooperation. 

At  the  same  time,  severe  general  international  confer- 
ences were  held,  one  at  Washington,  to  deal  with  the  subject 
of  international  cable  communications — a  continuation  of 
the  conference  begun  in  October,  1920 — ;  one  at  Barcelona, 
to  deal  with  various  questions  connected  with  land  trans- 
portation in  Europe;  and  one  at  Geneva,  to  deal  with  the 
white  slave  traffic.  The  last  two  conferences  were  held  on  J 
the  initiative  of  the  League.2 

Finally,  the  ordinary  processes  of  treaty  negotiation 
and  diplomacy  continued  to  gain  momentum  as  war  condi- 
tions died  away  and  normal  relations  were  resumed.  In 
spite  of  all  the  instability  and  uncertainty,  the  want  and 
distress  still  surviving  as  a  legacy  of  the  War,  the  practice 
of  international  government  continued  to  regain  its  full 
stature  and  to  expand  still  further,  both  through  the  League 
and  apart  from  that  organization.  And  as  1921  drew  to  a  •  ~/ 
close  there  convened  in  Washington  a  conference  which 
might  open  an  entirely  new  chapter  in  the  development  / 

'New  York  Times,  1,  4,  8  January;  10  May;  26,  27  June;  21  July;  18 
August,  1921. 

'Same,  5  February,  19  March,  1921;  Official  Journal,  II,  No.  3,  290,  and 
No.  7,  697;  No.  5-6,  596. 


510  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  general  international  organization,  whether  under  the 
auspices  of  the  League,  or  apart  from  it  but  in  cooperation 
with  it,  or,  finally,  by  way  of  supplanting  it  with  some  other 
form  of  international  association.  The  outcome  must  be 
left  to  the  future. 


APPENDIX  A 

DOCUMENTS  ILLUSTRATING  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION. 

No.  1.    Consular  Convention  between  the  United  States 
and  Sweden,  1910.1 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  Sweden,  being  mutually  desirous  of  denning  the  rights, 
privileges,  and  immunities  of  consular  officers  of  the  two  countries, 
and  deeming  it  expedient  to  conclude  a  consular  convention  for 
that  purpose,  have  accordingly  named  as  their  Plenipotentiaries: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  Philander  C. 
Knox,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  of  America ;  and 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Sweden,  Herman  Ludvig  Fabian  de 
Lagercrantz,  his  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary at  Washington ; 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective 
full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  proper  form,  have  agreed 
upon  the  following  articles : 

Article  I. 

Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agrees  to  receive  from 
the  other  consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-con- 
suls, deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents 
in  all  its  ports,  cities,  and  places,  except  those  where  it  may  not 
be  convenient  to  recognize  such  officers.  This  reservation,  how- 
ever, shall  not  apply  to  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  with- 
out also  applying  to  every  other  power. 

Article  II. 

The  consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls, 
deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents  of  each 
1  U.  S.  8.  L.,  XXXVII,  1479;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VI. 

511 


512  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  enjoy  reciprocally,  in 
the  States  of  the  other,  all  the  privileges,  exemptions,  and  immu- 
nities that  are  enjoyed  by  officers  of  the  same  rank  and  quality 
of  the  most  favored  nation.  The  said  officers,  before  being  ad- 
mitted to  the  exercise  of  their  functions  and  the  enjoyment  of  the 
immunities  thereto  pertaining,  shall  present  their  commissions  in 
the  forms  established  in  their  respective  countries.  The  Govern- 
ment of  each  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  furnish 
the  necessary  exequatur  free  of  charge,  and,  on  the  exhibition  of 
this  instrument,  the  said  officers  shall  be  permitted  to  enjoy  the 
rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  granted  by  this  Convention. 

Article  III. 

Consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls, 
deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents,  citi- 
zens of  the  State  by  which  they  are  appointed,  shall  be  exempt  from 
arrest  except  in  the  cases  of  offenses  which  the  local  legislation 
qualifies  as  crimes  and  punishes  as  such ;  they  shall  be  exempt  from 
military  billetings,  service  in  the  Regular  Army  or  Navy,  in  the 
militia,  or  in  the  national  guard;  they  shall  likewise  be  exempt 
from  all  direct  taxes — national,  State,  or  municipal — imposed  upon 
persons,  either  in  the  nature  of  a  capitation  tax  or  in  respect  to 
their  property,  unless  such  taxes  become  due  on  account  of  the  pos- 
session of  real  estate,  or  for  interest  on  capital  invested  in  the  coun- 
try where  said  officers  exercise  their  functions,  or  for  income  from 
pensions  of  a  public  or  private  nature  enjoyed  from  said  country. 
This  exemption  shall  not,  however,  apply  to  consuls-general,  con- 
suls, vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls,  deputy  consuls-general, 
deputy  consuls,  or  consular  agents  engaged  in  any  profession, 
business,  or  trade ;  but  the  said  officers  shall  in  such  case  be  subject 
to  the  payment  of  the  same  taxes  that  would  be  paid  by  any  other 
foreigner  under  the  like  circumstances. 

Article  IV. 

When  in  a  civil  case  a  court  of  one  of  the  two  countries  shall 
desire  to  receive  the  judicial  declaration  or  deposition  of  a  consul- 
general,  consul,  vice-consul,  or  consular  agent,  who  is  a  citizen  of 


APPENDIX  A  513 

the  State  which  appointed  him,  and  who  is  engaged  in  no  com-, 
mercial  business,  it  shall  request  him,  in  writing,  to  appear  before 
it,  and  in  case  of  his  inability  to  do  so  it  shall  request  him  to  give 
his  testimony  in  writing,  or  shall  visit  his  residence  or  office  to 
obtain  it  orally,  and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  officer  to  comply 
with  this  request  with  as  little  delay  as  possible ;  but  in  all  criminal 
cases,  contemplated  by  the  sixth  article  of  the  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  whereby  the  right  is  secured  to 
persons  charged  with  crimes  to  obtain  witnesses  in  their  favor, 
the  appearance  in  court  of  said  consular  officers  shall  be  demanded, 
with  all  possible  regard  to  the  consular  dignity  and  to  the  duties 
of  his  office,  and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  officer  to  comply  with 
said  demand.  A  similar  treatment  shall  also  be  extended  to  the 
consuls  of  the  United  States  in  Sweden,  in  the  like  cases. 


Article  V. 

Consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls, 
deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents  may 
place  over  the  outer  door  of  their  offices  the  arms  of  their  nation, 
with  this  inscription:  Consulate-General,  or  Consulate,  or  Vice- 
Consulate,  or  Consular  Agency  of  the  United  States  or  of  Sweden. 

They  may  also  raise  the  flag  of  their  country  on  their  offices, 
except  in  the  capital  of  the  country  when  there  is  a  legation  there. 
They  may  in  like  manner  raise  the  flag  of  their  country  over  the 
boat  employed  by  them  in  the  port  and  for  the  exercise  of  their 
functions. 

Article  VI. 

The  consular  offices  shall  at  all  times  be  inviolable.  The  local 
authorities  shall  not,  under  any  pretext,  invade  them.  In  no  case 
shall  they  examine  or  seize  the  papers  there  deposited.  In  no  case 
shall  those  offices  be  used  as  places  of  asylum.  When  a  consular 
officer  is  engaged  in  other  business,  the  papers  relating  to  the  con- 
sulate shall  be  kept  separate.  Nor  shall  consular  officers  be  re- 
quired to  produce  the  official  archives  in  court  or  to  testify  as  to 
their  contents. 


514  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Article  VII. 

In  the  event  of  the  death,  incapacity,  or  absence  of  consuls- 
general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls,  and  consular 
agents,  their  chancellors  or  secretaries,  whose  official  character 
may  have  previously  been  made  known  to  the  Department  of  State 
at  Washington  or  to  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Sweden, 
may  temporarily  exercise  their  functions,  and  while  thus  acting 
shall  enjoy  all  the  rights,  prerogatives,  and  immunities  granted  to 
the  incumbents. 

Article  VIII. 

Consuls-general  and  consuls  may,  so  far  as  the  laws  of  their 
country  allow,  with  the  approbation  of  their  respective  Govern- 
ments, appoint  vice-consuls-general,  deputy  consuls-general,  vice- 
consuls,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents  in  the  cities,  ports, 
and  places  within  their  consular  district.  These  agents  may  be 
selected  from  among  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  of  Sweden, 
or  those  of  other  countries.  They  shall  be  furnished  with  a  regular 
commission,  and  shall  enjoy  the  privileges  stipulated  for  consular 
officers  in  this  convention,  subject  to  the  exceptions  specified  in 
Article  III. 

Article  IX. 

Consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls,  and 
consular  agents  shall  have  the  right  to  address  the  authorities 
whether,  in  the  United  States,  of  the  Union,  the  States,  or  the 
municipalities,  or  in  Sweden,  of  the  State,  the  Provinces,  or  the 
commune,  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  their  consular  district 
in  order  to  complain  of  any  infraction  of  the  treaties  and  conven- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Sweden,  and  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  the  rights  and  interests  of  their  countrymen.  If  the 
complaint  should  not  be  satisfactorily  redressed,  the  consular 
officers  aforesaid,  in  the  absence  of  a  diplomatic  agent  of  their 
country,  may  apply  directly  to  the  Government  of  the  country 
where  they  exercise  their  functions. 

Article  X. 

Consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  vice-consuls, 
deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular  agents  of  the 


APPENDIX  A  515 

respective  countries  may,  as  far  as  may  be  compatible  with  the 
laws  of  their  own  country,  take  at  their  offices,  their  private  resi- 
dences, at  the  residence  of  the  parties  concerned,  or  on  board  ship, 
the  depositions  of  the  captains  and  crews  of  the  vessels  of  their 
own  country  and  of  passengers  thereon,  as  well  as  the  depositions 
of  any  citizen  or  subject  of  their  own  country;  draw  up,  attest, 
certify,  and  authenticate  all  unilateral  acts,  deeds,  and  testamen- 
tary dispositions  of  their  countrymen,  as  well  as  all  articles  of 
agreement  or  contracts  to  which  one  or  more  of  their  countrymen 
is  or  are  party ;  draw  up,  attest,  certify,  and  authenticate  all  deeds 
or  written  instruments  which  have  for  their  object  the  conveyance 
or  encumbrance  of  real  or  personal  property  situated  in  the  terri- 
tory of  the  country  by  which  said  consular  officers  are  appointed, 
and  all  unilateral  acts,  deeds,  testamentary  dispositions,  as  well  as 
articles  of  agreement  or  contracts  relating  to  property  situated  or 
business  to  be  transacted  in  the  territory  of  the  nation  by  which  the 
said  consular  officers  are  appointed ;  even  in  cases  where  said  uni- 
lateral acts,  deeds,  testamentary  dispositions,  articles  of  agree- 
ment, or  contracts  are  executed  solely  by  citizens  or  subjects  of 
the  country  within  which  said  consular  officers  exercise  their 
functions. 

All  such  instruments  and  documents  thus  executed  and  all 
copies  and  translations  thereof,  when  duly  authenticated  by  such 
consul-general,  consul,  vice-consul-general,  vice-consul,  deputy 
consul-general,  deputy  consul,  or  consular  agent  under  his  official 
seal,  shall  be  received  as  evidence  in  the  United  States  and  in 
Sweden  as  original  documents  or  authenticated  copies,  as  the  case 
may  be,  and  shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  drawn  up 
by  and  executed  before  a  notary  or  public  officer  duly  authorized 
in  the  country  by  which  said  consular  officer  was  appointed ;  pro- 
vided, always,  that  they  have  been  drawn  and  executed  in  con- 
formity to  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  country  where  they  are 
intended  to  take  effect. 

Article  XI. 

The  respective  consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general, 
vice-consuls,  deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular 
agents  shall  have  exclusive  charge  of  the  internal  order  of  the 


516  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

merchant  vessels  of  their  nation,  and  shall  alone  take  cognizance 
of  any  differences  which  may  arise,  either  at  sea  or  in  port,  between 
the  captains,  officers,  and  crews,  without  exception,  particularly  in 
reference  to  the  adjustment  of  wages  and  the  execution  of  con- 
tracts. The  local  authorities  shall  not  interfere,  except  when  the 
disorder  that  has  arisen  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  disturb  tran- 
quillity and  public  order  on  shore  or  in  the  port,  or  when  a  person 
of  the  country  or  not  belonging  to  the  crew  shall  be  concerned 
therein. 

In  all  other  cases  the  aforesaid  authorities  shall  confine  them- 
selves to  lending  aid  to  the  said  consular  officers,  if  they  are 
requested  by  them  to  do  so,  in  causing  the  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment of  any  person  whose  name  is  inscribed  on  the  crew  list 
whenever,  for  any  cause,  the  said  officers  shall  think  proper. 

Article  XII. 

The  respective  consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general, 
vice-consuls,  deputy  consuls-general,  deputy  consuls,  and  consular 
agents  may  cause  to  be  arrested  the  officers,  sailors,  and  all  other 
persons  making  part  of  the  crews  in  any  manner  whatever,  of  ships 
of  war  or  merchant  vessels  of  their  nation,  who  may  be  guilty,  or 
be  accused,  of  having  deserted  said  ships  and  vessels,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  sending  them  on  board  or  back  to  their  country.  To  this 
end  they  shall  address  the  competent  local  authorities  of  the  re- 
spective countries,  in  writing,  and  shall  make  to  them  a  written 
request  for  the  deserters,  supporting  it  by  the  exhibition  of  the 
register  of  the  vessel  and  list  of  the  crew,  or  by  other  official  docu- 
ments, to  show  that  the  persons  claimed  belong  to  the  said  ship's 
company.  Upon  such  request  thus  supported,  the  delivery  to  them 
of  the  deserters  can  not  be  refused,  unless  it  should  be  duly  proved 
that  they  were  citizens  of  the  country  where  their  extradition  is 
demanded  at  the  time  of  their  being  inscribed  on  the  crew  list. 
All  the  necessary  aid  and  protection  shall  be  furnished  for  the 
pursuit,  seizure,  and  arrest  of  the  deserters,  who  shall  even  be 
put  and  kept  in  the  prisons  of  the  country,  at  the  request  and 
expense  of  the  consular  officers,  until  there  may  be  an  opportunity 
for  sending  them  away.  If,  however,  such  an  opportunity  should 
not  present  itself  within  the  space  of  two  months,  counting  from 


APPENDIX  A  517 

the  day  of  the  arrest,  the  deserters  shall  be  set  at  liberty,  nor  shall 
they  be  again  arrested  for  the  same  cause. 

If  the  deserter  has  committed  any  misdemeanor,  and  the  court 
having  the  right  to  take  cognizance  of  the  offense  shall  claim  and 
exercise  it,  the  delivery  of  the  deserter  shall  be  deferred  until  the 
decision  of  the  court  has  been  pronounced  and  executed. 

Article  XIII. 

All  proceedings  relative  to  the  salvage  of  vessels  of  the  United 
States  wrecked  upon  the  coasts  of  Sweden,  and  of  Swedish  vessels 
wrecked  upon  the  coasts  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  directed  by 
the  consuls-general,  consuls,  vice-consuls-general,  and  vice-consuls 
of  the  two  countries,  respectively,  and  until  their  arrival  by  the 
respective  consular  agents,  wherever  an  agency  exists.  In  the 
places  and  ports  where  an  agency  does  not  exist,  the  local  author- 
ities until  the  arrival  of  the  consular  officer  in  whose  district  the 
wreck  may  have  occurred,  and  who  shall  be  immediately  informed 
of  the  occurrence,  shall  take  all  necessary  measures  for  the  pro- 
tection of  persons  and  the  preservation  of  wrecked  property.  The 
local  authorities  shall  not  otherwise  interfere  than  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  order,  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  salvors,  if 
these  do  not  belong  to  the  crews  that  have  been  wrecked,  and  to 
carry  into  effect  the  arrangements  made  for  the  entry  and  exporta- 
tion of  the  merchandise  saved.  It  is  understood  that  such  mer- 
chandise is  not  to  be  subjected  to  any  custom-house  charges,  unless 
it  be  intended  for  consumption  in  the  country  where  the  wreck 
may  have  taken  place. 

The  intervention  of  the  local  authorities  in  these  different  cases 
shall  occasion  no  expense  of  any  kind,  except  such  as  may  be 
caused  by  the  operations  of  salvage  and  the  preservation  of  the 
goods  saved,  together  with  such  as  would  be  incurred  under  similar 
circumstances  by  vessels  of  the  nation. 

Article  XIV. 

In  case  of  the  death  of  any  citizen  of  Sweden  in  the  United 
States  or  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Sweden  without  having  in  the  country  of  his  decease  any  known 
heirs  or  testamentary  executors  by  him  appointed,  the  competent 


518 

local  authorities  shall  at  once  inform  the  nearest  consular  officer 
of  the  nation  to  which  the  deceased  belongs  of  the  circumstances, 
in  order  that  the  necessary  information  may  be  immediately  for- 
warded to  parties  interested. 

In  the  event  of  any  citizens  of  either  of  the  two  Contracting 
Parties  dying  without  will  or  testament,  in  the  territory  of  the 
other  Contracting  Party,  the  consul-general,  consul,  vice-consul- 
general,  or  vice-consul  of  the  nation  to  which  the  deceased  may 
belong,  or,  in  his  absence,  the  representative  of  such  consul-general, 
consul,  vice-consul-general,  or  vice-consul,  shall,  so  far  as  the  laws 
of  each  country  will  permit  and  pending  the  appointment  of  an 
administrator  and  until  letters  of  administration  have  been  granted, 
take  charge  of  the  property  left  by  the  deceased  for  the  benefit  of 
his  lawful  heirs  and  creditors,  and,  moreover,  have  the  right  to  be 
appointed  as  administrator  of  such  estate. 

It  is  understood  that  when,  under  the  provisions  of  this  article, 
any  consul-general,  consul,  vice-consul-general,  or  vice-consul,  or 
the  representative  of  each  or  either,  is  acting  as  executor  or  admin- 
istrator of  the  estate  of  one  of  his  deceased  nationals,  said  officer 
or  his  representative  shall,  in  all  matters  connected  with,  relating 
to,  or  growing  out  of  the  settlement  of  such  estates,  be  in  such 
capacities  as  fully  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the 
country  wherein  the  estate  is  situated  as  if  said  officer  or  repre- 
sentative were  a  citizen  of  that  country  and  possessed  of  no  repre- 
sentative capacity  whatsoever. 

The  citizens  of  each  of  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  have  power 
to  dispose  of  their  personal  goods  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
other,  by  sale,  donation,  testament,  or  otherwise,  and  their  repre- 
sentatives, being  citizens  of  the  other  Party,  shall  succeed  to  their 
personal  goods,  whether  by  testament  or  ab  intestato,  and  they  may 
in  accordance  with  and  acting  under  the  provisions  of  the  laws  of 
the  jurisdiction  in  which  the  property  is  found  take  possession 
thereof,  either  by  themselves  or  others  acting  for  them,  and  dispose 
of  the  same  at  their  will,  paying  such  dues  only  as  the  inhabitants 
of  the  country  wherein  such  goods  are  shall  be  subject  to  pay  in 
like  cases. 

As  for  the  case  of  real  estate,  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the 
two  Contracting  Parties  shall  be  treated  on  the  footing  of  the 
most-favored  nation. 


APPENDIX  A  519 

Article  XV. 

The  present  convention  shall  remain  in  force  for  the  space  of 
ten  years,  counting  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications, 
which  shall  be  made  in  conformity  with  the  respective  Constitutions 
of  the  two  countries,  and  exchanged  at  "Washington  as  soon  as 
possible  within  the  period  of  one  year.  In  case  neither  Party 
gives  notice,  twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the  said  period 
of  ten  years,  of  its  intention  not  to  renew  this  Convention,  it  shall 
remain  in  force  one  year  longer,  and  so  on,  from  year  to  year, 
until  the  expiration  of  a  year  from  the  day  on  which  one  of  the 
Parties  shall  have  given  such  notice. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
this  Convention,  and  have  hereunto  affixed  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  first  day  of 
June,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  ten. 

No.  2.    Regulations  of  Vienna,  1815,  and  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1818, 
concerning  Diplomatic  Rank.1 

In  order  to  prevent  in  the  future  the  inconveniences  which 
have  frequently  occurred,  and  which  may  still  occur,  from  the 
claims  of  Precedence  among  the  different  Diplomatic  characters, 
the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Powers  who  signed  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
have  agreed  on  the  following  Articles,  and  think  it  their  duty  to 
invite  those  of  other  Crowned  Heads  to  adopt  the  same  regulations : 

Article  I. 

Diplomatic  characters  are  divided  into  three  classes: 

That  of  Ambassadors,  Legates,  or  Nuncios. 

That  of  Envoys,  Ministers,  or  other  persons  accredited  to 
Sovereigns. 

That  of  Charges  d  Affaires  accredited  to  Ministers  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Article  II. 

Ambassadors,  Legates,  or  Nuncios  only  shall  have  the  Repre- 
sentative character. 

1  U.  S.  Diplomatic  Instructions,  §  18;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VIII. 


520 

Article  III. 

Diplomatic  characters  charged  with  any  special  mission  shall 
not,  on  that  account,  assume  any  superiority  of  rank. 

Article  IV. 

Diplomatic  characters  shall  rank  in  their  respective  classes 
according  to  the  date  of  the  official  notification  of  their  arrival. 

The  present  Regulation  shall  not  occasion  any  change  respect- 
ing the  Representative  of  the  Pope. 

Article  V. 

There  shall  be  a  regular  form  adopted  by  each  State  for  the 
reception  of  Diplomatic  Characters  of  every  class. 

Article  VI. 

Ties  of  consanguinity  or  family  alliance  between  Courts  confer 
no  rank  on  their  Diplomatic  Agents.  The  same  rule  also  applies  to 
political  alliances. 

Article  VII. 

In  Acts  or  Treaties  between  several  Powers  that  admit  alternity, 
the  order  which  is  to  be  observed  in  the  signatures  of  Ministers 
shall  be  decided  by  ballot. 

Article  VIII. 

It  is  agreed  between  the  Five  Courts  that  Ministers  Resident 
accredited  to  them  shall  form,  with  respect  to  their  Precedence, 
an  intermediate  class  between  Ministers  of  the  Second  Class  and 
Charges  d' Affaires. 

No.  3.    American  Foreign  Service  and  Foreign  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Representatives  in  the  United  States,  December,  1916. 

a.    Diplomatic  Service  of  the  United  States.1 

Argentina  Buenos  Aires        A.  E.  &  P.;2  2  Sees.;  C.  M. 

N.  Atts. 

1  Register,  15  December,  1916,  27-31;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VIII. 

'A.  E.  and  P.:  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary.  E.  E. 
and  M.  P. :  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  Att. :  Attache". 
C. :  Commercial.  C.  G. :  Consul  General.  Couns. :  Counsellor.  M. :  Military. 
N. :  Naval.  Sec.:  Secretary.  St.  Int.:  Student  Interpreter. 


APPENDIX  A 


521 


Austria-Hungary        Vienna 


Belgium 

Bolivia 

Brazil 

Bulgaria 
Chile 

China 

Colombia 
Costa  Rica 
Cuba 

Denmark 

Dominican  Republic 

Ecuador 

Prance 

German  Empire 
Great  Britain 

Greece 

Guatemala 

Haiti 

Honduras 

Italy 

Japan 
Liberia 

Luxemburg 

Mexico 

Montenegro 

Morocco 

Netherlands 

Nicaragua 
Norway 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Persia 


Brussels 

La  Paz 

Rio  de  Janeiro 

See  Roumania 
Santiago 

Peking 

Bogota 
San  Jose 
Habana 

Copenhagen 

Santo  Domingo 

Quito 

Paris 

Berlin 
London 

Athens 
Guatemala 
Port  au  Prince 
Tegucigalpa 
Rome 

Tokyo 
Monrovia 

Bee  Netherlands 

Mexico 

See  Greece 

Tangier 

The  Hague 

Managua 
Christiania 

Panama 

Asuncion 

Teheran 


A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  5  Sees. ; 

M.  N.  Atts. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 
A.  E.  &  P.;  2  Sees.:  C.  N. 

Atts. 

A.  E.  &  P.;   1   Sec.;  C.M. 

Atts. 
E.E.  &  M.  P.;  4  Sees.;  C. 

M.  2  N.  Atts. ;  8  St.  Ints. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 
E.E.  &  M.  P.;  2  Sees.;  M. 

Att. 
E.E.  &  M.P.;  Sec.;  C.M. 

Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 
A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  4  Sees. ; 

C.  M.  2  N.  Atts. 
A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  6  Sees. ; 

C.  M.  2  N.  Atts. 
A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  7  Sees. ; 

C.  2  M.  3  N.  Atts. 
E.E.  &M.P.;  Sec.;  M.Att. 
E.E.  &M.P.;  Sec.;  M.Att. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 
E.E.  &M.P.;  Sec.;  M.Att. 
A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  2  Sees. ; 

M.  N.  Atts. 
A.E.  &  P.;  4  Sees.;  6M.2 

N.  Atts. 
Minister  Resident  &  C.  G. ; 

Sec. ;  M.  Att. 

A.  E.  &  P. ;  Sec. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  M.  N. 

Atts. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 
E.E.  &  M.P.;  Sec.;  C.M. 

Atts. 

E.E.  &  M.  P.;  Sec. 
E.E.  &  M.  P.;  Sec.;  C.Att. 
E,E.  &M.P.;Sec. 


522 

Peru 

Portugal 

Roumania 

Russia 

Salvador 

Serbia 

Siam 


Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 

Egypt 

Uruguay 

Venezuela 

Department 

Unassigned 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Lima 

Lisbon 

Bucharest 

Petrograd 

San  Salvador 
See  Roumania 
Bangkok 

Madrid 
Stockholm 
Berne 
Constantinople 

Cairo 

Montevideo 

Caracas 


E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 
E.  E.  &  M.P.;  3  Sees.;  M. 

Att. 
A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  4  Sees. ; 

C.  M.  2  N.  Atts. 
E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P.;  Sec.;  Inter- 
preter. 

A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  Sec. ;  C. 
M.  Atts. 

E.  E.  &  M.P.;  Sec.;  C.M. 
Atts. 

E.E.  &  M.P.;  Sec.;  C.M. 
Atts. 

A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  4  Sees. ; 
M.  Att. ;  2  Stud.  Ints. 

Agent  &  C.  G. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  C.  Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 

4  Sees. 

6  persons. 


b.    Foreign  Diplomatic  Representatives  in  the  United  States 


Argentina 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

Bolivia 

Brazil 

Bulgaria 

Chile 

China 

Colombia 

Costa  Rica 

Cuba 

Denmark 

Dominican  Republic 

Ecuador 


A.  E.  &  P. ; 2  Couns. ;  2  Sees. ;  M.  N.  Atts. 

Couns.  &  Ch. ;  2  Sees. ;  N.  Att. ;  Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Couns. ;  Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. 

A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  3  Sees. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  Att. 

A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns.  &  Ch. ;  Sec. ;  C.  M.  N.  Atts. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Couns. ;  3  Sees. ;  Att. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

E.E.  &M.P.;  Sec. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  2  Sees. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Att. 

E.  E.  &M.P.;  Sec. 

E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  2  Sees. 


*Begister,  1916,  181-185;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VIII. 

JA.  E.  and  P.:  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary.  E.  E. 
and  M.  P. :  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  Att. :  Attache". 
C.:  Commercial.  Ch.:  Charge  d 'Affaires.  Couns.:  Counsellor,  M.:  Military. 
N.:  Na*ral.  Sec.:  Secretary. 


APPENDIX  A 


523 


France  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  3  Sees. ;  C.  M.  N.  Atts. ; 

Att. 

Germany  A.  E.  &  P. ;  2  Couns. ;  2  Sees. ;  C.  Att. ;  Att, 

Great  Britain  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  6  Sees. ;  M.  2  N.  Atts. ;  2 

Atts. 

Greece  Ch. ;  Sec. 

Guatemala  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Haiti  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Honduras  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Italy  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  2  Sees. ;  C.  Att, ;  Att. 

Japan  A.  E.  &  P.;  Couns.;  2  Sees.;  M.  N.Atts.;  2 

Atts. 

Netherlands  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    2  Atts. 

Nicaragua  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Ch. 

Norway  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Sec. 

Panama  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Sec. ;  Att. 

Paraguay  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Att. 

Persia  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Couns. ;  2  Sees. 

Peru  E.  E.  &  M.  P.    Ch. 

Portugal  E.  E.  &  M.  P. 

Russia  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  3  Sees. ;  2  C.  M.  3  N.  Atts. ; 

Att. 

Salvador  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Siam  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. ;  2  Atts. 

Spain  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Couns. ;  Sec. ;  M.  Att. 

Sweden  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Couns. ;  Sec. 

Switzerland  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Turkey  A.  E.  &  P. ;  Sec.  &  Ch. ;  Sec. 

Uruguay  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 

Venezuela  E.  E.  &  M.  P. ;  Sec. 


c.    Consular  Service  of  the  United  States.1 
5  Consuls  General  at  Large 

For:    North    America;    South    and    Central    America;    Western 
Europe ;  Eastern  Europe,  Asia  Minor,  and  Africa ;  and  the 

Far  East. 


Argentina 


Buenos  Aires 
Rosario 


C.  G. ; 2  3  V.  C. 
C.;  V.C. 


1  Register,  1916,  41-59 ;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VI. 

2C.  G.:   Consul  General.     C.:   Consul.     V.  C.:   Vice  Consul.     Agt.:    Con- 
sular Agent.     Mar.:  Marshal.    St.  Int:  Student  Interpreter. 


524  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Austria-Hungary 

Budapest,  Hungary  C.  G. ;  C. ;  V.  C. 

Carlsbad,  Bohemia,  Austria  C.    V.  C. 


Fiume,  Hungary  C. 

Prague,  Bohemia,  Austria  C. 

Reichenberg,  Bohemia,  Austria  C. 

Trieste,  Coastland,  Austria  C. 


V.  C. 
V.C. 
V.  C. 
V.C. 


Vienna,  Lower  Austria  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. 

Belgium 

Antwerp  C.  G. ;  V.  C. 

Brussels  C.  G. ;  V.  C. 

Ghent  C.;V.  C. 

Liege  C.jV.C. 

Brazil 

Bahia  C. ;  V.  C. 

Para  C. ;  2  V.  C. ;  3  Agts.1 

Pernambuco  C. ;  V.  C. 

Rio  de  Janeiro  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Rio  Grande  do  Sul  C. 

Santos  C.;V.C. 

Sao  Paulo  C.;V.  C. 

Bulgaria 
Sofia  C.  G. 

Chile 

Antofagasta  C. ;  2  V.  C. ;  2  Agts. 

Punta  Arenas  C. ;  V.  C. 

Valparaiso  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. ;  4  Agts. 

China 

Amoy  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Mar. 

Antung  C. ;  V.  C. ;  St.  Int. 

Canton  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. ;  Mar. ;  Interpreter. 

1  Consular  Agents  are  stationed  at  outlying  points  and  report  to  the  con- 
sular officers  at  a  central  point.  Thus,  the  three  Agents  reporting  to  the 
Consul  at  Para  are  stationed  at  Ceara,  Manaos,  and  Maranhao,  the  agents 
reporting  to  the  Consul  at  Calais,  France  (below),  are  stationed  at  Boulogne 
and  Dunkirk,  and  so  on.  In  this  way  consular  representatives  are  stationed  in 
many  more  cities  than  those  actually  named  in  these  tables.  For  details  see 
Register,  as  cited, 


APPENDIX  A  525 

Changsha  C. 

Chefoo  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Mar.;  Interpreter. 

Chungking  C. ;  V.  C. 

Foochow  C. ;  V.  C. 

Hankow  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. ;  Mar. ;  Interpreter 

Harbin  C.jV.C. 

Mukden  C.  G. ;  V.  C. 

Nanking  C. ;  V.  C. 

Shanghai  C.  G. ;  7  V.  C. ;  Mars. ;  Interpreters. 

Swatow  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Interpreter 

Tientsin  C.  G. ;  3  V.  C. ;  Mar. ;  Interpreter. 

Colombia 

Barranquilla  2  C. ;  3  Agts. 

Cartagena  C. ;  V.  C. 

Costa  Rica 

Port  Limon  C. ;  V.  C. 

San  Jose  C.;V.C.;Agt. 

Cuba 

Cienfuegos  C. ;  V.  C. ;  2  Agts. 

Habana  C.  G. ;  4  V.  C. ;  3  Agts. 

Santiago  de  Cuba  C. ;  V.  C. ;  4  Agts. 

Denmark  and  Dominions 

Copenhagen  C.  G. ;  V.  C. 

St.  Thomas,  West  Indies  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Dominican  Republic 

Puerto  Plata  C. ;  V.  C. ;  3  Agts. 

Santo  Domingo  V.  C. ;  3  Agts. 

Ecuador 
Guayaquil  C.  G. ;  V.  C. ;  2  Agts. 

France  and  Dominions 

Algiers,  Algeria  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Bordeaux  C. ;  3  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Calais  C. ;  2  V.  C. ;  2  Agts. 

Dakar,  Senegal  C.;V.  C. 


526  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Grenoble  C. ;  V.  C. 

Guadeloupe,  West  Indies  C. ;  V.  C. 

Havre  C.;V.C. 

La  Rochelle  C. ;  V.  C. 

Limoges  C. ;  V.  C. 

Lyon  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Marseille  C.  G. ;  V.  C. ;  2  Agts. 

Martinique,  West  Indies  C. ;  V.  C. 

Nantes  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Nice  C. ;  V.  C. 

Paris  C.  G. ;  C. ;  3  V.  C. 

Rouen  C. ;  V.  C. ;  Agt. 

Saigon,  French  Indo-China  C. ;  V.  C. 

St.  Etienne  C. ;  V.  G. 

St.  Pierre-Miquelon  C. ;  V.  C. 

Tahiti,  Society  Islands  C. ;  V.  C. 

Tananarive,  Madagascar  C. ;  V.  C. 

Tunis,  Tunis  C. 

German  Empire 

5  C.  G.;  18  C.;  28  V.  C.;  5  Agts.;  stationed  at  following  points i 

Aix  la  Chapelle,  Prussia  Hanover,  Prussia 

Apia,  Samoa  Kehl,  Baden 

Barmen,  Prussia  Leipzig,  Saxony 

Berlin,  Prussia  Madgeburg,  Prussia 

Bremen  Mannheim,  Baden 

Breslau,  Prussia  Munich,  Bavaria 

Chemnitz,  Saxony  Nuremberg,  Bavaria 

Cologne,  Prussia  Plauen,  Saxony 

Dresden,  Saxony  Stettin,  Prussia 

Erfurt,  Prussia  Stuttgart,  Wurttemberg 

Frankfort  on  the  Main,  Prussia  Tsingtau,  China 

Hamburg 

Great  Britain  and  Dominions 

12  C.G.;  80  C.;  88  V.  C. ;  54  Agts.;  1  Interpreter;  Commercial 

Attache;  stationed  at  following  points: 

Aden,  Arabia  Bradford,  England 

Auckland,  New  Zealand  Bristol,  England 

Barbados,  West  Indies  Calcutta,  India 

Belfast,  Ireland  Calgary,  Alberta,  Canada 

Belize,  British  Honduras  Campbellton,  New  Brunswick 

Birmingham,  England  Cape  Town,  Cape  of  Good  Hope 

Bombay,  India  Cardiff,  Wales 


APPENDIX  A 


527 


Charlottetown,  P.  E.  I. 

Colombo,  Ceylon 

Cork  (Queenstown),  Ireland 

Cornwall,  Ontario 

Dublin,  Ireland 

Dundee,  Scotland 

Dunfermline,  Scotland 

Durban,  Natal 

Edinburgh,  Scotland 

Fernie,  British  Columbia 

Fort  William  and  Port  Arthur, 

Ontario 

Georgetown,  Guiana 
Gibraltar,  Spain 
Glasgow,  Scotland 
Halifax,  Nova  Scotia 
Hamilton,  Bermuda 
Hamilton,  Ontario 
Hobart,  Tasmania 
Hongkong 

Huddersfield,  England 
Hull,  England 
Johannesburg,  Transvaal 
Karachi,  India 
Kingston,  Jamaica 
Kingston,  Ontario 
Lagos,  Nigeria 
Leeds,  England 
Liverpool,  England 
London,  England 
Madras,  India 
Malta,  Maltese  Islands 
Manchester,  England 
Melbourne,  Australia 
Mombasa,  British  East  Africa 
Moncton,  New  Brunswick 
Montreal,  Quebec 


Nassau,  N.  P.,  Bahamas 

Newcastle,  N.  S.  W.,  Australia 

Newcastle-on-Tyne,  England 

Niagara  Falls,  Ontario 

Nottingham,  England 

Ottawa,  Ontario 

Plymouth,  England 

Port  Antonio,  Jamaica 

Port  Elizabeth,  Cape  of  Good 
Hope 

Prescott,  Ontario 

Prince  Rupert,  British  Colum- 
bia 

Quebec,  Quebec 

Rangoon,  India 

Regina,  Saskatchewan 

Riviere  du  Loup,  Quebec 

St.  John,  New  Brunswick 

St.  John's,  Newfoundland 

St.  Stephen,  New  Brunswick 

Sarnia,  Ontario 

Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Ontario 

Sheffield,  England 

Sherbrooke,  Quebec 

Singapore,  Straits  Settlements 

Southampton,  England 

Stoke-on-Trent,  England 

Swansea,  Wales 

Sydney,  Australia 

Sydney,  Nova  Scotia 

Toronto,  Ontario 

Trinidad,  West  Indies 

Vancouver,  British  Columbia 

Victoria,  British  Columbia 

Windsor,  Ontario 

Winnipeg,  Manitoba 

Yarmouth,  Nova  Scotia 


Athens 
Patras 


Guatemala 


Greece 

C.G.;  2  C.;  4  V.C.;  2  Agts.;  at: 
Saloniki 

Guatemala 
C. ;  3  V.  C. ;  3  Agts. 


528  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Haiti 

2  C.;  2  V.  C.;  6  Agts.;  at: 
Cape  Haitien  Port  an  Prince 

Honduras 
3  C.;3  V.  C.;  6  Agts.;  at: 

Ceiba  Tegucigalpa 

Puerto  Cortes 

Italy 
C.G.;  10  C.;  14  V.C.;  at: 

Catania  Naples 

Florence  Palermo 

Genoa  Rome 

Leghorn  Turin 

Milan  Venice 

Japan 
2  C.  G. ;  4  C. ;  8  V.  C. ;  4  Interpreters,  2  St.  Ints. ;  2  Agts. ;  at: 

Dairen,  Manchuria  Seoul,  Chosen 

Kobe  Taihoku,  Taiwan 

Nagasaki  Yokohama 

Kongo 
Boma  C.  G.jV.C. 

Liberia 
Monrovia  C.  G. ;  V.  C. 

Mexico 
2  C.  G.;  20  C.;  25  V.  C.;  10  Agts.;  at: 

Acapulco,  Guerrero  Mexico,  Mexico 
Aguascalientes,  Aguascalientes        Monterey,  Nueva  Leon 

Chihuahua,  Chihuahua  Nogales,  Sonora 

Ciudad  Juraez,  Chihuahua  Nuevo  Laredo,  Tamaulipas 

Durango,  Durango  Piedras  Negras,  Coahuila 

Frontera,  Tabasco  Progreso,  Yucatan 

Guadalajara,  Jalisco  Salina  Cruz,  Oaxaca 

Hermosillo,  Sonora  Saltillo,  Coahuila 

Manzanillo,  Colima  San  Luis  Potosi,  San  Luis  Potosi 

Matamoros,  Tamaulipas  Tampico,  Tamaulipas 

Mazatlan,  Sinaloa  Vera  Cruz,  Vera  Cruz 


APPENDIX  A 


529 


Morocco 
Tangier  C.  G.;    V.  C.;    2    Agts.;    Interpreter 

Netherlands  and  Dominions 
C.G.;  3  C.;  5  V.  C.;  6  Agts.;  at: 

Amsterdam  Curacao,  West  Indies 

Batavia,  Java  Rotterdam 

Nicaragua 

2  C.;  2  V.C.;  2  Agts.;  at: 
Bluefields  Corinto 

Norway 
C.G.;  2  C.;  3  V.C.;  2  Agts.;  at: 

Bergen  Stavanger 

Christiania 

Panama 

C.G.;  C.;  2  V.C.;  Agt. ;  at: 
Colon  Panama 

Paraguay 
Asuncion  C. ;  V.  C. 

Persia 

2  C.;  V.  C.;  Interpreter;  at: 
Tabriz  Teheran 

Peru 
Callao-Lima  C.  G. ;  2  V.  C. ;  4  Agts. 

Portugal  and  Dominions 
C.G.;  2C.;  3V.  C.;  5  Agts.;  at: 

Lisbon  St.  Michaels,  Azores 

Lourengo  Marques,  East  Africa 


530 


Moscow 
Odessa 
Petrograd 
Riga 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Russia 
C.G.;  8  C.;  7  V.  C.;  3  AgtS.;  at: 

Tiflis 

Vladivostok,  Siberia 

Warsaw 


Salvador 
San  Salvador  C.G.;  V.C. 

Serbia 
Belgrade  C. ;  V.  C. 

Siam 
Bangkok  V.  C. 

Spain  and  Dominions 
C.G.;6C.;8  V.C.;  10  Agts.;at: 

Barcelona  Seville 

Bilboa  Teneriffe,  Canary  Islands 

Madrid  Valencia 

Malaga 

Sweden 

C.G.;C.;2  V.C.;2  Agts.;  at: 
Goteborg  Stockholm 

Switzerland 
C.G.;  4  C.;  7  V.C.;  2  Agts. ;  at: 

Basel  St.  Gall 

Berne  Zurich 

Geneva 

Turkey  and  Dominions 

4  C.  G. ;  9  C. ;  16  V.  C. ;  13  Agts. ;  9  Interpreters;  1  St.  Int. ;  at : 

Aleppo,  Syria  Harput 

Alexandria,  Egypt  Jerusalem,  Palestine 

Bagdad  Mersina 

Beirut,  Syria  Smyrna 

Cairo,  Egypt  Trebizond 
Constantinople 


APPENDIX  A  531 

Uruguay 
Montevideo  C. ;  V.  C. 

Venezuela 
3C.;3  V.C.;2  Agts.;at: 

La  Guaira  Puerto  Cabello 

Maracaibo 

d.    Foreign  Consular  Officers  in  the  United  States.1 

Argentina 

State  City 

Alabama                                       Mobile  V.  C.2 

California                                      Los  Angeles  V.  C. 

San  Francisco  V.  C. 

Florida                                           Apalachicola  V.  C. 

Fernandina  V.  C. 

Pensacola  V.  C. 

Georgia                                          Brunswick  V.  C. 

Savannah  V.  C. 

Illinois                                           Chicago  V.  C. 

Louisiana                                       New  Orleans  V.  C. 

Maine                                             Portland  V.  C. 

Maryland                                       Baltimore  V.  C. 

Massachusetts                                Boston  V.  C. 

Missouri                                         St.  Louis  V.  C. 

New  York                                      New  York  City  C.  G. ;  C. 

Pennsylvania                                 Philadelphia  V.  C. 

Philippine  Islands                        Manila  V.  C. 

Porto  Rico                                     San  Juan  V.  C. 

Texas                                               Port  Arthur  V.  C. 

Virginia                                           Newport  News  V.  C. 

Norfolk  C. ;  V.  C. 

Washington                                   Tacoma  V.  C. 

*Eegister,  1916,  186-217;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  VI. 

*  C.  G. :  Consul  General.    C. :  Consul.    V.  C. :  Vice  Consul.     C.  A. :  Consular 
Agent.     A.  C.  A.:  Acting  Consular  Agent.     D.  C.  A.:  Deputy  Consular  Agent. 


532  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Austria-Hungary 

California  San  Francisco  C. 

Colorado  Denver  C. 

Florida  Pensacola  V.  C. 

Georgia  Savannah  V.  C. 

Hawaii  Honolulu  C. 

Illinois  Chicago  C.  G. 

Louisiana  New  Orleans  C. 

Maryland  Baltimore  C. 

Massachusetts  Boston  C. 

Minnesota  St.  Paul  C. 

Missouri  St.  Louis  C. 

New  York  Buffalo  A.  C.  A. 

New  York  City  C.  G. 

Ohio  Cleveland  C. 

Pennsylvania  Philadelphia  C.  G. 

Pittsburgh  C. 

Uniontown  D.  C.  A. 

Wilkes-Barre  D.  C.  A. 

Philippine  Islands  Manila  C. 

Porto  Rico  San  Juan  C. 

Texas  Galveston  C. 

Virginia  Richmond  C. 

West  Virginia  Charleston  C. 

Belgium  China 

41  Consular  officers  in  35  cities       6  Consular  officers  in  6  cities. 
in  18  states  and  the  island  pos- 
sessions. Colombia 

Bolivia  ^  Consular  officers  in  16  cities. 

Costa  Rica 
18  Consular  officers  in  15  cities. 


13  Consular  officers  in  as  many  c    t    Rica 

cities. 


Brazil 
34  Consular  officers  in  20  cities.  Cuba 

Bulgaria  ^  Consular  officers  in  34  cities. 

Consul   General   in   New  York  Denmark 

City. 

~,  ..  38  Consular  officers  in  35  cities. 

L/tiile 

,  c  ~         ,         -V,         .  Dominican  Republic 

15  Consular  officers  in  as  many 

cities.  20  Consular  officers  in  18  cities. 


APPENDIX  A  533 

Ecuador  Netherlands 

14  Consular  officers  in  14  cities.  Officers  in  33  cities. 

France  Nicaragua 

47  Consular  officers  in  42  cities.  Officers  in  14  cities. 

German  Empire  Norway 

35  Consular  officers  in  34  cities.  Officers  in  53  cities. 

Great  Britain  Panama 

92  Consular  officers  in  58  cities.  Officers  in  24  cities. 

Greece  Paraguay 

11  Consular  officers  in  11  cities.  Officers  in  12  cities. 

Guatemala  Persia 

20  Consular  officers  in  19  cities.  Officers  in  6  cities. 

Haiti  Peru 

Officers  in  9  cities.  Officers  in  25  cities. 

Honduras  Portugal 

Officers  in  12  cities.  Officers  in  21  cities. 

Italy  RuS9ia 

Officers  in  65  cities.  Officers  in  16  cities. 

Japan  Salvador 

Officers  in  13  cities.  Officers  in  7  cities" 

Liberia  Serb™ 

~~,         .     in    ...  Consul   General   in   New  York 
Officers  m  10  cities. 


Mexico  Siam 

Officers  in  24  cities.  Officers  in  3  cities. 

Monaco  Spam 

Officers  in  2  cities.  Officers  in  35  cities. 

Montenegro  Sweden 

Consul  in  New  York  City.  Officers  in  33  cities. 


534 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Switzerland 
Officers  in  14  cities. 

Turkey 
Officers  in  5  cities. 


Uruguay 
Officers  in  27  cities. 

Venezuela 
Officers  in  17  cities. 


No.  4.    Arbitration  Convention  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  1908.1 


Preamble 
Parties 


Purpose 


Agents 


Body 


The  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond 
the  Seas,  Emperor  of  India,  desiring,  in  pur- 
suance of  the  principles  set  forth  in  Articles 
15-19  of  the  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Set- 
tlement of  International  Disputes,  signed  at 
The  Hague  July  29,  1899,  to  enter  into  nego- 
tiations for  the  conclusion  of  an  Arbitration 
Convention,  have  named  as  their  Plenipo- 
tentiaries, to  wit: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  Elihu  Root,  Secretary  of  State  of 
the  United  States,  and 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  King- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  and  of  the 
British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas,  Emperor 
of  India,  The  Right  Honorable  James  Bryce, 
O.  M.,  who,  after  having  communicated  to 
one  another  their  full  powers,  found  in  good 
and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following 
articles : 

Article  I. 


Differences  which  may  arise  of  a  legal 
nature  or  relating  to  the  interpretation  of 
General  Article  treaties  existing  between  the  two  Contracting 
Parties  and  which  it  may  not  have  been  pos- 
sible to  settle  by  diplomacy,  shall  be  referred 
to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  estab- 
lished at  The  Hague  by  the  Convention  of 
the  29th  of  July,  1899,  provided,  neverthe- 
less, that  they  do  not  affect  the  vital  interests, 

1  U.  8.  8.  L.,  XXXV,  1960 ;  see,  above,  text,  Chaps.  X,  XI,  XIV. 


APPENDIX  A 


535 


Special  Articles 


the  independence,  or  the  honor  of  the  two 
Contracting  States,  and  do  not  concern  the 
interests  of  third  Parties. 

Article  II. 


In  each  individual  case  the  High  Con- 
tracting   Parties    before    appealing    to    the 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  shall  con- 
clude a  special  Agreement  defining  clearly 
Procedure  the  matter  in  dispute,  the  scope  of  the  powers 

of  the  Arbitrators,  and  the  periods  to  be 
fixed  for  the  formation  of  the  Arbitral  Tribu- 
nal and  the  several  stages  of  the  procedure. 
It  is  understood  that  such  special  agreements 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  will  be  made 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
thereof;  His  Majesty's  Government  reserv- 
ing the  right  before  concluding  a  special 
agreement  in  any  matter  affecting  the  inter- 
ests of  a  self-governing  Dominion  of  the 
British  Empire  to  obtain  the  concurrence 
therein  of  the  Government  of  that  Dominion. 

Article  III. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified 
Ratification  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 

America  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 

of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  his  Britannic 
Exchange  Majesty.  The  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged 

at  Washington  as  soon  as  possible,  and  the 
Effectiveness  Convention  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of 

the  exchange  of  its  ratifications. 


Duration 


Place 
Date 

Signatures  and 
Seals 


Article  IV. 

The  present  Convention  is  concluded  for 
a  period  of  five  years,  dating  from  the  day 
of  the  exchange  of  its  ratifications. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington, this  fourth  day  of  April,  in  the  year 
1908. 

ELIHU  ROOT     (SEAL) 
JAMES  BRYCE   (SEAL) 


536 

a.    Resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  Consenting  to 
the  Ratification  of  a  Treaty  by  the  President.1 

Tuesday,  January  22,  1901. 

#     #     *    * 

Mr.  Lodge  submitted  the  following  resolution  for  consideration : 

Resolved  (two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concurring),  That 
the  Senate  advise  and  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  signed  at  Washington  Novem- 
ber 7,  1900,  providing  for  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  any 
and  all  islands  of  the  Philippine  Archipelago  lying  outside  of  the 
lines  described  in  Article  III  of  the  treaty  of  peace  of  December 
10,  1898. 

On  the  question  to  agree  to  the  resolution, 

It  was  decided  in  the  affirmative,  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present 
having  voted  in  the  affirmative ;  yeas,  38 ;  nays,  19. 


Ordered,  That  the  Secretary  lay  the  said  resolutions  before  the 
President  of  the  United  States. 


b.    Act  of  Ratification  of  a  Treaty.2 

The  executive  authority  of  the  Dominican  Republic. 
To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come,  greeting: 

Whereas  a  convention  was  signed  in  the  city  of  Santo  Domingo 
on  the  eighth  day  of  February,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
seven,  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  Dominican  Republic  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  a  true  copy  of  which  convention,  in 
Spanish  and  English,  is  word  for  word  as  follows : 

(Here  follows  copy  of  convention,  in  Spanish  and  English.) 

And  whereas  by  a  resolution  of  the  third  of  May  of  the  present 
year  the  national  congress  approved  said  convention,  the  executive 
authority  of  the  Republic  confirms  and  ratifies  the  aforesaid  con- 
vention in  all  and  every  one  of  its  stipulations,  as  above  written, 
and  promises  that  every  article  and  clause  thereof  will  be  inviolably 
observed. 

In  testimony  whereof  these  presents  are  executed,  sealed  with 
the  seal  of  the  Republic,  and  signed  and  countersigned  in  the  city 

1  Journals  of  the  Executive  Proceedings  of  the  Senate,  XXXII,  646;  see, 
above,  text,  Chap.  X. 

'  U.  S.  Foreign  Relations,  1907,  316 ;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  X. 


APPENDIX  A  537 

of  Santo  Domingo  the  nineteenth  day  of  June,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  1907. 

RAMON  CACERES, 

President  of  the  Republic. 
Countersigned : 

E.  TEJERA,    (Seal) 

Minister  of  Foreign  Relations. 

c.    Protocol  of  an  Exchange  of  Ratifications.1 

The  undersigned  plenipotentiaries  having  met  with  the  object 
of  exchanging  the  ratifications  of  the  convention  signed  between 
the  Dominican  Republic  and  the  United  States  on  February  8, 
1907,  providing  for  the  assistance  of  the  United  States  in  the  col- 
lection of  the  customs  duties  of  the  Dominican  Republic  and  the 
application  of  the  said  customs  duties,  and  the  ratifications  of  said 
convention  having  been  carefully  compared  and  having  been  found 
to  exactly  conform  one  with  the  other,  the  exchange  was  to-day 
affected  in  the  usual  form. 

In  testimony  whereof  this  protocol  of  exchange  is  signed  and 
sealed. 

Done  in  Washington  the  8th  day  of  July,  1907. 

EMILIO  C.  JOUBERT  (Seal) 

ROBERT  BACON.  (Seal) 

d.    Proclamation  of  a  Treaty  by  the  President.2 

By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America 

A  Proclamation. 

Whereas  an  Arbitration  Convention  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
was  concluded  and  signed  by  their  respective  Plenipotentiaries  at 
Washington,  on  the  fourth  day  of  April,  one  thousand,  nine  hun- 
dred and  eight,  the  original  of  which  Convention  is  word  for  word 
as  follows: 

(Text  of  Convention) 

And  whereas  the  said  Convention  has  been  duly  ratified  on  both 
parts  and  the  ratifications  of  the  two  governments  were  exchanged 
in  the  City  of  Washington,  on  the  fourth  day  of  June,  one  thousand, 
nine  hundred  and  eight; 

1 17.  S.  Foreign  Relations,  1907,  316;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  X. 
J  TJ.  S.  S.  L.,  XXXV,  I960;  see,  above,  text.  Chap.  X. 


538  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known  that  I,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  President 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  have  caused  said  Convention  to 
be  made  public,  to  the  end  that  the  same  and  every  article  and 
clause  thereof  may  be  observed  and  fulfilled  with  good  faith  by 
the  United  States  and  the  citizens  thereof. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  fifth  day  of  June, 

in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand,  nine  hundred  and 

(SEAL)     eight,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of 

America  the  one  hundred  and  thirty  second. 
By  the  President  : 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT. 
EUHU  ROOT, 

Secretary  of  State. 


No.  5.    Treaty  of  Peace,  Signed  at  Paris,  30  March,  1856,  and 
Declaration  of  Paris,  adopted  by  signatories  thereto. 

a.    Treaty  of  Paris,  30  March,  1856.1 

In  the  Name  of  Almighty  God. 

Their  Majesties  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  the  Emperor  of 
all  the  Russias,  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and  the  Emperor  of  the 
Ottomans,  animated  by  the  desire  of  putting  an  end  to  the  calam- 
ities of  war,  and  wishing  to  prevent  the  return  of  the  complications 
which  occasioned  it,  resolve  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria  as  to  the  bases  on  which  peace 
might  be  reestablished  and  consolidated,  by  securing,  throuh 

id 


purpose  Their  said  Majesties  have  named  as  their 
Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 
(Names  of  plenipotentiaries.) 

Which  Plenipotentiaries,  assembled  in  Congress  at  Paris, 
An  understanding  having  been  happily  established  between 
them,  Their  Majesties  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  Emperor  of  the 
French,  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and 
the  Emperor  of  the  Ottomans,  considering  that  in_j;he^inteiifiSjL-OJ, 
Europe,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  a  signing  Party  to  tlje 
Convention  of  the  13th  of  July,  1841,  should  be  invited  to  partici- 

*  i  J  tfflHHHM^  ••-•''•'     -•^**SWI'"^ 

*P.  f  F.,  XL VI,  8-26;  see,  above,  text,  Chaps.  XI,  Xlll,  XXI, 


APPENDIX  A  539 

pate  in  the  new  arrangements,  to  be  adopted,  and  appreciating  the 
value  that  the  concurineiice  of  His  said  Majesty  would  add  to  a 
w^rkof  generaln  pacification,  invited  him  to  send  Plenipotentiaries 
to  the  Congress, 

In  consequence,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  has  named  as 
His  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say : 

(Names  of  plenipotentiaries.) 

The  Plenipotentiaries,  after  having  exchanged  their  full 
powers,  found  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  fol- 
lowing Articles: — 

Article  I. 

From  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present 
Treaty,  there  shall  be  peace  and  friendship  between  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  on  the  one  part,  and 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  on  the  other  part ;  as 
well  as  between  their  heirs  and  successors,  their  respective  domin- 
ions and  subjects,  in  perpetuity. 

Article  VII. 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  the  French,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  and  His  Majesty  the  King 
of  Sardinia,  declare  the  Sublime  Porte  admitted  to  participate  in 
the  advantages  of  the  public  law  and  system  (concert)  of  Europe. 
Their  Ma jesties_  engage,  each  on  his  part,  to  respect  the  inde- 
pendence and~7Keterritorial  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire; 
guarantee  .ir^  common  Jhe  strict  observance  fl^th^t  engagement ;  and 
will/m  consequence,  consm^a^^a^tjtendingjo^its  violation  as  a 
question  of  general  interest" 


Article  VIII. 

If  there  should  arise  between  the  Sublime  Porte  and  one  or 
more  of  the  other  signing  Powers,  any  jnisunderstanding  which 
might  endanger  the  maintenance  of  their  "relations,  the  Sublime 
Porte,  and^each  of  such  Powers,  before  having  recourse  to  the  use 
of  force,  shall  afford  the  other  Contracting  Parties  the  opportunity 
of  preventing  such  an  extremity  by  means  of  their  mediation. 


540  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  IX. 

His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  having,  in  his  constant  solici- 
tude for  the  welfare  of  his  subjects,  issued  _a  Firman  which,  while 
ameliorating  their  condition  without"HTstincti6Ttf*oT"  religion  or  of 
race,  records  his  generous  intentions  towards  the  Christian  popu- 
lations of  his  Empire,  and  wishing  to  give  a  further  proof  of  his 
sentiments  in  that  respect,  has  resolved  to  communicate  to  the 
Contracting  Parties  the  said  Firman  emanating  spontaneously 
from  his  sovereign  will. 

The  Contracting  Powers  recognize  the  high  value  of  this  com- 
munication. It  is  clearly  understood  that  it  cannot,  in  any  case, 
give  to  the  said  Powers  the  right  to  interfere,  either  collectively  or 
separately,  in  the  relations  of  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  with  his 
subjects,  nor  in  the  internal  administration  of  his  Empire. 

Article  X. 

The  Convention  of  the  13th  of  July,  1841,  which  maintains  the 
ancient  rule  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  relative  to  the  closing  of  the 
Straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  of  the  Dardanelles,  has'been  revised 
by  common  consent. 

The  Act  concluded  for  that  purpose,  and  in  conformity  with 
that  principle,  between  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  is  and 
remains  annexed  to  Represent  Treaty,  an^  shall  have  the  same 
force  ancTvaliclity  '"as  if  it  formed  an  integral  part  thereof. 

Article  XI. 

The  Black  Sea  is  neutralized:  its  waters  and  its  ports,  thrown 
open  to  the  mercantile  marine  "of  every  nation,  are  formally  and 
in  perpetuity  interdicted  to  the  flag  of  war,  either  of  the  Powers 
possessing  its  coasts,  or  of  any  other  Power,  with  the  exceptions 
mentioned  in  Articles  XIV  and  XIX  of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  XII. 

Free  from  any  impediment,  the  commerce  in  the  ports  and 
waters  of  the  Black  Sea  shall  be  subject  only  to  regulations  of 
health,  customs,  and  police,  framed  in  a  spirit  favorable  to  the 
development  of  commercial  transactions. 

In  order  to  afford  to  the  commercial  and  maritime  interests  of 
every  nation  the  security  which  is  desired,  Russia  and  the  Sublime 
Porte  will  admit  Consuls  into  their  ports  situated  upon  the  coast 
of  the  Black  Sea,  in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  interna- 
tional law. 


APPENDIX  A  541 


.    <9VA 


Article  XIII 

The  Black  Sea  being  neutralized  according  to  the  terms  of 
Article  XI,  the  maintenance  or  establishment  upon  its  coast  of 
military-maritime  arsenals  becomes  alike  unnecessary  and  pur- 
poseless; in  consequence,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the 
Russias  and  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan  engage^  nol  to  estab-  \ 
lish  or  to  maintain  upon  that  coast  any  military-maritime  arsenal.  ) 

Article  XIV. 

Their  Majesties  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias  and  the  Sultan     >,     •>    >  * 

having  concluded  a  Convention  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the-     • 
force  and  the  number  of  light  vessels^necessary  for  the  service  of  / 

their  coasts,  which  they  reserve  to  themselves  to  maintain  in  the          • 
Slack  Sea,  that  Convention  is  annexed  to  the  present  Treaty,  and 
shall  have  the  same  force  and  validity  as  if  it  formed  an  integral 
part  thereof.     It  cannot  be  either  annulled  or  modified  without  the 
assent  of  the  Powers  signing  the  Present  Treaty. 

Article  XV. 

The  Act  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  having  established  the  prin- 
ciples intended  to  regulate  the  navigation  of  rivers  which  separate 
or  traverse  different  States,  the  Contracting  Powers  stipulate 
among  themselves  that  those  principles  shall  in  future  be  equally 
applied  to  the  Danube  and  its  mouths.  They  declare  that  this 
arrangement  henceforth  forms  a  part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe, 
and  take  it  under  their  guarantee. 

The  navigation  of  the  Danube  cannot  be  subjected  to  any 
impediment  or  charge  not  expressly  provided  for  by  the  stipula- 
tions contained  in  the  following  Articles:  in  consequence,  there 
shall  not  be  levied  any  toll  founded  solely  upon  the  fact  of  the 
navigation  of  the  river,  nor  any  duty  upon  the  goods  which  may 
be  on  board  of  vessels.  T^e  regulations  of  police  and  of  quarantine 
to  be  established  for  the  safety  of  the  States  separated  or  traversed 
by  that  river  shall  be  so  framed  as  to  facilitate,  as  much  as  possible, 
the  passage  of  vessels.  With  the  exception  of  such  regulations,  no 
obstacle  whatever  shall  be  opposed  to  free  navigation. 

Article  XVI. 

With  the  view  to  carry  out  the  arrangements  of  the  preceding 
Article,  a  Commission,  in  which  Great  Britain,  Austria,  France, 
Prussia,  Russia,  Sardinia,  and  Turkey,  shall  each  be  represented       / 
by  one  delegate,  shall  be  charged  to  designate  and  to  cause  to  be  V 


542  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

executed  the  works  necessary  below  Isaktcha,  to  clear  the  mouths 
of  the  Danube,  as  well  as  the  neighboring  parts  of  the  sea,  from 
the  sands  and  other  impediments  which  obstruct  them,  in  order 
to  put  that  part  of  the  river  and  the  said  parts  of  the  sea  in  the 
best  possible  state  for  navigation. 

In  order  to  cover  the  expenses  of  such  works,  as  well  as  of  the 
establishments  intended  to  secure  and  to  facilitate  the  navigation 
at  the  mouths  of  the  Danube,  fixed  duties,  of  a  suitable  rate,  set- 
tled by  the  Commission  by  a  majority  of  votes,  may  be  levied,  on 
the  express  condition  that,  in  this  respect  as  in  every  other,  the 

J  flags  of  all  nations  shall  be  treated  on  the  footing  of  perfect 

^equality. 

Article  XVII. 

A  Commission  shall  be  established,  and  shall  be  composed  of 
delegates  of  Austria,  Bavaria,  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  Wiirtemberg 
(one  for  each  of  those  Powers),  to  whom  shall  be  added  Commis- 
sioners from  the  three  Danubian  Principalities,  whose  nomination 
shall  have  been  approved  by  the  Porte.  This  Commission,  which 
shall  be  permanent:  1.  Shall  prepare  regulations  of  navigation  and 
river  police;  2.  Shall  remove  the  impediments,  of  whatever  nature 
they  may  be,  which  still  prevent  the  application  to  the  Danube  of 
the  arrangements  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna ;  3.  Shall  order  and  cause 
to  be  executed  the  necessary  works  throughout  the  whole  course 
of  the  river;  and  4,  Shall,  after  the  dissolution  of  the  European 
Commission,  see  to  maintaining  the  mouths  of  the  Danube  and  the 
neighboring  parts  of  the  sea  in  a  navigable  state. 

Article  XVIII. 

It  is  understood  that  the  European  Commission  shall  have  com- 
pleted its  task,  and  that  the  Riverain  Commission  shall  have  fin- 
ished the  works  described  in  the  preceding  Article,  under  Nos.  1 
and  2,  within  the  period  of  two  years.  The  signing  Powers  assem- 
bled in  Conference  having  been  informed  of  that  fact,  shall,  after 
having  placed  it  on  record,  pronounce  the  dissolution  of  the  Euro- 
pean Commission,  and  from  that  time  the  permanent  Riverain 
Commission  shall  enjoy  the  same  powers  as  those  with  which  the 
European  Commission  shall  have  until  then  been  invested. 

Article  XIX. 

In  order  to  insure  the  execution  of  the  regulations  which  shall 
have  been  established  by  common  agreement,  in  conformity  with 
the  principles  above  declared,  each  of  the  Contracting  Powers 
shall  have  the  right  to  station,  at  all  times,  two  light  vessels  at  the 

mouths  of  the  Danube. 

*     *     *     * 


APPENDIX  A  543 


Article  XXII. 

The  Principalities  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  shall  continue  to 
enjoy,  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte,  and  under  the  guarantee 
of  the  Contracting  Powers,  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  which 
they  are  in  possession.  No  exclusive  protection  shall  be  exercised 
over  them  by  any  of  the  Guaranteeing  Powers.  There  shall  be  no 
separate  right  of  interference  in  their  internal  affairs. 

*     *    *     * 
Article  XXXIV. 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  at  Paris  in  the  space  of  four  weeks,  or  sooner  if 
possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto  the  seal  of  their  arms. 

Done  at  Paris,  the  thirtieth  day  of  the  month  of  March,  in  the 
year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-six. 

CLARENDON. 

COWTLEY. 

BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN. 

HiJBNER. 

A.  WALEWSKI. 

BOURQUENEY. 

MANTEUFFEL. 

C.  M.  D 'HATZFELDT. 

ORLOFF. 

BRUNNOW. 

C.  CAVOUR. 

DE  VlLLAMARINA. 

AALJ. 

MEHEMMED  DJEMIL.. 

b.    Declaration  of  Paris,  1856.1 

Considering : 

That  maritime  law,  in  time  of  war,  has  long  been  the  subject  of 
deplorable  disputes: 

That  the  uncertainty  of  the  law  and  of  the  duties  in  this  same 
matter  gives  occasion  to  differences  of  opinion  between  neutrals 
and  belligerents  which  may  cause  serious  difficulties  and  even 
conflicts : 

That  it  is  consequently  advantageous  to  establish  a  uniform 
doctrine  on  so  important  a  point: 

*B.  f  F.,  XLVI,  26-27;  see,  above,  text,  Chaps.  X,  XI,  XII. 


544 

That  the  Plenipotentiaries  assembled  at  the  Congress  of  Paris 
cannot  better  respond  to  the  intentions  by  which  their  Governments 
are  animated  than  by  seeking  to  introduce  into  international  rela- 
tions fixed  principles  in  this  respect : 

The  above-mentioned  Plenipotentiaries,  being  duly  authorized, 
resolved  to  concert  among  themselves  as  to  the  means  of  attaining 
this  object;  and,  having  come  to  an  agreement,  have  adopted  the 
following  solemn  Declaration : — 
,      1.    Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished: 
/      2.     The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  exception 
of  contraband  of  war: 

3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war, 
V    are  not  liable  to  capture  under  enemy's  flag: 

4.  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective;  that 
,y  is  to  say  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  really  to  prevent  access 

to  the  enemy's  coast. 

The  Governments  of  the  undersigned  Plenipotentiaries  engage 
to  bring  the  present  Declaration  to  the  knowledge  of  the  States 
which  have  not  been  called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  Congress  of 
Paris,  and  invite  them  to  accede  to  it. 

Convinced  that  the  maxims  which  they  now  proclaim  cannot  but 
be  received  with  gratitude  by  the  whole  world,  the  undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries  doubt  not  that  the  efforts  of  their  Governments 
to  obtain  the  general  adoption  thereof  will  be  crowned  with  full 
success. 

The  present  Declaration  is  not  and  shall  not  be  binding  except 
between  those  powers  who  have  acceded  or  shall  accede  to  it. 

No.  6.    Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  Internationa] 
Disputes  signed  at  The  Hague,  1907.1 

His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor,  King  of  Prussia;  [etc.] : 

Animated  by  the  sincere  desire  to  work  for  the  maintenance  of 
general  peace; 

Resolved  to  promote  by  all  the  efforts  in  their  power  the  friendly 
settlement  of  international  disputes; 

Recognizing  the  solidarity  uniting  the  members  of  the  society  of 
civilized  nations; 

Desirous  of  extending  the  empire  of  law  and  of  strengthening 
the  appreciation  of  international  justice ; 

Convinced  that  the  permanent  institution  of  a  tribunal  of  arbi- 
tration, accessible  to  all,  in  the  midst  of  independent  Powers,  will 
contribute  effectively  to  this  result ; 

Having  regard  to  the  advantages  attending  the  general  and 
regular  organization  of  the  procedure  of  arbitration ; 

1  U.  S.  S.  L.,  XXXVI,  2199;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XV. 


APPENDIX  A  545 

Sharing  the  opinion  of  the  august  initiator  of  the  International 
Peace  Conference  that  it  is  expedient  to  record  in  an  international 
agreement  the  principles  of  equity  and  right  on  which  are  based 
the  security  of  States  and  the  welfare  of  peoples ; 

Being  desirous,  with  this  object,  of  insuring  the  better  working 
in  practice  of  commissions  of  inquiry  and  tribunals  of  arbitration, 
and  of  facilitating  recourse  to  arbitration  in  cases  which  allow  of  a 
summary  procedure,1 

Have  deemed  it  necessary  to  revise  in  certain  particulars  and  to 
complete  the  work  of  the  First  Peace  Conference  for  the  pacific 
settlement  of  international  disputes; 

The  high  contracting  Parties  have  resolved  to  conclude  a  new 
Convention  for  this  purpose,  and  have  appointed  the  following  as 
their  plenipotentiaries : 

(Here  follow  the  names  of  plenipotentiaries.) 

Who,  after  having  deposited  their  full  powers,  found  in  good 
and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following: 

PART  I. — THE  MAINTENANCE  OP  GENERAL  PEACE. 

Article  1. 

With  a  view  to  obviating  as  far  as  possible  recourse  to  force 
in  the  relations  between  States,  the  contracting  Powers  agree  to 
use  their  best  efforts  to  insure  the  pacific  settlement  of  international 
differences. 

PART  II. — GOOD  OFFICES  AND  MEDIATION. 

Article  2. 

In  case  of  serious  disagreement  or  dispute,  before  an  appeal  to 
arms,  the  contracting  Powers  agree  to  have  recourse,  as  far  as 
circumstances  allow,  to  the  good  offices  or  mediation  of  one  or  more 
friendly  Powers. 

Article  3. 

Independently  of  this  recourse,  the  contracting  Powers  deem  it 
expedient  and  desirable  that  one  or  more  Powers,  strangers  to  the 
dispute,  should,  on  their  own  initiative  and  as  far  as  circumstances 
may  allow,  offer  their  good  offices  or  mediation  to  the  States  at 
variance. 

Powers  strangers  to  the  dispute  have  the  right  to  offer  good 
offices  or  mediation  even  during  the  course  of  hostilities. 

1  Italics  indicate  changes  in  the  Convention  as  drawn  in  1907. 


546  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  exercise  of  this  right  can  never  be  regarded  by  either  of 
the  parties  in  dispute  as  an  unfriendly  act. 

Article  4. 

The  part  of  the  mediator  consists  in  reconciling  the  opposing 
claims  and  appeasing  the  feelings  of  resentment  which  may  have 
arisen  between  the  States  at  variance. 

Article  5. 

The  functions  of  the  mediator  are  at  an  end  when  once  it  is 
declared,  either  by  one  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  by  the 
mediator  himself,  that  the  means  of  reconciliation  proposed  by 
him  are  not  accepted. 

Article  6. 

Good  offices  and  mediation  undertaken  either  at  the  request  of 
the  parties  in  dispute  or  on  the  initiative  of  Powers  strangers  to 
the  dispute  have  exclusively  the  character  of  advice,  and  never 
have  binding  force. 

Article  7. 

The  acceptance  of  mediation  can  not,  unless  there  be  an  agree- 
ment to  the  contrary,  have  the  effect  of  interrupting,  delaying,  or 
hindering  mobilization  or  other  measures  of  preparation  for  war. 

If  it  takes  place  after  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  the  mili- 
tary operations  in  progress  are  not  interrupted  in  the  absence  of 
an  agreement  to  the  contrary. 

Article  8. 

The  contracting  Powers  are  agreed  in  recommending  the  appli- 
cation, when  circumstances  allow,  of  special  mediation  in  the  fol- 
lowing form: 

In  case  of  a  serious  difference  endangering  peace,  the  States  at 
variance  choose  respectively  a  Power,  to  which  they  intrust  the 
mission  of  entering  into  direct  communication  with  the  Power 
chosen  on  the  other  side,  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  rupture 
of  pacific  relations. 

For  the  period  of  this  mandate,  the  term  of  which,  unless  other- 
wise stipulated,  can  not  exceed  thirty  days,  the  States  in  dispute 
cease  from  all  direct  communication  on  the  subject  of  the  dispute, 
which  is  regarded  as  referred  exclusively  to  the  mediating  Powers, 
which  must  use  their  best  efforts  to  settle  it. 


APPENDIX  A  547 

In  case  of  a  definite  rupture  of  pacific  relations,  these  Powers 
are  charged  with  the  joint  task  of  taking  advantage  of  any  oppor- 
tunity to  restore  peace. 

PART  III. — INTERNATIONAL  COMMISSIONS  OP  INQUIBY 

Article  9. 

In  disputes  of  an  international  nature  involving  neither  honol 
nor  vital  interests,  and  arising  from  a  difference  of  opinion  on 
points  of  fact,  the  contracting  Powers  deem  it  expedient  and  desir* 
able  that  the  parties  who  have  not  been  able  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment by  means  of  diplomacy,  should,  as  far  as  circumstances  allow, 
institute  an  international  commission  of  inquiry,  to  facilitate  a 
solution  of  these  disputes  by  elucidating  the  facts  by  means  of  an 
impartial  and  conscientious  investigation. 

Article  10. 

International  commissions  of  inquiry  are  constituted  by  special 
agreement  between  the  parties  in  dispute. 

The  inquiry  convention  defines  the  facts  to  be  examined;  it 
determines  the  mode  and  time  in  which  the  commission  is  to  be 
formed  and  the  extent  of  the  powers  of  the  commissioners. 

It  also  determines,  if  there  is  need,  where  the  commission  is  to 
sit,  and  whether  it  may  remove  to  another  place,  the  language  the 
commission  shall  use  and  the  languages  the  use  of  which  shall  be 
authorized  before  it,  as  well  as  the  date  on  which  each  party  must 
deposit  its  statement  of  facts,  and,  generally  speaking,  all  the  con- 
ditions upon  which  the  parties  have  agreed. 

If  the  parties  consider  it  necessary  to  appoint  assessors,  the 
convention  of  inquiry  shall  determine  the  mode  of  their  selection 
and  the  extent  of  their  powers. 

Article  11. 

//  the  inquiry  convention  has  not  determined  where  the  com- 
mission is  to  sit,  it  will  sit  at  The  Hague. 

The  place  of  meeting,  once  fixed,  can  not  be  altered  by  the 
commission  except  with  the  assent  of  the  parties. 

If  the  inquiry  convention  has  not  determined  what  languages 
are  to  be  employed,  the  question  shall  be  decided  by  the  commission. 

Article  12. 

Unless  an  undertaking  is  made  to  the  contrary,  commissions  of 
inquiry  shall  be  formed  in  the  manner  determined  by  Articles  45 
and  57  of  the  present  Convention. 


548  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  13. 

Should  one  of  the  commissioners  or  one  of  the  assessors,  should 
there  be  any,  either  die,  or  resign,  or  be  unable  for  any  reason 
whatever  to  discharge  his  functions,  the  same  procedure  is  followed 
for  filling  the  vacancy  as  was  followed  for  appointing  him. 

Article  14. 

The  parties  are  entitled  to  appoint  special  agents  to  attend  the 
commission  of  inquiry,  whose  duty  it  is  to  represent  them  and  to 
act  as  intermediaries  between  them  and  the  commission. 

They  are  further  authorized  to  engage  counsel  or  advocates, 
appointed  by  themselves,  to  state  their  case  and  uphold  their  inter- 
ests before  the  commission. 

Article  15. 

The  International  Bureau  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitra- 
tion acts  as  registry  for  the  commissions  which  sit  at  The  Hague, 
and  shall  place  its  offices  and  staff  at  the  disposal  of  the  contracting 
Powers  for  the  use  of  the  commission  of  inquiry. 

Article  16. 

//  the  commission  meets  elsewhere  than  at  The  Hague,  it 
appoints  a  secretary  general,  whose  office  serves  as  registry. 

It  is  the  function  of  the  registry,  under  the  control  of  the  presi- 
dent, to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  sittings  of  the 
commission,  the  preparation  of  the  minutes,  and,  while  the  inquiry 
lasts,  for  the  charge  of  the  archives,  which  shall  subsequently  be 
transferred  to  the  International  Bureau  at  The  Hague. 

Article  17. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  constitution  and  working  of  commis- 
sions of  inquiry,  the  contracting  Powers  recommend  the  following 
rules,  which  shall  be  applicable  to  the  inquiry  procedure  in  so  far 
as  the  parties  do  not  adopt  other  rules. 

Article  18. 

The  commission  shall  settle  the  details  of  the  procedure  not  cov- 
ered by  the  special  inquiry  convention  or  the  present  Convention, 
and  shall  arrange  all  the  formalities  required  for  dealing  with  the 
evidence. 


APPENDIX  A  549 

Article  19. 

On  the  inquiry  both  sides  must  be  heard. 

At  the  dates  fixed,  each  party  communicates  to  the  commis- 
sion and  to  the  other  party  the  statements  of  facts,  if  any,  and, 
in  all  cases,  the  instruments,  papers,  and  documents'  which  it  con- 
siders useful  for  ascertaining  the  truth,  as  well  as  the  Ust  of  wit- 
nesses and  experts  whose  evidence  it  wishes  to  be  heard. 

Article  20. 

The  commission  is  entitled,  with  the  assent  of  the  Powers,  to 
move  temporarily  to  any  place  where  it  considers  it  may  be  useful 
to  have  recourse  to  this  means  of  inquiry  or  to  send  one  or  more 
of  its  members.  Permission  must  be  obtained  from  the  State  on 
whose  territory  it  is  proposed  to  hold  the  inquiry. 

Article  21. 

Every  investigation,  and  every  examination  of  a  locality,  must 
be  made  in  the  presence  of  the  agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties  or 
after  they  have  been  duly  summoned. 

Article  22. 

The  commission  is  entitled  to  ask  from  either  party  for  such 
explanations  and  information  as  it  considers  necessary. 

Article  23. 

The  parties  undertake  to  supply  the  commission  of  inquiry,  as 
fully  as  they  may  think  possible,  with  all  means  and  facilities  neces- 
sary to  enable  it  to  become  completely  acquainted  with,  and  to 
accurately  understand,  the  facts  in  question. 

They  undertake  to  make  use  of  the  means  at  their  disposal, 
under  their  municipal  law,  to  insure  the  appearance  of  the  wit- 
nesses>  or  experts  who  are  in  their  territory  and  have  been  sunv, 
moned  before  the  commission. 

If  the  witnesses  or  experts  are  unable  to  appear  before  the 
commission,  the  parties  will  arrange  for  their  evidence  to  be  taken 
before  the  qualified  officials  of  their  own  country. 

Article  24. 

For  all  notices  to  be  served  by  the  commission  in  the  territory 
of  a  third  contracting  Power,  the  commission  shall  apply  direct  to 
the  Government  of  the  said  Power.  The  same  rule  applies-  in  the 
case  of  steps  being  taken  on  the  spot  to  procure  evidence. 


550  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  requests  for  this  purpose  are  to  be  executed  so  far  as  the 
means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Power  applied  to  under  its  municipal 
law  allow.  They  can  not  be  rejected  unless  the  Power  in  question 
considers  they  are  calculated  to  impair  its  sovereign  rights  or  its 
safety. 

The  commission  will  equally  be  always  entitled  to  act  through 
the  Power  on  whose  territory  it  sits. 

Article  25. 

The  witnesses  and  experts  are  summoned  on  the  request  of  the 
parties  or  by  the  commission  of  its  own  motion,  and,  in  every 
case,  through  the  Government  of  the  State  in  whose  territory 
they  are. 

The  witnesses  are  heard  in  succession  and  separately,  in  the 
presence  of  the  agents  and  counsel,  and  in  the  order  fixed  by  the 
commission. 

Article  26. 

The  examination  of  witnesses  is  conducted  by  the  president. 

The  members  of  the  commission  may  however  put  to  each  wit- 
ness questions  which  they  consider  likely  to  throw  light  on  and 
complete  his  evidence,  or  get  information  on  any  point  concerning 
the  witness  within  the  limits  of  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  get 
at  the  truth. 

The  agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties  may  not  interrupt  the 
witness  when  he  is  makvng  his  statement,  nor  put  any  direct  ques- 
tion to  him,  but  they  may  ask  the  president  to  put  such  additional 
questions  to  the  witness  as  they  think  expedient. 

Article  27. 

The  witness  must  give  his  evidence  without  being  allowed  to 
read  any  written  draft.  He  may,  however,  be  permitted  by  the 
president  to  consult  notes  or  documents  if  the  nature  of  the  facts 
referred  to  necessitates  their  employment. 

Article  28. 

A  minute  of  the  evidence  of  the  witness  is  drawn  up  forthwith 
and  read  to  the  witness.  The  latter  may  make  such  alterations  and 
additions  as  he  thinks  necessary,  which  witt  be  recorded  at  the 
end  of  his  statement. 

When  the  whole  of  his  statement  has  been  read  to  the  witness, 
he  is  asked  to  sign  it. 


APPENDIX  A  551 


Article  29. 

The  agents  are  authorized,  in  the  course  of  or  af  the  close  of 
the  inquiry,  to  present  in  writing  to  the  commission  and  to  the 
other  party  such  statements,  requisitions,  or  summaries  of  the 
facts  as  they  consider  useful  for  ascertaining  the  truth. 

Article  30. 

The  commission  considers  its  decisions  in  private  and  the  pro- 
ceedings are  secret. 

All  questions  are  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the 
commission. 

If  a  member  declines  to  vote,  the  fact  must  be  recorded  in  the 
minutes. 

Article  31. 

The  sittings  of  the  commission  are  not  public,  nor  the  minutes 
and  documents  connected  with  the  inquiry  published  except  in 
virtue  of  a  decision  of  the  commission  taken  with  the  consent  of 
the  parties. 

Article  32. 

After  the  parties  have  presented  all  the  explanations  and  evi- 
dence, and  the  witnesses  have  all  been  heard,  the  president  declares 
the  inquiry  terminated,  and  the  commission  adjourns  to  deliberate 
and  to  draw  up  its  report. 

Article  33. 

The  report  is  signed  by  all  the  members  of  the  commission. 
//  one  of  the  members  refuses  to  sign,  the  fact  is  mentioned;  but 
the  validity  of  the  report  is  not  affected. 

Article  34. 

The  report  of  the  commission  is  read  at  01  public  sitting,  the 
agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties  being  present  or  duly  summoned. 
A  copy  of  the  report  is  given  to  each  party. 

Article  35. 

The  report  of  the  commission  is  limited  to  a  statement  of  facts, 
and  has  in  no  way  the  character  of  an  award.  It  leaves  to  the 
parties  entire  freedom  as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to  the  statement. 


552  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Article  36. 

Each  party  pays  its  own  expenses  and  an  equal  share  of  the 
expenses  incurred  by  the  commission. 


PART  IV. — INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

CHAPTER  I. — The  System  of  Arbitration 
Article  37. 

International  arbitration  has  for  its  object  the  settlement  of  dis- 
putes between  States  by  judges  of  their  own  choice  and  on  the  basis 
of  respect  for  law. 

Recourse  to  arbitration  implies  an  engagement  to  submit  in 
good  faith  to  the  award. 

Article  38. 

In  questions  of  a  legal  nature,  and  especially  in  the  interpreta- 
tion or  application  of  international  conventions,  arbitration  is 
recognized  by  the  contracting  Powers  as  the  most  effective,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  the  most  equitable  means  of  settling  disputes 
which  diplomacy  has  failed  to  settle. 

Consequently,  it  would  be  desirable  that,  in  disputes  about  the 
above-mentioned  questions,  the  contracting  Powers  should,  if  the 
case  arose,  have  recourse  to  arbitration,  in  so  far  as  circumstances 
permit. 

Article  39. 

The  arbitration  convention  is  concluded  for  questions  already 
existing  or  for  questions  which  may  arise  eventually. 

It  may  embrace  any  dispute  or  only  disputes  of  a  certain 
category. 

Article  40. 

Independently  of  general  or  private  treaties  expressly  stipulat- 
ing recourse  to  arbitration  as  obligatory  on  the  contracting  Powers, 
the  said  Powers  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  of  concluding  new 
agreements,  general  or  particular,  with  a  view  to  extending  com- 
pulsory arbitration  to  all  cases  which  they  may  consider  it  possible 
to  submit  to  it. 


APPENDIX  A  553 

CHAPTER  II. — The  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration. 

Article  41. 

"With  the  object  of  facilitating  an  immediate  recourse  to  arbitra- 
tion for  international  differences,  which  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
settle  by  diplomacy,  the  contracting  Powers  undertake  to  maintain 
the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  as  established  by  the  First 
Peace  Conference,  accessible  at  all  times,  and  operating,  unless 
otherwise  stipulated  by  the  parties,  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
of  procedure  inserted  in  the  present  Convention. 

Article  42. 

The  Permanent  Court  is  competent  for  all  arbitration  cases, 
unless  the  parties  agree  to  institute  a  special  tribunal. 

Article  43. 

The  Permanent  Court  sits  at  The  Hague. 

An  International  Bureau  serves  as  registry  for  the  Court.  It  is 
the  channel  for  communications  relative  to  the  meetings  of  the 
Court;  it  has  charge  of  the  archives  and  conducts  all  the  admin- 
istrative business. 

The  contracting  Powers  undertake  to  .communicate  to  the 
Bureau,  as  soon  as  possible,  a  certified  copy  of  any  conditions  of 
arbitration  arrived  at  between  them  and  of  any  award  concerning 
them  delivered  by  a  special  tribunal. 

They  likewise  undertake  to  communicate  to  the  Bureau  the 
laws,  regulations,  and  documents  eventually  showing  the  execution 
of  the  awards  given  by  the  Court. 

Article  44. 

Each  contracting  Power  selects  four  persons  at  the  most,  of 
known  competency  in  questions  of  international  law,  of  the  highest 
moral  reputation,  and  disposed  to  accept  the  duties  of  arbitrator. 

The  persons  thus  selected  are  inscribed,  as  members  of  the 
Court,  in  a  list  which  shall  be  notified  to  all  the  contracting  Powers 
by  the  Bureau. 

Any  alteration  in  the  list  of  arbitrators  is  brought  by  the 
Bureau  to  the  knowledge  of  the  contracting  Powers. 

Two  or  more  Powers  may  agree  on  the  selection  in  common  of 
one  or  more  members. 

The  same  person  can  be  selected  by  different  Powers. 

The  members  of  the  Court  are  appointed  for  a  term  of  six  years. 
These  appointments  are  renewable. 


554  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Should  a  member  of  the  Court  die  or  resign,  the  same  procedure 
is  followed  for  filling  the  vacancy  as  was  followed  for  appointing 
him.  In  this  case  the  appointment  is  made  for  a  fresh  period  of 
six  years. 

Article  45. 

When  the  contracting  Powers  wish  to  have  recourse  to  the 
Permanent  Court  for  the  settlement  of  a  difference  which  has  arisen 
between  them,  the  arbitrators  called  upon  to  form  the  tribunal 
with  jurisdiction  to  decide  this  difference  must  be  chosen  from 
the  general  list  of  members  of  the  Court. 

Failing  the  direct  agreement  of  the  parties  on  the  composition 
of  the  arbitration  tribunal,  the  following  course  shall  be  pursued: 

Each  party  appoints  two  arbitrators,  of  whom  one  only  can  be 
its  national  or  chosen  from  among  the  persons  selected  by  it  as 
members  of  the  Permanent  Court.  These  arbitrators  together 
choose  an  umpire. 

If  the  votes  are  equally  divided,  the  choice  of  the  umpire  is 
intrusted  to  a  third  Power,  selected  by  the  parties  by  common 
accord. 

If  an  agreement  is  not  arrived  at  on  this  subject  each  party 
selects  a  different  Power,  and  the  choice  of  the  umpire  is  made  in 
concert  by  the  Powers  thus  selected. 

//,  within  two  months'  time,  these  two  Powers  can  not  come 
to  an  agreement,  each  of  them  presents  two  candidates  taken  from 
the  list  of  members  of  the  Permanent  Court,  exclusive  of  the  mem- 
bers selected  by  the  parties  and  not  being  nationals  of  either  of 
them.  Drawing  lots  determines  which  of  the  candidates  thus  pre- 
sented shall  be  umpire. 

Article  46. 

The  tribunal  being  thus  composed,  the  parties  notify  to  the 
Bureau  their  determination  to  have  recourse  to  the  Court,  the 
text  of  their  compromis,  and  the  names  of  the  arbitrators. 

The  Bureau  communicates  without  delay  to  each  arbitrator  the 
compromis,  and  the  names  of  the  other  members  of  the  tribunal. 

The  tribunal  assembles  at  the  date  fixed  by  the  parties.  The 
Bureau  makes  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  meeting. 

The  members  of  the  tribunal,  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  and 
out  of  their  own  country,  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  im- 
munities. 

Article  47. 

The  Bureau  is  authorized  to  place  its  offices  and  staff  at  the 
disposal  of  the  contracting  Powers  for  the  use  of  any  special  board 
of  arbitration. 


APPENDIX  A  555 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  Permanent  Court  may,  within  the  con- 
ditions laid  down  in  the  regulations,  be  extended  to  disputes 
between  non-contracting  Powers  or  between  contracting  Powers 
and  non-contracting  Powers,  if  the  parties  are  agreed  on  recourse 
to  this  tribunal. 

Article  48. 

The  contracting  Powers  consider  it  their  duty,  if  a  serious 
dispute  threatens  to  break  out  between  two  or  more  of  them,  to 
remind  these  latter  that  the  Permanent  Court  is  open  to  them. 

Consequently,  they  declare  that  the  fact  of  reminding  the  parties 
at  variance  of  the  provisions  of  the  present  Convention,  and  the 
advice  given  to  them,  in  the  highest  interests  of  peace,  to  have 
recourse  to  the  Permanent  Court,  can  only  be  regarded  as  friendly 
actions. 

In  case  of  dispute  between  two  Powers,  one  of  them,  can  always 
address  to  the  International  Bureau  a  note  containing  a  dfeclara- 
tion  that  it  would  be  ready  to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration. 

The  Bureau  must  at  once  inform  the  other  Power  of  the  dec- 
laration. 

Article  49. 

The  Permanent  Administrative  Council,  composed  of  the  diplo- 
matic representatives  of  the  contracting  Powers  accredited  to  The 
Hague  and  of  the  Netherland  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who 
will  act  as  president,  is  charged  with  the  direction  and  control  of 
the  International  Bureau. 

The  Council  settles  its  rules  of  procedure  and  all  other  necessary 
regulations. 

It  decides  all  questions  of  administration  which  may  arise  with 
regard  to  the  operations  of  the  Court. 

It  has  entire  control  over  the  appointment,  suspension,  or  dis- 
missal of  the  officials  and  employees  of  the  Bureau. 

It  fixes  the  payments  and  salaries,  and  controls  the  general 
expenditure. 

At  meetings  duly  summoned  the  presence  of  nine  members  is 
sufficient  to  render  valid  the  discussions  of  the  Council.  The  deci- 
sions are  taken  by  a  majority  of  votes. 

The  Council  communicates  to  the  contracting  Powers  without 
delay  the  regulations  adopted  by  it.  It  furnishes  them  with  an 
annual  report  on  the  labors  of  the  Court,  the  working  of  the  admin- 
istration, and  the  expenditure.  The  report  likewise  contains  a 
resume  of  what  is  important  in  the  documents  communicated  to 
the  Bureau  by  the  Powers  in  virtue  of  Article  43,  paragraphs 
3  and  4. 


556  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  50. 

The  expenses  of  the  Bureau  shall  be  borne  by  the  contracting 
Powers  in  the  proportion  fixed  for  the  International  Bureau  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union. 

The  expenses  to  be  charged  to  the  adhering  Powers  shall  be 
reckoned  from  the  date  on  which  their  adhesion  comes  into  force. 


CHAPTER  III. — Arbitration  Procedure 

Article  51. 

"With  a  view  to  encouraging  the  development  of  arbitration,  the 
contracting  Powers  have  agreed  on  the  following  rules,  which  are 
applicable  to  arbitration  procedure,  unless  other  rules  have  been 
agreed  on  by  the  parties. 

Article  52. 

The  Powers  which  have  recourse  to  arbitration  sign  a  com- 
promis,  in  which  the  subject  of  the  dispute  is  clearly  defined,  the 
time  allowed  for  appointing  arbitrators,  the  form,  order,  and  time 
in  which  the  communication  referred  to  in  Article  63  must  be 
made,  and  the  amount  of  the  sum  which  each  party  must  deposit  in 
advance  to  defray  the- expenses. 

The  compromis  likewise  defines,  if  there  is  occasion,  the  manner 
of  appointing  arbitrators,  any  special  powers  which  may  eventually 
belong  to  the  tribunal,  where  it  shall  meet,  the  language  it  shall 
use,  and  the  languages  the  employment  of  which  shall  be  author- 
ized before  it,  and,  generally  speaking,  all  the  conditions  on  which 
the  parties  are  agreed. 

Article  53. 

The  Permanent  Court  is  competent  to  settle  the  compromis,  if 
the  parties  are  agreed  to  have  recourse  to  it  for  the  purpose. 

It  is  similarly  competent,  even  if  the  request  is  only  made  by 
one.  of  the  parties,  when  all  attempts  to  reach  an  understanding 
through  the  diplomatic  channel  have  failed,  in  the  case  of — 

1.  A  dispute  covered  by  a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  con- 
cluded or  renewed  after  the  present  Convention  has  come  into 
farce,  and  providing  for  a  compromis  in  all  disputes  and  not  either 
explicitly  or  implicitly  excluding  the  settlement  of  the  compromis 
from  the  competence  of  the  Court.  Recourse  can  not,  however, 
be  had  to  the  Court  if  the  other  party  declares  that  in  its  opinion 
the  dispute  does  not  belong  to  the  category  of  disputes  which  can 


APPENDIX  A  557 

be  submitted  to  compulsory  arbitration,  unless  the  treaty  of  arbi- 
tration confers  upon  the  arbitration  tribunal  the  power  of  deciding 
this  preliminary  question. 

2.  A  dispute  arising  from  contract  debts  claimed  from  one 
Power  by  another  Power  as  due  to  its  nationals,  and  for  the  settle- 
ment of  which  the  offer  of  arbitration  has  been  accepted.  This 
arrangement  is  not  applicable  if  acceptance  is  subject  to  the  condi- 
tion that  the  compromis  should  be  settled  in  some  other  way. 

Article  54. 

In  the  cases  contemplated  in  the  preceding  article,  the  com- 
promis shall  be  settled  by  a  commission  consisting  of  five  members 
selected  in  the  manner  arranged  for  in  Article  45,  paragraphs 
3  to  6. 

The  fifth  member  is  president  of  the  commission  ex  officio. 

Article  55. 

The  duties  of  arbitrator  may  be  conferred  on  one  arbitrator 
alone  or  on  several  arbitrators  selected  by  the  parties  as  they  please, 
or  chosen  by  them  from  the  members  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration  established  by  the  present  Convention. 

Failing  the  constitution  of  the  tribunal  by  direct  agreement 
between  the  parties,  the  course  referred  to  in  Article  45,  paragraphs 
3  to  6,  is  followed. 

Article  56. 

When  a  sovereign  or  the  chief  of  a  State  is  chosen  as  arbitrator, 
the  arbitration  procedure  is  settled  by  him. 

Article  57. 

The  umpire  is  president  of  the  tribunal  ex  officio. 
"When  the  tribunal  does  not  include  an  umpire,  it  appoints 
its  own  president. 

Article  58. 

When  the  compromis  is  settled  by  a  commission,  as  contem- 
plated in  Article  54,  and  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  to  the 
contrary,  the  commission  itself  shall  form  the  arbitration  tribunal. 

Article  59. 

Should  one  of  the  arbitrators  either  die,  retire,  or  be  unable  for 
any  reason  whatever  to  discharge  his  functions,  the  same  procedure 


558  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

is  followed  for  filling  the  vacancy  as  was  followed  for  appoint- 
ing him. 

Article  60. 

The  tribunal  sits  at  The  Hague,  unless  some  other  place  is 
selected  by  the  parties. 

The  tribunal  can  only  sit  in  the  territory  of  a  third  Power  with 
the  latter's  consent. 

The  place  of  meeting  once  fixed  can  not  be  altered  by  the  tri- 
bunal, except  with  the  consent  of  the  parties. 

Article  61. 

If  the  question  as  to  what  languages  are  to  be  used  has  not 
been  settled  by  the  compromis,  it  shall  be  decided  by  the  tribunal. 

Article  62. 

The  parties  are  entitled  to  appoint  special  agents  to  attend  the 
tribunal  to  act  as  intermediaries  between  themselves  and  the 
tribunal. 

They  are  further  authorized  to  retain  for  the  defense  of  their 
rights  and  interests  before  the  tribunal  counsel  or  advocates  ap- 
pointed by  themselves  for  this  purpose. 

The  members  of  the  Permanent  Court  may  not  act  as  agents, 
counsel,  or  advocates  except  on  behalf  of  the  Power  which  ap- 
pointed them  members  of  the  Court. 


Article  63. 

As  a  general  rule,  arbitration  procedure  comprises  two  distinct 
phases:  pleadings  and  oral  discussions. 

The  pleadings  consist  in  the  communication  by  the  respective 
agents  to  the  members  of  the  tribunal  and  the  opposite  party  of 
cases,  counter-cases,  and,  if  necessary,  of  replies;  the  parties  annex 
thereto  all  papers  and  documents  called  for  in  the  case.  This 
communication  shall  be  made  either  directly  or  through  the  inter- 
mediary of  the  International  Bureau,  in  the  order  and  within  the 
time  fixed  by  the  compromis. 

The  time  fixed  by  the  compromis  may  be  extended  by  mutual 
agreement  by  the  parties,  or  by  the  tribunal  when  the  latter  con- 
siders it  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  a  just  decision. 

The  discussions  consist  in  the  oral  development  before  the 
tribunal  of  the  arguments  of  the  parties. 


APPENDIX  A  559 

Article  64. 

A  certified  copy  of  every  document  produced  by  one  party  must 
be  communicated  to  the  other  party. 

Article  65. 

Unless  special  circumstances  arise,  the  tribunal  does  not  meet 
until  the  pleadings  are  closed. 

Article  66. 

The  discussions  are  under  the  control  of  the  president. 

They  are  only  public  if  it  be  so  decided  by  the  tribunal,  with  the 
assent  of  the  parties. 

They  are  recorded  in  minutes  drawn  up  by  the  secretaries  ap- 
pointed by  the  president.  These  minutes  are  signed  by  the  presi- 
dent and  by  one  of  the  secretaries  and  alone  have  an  authentic 
character. 

Article  67. 

After  the  close  of  the  pleadings,  the  tribunal  is  entitled  to 
refuse  discussion  of  all  new  papers  or  documents  which  one  of  the 
parties  may  wish  to  submit  to  it  without  the  consent  of  the  other 
party. 

Article  68. 

The  tribunal  is  free  to  take  into  consideration  new  papers  or 
documents  to  which  its  attention  may  be  drawn  by  the  agents  or 
counsel  of  the  parties. 

In  this  case,  the  tribunal  has  the  right  to  require  the  production 
of  these  papers  or  documents,  but  is  obliged  to  make  them  known 
to  the  opposite  party. 

Article  69. 

The  tribunal  can,  besides,  require  from  the  agents  of  the  parties 
the  production  of  all  papers,  and  can  demand  all  necessary  ex- 
planations. In  case  of  refusal  the  tribunal  takes  note  of  it. 

Article  70. 

The  agents  and  the  counsel  of  the  parties  are  authorized  to 
present  orally  to  the  tribunal  all  the  arguments  they  may  consider 
expedient  in  defense  of  their  case. 


560  INTEBNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Article  71. 

They  are  entitled  to  raise  objections  and  points.  The  decisions 
of  the  tribunal  on  these  points  are  final  and  can  not  form  the 
subject  of  any  subsequent  discussion. 

Article  72. 

The  members  of  the  tribunal  are  entitled  to  put  questions  to 
the  agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties,  and  to  ask  them  for  explana- 
tions on  doubtful  points. 

Neither  the  questions  put,  nor  the  remarks  made  by  members 
of  the  tribunal  in  the  course  of  the  discussions,  can  be  regarded 
as  an  expression  of  opinion  by  the  tribunal  in  general  or  by  its 
members  in  particular. 

Article  73. 

The  tribunal  is  authorized  to  declare  its  competence  in  inter- 
preting the  compromis,  as  well  as  the  other  papers  and  documents 
which  may  be  invoked,  and  in  applying  the  principles  of  law. 

Article  74. 

The  tribunal  is  entitled  to  issue  rules  of  procedure  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  case,  to  decide  the  forms,  order,  and  time  in  which  each 
party  must  conclude  its  arguments,  and  to  arrange  all  the  for- 
malities required  for  dealing  with  the  evidence. 

Article  75. 

The  parties  undertake  to  supply  the  tribunal,  as  fully  as  they 
consider  possible,  with  all  the  information  required  for  deciding 
the  case. 

Article  76. 

For  all  notices  which  the  tribunal  has  to  serve  in  the  territory 
of  a  third  contracting  Power,  the  tribunal  shall  apply  direct  to 
the  Government  of  that  Power.  The  same  rule  applies  in  the  case 
of  steps  being  taken  to  procure  evidence  on  the  spot. 

The  requests  for  this  purpose  are  to  be  executed  as  far  as  the 
means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Power  applied  to  under  its  municipal 
law  allow.  They  can  not  be  rejected  unless  the  Power  in  question 
considers  them  calculated  to  impair  its  own  sovereign  rights/  or  its 
safety. 

The  Court  will  equally  be  always  entitled  to  act  through  the 
Power  on  whose  territory  it  sits. 


APPENDIX  A  561 


Article  77. 

When  the  agents  and  counsel  of  the  parties  have  submitted  all 
the  explanations  and  evidence  in  support  of  their  case  the  presi- 
dent shall  declare  the  discussion  closed. 

Article  78. 

The  tribunal  considers  its  decisions  in  private  and  the  pro- 
ceedings remain  secret. 

All  questions  are  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the 
tribunal. 

Article  79. 

The  award  must  give  the  reasons  on  which  it  is  based.  It  con- 
tains the  names  of  the  arbitrators;  it  is  signed  by  the  president  and 
registrar  or  by  the  secretary  acting  as  registrar. 

Article  80. 

The  award  is  read  out  in  public  sitting,  the  agents  and  counsel 
of  the  parties  being  present  or  duly  summoned  to  attend. 

Article  81. 

The  award,  duly  pronounced  and  notified  to  the  agents  of  the 
parties,  settles  the  dispute  definitively  and  without  appeal. 

Article  82. 

Any  dispute  arising  between  the  parties  as  to  the  interpreta- 
tion and  execution  of  the  award  shall,  in  the  absence  of  an  agree- 
ment to  the  contrary,  be  submitted  to  the  tribunal  ivhich  pro- 
nounced it. 

Article  83. 

The  parties  can  reserve  in  the  compromis  the  right  to  demand 
the  revision  of  the  award. 

In  this  case  and  unless  there  be  an  agreement  to  the  contrary, 
the  demand  must  be  addressed  to  the  tribunal  which  pronounced 
the  award.  It  can  only  be  made  on  the  ground  of  the  discovery  of 
some  new  fact  calculated  to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  upon  the 
award  and  which  was  unknown  to  the  tribunal  and  to  the  party 
which  demanded  the  revision  at  the  time  the  discussion  was  closed. 

Proceedings  for  revision  can  only  be  instituted  by  a  decision  of 


562  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

the  tribunal  expressly  recording  the  existence  of  the  new  fact, 
recognizing  in  it  the  character  described  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph, and  declaring  the  demand  admissible  on  this  ground. 

The  compromis  fixes  the  period  within  which  the  demand  for 
revision  must  be  made. 

Article  84. 

The  award  is  not  binding  except  on  the  parties  in  dispute. 

When  it  concerns  the  interpretation  of  a  Convention  to  which 
Powers  other  than  those  in  dispute  are  parties,  they  shall  inform 
all  the  signatory  Powers  in  good  time.  Each  of  these  Powers  is 
entitled  to  intervene  in  the  case.  If  one  or  more  avail  themselves 
of  this  right,  the  interpretation  contained  in  the  award  is  equally 
binding  on  them. 

Article  85. 

Each  party  pays  its  own  expenses  and  an  equal  share  of  the 
expenses  of  the  tribunal. 

CHAPTER  IV. — Arbitration  by  Summary  Procedure. 

Article  86. 

With  a>  view  to  facilitating  the  working  of  the  system  of  arbi- 
tration in  disputes  admitting  of  a  summary  procedure,  the  con- 
tracting Powers  adopt  the  following  rules-,  which  shall  be  observed 
in  the  absence  of  other  arrangements  and  subject  to  the  reservation 
that  the  provisions  of  Chapter  III  apply  so  far  as  may  be. 

Article  87. 

Each  of  the  parties  in  dispute  appoints  an  arbitrator.  The  two 
arbitrators  thus  selected  choose  an  umpire.  If  they  do  not  agree 
on  this  point,  each  of  them  proposes  two  candidates  taken  from 
the  general  list  of  the  members  of  the  Permanent  Court  exclusive 
of  the  members  appointed  by  either  of  the  parties  and  not  being 
nationals  of  either  of  them;  which  of  the  candidates  thus  proposed 
shall  be  the  umpire  is  determined  by  lot. 

The  umpire  presides  over  the  tribunal,  which  gives  its  decisions 
by  a  majority  of  votes. 

Article  88. 

In  the  absence  of  any  previous  agreement  the  tribunal,  as  soon 
as  it  is  formed,  settles  the  time  within  which  the  two  parties  must 
submit  their  respective  cases  to  it. 


APPENDIX  A  563 


Article  89. 

Each  party  is  represented  before  the  tribunal  "by  an  agent,  who 
serves  as  intermediary  between  the  tribunal  and  the  Government 
who  appointed  him. 

Article  90. 

The  proceedings  are  conducted  exclusively  in  writing.  Each 
party,  however,  is  entitled  to  ask  that  witnesses  and  experts  should 
be  called.  The  tribunal  has,  for  its  part,  the  right  to  demand  oral 
explanations  from  the  agents  of  the  two  parties,  as  well  as  from 
the  experts  and  witnesses  whose  appearance  in  Court  it  may  con- 
sider useful. 

PART  V. — FINAL  PROVISIONS. 

Article  91. 

The  present  Convention,  duly  ratified,  shall  replace,  as  between 
the  contracting  Powers,  the  Convention  for  the  pacific  settlement 
of  international  disputes  of  the  29th  July,  1899. 

Article  92. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  ratifications  shall  be  deposited  at  The  Hague. 

The  first  deposit  of  ratifications  shall  be  recorded  in  a  proces- 
verbal  signed  by  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  which  take  part 
therein  and  by  the  Netherland  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  subsequent  deposits  of  ratifications  shall  be  made  by  means 
of  a  written  notification,  addressed  to  the  Netherland  Government 
and  accompanied  by  the  instrument  of  ratification. 

A  duly  certified  copy  of  the  proces-verbal  relative  to  the  first 
deposit  of  ratifications,  of  the  notifications  mentioned  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph,  and  of  the  instruments  of  ratification,  shall  be 
immediately  sent  by  the  Netherland  Government,  through  the 
diplomatic  channel,  to  the  Powers  invited  to  the  Second  Peace  Con- 
ference, as  well  as  to  those  Powers  which  have  adhered  to  the  Con- 
vention. In  the  cases  contemplated  in  the  preceding  paragraph, 
the  said  Government  shall  at  the  same  time  inform  the  Powers  of 
the  date  on  which  it  received  the  notification. 

Article  93. 

Non-signatory  Powers  which  have  been  invited  to  the  Second 
Peace  Conference  may  adhere  to  the  present  Convention. 


564 

The  Power  which  desires  to  adhere  notifies  its  intention  in  writ- 
ing to  the  Netherland  Government,  forwarding  to  it  the  act  of 
adhesion,  which  shall  be  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  said 
Government. 

This  Government  shall  immediately  forward  to  all  the  other 
Powers  invited  to  the  Second  Peace  Conference  a  duly  certified 
copy  of  the  notification  as  well  as  of  the  act  of  adhesion,  mentioning 
the  date  on  which  it  received  the  notification. 

Article  94. 

The  conditions  on  which  the  Powers  which  have  not  been 
invited  to  the  Second  Peace  Conference  may  adhere  to  the  present 
Convention  shall  form  the  subject  of  a  subsequent  agreement  be- 
tween the  contracting  Powers. 

Article  95. 

The  present  Convention  shall  take  effect,  in  the  case  of  the 
Powers  which  were  not  a  party  to  the  first  deposit  of  ratifications, 
sixty  days  after  the  date  of  the  proces-verbal  of  this  deposit,  and, 
in  the  case  of  the  Powers  which  ratify  subsequently  or  which  ad- 
here, sixty  days  after  the  notification  of  their  ratification  or  of 
their  adhesion  has  been  received  by  the  Netherland  Government. 

Article  96. 

In  the  event  of  one  of  the  contracting  Powers  wishing  to  de- 
nounce the  present  Convention,  the  denunciation  shall  be  notified 
in  writing  to  the  Netherland  Government,  which  shall  immediately 
communicate  a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  notification  to  all  the 
other  Powers  informing  them  of  the  date  on  which  it  was  received. 

The  denunciation  shall  only  have  effect  in  regard  to  the  noti- 
fying Power,  and  one  year  after  the  notification  has  reached  the 
Netherland  Government. 

Article  97. 

A  register  kept  by  the  Netherland  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
shall  give  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications  effected  in  virtue 
of  Article  92,  paragraphs  3  and  4,  as  well  as  the  date  on  which 
the  notifications  of  adhesion  (Article  93,  paragraph  2)  or  of  denun- 
ciation (Article  96,  paragraph  1)  have  been  received. 

Each  contracting  Power  is  entitled  to  have  access  to  this  regis- 
ter and  to  be  supplied  with  duly  certified  extracts  from  it. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  appended  their 
signatures  to  the  present  Convention. 


APPENDIX  A  565 

Done  at  The  Hague,  the  18th  October,  1907,  in  a  single  copy, 
which  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Netherland 
Government,  and  duly  certified  copies  of  which  shall  be  sent, 
through  the  diplomatic  channel  to  the  contracting  Powers. 

(Here  follow  signatures.) 


No.  7.    Convention  for  the  Creation  of  an  International 
Institute  of  Agriculture,  1905.1 

In  a  series  of  meetings  held  at  Rome,  from  May  29  to  June  6, 
1905,  the  delegates  of  the  Powers  convened  at  the  Conference  for 
the  creation  of  an  International  Institute  of  Agriculture,  having 
agreed  upon  the  text  of  a  Convention  to  be  dated  June  7,  1905, 
and  this  text  having  been  submitted  for  approval  to  the  Govern- 
ments which  took  part  in  the  said  conference,  the  undersigned, 
having  been  furnished  with  full  powers,  found  in  good  and  due 
form,  have  agreed,  in  the  names  of  their  respective  Governments, 
on  what  follows: 

Article  I. 

There  is  hereby  created  a  permanent  international  institute  of 
agriculture,  having  its  seat  in  Home. 

Article  II. 

The  international  institute  of  agriculture  is  to  be  a  government 
institution,  in  which  each  adhering  power  shall  be  represented  by 
delegates  of  its  choice. 

The  institute  shall  be  composed  of  a  general  assembly  and  a 
permanent  committee,  the  composition  and  duties  of  which  are 
defined  in  the  ensuing  articles. 

Article  III. 

The  general  assembly  of  the  institute  shall  be  composed  of  the 
representatives  of  the  adhering  governments.  Each  nation,  what- 
ever be  the  number  of  its  delegates,  shall  be  entitled  to  a  number 
of  votes  in  the  assembly  which  shall  be  determined  according  to 
the  group  to  which  it  belongs,  and  to  which  reference  will  be  made 
in  Article  X. 

1  U.  S.  S.  L.,  XXXV,  1918.  Compare,  above,  Document  No.  5,  Arts.  XV- 
XVIII,  pp.  541-542. 


566  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  IV. 

The  general  assembly  shall  elect  for  each  session  from  among 
its  members  a  president  and  two  vice-presidents. 

The  sessions  shall  take  place  on  dates  fixed  by  the  last  general 
assembly  and  according  to  a  program  proposed  by  the  permanent 
committee  and  adopted  by  the  adhering  governments. 

Article  V. 

The  general  assembly  shall  exercise  supreme  control  over  the 
international  institute  of  agriculture. 

It  shall  approve  the  projects  prepared  by  the  permanent  com- 
mittee regarding  the  organization  and  internal  workings  of  the 
institute.  It  shall  fix  the  total  amount  of  expenditures  and  audit 
and  approve  the  accounts. 

It  shall  submit  to  the  approval  of  the  adhering  governments 
modifications  of  any  nature  involving  an  increase  in  expenditure 
or  an  enlargement  of  the  functions  of  the  institute.  It  shall  set 
the  date  for  holding  the  sessions.  It  shall  prepare  its  regulations. 

The  presence  at  the  general  assemblies  of  delegates  representing 
two-thirds  of  the  adhering  nations  shall  be  required  in  order  to 
render  the  deliberations  valid. 

Article  VI. 

The  executive  power  of  the  institute  is  intrusted  to  the  perma- 
nent committee,  which,  under  the  direction  and  control  of  the 
general  assembly,  shall  carry  out  the  decisions  of  the  latter  and 
prepare  propositions  to  submit  to  it. 

Article  VII. 

The  permanent  committee  shall  be  composed  of  members  desig- 
nated by  the  respective  governments.  Each  adhering  nation  shall 
be  represented  in  the  permanent  committee  by  one  member.  How- 
ever, the  representation  of  one  nation  may  be  intrusted  to  a  dele- 
gate of  another  adhering  nation,  provided  that  the  actual  number 
of  members  shall  not  be  less  than  fifteen. 

The  conditions  of  voting  in  the  permanent  committee  shall  be 
the  same  as  those  indicated  in  Article  III  for  the  general  assemblies. 

Article  VIII. 

The  permanent  committee  shall  elect  from  among  its  members 
for  a  period  of  three  years  a  president  and  a  vice-president,  who 


APPENDIX  A  567 

may  be  reflected.  It  shall  prepare  its  internal  regulations,  vote 
the  budget  of  the  institute  within  the  limits  of  the  funds  placed 
at  its  disposal  by  the  general  assembly,  and  appoint  and  remove 
the  officials  and  employees  of  its  office. 

The  general  secretary  of  the  permanent  committee  shall  act  as 
secretary  of  the  assembly. 

Article  IX. 

The  institute,  confining  its  operations  within  an  international 
sphere,  shall — 

(a)  Collect,  study,  and  publish  as  promptly  as  possible  sta- 
tistical, technical,  or  economic  information  concerning  farming, 
both  vegetable  and  animal  products,  the  commerce  in  agricultural 
products,  and  the  prices  prevailing  in  the  various  markets ; 

(b)  Communicate  to  parties  interested,  also  as  promptly  as 
possible,  all  the  information  just  referred  to ; 

(c)  Indicate  the  wages  paid  for  farm  work; 

(d)  Make  known  the  new  diseases  of  vegetables  which  may 
appear  in  any  part  of  the  world,  showing  the  territories  infected, 
the  progress  of  the  disease,  and,  if  possible,  the  remedies  which  are 
effective  in  combating  them; 

(e)  Study  questions  concerning  agricultural  cooperation,  in- 
surance, and  credit  in  all  their  aspects ;  collect  and  publish  informa- 
tion which  might  be  useful  in  the  various  countries  in  the  organi- 
zation of  works  connected  with  agricultural  cooperation,  insur- 
ance, and  credit ; 

(f)  Submit  to  the  approval  of  the  governments,  if  there  is 
occasion  for  it,  measures  for  the  protection  of  the  common  interests 
of  farmers  and  for  the  improvement  of  their  condition,  after  having 
utilized  all  the  necessary  sources  of  information,  such  as  the  wishes 
expressed  by  international  or  other  agricultural  congresses  or  con- 
gresses of  sciences  applied  to  agriculture,  agricultural  societies, 
academies,  learned  bodies,  etc. 

All  questions  concerning  the  economic  interests,  the  legislation, 
and  the  administration  of  a  particular  nation  shall  be  excluded 
from  the  consideration  of  the  institute. 

Article  X. 

The  nations  adhering  to  the  institute  shall  be  classed  in  five 
groups,  according  to  the  place  which  each  of  them  thinks  it  ought 
to  occupy. 

The  number  of  votes  which  each  nation  shall  have  and  the 
number  of  units  of  assessment  shall  be  established  according  to  the 
following  gradations: 


568  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

NUMBERS  UNITS  OF 

OP  VOTES.  ASSESSMENT. 

I 5  16 

II 4  8 

III 3  4 

IV  2  2 

V  1  1 

In  any  event  the  contribution  due  per  unit  of  assessment  shall 
never  exceed  a  maximum  of  2,500  francs. 

As  a  temporary  provision  the  assessment  for  the  first  two 
years  shall  not  exceed  1,500  francs  per  unit. 

Colonies  may,  at  the  request  of  the  nations  to  which  they  be- 
long, be  admitted  to  form  part  of  the  institute  on  the  same  condi- 
tions as  the  independent  nations. 

Article  XI. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  and  the  ratifications 
exchanged  as  soon  as  possible  by  depositing  them  with  the  Italian 
Government. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  present  Convention  and  have  hereunto  affixed  their  seals. 

Done  at  Rome  the  7th  of  June  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
five,  in  a  single  original,  deposited  with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  Italy,  of  which  certified  copies  shall  be  sent  through  the 
diplomatic  channel  to  the  contracting  States. 

No.  8.    Proposals  for  The  Hague  Conference  of  1907.1 

a.  Memorandum  from  the  Russian  Embassy  in  Washington, 
handed  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  13  September,  1905, 
proposing  a  Second  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague. 

In  view  of  the  termination,  with  the  cordial  cooperation  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  of  the  war,  and  of  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  between  Russia  and  Japan,  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor,  as  initiator  of  the  International  Peace  Conference  of 
1899,  holds  that  a  favorable  moment  has  now  come  for  the  further 
development  and  for  the  systematizing  of  the  labors  of  that  inter- 
national conference.  With  this  end  in  view,  and  being  assured  in 
advance  of  the  sympathy  of  President  Roosevelt,  who  has  already, 
last  year,  pronounced  himself  in  favor  of  such  a  project,  His 
Majesty  desires  to  approach  him  with  a  proposal  to  the  effect  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  take  part  in  a  new  interna- 

*J7.  8.  For.  Eels.,  1905,  828;  1906,  1629;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XX. 


APPENDIX  A  569 

tional  conference  which  could  be  called  together  at  The  Hague 
as  soon  as  favorable  replies  could  be  secured  from  all  the  other 
States  to  which  a  similar  proposal  will  be  made.  As  the  course  of 
the  late  war  has  given  rise  to  a  number  of  questions  which  are  of 
the  greatest  importance  and  closely  related  to  the  Acts  of  the 
First  Conference,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Russia  at  the  future 
meeting  will  lay  before  the  conference  a  detailed  program  which 
could  serve  as  a  starting  point  for  its  deliberations. 


b.    Note  from  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 

3  April,  1906. 

Imperial  Russian  Embassy, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  April  3,  1906. 

Mr.  Secretary  of  State :  I  have  just  received  from  my  Govern- 
ment order  by  telegraph  to  bring  the  following  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  United  States  Government: 

The  Imperial  (Russian)  Government,  in  agreement  with  the 
Dutch  Government,  proposes  to  call  The  Hague  Conference  during 
the  first  half  of  the  month  of  July  of  the  present  year. 

Russia  at  the  same  time  invites  the  nations  which  did  not  sign 
the  convention  relative  to  the  laws  of  war  on  land,  nor  that  rela- 
tive to  the  adaptation  of  the  Geneva  Convention  to  war  at  sea,  to 
inform  the  Royal  Government  of  The  Netherlands  of  their  ad- 
hesion to  these  conventions.  With  regard  to  further  adhesions  to 
the  convention  concerning  international  arbitration,  the  Imperial 
Government  is  conferring  on  this  subject  with  the  Governments 
which  signed  the  acts  of  1899. 

I  deem  it  proper  at  the  same  time  to  inclose  herewith  a  sum- 
mary of  the  program  which  the  Imperial  Government  proposes 
to  submit  to  the  Conference  at  The  Hague,  and  I  should  thank 
your  Excellency  to  inform  me  of  the  response  of  your  Government 
to  this  proposition,  in  order  that  I  may  transmit  it  to  St.  Peters- 
burg by  telegraph. 

Please  accept,  etc.,  ROSEN. 


c.    Note  from  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  the  Secretary  of  State 

proposing  the  Program  of  the  Second  Peace  Conference 

12  April,  1906. 

Imperial  Embassy  of  Russia, 

Washington,  April   12,  1906. 

Mr.   Secretary  of  State:    When  it  assumed  the  initiative  of 
calling  a  Second  Peace  Conference,  the  Imperial  Government  had 


570  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

in  view  the  necessity  of  further  developing  the  humanitarian  prin- 
ciples on  which  was  based  the  work  accomplished  by  the  great 
international  assemblage  of  1899. 

At  the  same  time,  it  deemed  it  expedient  to  enlarge  as  much 
as  possible  the  number  of  States  participating  in  the  labors  of  the 
contemplated  conference,  and  the  alacrity  with  which  the  call  was 
answered  bears  witness  to  the  depth  and  breadth  of  the  present 
sentiment  of  solidarity  for  the  application  of  ideas  aiming  at  the 
good  of  all  mankind. 

The  First  Conference  separated  in  the  firm  belief  that  its  labors 
would  subsequently  be  perfected  from  the  effect  of  the  regular 
progress  of  enlightenment  among  the  nations  and  kept  abreast  of 
the  results  acquired  from  experience.  Its  most  important  creation, 
the  International  Court  of  Arbitration,  is  an  institution  that  has 
already  proved  its  worth  and  brought  together,  for  the  good  of  all, 
an  areopagus  of  jurists  who  command  the  respect  of  the  world. 
How  much  good  could  be  accomplished  by  international  commis- 
sions of  inquiry  toward  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  States 
has  also  been  shown. 

There  are,  however,  certain  improvements  to  be  made  in  the 
Convention  relative  to  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes.  Following  recent  arbitrations,  the  jurists  assembled  in 
court  have  raised  certain  questions  of  detail  which  should  be  acted 
upon  by  adding  to  the  said  Convention  the  necessary  amplifica- 
tions. It  would  seem  especially  desirable  to  lay  down  fixed  prin- 
ciples in  regard  to  the  use  of  languages  in  the  proceedings  in 
view  of  the  difficulties  that  may  arise  in  the  future  as  the  cases 
referred  to  arbitral  jurisdiction  multiply.  The  modus  operandi 
of  International  Commissions  of  Inquiry  would  likewise  be  open 
to  improvement. 

As  regards  the  regulating  of  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War 
on  Land,  the  provisions  established  by  the  First  Conference  ought 
also  to  be  completed  and  defined,  so  as  to  remove  all  misappre- 
hensions. 

As  for  maritime  warfare,  in  regard  to  which  the  laws  and 
customs  of  the  several  countries  differ  on  certain  points,  it  is 
necessary  to  establish  fixed  rules  in  keeping  with  the  exigencies 
of  the  rights  of  belligerents  and  the  interests  of  neutrals. 

A  convention  bearing  on  these  subjects  should  be  framed  and 
would  constitute  one  of  the  most  prominent  parts  of  the  tasks 
devolved  upon  the  forthcoming  conference. 

Holding,  therefore,  that  there  is  at  present  occasion  only  to 
examine  questions  that  demand  special  attention  as  being  the  out- 
come of  the  experience  of  recent  years,  without  touching  upon 
those  that  might  have  reference  to  the  limitation  of  military  or 


APPENDIX  A  571 

naval  forces,  the  Imperial  Government  proposes  for  the  program  of 
the  contemplated  meeting  the  following  main  points: 

1.  Improvements  to  be  made  in  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 

vention relative  to  the  pacific  settlement  of  interna- 
tional disputes  as  regards  the  Court  of  Arbitration 
and  the  International  Commissions  of  Inquiry. 

2.  Additions  to  be  made  to  the  provisions  of  the  Conven- 

tion of  1899  relative  to  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War 
on  Land — among  others,  those  concerning  the  open- 
ing of  Hostilities,  the  Rights  of  Neutrals  on  land,  etc. 
Declarations  of  1899:  one  of  these  having  expired, 
question  of  its  being  revived. 

3.  Framing  of  a  convention  relative  to  the  laws  and  cus- 

toms of  maritime  warfare,  concerning — 

The  special  operations  of  maritime  warfare,  such  as 
the  bombardment  of  ports,  cities,  and  villages  by  a 
naval  force ;  the  laying  of  torpedoes,  etc. ; 

The  transformation  of  merchant  vessels  into  war- 
ships; 

The  private  property  of  belligerents  at  sea; 

The  length  of  time  to  be  granted  to  merchant  ships 
for  their  departure  from  ports  of  neutrals  or  of  the 
enemy  after  the  opening  of  hostilities; 

The  rights  and  duties  of  neutrals  at  sea,  among 
others,  the  questions  of  contraband,  the  rules  applica- 
ble to  belligerent  vessels  in  neutral  ports ;  destruction, 
in  case  of  vis  major,  of  neutral  merchant  vessels  cap- 
tured as  prizes; 

In  the  said  convention  to  be  drafted,  there  would 
be  introduced  the  provisions  relative  to  war  on  land 
that  would  be  also  applicable  to  maritime  warfare. 

4.  Additions  to  be  made  to  the  Convention  of  1899  for  the 

Adaptation   to   Maritime   Warfare   of  the   Principles 

of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1864. 

As  was  the  case  at  the  Conference  of  1899,  it  would  be  well 
understood  that  the  deliberations  of  the  contemplated  meeting 
should  not  deal  with  the  political  relations  of  the  several  States, 
or  the  condition  of  things  established  by  treaties,  or  in  general 
with  questions  that  did  not  directly  come  within  the  program 
adopted  by  the  several  cabinets. 

The  Imperial  Government  desires  distinctly  to  state  that  the 
data  of  this  program  and  the  eventual  acceptance  of  the  several 
States  clearly  do  not  prejudge  the  opinion  that  may  be  delivered 
in  the  conference  in  regard  to  the  solving  of  the  questions  brought 
up  for  discussion.  It  would  likewise  be  for  the  contemplated  meet- 


572  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

ing  to  decide  as  to  the  order  of  the  questions  to  be  examined  and 
the  form  to  be  given  to  the  decisions  reached,  as  to  whether  it 
should  be  deemed  preferable  to  include  some  of  them  in  new  con- 
ventions or  to  append  them,  as  additions,  to  conventions  already 
existing. 

In  formulating  the  above-mentioned  program,  the  Imperial 
Government  bore  in  mind,  as  far  as  possible,  the  recommendations 
made  by  the  First  Peace  Conference,  with  special  regard  to  the 
Rights  and  Duties  of  Neutrals,  the  private  property  of  belligerents 
at  sea,  the  bombardment  of  ports,  cities,  etc.  It  entertains  the 
hope  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  take  the  whole 
of  the  points  proposed  as  the  expression  of  a  wish  to  come  nearer 
that  lofty  ideal  of  international  justice  which  is  the  permanent 
goal  of  the  whole  civilized  world. 

By  order  of  my  Government,  I  have  the  honor  to  acquaint  you 
with  the  foregoing,  and,  awaiting  the  reply  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  I  embrace  this 
opportunity  to  beg  you,  Mr.  Secretary  of  State,  to  accept  the 
assurance  of  my  very  high  consideration.  ROSEN. 

No.  9.    Final  Act  of  the  Second  Hague  Peace  Conference,  1907. ' 

The  Second  International  Peace  Conference,  proposed  in  the 
first  instance  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
having  been  convoked,  on  the  invitation  of  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  All  the  Russias,  by  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  Nether- 
lands, assembled  on  the  15th  June,  1907,  at  The  Hague,  in  the 
Hall  of  the  Knights,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  fresh  development 
to  the  humanitarian  principles  which  served  as  a  basis  for  the 
work  of  the  First  Conference  of  1899, 

The  following  Powers  took  part  in  the  Conference,  and  ap- 
pointed the  Delegates  named  below: — 

(Here  follow  the  names  of  the  delegates.) 

At  a  series  of  meetings,  held  from  the  15th  June  to  the  18th 
October,  1907,  in  which  the  above  Delegates  were  throughout  ani- 
mated by  the  desire  to  realize,  in  the  fullest  possible  measure,  the 
generous  views  of  the  august  initiator  of  the  Conference  and  the 
intentions  of  their  Governments,  the  Conference  drew  up  for 
submission  for  signature  by  the  Plenipotentiaries,  the  text  of  the 
Conventions  and  of  the  Declaration  enumerated  below  and  annexed 
to  the  present  Act : — 

1.  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 

Disputes. 

2.  Convention   respecting  the   Limitation   of  the   Employ- 

ment of  Force  for  the  Recovery  of  Contract  Debts. 
*U.  S.  For.  Eels.,  1907,  1266;  see,  above,  text,  Chaps.  XI,  XX. 


APPENDIX  A  573 

3.  Convention  relative  to  the  Opening  of  Hostilities. 

4.  Convention  respecting  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War 

on  Land. 

5.  Convention  respecting  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Neutral 

Powers  and  Persons  in  case  of  War  on  Land. 

6.  Convention  relative  to  the  Status  of  Enemy  Merchant- 

ships  at  the  Outbreak  of  Hostilities. 

7.  Convention  relative  to  the  Conversion  of  Merchant-ships 

into  War-ships. ' 

8.  Convention  relative  to  the  Laying  of  Automatic  Sub- 

marine Contact  Mines. 

9.  Convention  respecting  Bombardment  by  Naval  Forces 

in  Time  of  War. 

10.  Convention   for  the  Adaptation  to  Naval  War  of  the 

Principles  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

11.  Convention  relative  to  certain  Restrictions  with  regard 

to  the  Exercise  of  the  Right  of  Capture  in  Naval  War. 

12.  Convention  relative  to  the  creation  of  an  International 

Prize  Court. 

13.  Convention  concerning  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Neutral 

Powers  in  Naval  War. 

14.  Declaration  prohibiting  the  discharge  of  Projectiles  and 

Explosives  from  Balloons. 

These  Conventions  and  Declaration  shall  form  so  many  separate 
Acts.  These  Acts  shall  be  dated  this  day,  and  may  be  signed  up 
to  the  30th  June,  1908,  at  The  Hague,  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of 
the  Powers  represented  at  the  Second  Peace  Conference. 

The  Conference,  actuated  by  the  spirit  of  mutual  agreement  and 
concession  characterizing  its  deliberations,  has  agreed  upon  the 
following  Declaration,  which,  while  reserving  to  each  of  the  Powers 
represented  full  liberty  of  action  as  regards  voting,  enables  them 
to  affirm  the  principles  which  they  regard  as  unanimously 
admitted : — 

It  is  unanimous — 

1.  In  admitting  the  principle  of  compulsory  arbitration. 

2.  In  declaring  that  certain  disputes,  in  particular  those 

relating  to  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the 
provisions  of  International  Agreements,  may  be  sub- 
mitted to  compulsory  arbitration  without  any  restric- 
tion. 

Finally,  it  is  unanimous  in  proclaiming  that,  although  it  has 
not  yet  been  found  feasible  to  conclude  a  Convention  in  this  sense, 
nevertheless  the  divergences  of  opinion  which  have  come  to  light 
have  not  exceeded  the  bounds  of  judicial  controversy,  and  that, 
by  working  together  here  during  the  past  four  months,  the  collected 
Powers  not  only  have  learnt  to  understand  one  another  and  to 


574  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

draw  closer  together,  but  have  succeeded  in  the  course  of  this  long 
collaboration  in  evolving  a  very  lofty  conception  of  the  common 
welfare  of  humanity. 

The  Conference  has  further  unanimously  adopted  the  following 
Resolution : — 

The  Second  Peace  Conference  confirms  the  Resolution  adopted 
by  the  Conference  of  1899  in  regard  to  the  limitation  of  military 
expenditure;  and  inasmuch  as  military  expenditure  has  consid- 
erably increased  in  almost  every  country  since  that  time,  the  Con- 
ference declares  that  it  is  eminently  desirable  that  the  Govern- 
ments should  resume  the  serious  examination  of  this  question. 

It  has  besides  expressed  the  following  opinions: — 

1.  The   Conference   calls  the    attention   of   the    Signatory 

Powers  to  the  advisability  of  adopting  the  annexed 
draft  Convention  for  the  creation  of  a  Judicial  Arbi- 
tration Court,  and  of  bringing  it  into  force  as  soon  as 
an  agreement  has  been  reached  respecting  the  selection 
of  the  Judges  and  the  constitution  of  the  Court. 

2.  The  Conference  expresses  the  opinion  that,  in  case  of 

war,  the  responsible  authorities,  civil  as  well  as  mili- 
tary, should  make  it  their  special  duty  to  ensure  and 
safeguard  the  maintenance  of  pacific  relations,  more 
especially  of  the  commercial  and  industrial  relations 
between  the  inhabitants  of  the  belligerent  States  and 
neutral  countries. 

3.  The  Conference  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  Powers 

should  regulate,  by  special  Treaties,  the  position,  as 
regards  military  charges,  of  foreigners  residing  within 
their  territories. 

4.  The  Conference  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  prepara- 

tion of  regulations  relative  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 
naval  war  should  figure  in  the  program  of  the  next 
Conference,  and  that  in  any  case  the  Powers  may 
apply,  as  far  as  possible,  to  war  by  sea  the  principles 
of  the  Convention  relative  to  the  laws  and  Customs  of 
War  on  land. 

Finally,  the  Conference  recommends  to  the  Powers  the  assembly 
of  a  Third  Peace  Conference,  which  might  be  held  within  a  period 
corresponding  to  that  which  has  elapsed  since  the  preceding  Con- 
ference, at  a  date  to  be  fixed  by  common  agreement  between  the 
Powers,  and  it  calls  their  attention  to  the  necessity  of  preparing 
the  program  of  this  Third  Conference  a  sufficient  time  in  ad- 
vance to  ensure  its  deliberations  being  conducted  with  the  necessary 
authority  and  expedition. 

In  order  to  attain  this  object  the  Conference  considers  that  it 


APPENDIX  A  575 

would  be  very  desirable  that,  some  two  years  before  the  probable 
date  of  the  meeting,  a  preparatory  Committee  should  be  charged  by 
the  Governments  with  the  task  of  collecting  the  various  proposals 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Conference,  of  ascertaining  what  subjects 
are  ripe  for  embodiment  in  an  International  Regulation,  and  of 
preparing  a  program  which  the  Governments  should  decide  upon 
in  sufficient  time  to  enable  it  to  be  carefully  examined  by  the  coun- 
tries interested.  This  Committee  should  further  be  intrusted  with 
the  task  of  proposing  a  system  of  organization  and  procedure  for 
the  Conference  itself. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  the  present 
Act  and  have  affixed  their  seals  thereto. 

Done  at  The  Hague,  the  18th  October,  1907,  in  a  single  copy, 
which  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Netherland 
Government,  and  duly  certified  copies  of  which  shall  be  sent  to  all 
the  Powers  represented  at  the  Conference. 

(Here  follow  signatures.} 


No.  10.    Regulations  Governing  the  Organization  and  Work  of 
the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  1919.1 

Article  I. 

The  Conference  assembled  to  fix  the  conditions  of  peace,  first 
in  the  preliminaries  of  peace  and  then  in  the  definite  treaty  of 
peace,  shall  include  the  representatives  of  the  belligerent  Allied 
and  associated  Powers.  The  belligerent  Powers  with  general  inter- 
ests (the  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire,  France, 
Italy,  and  Japan)  shall  take  part  in  all  sittings  and  commissions. 
The  belligerent  Powers  with  particular  interests  (Belgium,  Brazil, 
the  British  Dominions  and  India,  China,  Cuba,  Greece,  Guatemala, 
Haiti,  Hedjaz,  Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Poland, 
Portugal,  Rumania,  Serbia,  Siam,  and  the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic) 
shall  take  part  in  the  sittings  at  which  questions  concerning  them 
are  discussed.  The  Powers  in  a  state  of  diplomatic  rupture  with 
the  enemy  Powers  (Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Uruguay)  shall 
take  part  in  the  sittings  at  which  questions  concerning  them  are 
discussed.  Neutral  Powers  and  States  in  process  of  formation  may 
be  heard  either  orally  or  in  writing  when  summoned  by  the  Powers 
with  general  interests  at  sittings  devoted  especially  to  the  examina- 
tion of  questions  directly  concerning  them,  but  only  so  far  as  these 
questions  are  concerned. 

*Am.  Jour.  Int.  Law,  XIII,  No.  2  (April,  1919),  Supplement,  109;  see, 
above,  text,  Chap.  XXI. 


576  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  II. 

The  Powers  shall  be  represented  by  Plenipotentiary  Delegates 
to  the  number  of  five  for  the  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan;  three  for  Belgium,  Brazil  and 
Serbia ;  two  for  China,  Greece,  Hedjaz,  Poland,  Portugal,  Rumania, 
Siam,  and  the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic;  one  for  Cuba,  Guatemala, 
Haiti,  Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  and  Panama ;  one  for  Bolivia, 
Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Uruguay.  The  British  Dominions  and  India 
shall  be  represented  as  follows:  Two  delegates  each  for  Australia, 
Canada,  South  Africa,  and  India  (including  the  Native  States)  ; 
one  delegate  for  New  Zealand.  Although  the  number  of  delegates 
may  not  exceed  the  figures  above  mentioned,  each  delegation  has 
the  right  to  avail  itself  of  the  panel  system.  The  representation  of 
the  Dominions  (including  Newfoundland)  and  India  may  besides 
be  included  in  the  representation  of  the  British  Empire  by  the 
panel  system.  Montenegro  shall  be  represented  by  one  delegate, 
but  the  rules  concerning  the  designation  of  this  delegate  shall  not 
be  fixed  until  the  moment  when  the  political  situation  of  this  coun- 
try shall  have  been  cleared  up.  The  conditions  of  the  representa- 
tion of  Russia  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Conference  at  the  moment  when 
the  matters  concerning  Russia  are  examined. 

Article  III. 

Each  delegation  of  Plenipotentiaries  may  be  accompanied  by 
technical  delegates  properly  accredited  and  by  two  stenographers. 
The  technical  delegates  may  be  present  at  the  sittings  for  the  pur- 
pose of  furnishing  information  which  may  be  asked  of  them.  They 
shall  be  allowed  to  speak  for  the  purpose  of  giving  any  desired 
explanations. 

Article  IV. 

The  delegates  take  precedence  according  to  the  alphabetical 
order  in  French  of  the  Powers. 


Article  V. 

The  Conference  will  be  declared  open  by  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic.  The  President  of  the  Council  of  French  Min- 
isters will  be  invested  temporarily  with  the  Chairmanship.  Imme- 
diately after  this,  a  Committee,  composed  of  one  Plenipotentiary  of 
each  of  the  great  Allied  or  associated  Powers,  shall  proceed  at  once 
to  the  authentication  of  the  credentials  of  all  members  present. 


APPENDIX  A  577 


Article  VI. 

In  the  course  of  the  first  meeting,  the  Conference  will  proceed 
to  appoint  a  permanent  President  and  four  Vice-Presidents  chosen 
from  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Great  Powers  in  alphabetical 
order. 

Article  VII. 

A  Secretariat  appointed  from  outside  Plenipotentiaries  and 
composed  of  one  representative  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
one  of  the  British  Empire,  one  of  France,  one  of  Italy,  and  one  of 
Japan,  will  be  submitted  to  the  approval  of  the  Conference  by  the 
President,  who  will  be  the  controlling  authority  responsible  for  its 
operations.  This  Secretariat  will  be  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
drafting  protocols  of  the  meetings,  of  classifying  the  archives,  of 
providing  for  the  administrative  organization  of  the  Conference, 
and  generally  of  ensuring  the  regular  and  punctual  working  of  the 
services  entrusted  to  it.  The  head  of  the  Secretariat  will  have 
charge  of,  and  be  responsible  for,  the  protocols  and  archives.  The 
archives  will  always  be  open  to  the  members  of  the  Conference. 

Article  VIII. 

The  publicity  of  the  proceedings  shall  be  ensured  by  official 
communiques  which  shall  be  prepared  by  the  Secretariat  for  pub- 
lication. In  case  of  disagreement  as  to  the  drafting  of  these  com- 
muniques the  matter  shall  be  referred  to  the  principal  Plenipo- 
tentiaries or  their  representatives. 

Article  IX. 

All  documents  intended  for  inclusion  in  the  protocols  must  be 
handed  in  in  writing  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  presenting  them. 
No  document  or  proposition  may  be  submitted  save  by  one  of  the 
Plenipotentiaries  or  in  his  name. 

Article  X. 

Plenipotentiaries  wishing  to  make  a  proposal  unconnected  with 
the  questions  on  the  agenda  or  not  arising  from  the  discussion 
shall  give  notice  of  the  same  twenty-four  hours  in  advance  in  order 
to  facilitate  discussion.  However,  exceptions  can  be  made  to  this 
rule  in  the  case  of  amendments  or  secondary  questions,  but  not  in 
the  case  of  substantive  proposals. 


578  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  XI. 

Petitions,  memoranda,  observations,  or  documents  forwarded  to 
the  Conference  by  any  person  other  than  Plenipotentiaries  must  be 
received  and  classified  by  the  Secretariat.  Such  of  these  commu- 
nications as  are  of  political  interest  will  be  briefly  summarized  in  a 
list  to  be  distributed  to  all  the  Plenipotentiaries.  This  list  will  be 
kept  up  to  date  as  analogous  communications  are  received.  All 
such  documents  will  be  deposited  in  the  archives. 

Article  XII. 

The  discussion  of  the  questions  to  be  decided  will  comprise  a 
first  and  a  second  reading.  The  first  will  consist  of  general  dis- 
cussion with  the  object  of  obtaining  agreement  on  matters  of  prin- 
ciple. Subsequently,  there  will  be  a  second  reading  for  more 
detailed  examination. 

Article  XIII. 

The  Plenipotentiaries  shall  have  the  right,  subject  to  the  agree- 
ment of  the  Conference,  to  authorize  their  technical  delegates  to 
submit  technical  "explanations  on  such  points  as  may  be  deemed 
useful.  If  the  Conference  thinks  it  advisable,  the  technical  ex- 
amination of  any  particular  question  may  be  entrusted  to  a  com- 
mittee of  technical  delegates,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  report  and 
suggest  solutions. 

Article  XIV. 

The  protocols  drawn  up  by  the  Secretariat  shall  be  printed  and 
distributed  in  proof  to  the  delegates  in  the  shortest  possible  time 
in  order  to  expedite  the  work  of  the  Conference.  The  communica- 
tion thus  made  in  advance  shall  take  the  place  of  the  reading  of 
the  protocols  at  the  beginning  of  each  meeting.  If  no  alteration  is 
proposed  by  the  Plenipotentiaries,  the  text  shall  be  deemed  ap- 
proved and  be  entered  in  the  archives.  If  any  alteration  is  pro- 
posed, its  text  shall  be  read  by  the  President  at  the  beginning  of 
the  following  meeting.  In  any  case,  the  protocol  must  be  read  out 
in  full  at  the  request  of  any  Plenipotentiary. 

Article  XV. 

A  committee  shall  be  formed  for  drafting  the  resolutions 
adopted.  This  committee  shall  concern  itself  only  with  questions 
which  have  been  decided.  Its  sole  duty  shall  be  to  draw  up  the 
text  of  the  decisions  adopted  and  to  present  it  for  the  approval  of 


APPENDIX  A  579 

the  Conference,  It  shall  be  composed  of  five  members  not  form- 
ing part  of  the  Plenipotentiary  Delegates,  and  composed  of  one 
representative  of  the  United  States  of  America,  one  of  the  British 
Empire,  one  of  France,  one  of  Italy,  and  one  of  Japan. 


No.  11.    Treaty  of  Alliance  for  the  Preservation  of  the 
Balance  of  Power,  1814.1 

In  the  Name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Undivided  Trinity. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Apostolic  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia,  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  All  the  Eussias,  and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia, 
have  transmitted  to  the  French  Government  proposals  for  conclud- 
ing a  General  Peace,  and  being  desirous,  should  France  refuse  the 
Conditions  therein  contained,  to  draw  closer  the  ties  which  unite 
them  for  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  a  War  undertaken  for  the 
salutary  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  the  miseries  of  Europe,  of 
securing  its  future  repose,  by  reestablishing  a  just  balance  of  Power, 
and  being  at  the  same  time  desirous,  should  the  Almighty  bless  their 
pacific  intentions,  to  fix  the  means  of  maintaining  against  every 
attempt  the  order  of  things  which  shall  have  been  the  happy  conse- 
quence of  their  efforts,  have  agreed  to  sanction  by  a  solemn  Treaty, 
signed  separately  by  each  of  the  four  Powers  with  the  three  others, 
this  twofold  engagement. 

(Here  the  plenipotentiaries  are  named.} 

The  said  Plenipotentiaries,  after  having  exchanged  their  Full 
Powers,  found  to  be  in  due  and  proper  form,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  Articles: 

Article  I. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  above  named  solemnly  engage 
by  the  present  Treaty,  and  in  the  event  of  France  refusing  to  accede 
to  the  Conditions  of  Peace  now  proposed,  to  apply  all  the  means 
of  their  respective  States  to  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  War 
against  that  Power,  and  to  employ  them  in  perfect  concert,  in  order 
to  obtain  for  themselves  and  for  Europe  a  General  Peace,  under  the 
protection  of  which  the  rights  and  liberties  of  all  Nations  may  be 
established  and  secured. 

This  engagement  shall  in  no  respect  affect  the  Stipulations 
which  the  several  Powers  have  already  contracted  relative  to  the 
number  of  Troops  to  be  kept  against  the  Enemy ;  and  it  is  under- 
stood that  the  Courts  of  England,  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia, 

1J5.  $  F.,  I,  121-129;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XXIV. 


580  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

engage  by  the  present  Treaty  to  keep  in  the  field,  each  of  them, 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  effective  men,  exclusive  of  garri- 
sons, to  be  employed  in  active  service  against  the  common  Enemy. 

Article  II. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  reciprocally  engage  not  to  nego- 
tiate separately  with  the  common  Enemy,  nor  to~sign  Peace,  Truce, 
nor  Convention,  but  with  common  consent.  They,  moreover,  en- 
gage not  to  lay  down  their  Arms  until  the  object  of  the  War,  mu- 
tually understood  and  agreed  upon,  shall  have  been  attained. 


Article  V. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties,  reserving  to  themselves  to  con- 
cert together,  on  the  conclusion  of  a  Peace  with  France,  as  to  the 
means  best  adapted  to  guarantee  to  Europe,  and  to  themselves 
reciprocally,  the  continuance  of  the  Peace,  have  also  determined 

to  enter,  without  delay,  into  defensive  engagements  for  the  pro- 
tection of  their  respective  States  in  Europe  against  every  attempt 
which  France  might  make  to  infringe  the  order  of  things  resulting 
from  such  Pacification. 

Article  VI. 

To  effect  this,  they  agree  that  in  the  event  of  one  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  being  threatened  with  an  attack  on  the  part 
of  France,  the  others  shall  employ  their  most  strenuous  efforts  to 
prevent  it,  by  friendly  interposition. 

Article  VII. 

In  the  case  of  these  endeavors  proving  ineffectual,  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  promise  to  come  to  the  immediate  assistance 
of  the  Power  attacked,  each  with  a  body  of  sixty  thousand  men. 


Article  XV. 

In  order  to  render  more  effectual  the  Defensive  Engagements 
above  stipulated,  by  uniting  for  their  common  defense  the  Powers 
the  most  exposed  to  a  French  invasion,  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  engage  to  invite  those  Powers  to  accede  to  the  present 
Treaty  of  Defensive  Alliance. 


APPENDIX  A  581 


Article  XVI. 

The  present  Treaty  of  Defensive  Alliance  having  for  its  object 
to  maintain  the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  to  secure  the  repose  and 
independence  of  its  States,  and  to  prevent  the  invasions  which 
during  so  many  years  have  desolated  the  World,  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  have  agreed  to  extend  the  duration  of  it  to  twenty 
years,  to  take  date  from  the  day  of  its  Signature;  and  they  reserve 
to  themselves,  to  concert  upon  its  ulterior  prolongation,  three  years 
before  its  expiration,  should  circumstances  require  it. 

Article  XVII. 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  Katifications  ex- 
changed within  two  months,  or  sooner  if  possible. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  same,  and  affixed  thereto  the  Seal  of  their  Arms. 

Done  at  Chaumont  this  1st  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  1814. 

(L.  S.)     CASTLEKEAGH. 
(L.  S.)     CLEMENT  WENCESLAUS  LOTHAIKE, 
Prince  of  Metternich. 


No.  12.    Act  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  26  September,  1815. ! 

In  the  Name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Invisible  Trinity. 

Their  Majesties  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  the  King  of  Prussia, 
and  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  having,  in  consequence  of  the  great 
events  which  have  marked  the  course  of  the  three  last  years  in 
Europe,  and  especially  of  the  blessings  which  it  has  pleased  Divine 
Providence  to  shower  down  upon  those  States  which  place  their 
confidence  and  their  hope  on  it  alone,  acquired  the  intimate  con- 
viction of  the  necessity  of  settling  the  steps  to  be  observed  by  the 
Powers,  in  their  reciprocal  relations,  upon  the  sublime  truths 
which  the  Holy  Religion  of  our  Saviour  teaches : 

They  solemnly  declare  that  the  present  Act  has  no  other  object 
than  to  publish,  in  the  face  of  the  whole  world,  their  fixed  resolu- 
tion, both  in  the  administration  of  their  respective  States,  and  in 
their  political  relations  with  every  other  Government,  tn  tfljff  ^°y 
their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  that  Holy  Religion,  the  precepts 
of  Justice,  Christian  Charity,  and  Peace,  which,  far  from  being  ap- 
plicable only  to  private  concerns,  must  have  an  immediate  influ- 
ence on  the  councils  of  Princes,  and  guide  all  their  steps,  as  being 
the  only  means  of  consolidating  human  institutions  and  remedying 

1B.  f  F.,  Ill,  211;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XXV, 


582  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

their  imperfections.  In  consequence,  their  Majesties  have  agreed 
on  the  following  Articles: 

Article  I. 

Conformably  to  the  words  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  com- 
mand all  men  to  consider  each  other  as  brethren,  the  Three  Con- 
tracting Monarchs  will  remain  united  by  the  bonds  of  a  true  and 
indissoluble  fraternity,  and,  considering  each  other  as  fellow  coun- 
trymen, they  will,  on  alfoccasions  and  in  all  places,  lend  each  other 
aid  and  assistance;  and,  regarding  themselves  toward  their  sub- 
jects and  armies  as  fathers  of  families,  they  will  lead  them,  in  the 
same  spirit  of  fraternity  with  which  they  are  animated,  to  protect 
Religion,  Peace  and  Justice. 

Article  II. 

In  consequence,  the  sole  principle  j)f  force,  whether  between 
the  said  Governments  of  l)etween~tneir^  Subjects,  shall  be  that  of 

doing  each  other  reciprocal  service,  and  of  testifying  by  unalter- 
able good  will  the  mutual  affection  with  which  they  ought  to  be 
animated,  to  consider  themselves  all  as  members  of  one  and  the 
same  Christian  nation;  the  three  allied  Princes  looking  on  them- 
selves as  merely  delegated  by  Providence  to  govern  threebranches 
of  the  one  family,  namely,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  thus  con- 
fessing that  the  Christian  world,  of  which  they  and  their  people 
form  a  part,  has  in  reality  no  other  Sovereign  than  Him  to  whom 
alone  power  really  belongs,  because  in  Him  alone  are  found  all 
the  treasures  of  love,  science,  and  infinite  wisdom,  that  is  to  say, 
God,  our  Divine  Saviour,  the  Word  of  the  Most  High,  the  Word  of 
life.  Their  Majesties  consequently  recommend  to  their  people, 
with  the  most  tender  solicitude,  as  the  sole  means  of  enjoying  that 
Peace  which  arises  from  a  good  conscience,  and  which  alone  is  dur- 
able, to  strengthen  themselves  every  day  more  and  more  in  the 
principles  and  exercise  of  the  duties  which  the  Divine  Saviour  has 
taught  to  mankind. 

Article  III. 

All  the  Powers  who  shall  choose  solemnly  to  avow  the  sacred 
principles  which  have  dictated  the  present  Act,  and  shall  acknowl- 
edge how  important  it  is  for  the  happiness  of  nations,  too  long  agi- 
tated, that  these  truths  should  henceforth  exercise  over  the  desti- 
nies of  mankind  all  the  influence  which  belongs  to  them,  will  be  re- 
ceived with  equal  ardor  and  affection  into  this  Holy  Alliance. 


APPENDIX  A  583 

Done  in  triplicate,  and  signed  at  Paris,  the  year  of  Grace  1815, 
14/26  September. 

(L.  S.)     FRANCIS. 

(L.  S.)     FREDERICK  WILLIAM. 

(L.  S.)     ALEXANDER. 

No.  13.   Program  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  in  the  Greek  Question ; 
Treaty  of  6  July,  1827.1 

In  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Undivided  Trinity. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  France  and  Navarre,  and  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Kussias,  penetrated  with  the  neces- 
sity of  putting  an  end  to  the  sanguinary  struggle  which,  while  it 
abandons  the  Greek  Provinces  and  the  Islands  of  the  Archipelago 
to  all  the  disorders  of  anarchy,  daily  causes  fresh  impediments  to 
the  commerce  of  the  States  of  Europe,  and  gives  opportunity  for 
acts  of  Piracy  which  not  only  expose  the  subjects  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  to  grievous  losses,  but  also  render  necessary  meas- 
ures which  are  burdensome  for  their  observation  and  suppression. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  France  and  Navarre, 
having,  moreover,  received  from  the  Greeks  an  earnest  invitation 
to  interpose  their  mediation  with  the  Ottoman  Porte ;  and  together 
with  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  being  animated 
with  the  desire  of  putting  a  stop  to  the  effusion  of  blood,  and  of 
preventing  the  evils  of  every  kind  which  the  continuance  of  such 
a  state  of  things  may  produce ; 

They  have  resolved  to  combine  their  efforts,  and  to  regulate  the 
operation  thereof  by  a  formal  Treaty,  for  the  object  of  reestab- 
lishing peace  between  the  contending  parties,  by  means  of  an 
arrangement  called  for,  no  less  by  sentiments  of  humanity,  than  by 
interests  for  the  tranquillity  of  Europe. 

For  these  purposes  they  have  named  their  Plenipotentiaries  to 
discuss,  conclude,  and  sign  the  said  Treaty,  that  is  to  say : —  ... 

Who  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers, 
found  to  be  in  due  and  proper  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following 
articles. 

Article  I. 

The  contracting  Powers  shall  offer  their  mediation  to  the  Otto- 
man Porte,  with  the  view  of  effecting  a  reconciliation  between  it 
and  the  Greeks.  This  offer  of  mediation  shall  be  made  to  that 
Power  immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty,  by 

*B.  4-  F.,  XIV,  632;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XXV. 


584  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

means  of  a  joint  declaration,  signed  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of 
the  Allied  Courts  at  Constantinople;  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  de- 
mand for  an  immediate  armistice  shall  be  made  to  the  two  con- 
tending parties,  as  a  preliminary  and  indispensable  condition  to 
the  opening  of  any  negotiation. 

Article  II. 

The  arrangement  to  be  proposed  to  the  Ottoman  Porte  shall 
rest  upon  the  following  bases : — 

The  Greeks  shall  hold  under  the  Sultan  as  under  a  Lord  par- 
amount; and,  in  consequence  thereof,  they  shall  pay  to  the  Otto- 
man Empire  an  annual  tribute,  the  amount  of  which  shall  be  fixed, 
once  for  all,  by  common  agreement.  They  shall  be  governed  by 
authorities  whom  they  shall  choose  and  appoint  themselves,  but 
in  the  nomination  of  whom  the  Porte  shall  have  a  defined  right. 
In  order  to  effect  a  complete  separation  between  the  individuals  of 
the  two  nations,  and  to  prevent  the  collisions  which  would  be  the 
inevitable  consequence  of  so  protracted  a  struggle,  the  Greeks  shall 
become  possessors  of  all  Turkish  property  situated  either  upon  the 
continent,  or  in  the  islands  of  Greece,  on  condition  of  indemnifying 
the  former  proprietors,  either  by  an  annual  sum  to  be  added  to 
the  tribute  which  they  shall  pay  to  the  Porte,  or  by  some  other 
arrangement  of  the  same  nature. 

Article  III. 

The  details  of  this  arrangement,  as  well  as  the  limits  of  the 
territory  upon  the  continent,  and  the  designation  of  the  islands  of 
the  Archipelago  to  which  it  shall  be  applicable,  shall  be  settled  by 
a  negotiation  to  be  afterwards  entered  into  between  the  High 
Powers  and  the  two  contending  parties. 

Article  IV. 

The  contracting  Powers  engage  to  pursue  the  salutary  work  of 
the  pacification  of  Greece,  upon  the  bases  laid  down  in  the  pre- 
ceding articles,  and  to  furnish,  without  the  least  delay,  their  rep- 
resentatives at  Constantinople  with  all  the  instructions  which  are 
required  for  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  which  they  now  sign. 

Article  V. 

The  contracting  Powers  will  not  seek  in  these  arrangements, 
any  augmentation  of  territory,  any  exclusive  influence,  or  any 
commercial  advantage  for  their  subjects,  which  those  of  every 
other  nation  may  not  equally  obtain. 


APPENDIX  A  585 


Article  VI. 

The  arrangements  for  reconciliation  and  peace,  which  shall  be 
definitively  agreed  upon  between  the  contending  parties,  shall  be 
guaranteed  by  those  of  the  signing  Powers  who  may  judge  it  ex- 
pedient or  possible  to  contract  that  obligation.  The  operation  and 
the  effects  of  such  guarantee  shall  become  the  subject  of  future 
stipulation  between  the  High  Powers. 


Article  VII. 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  in  two  months,  or  sooner  if  possible. 
In  witness,  &c. 

Done  at  London,  the  6th  day  of  July,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  1827. 

DUDLEY.  LE  PRINCE  DE  POLIGNAC. 

LIEVEN. 


Additional  Article. 

In  case  the  Ottoman  Porte  should  not,  within  the  space  of  one 
month,  accept  the  mediation  which  is  to  be  proposed  to  it,  the  High 
contracting  parties  agree  upon  the  following  measures: — 

1.  It  shall  be  declared  to  the  Porte,  by  their  representatives 
at  Constantinople,  that  the  inconveniences  and  evils  described  in 
the  Patent  Treaty  as  inseparable  from  the  state  of  things  which 
has,  for  six  years,  existed  in  the  East,  and  the  termination  of  which, 
by  the  means  at  the  command  of  the  Sublime  Ottoman  Porte,  ap- 
pears to  be  still  distant,  impose  upon  the  High  contracting  parties 
the  necessity  of  taking  immediate  measures  for  forming  a  connec- 
tion with  the  Greeks.     It  is  understood  that  this  shall  be  effected 
by  establishing  commercial  relations  with  the  Greeks,  and  by  send- 
ing to  and  receiving  from  them,  for  this  purpose,  consular  agents, 
provided  there  shall  exist  in  Greece  authorities  capable  of  sup- 
porting such  relations. 

2.  If,  within  the  said  term  of  one  month,  the  Porte  does  not 
accept  the  armistice  proposed  in  the  first  article  of  the  Patent 
Treaty,  or  if  the  Greeks  refuse  to  carry  it  into  execution,  the  High 
contracting  Powers  shall  declare  to  either  of  the  contending  parties 
which  may  be  disposed  to  continue  hostilities,  or  to  both  of  them, 
that  the  said  High  Powers  intend  to  exert  all  the  means  which 
circumstances  may  suggest  to  their  prudence,  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  the  immediate  effects  of  the  armistice  of  which  they  de- 
sire the  execution,  by  preventing,  as  far  as  possible,  all  collision 


586  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

between  the  contending  parties;  and  in  consequence,  immediately 
after  the  above-mentioned  declaration,  the  High  Powers  will, 
jointly,  exert  all  their  efforts  to  accomplish  the  object  of  such 
armistice,  without,  however,  taking  any  part  in  the  hostilities  be- 
tween the  two  contending  parties.  Immediately  after  the  signature 
of  the  present  additional  Article,  the  High  contracting  Powers  will, 
jointly,  transmit  to  the  admirals  commanding  their  respective 
squadrons  in  the  Levant,  conditional  instructions  in  conformity 
to  the  arrangements  above  declared. 

3.  Finally,  if,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  these  measures  do 
not  prove  sufficient  to  procure  the  adoption  of  the  propositions  of 
the  High  contracting  parties  by  the  Ottoman  Porte ;  or  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Greeks  decline  the  conditions  stipulated  in  their 
favor,  by  the  Treaty  of  this  date,  the  High  contracting  Powers 
will,  nevertheless,  continue  to  pursue  the  work  of  pacification,  on 
the  bases  upon  which  they  have  agreed ;  and,  in  consequence,  they 
authorize,  from  the  present  moment,  their  representatives  at  Lon- 
don to  discuss  and  determine  the  future  measures  which  it  may 
become  necessary  to  employ. 

The  present  additional  article  shall  have  the  same  force  and 
validity  as  if  it  were  inserted,  word  for  word,  in  the  treaty  of  this 
day.  It  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged 
at  the  same  time  as  those  of  the  said  treaty. 

In  witness,  &c. 

Done  at  London,  the  6th  day  of  July,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  1827. 

DUDLEY.  LE  PRINCE  DE  POLINAC, 

LIEVEN. 


No.  14.    Convention  of  the  Concert  of  Europe  providing 
Guarantees  for  the  Kingdom  of  Greece,  7  May,  1832.1 

The  Courts  of  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia,  exercising 
the  power  conveyed  to  them  by  the  Greek  Nation,  to  make  choice 
of  a  Sovereign  for  Greece,  raised  to  the  rank  of  an  independent 
State,  and  being  desirous  of  giving  to  that  country  a  fresh  proof 
of  their  friendly  disposition,  by  the  election  of  a  Prince  descended 
from  a  Royal  House,  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  which  cannot 
fail  to  be  of  essential  service  to  Greece,  and  which  has  already 
acquired  claims  to  her  esteem  and  gratitude,  have  resolved  to  offer 
the  Crown  of  the  new  Greek  State  to  the  Prince  Frederick  Otho 
of  Bavaria,  second  son  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria,  on  his  part,  acting  in  the 
character  of  Guardian  of  the  said  Prince  Otho  during  his  minority, 

J#.  f  F.,  XIX,  33;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XXV. 


APPENDIX  A  587 

participating  in  the  views  of  the  three  Courts,  and  duly  appre- 
ciating the  motives  which  have  induced  them  to  fix  their  choice 
upon  a  Prince  of  his  house,  has  determined  to  accept  the  Crown 
of  Greece  for  his  second  son  the  Prince  Frederick  Otho  of  Bavaria. 

In  consequence  of  such  acceptance,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
agreeing  upon  the  arrangements  which  it  has  rendered  necessary, 
their  Majesties  the  King  of  the  French,  the  King  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  Emperor  of  all 
the  Russias,  on  the  one  part,  and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria 
on  the  other,  have  named  as  their  Plenipotentiaries,  viz. : 

Who,  after  having  exchanged  their  full  powers,  found  to  be  in 
good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  and  signed  the  following 
Articles : — 

Article  I. 

The  Courts  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  duly  author- 
ized for  this  purpose  by  the  Greek  nation,  offer  the  hereditary 
Sovereignty  of  Greece  to  the  Prince  Frederick  Otho  of  Bavaria, 
second  son  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria. 

Article  II. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Bavaria,  acting  in  the  name  of  his 
said  son,  a  minor,  accepts,  on  his  behalf,  the  hereditary  Sovereignty 
of  Greece,  on  the  conditions  hereinafter  settled. 

Article  III. 

The  Prince  Otho  of  Bavaria  shall  bear  the  title  of  King  of 
Greece. 

Article  IV. 

Greece,  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Prince  Otho  of  Bavaria, 
and  under  the  guarantee  of  the  three  Courts,  shall  form  a  mon- 
archical and  independent  State,  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
Protocol  signed  between  the  said  Courts,  on  the  3rd  of  February, 
1830,  and  accepted  both  by  Greece  and  by  the  Ottoman  Porte. 


Article  V. 

The  limits  of  the  Greek  State  shall  be  such  as  shall  be  definitely 
settled  by  the  negotiations  which  the  Courts  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia,  have  recently  opened  with  the  Ottoman  Porte, 
in  execution  of  the  Protocol  of  the  26th  of  September,  1831. 


588  INTEKNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


Article  VI. 

The  three  Courts  having  beforehand  determined  to  convert  the 
Protocol  of  the  3rd  of  February,  1830,  into  a  definite  Treaty,  as 
soon  as  the  negotiations  relative  to  the  limits  of  Greece  shall  have 
terminated,  and  to  communicate  such  Treaty  to  all  the  States  with 
which  they  have  relations,  it  is  hereby  agreed  that  they  shall  fulfil 
this  engagement,  and  that  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Greece  shall 
become  a  Contracting  Party  to  the  Treaty  in  question. 

Article  VII. 

The  three  Courts  shall,  from  the  present  moment,  use  their 
influence  to  procure  the  recognition  of  the  Prince  Otho  of  Bavaria 
as  King  of  Greece,  by  all  the  Sovereigns  and  States  with  whom 
they  have  relations. 


Article  XII. 

In  execution  of  the  stipulations  of  the  Protocol  of  the  20th  of 
February,  1830,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias  en- 
gages to  guarantee,  and  their  Majesties  the  King  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  and  the  King  of  the  French 
engage  to  recommend,  the  former  to  his  Parliament,  the  latter  to 
his  Chambers,  to  enable  their  Majesties  to  guarantee,  on  the  follow- 
ing conditions,  a  loan  to  be  contracted  by  the  Prince  Otho  of 
Bavaria,  as  King  of  Greece: — 

1.  The  Principal  of  the  loan  to  be  contracted  under  the  guar- 
antee of  the  three  Powers  shall  not  exceed  a  total  amount  of  sixty 
millions  of  francs. 

2.  The  said  loan  shall  be  raised  by  instalments  of  twenty 
millions  of  francs  each. 

3.  For  the  present,  the  first  instalment  only  shall  be  raised, 
and  the  three  Courts  shall  each  become  responsible  for  the  pay- 
ment of  one-third  of  the  annual  amount  of  the  interest  and  sinking 
fund  of  the  said  instalment. 

4.  The  second  and  the  third  instalments  of  the  said  loan  may 
also  be  raised,  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  Greek   State, 
after  previous  agreement  between  the  three  Courts  and  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  Greece. 

5.  In  the  event  of  the  second  and  third  instalments  of  the 
above-mentioned  loan  being  raised  in  consequence  of  such  an  agree- 
ment, the  three  Courts  shall  each  become  responsible  for  the  pay- 
ment of  one-third  of  the  annual  amount  of  the  interest  and  sinking 
fund  of  these  two  instalments,  as  well  as  of  the  first. 


APPENDIX  A  589 

6.  The  Sovereign  of  Greece  and  the  Greek  State  shall  be  bound 
to  appropriate  to  the  payment  of  the  interest  and  sinking  fund  of 
such  instalments  of  the  loan  as  may  have  been  raised  under  the 
guarantee  of  the  three  Courts,  the  first  revenues  of  the  State,  in 
such  manner  that  the  actual  receipts  of  the  Greek  Treasury  shall 
be  devoted,  first  of  all,  to  the  payment  of  the  said  interest  and 
sinking  fund,  and  shall  not  be  employed  for  any  other  purpose, 
until  those  payments  on  account  of  the  instalments  of  the  loan 
raised  under  the  guarantee  of  the  three  Courts,  shall  have  been 
completely  secured  for  the  current  year. 

The  Diplomatic  Representatives  of  the  three  Courts  in  Greece 
shall  be  specially  charged  to  watch  over  the  fulfilment  of  the 
last-mentioned  stipulation. 

Article  XIII. 

In  case  a  pecuniary  compensation  in  favor  of  the  Ottoman 
Porte  should  result  from  the  negotiations  which  the  three  Courts 
have  already  opened  at  Constantinople  for  the  definite  settlement 
of  the  limits  of  Greece,  it  is  understood  that  the  amount  of  such 
compensation  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  loan 
which  forms  the  subject  of  the  preceding  Article. 


"V 


No.  15.    Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  1919.1 

The  High  Contracting  Parties, 

In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to  achieve 
international  peace  and  security  *_,  r  0 

by  the  acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,      A_^  ^  ^  f  )  ^  **" 
by  the  prescription  of  open,  just  and  honorable  relations 

between  nations, 

by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of  interna- 
tional  law  as  ^nT^c^u^T^uIe~o:f>con3uct  among  Govern- 
ments,  and 

by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for 
alL^ea^  oMigations    in    the    dealings    of    organized 
pj££#les  with  one  another, 
Agree  to  thSTCovenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  I. 

The  original  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be  those 
of  the  Signatories  which  are  named  in  the  Annex  to  this  Covenant 
and  also  such  of  those  other  States  named  in  the  Annex  as  shall 

1Sen.  Doc.  49,  66  Cong.  1  sess.,  8-17;  see,  above,  text,  Chap.  XXVII. 


590  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

accede  without  reservation  to  this  Covenant.  Such  accession  shall 
be  effected  by  a  Declaration  deposited  with  the  Secretariat  within 
two  months  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Covenant.  Notice 
thereof  shall  be  sent  to  all  other  Members  of  the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion,  or  Colony  not  named 
in  the  Annex  may  become  a  Member  of  the  League  if  its  admis- 
sion is  agreed  to  by  two-thirds  of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  it 
shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention  to  observe 
its  international  obligations,  and  shall  accept  such  regulations  as 
may  be  prescribed  by  the  League  in  regard  to  its  military,  naval, 
and  air  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years'  notice  of  its 
intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the  League,  provided  that  all 
its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obligations  under  this 
Covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of  its  withdrawal. 

Article  II. 

JjL          The  action  of  the  League  under  this  Covenant  shall  be  effected 
/*\  ^        through  the  instrumentality  of  an  Assembly  and  of  a  Council, 
with  a  permanent  Secretariat. 

Article  III. 

The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the  Members 
of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from  time  to 
time  as  occasion  may  require  at  the  Seat  of  the  League  or  at  such 
other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter  within 
the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the 
world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly  each  Member  of  the  League  shall 
have  one  vote,  and  may  not  have  more  than  three  Representatives. 

Article  IV. 

The  Council  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the  Principal 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  together  with  Representatives  of 
four  other  Members  of  the  League.  These  four  Members  of  the 
League  shall  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  from  time  to  time  in  its 
discretion.  Until  the  appointment  of  the  Representatives  of  the 
four  Members  of  the  League  first  selected  by  the  Assembly,  Repre- 
sentatives of  Belgium,  Brazil,  Spain,  and  Greece  shall  be  members 
of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly,  the  Council 


APPENDIX  A  591 

may  name  additional  Members  of  the  League  whose  Representa- 
tives shall  always  be  members  of  the  Council;  the  Council  with 
like  approval  may  increase  the  number  of  Members  of  the  League 
to  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  for  representation  on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may 
require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the  Seat  of  the  League,  or  at 
such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter  within"^ 
the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  atfeeting  the  peace  of  the/ 
world. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the  Council 
shall  be  invited  to  send  a  Representative  to  sit  as  a  member  at 
any  meeting  of  the  Council  during  the  consideration  of  matters 
specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that  Member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council,  each  Member  of  the  League  repre- 
sented on  the  Council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more 
than  one  Representative. 

Article  V. 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  Covenant 
or  by  the  terms  of  the  present  Treaty,  decisions  at  any  meeting  of 
the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  shall  require  the  agreement  of  all 
the  Members  of  the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Assembly  or  of 
the  Council,  including  the  appointment  of  Committee^  to  investi- 
gate particula"r  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the  Assembly  or  by 
the  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  Members  of 
the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first  meeting  of  the 
Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America. 


Article  VI. 

The  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  established  at  the  Seat 
of  tlie  TjeagueT"  ^Tne  Secretariat  shall  comprise  a  Secretary  General 
and  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  Secretary  General  shall  be  the  person  named  in  the 
Annex  ;  thereafter  the  Secretary  General  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
Council  with  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly. 

The  secretaries  and  staff  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  Secretary  General  with  the  approval  of  the  Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all  meetings 
of  the  Assembly  and  of  the  Council. 


592  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the  Members 
of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the  apportionment  of  the  ex- 
penses of  the  International  Bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  VII. 

The  Seat  of  the  League  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  Seat  of  the  League 
shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the  League,  including 
the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open  equally  to  men  and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  Members  of  the  League  and  officials  of 
the  League  when  engaged  on  the  business  of  the  League  shall  enjoy 
diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property,  occupied  by  the  League  or 
its  officials  or  by  Representatives  attending  its  meetings  shall  be 
inviolable. 

Article  VIII. 

The  Members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the  maintenance 
•  .    •        of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest 
point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by  com- 
mon action  of  international  obligations. 

The  CouncilTTaking  account  oYlEe  geographical  situation  and 
circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  formulate  plans  for  such  reduc- 
tion for  the  consideration  and  action  of  the  several  Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  revision  at 
least  every  ten  years. 

/  After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several  Gov- 
f  ermnents,  the  limits  of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall  not  be  ex- 
\  ceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture  by 
private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implementsToFwar  is  open  to 
grave  objections.  The  Council  shall  advise  how  the  evil  effects 
attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard 
being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  Members  of  the  League  which 
are  not  able  to  manufacture  the  munitions  and  implements  of  war 
necessary  for  their  safety. 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange  full  and 
frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  their  mili- 
tary, naval,  and  air  programs  and  the  condition  of  such  of  their 
industries  as  are  adaptable  to  war-like  purposes. 

Article  IX. 

JL  A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise  the 
f  Council  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  Articles  I  and  VIII 
,  and  on  military,  naval,  and  air  questions  generally. 


APPENDIX  A  593 

Article  X. 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and  prr 
as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  exis 
political  independence  of  all  Members  of  the  League.     In  case  of 
any  such  aggression  or  in  ease  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such 
aggression  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this 

obligation  shall  te  fulfilled. 

--S-* 

Article  XI. 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting  any 
of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter 
of  concern  to  the  whole  League,  and  the  League  shall  take  any 
action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the 
peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency  should  arise  the 
Secretary  General  shall  on  the  request  of  any  Member  of  the  League 
forthwith  summon  a  meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be^the  friendly  right  of  each  Member  of 
the  League  to  brmg^fco^tne  affienti o n  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the 
Council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting  international  rela- 
tions whfclv  threatens  to  disturb  international  peace  or  the  good 
understanding  between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

Article  XII. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  if  there  should  arise 
between  them  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  they  will 
submit  the  matter  either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Coun- 
cil, and  they  agree  in  no  case  to  resort  to  war  until  three  months 
after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  report  by  the  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the  arbitrators 
shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report  of  the 
Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the  submission  of 
the  dispute. 

Article  XIII. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  whenever  any  dispute 
shall  arise  between  them  which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for 
submission  to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled 
by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  subject-matter  to  arbi- 
tration. 

Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any  question 
of  international  law,   as  to  the  existence  of  any_f^ct  which   if  I  VX 
established  would  constitute  a^BreacF  of  any  international  obliga- 
tion, or  as  to  the  extent  and  "nature  of  the  reparation  to  be  made 


594  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

for  any  such  breach,  are  declared  to  be  among  those  which  are 
generally  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration. 

For  the  consideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of  arbitra- 
tion to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  Court  agreed  on  by 
the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  convention  existing 
between  them. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  carry  out  in 
full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered,  and  that  they 
will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the  League  which  com- 
plies therewith.  In  the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out  such 
an  award,  the  Council  shall  propose  what  steps  should  be  taken 
to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV. 

The  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  Members  of  the 
League  for  adoption  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice.  The  Court  shall  be  competent  to 
hear  and  determine  any  dispute  of  an  international  character 
which  the  parties  thereto  submit  to  it.  The  Court  may  also  give 
an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or  question  referred  to  it 
by  the  Council  or  by  the  Assembly. 

Article  XV. 

If  there  should  arise  between  Members  of  the  League  any  dis- 
pute likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion in  accordance  with  Article  XIII,  the  Members  of  the  League 
agree  that  they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the  Council.  Any  party 
to  the  dispute  may  effect  such  submission  by  giving  notice  of  the 
existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  Secretary  General,  who  will  make  all 
necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and  consideration 
thereof. 

For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dispute  will  communicate 
to  the  Secretary  General,  as  promptly  as  possible,  statements  of 
their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers,  and  the  Council 
may  forthwith  direct  the  publication  thereof. 

f  The  Council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the  dispute, 
and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  statement  shall  be  made  public 
giving  such  facts  and  explanations  regarding  the  dispute  and  the 
\terms  of  settlement  thereof  as  the  Council  may  deem  appropriate. 
\  If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either  unani- 
mously or  by  a  majority  vote  shall  make  and  publish  a  report  con- 
taining a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  the  recom- 
mendations which  are  deemed  just  and  proper  in  regard  thereto. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council  may 


APPENDIX  A  595 

make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  of  its  con- 
clusions regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
members  thereof  other  than  the  Representatives  of  one  or  more 
of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  Members  of  the  League  agree  that 
they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party  to  the  dispute  which  com- 
plies with  the  recommendations  of  the  report. 

If  the  Council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unanimously 
agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof,  other  than  the  Representatives 
of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  Members  of  the 
League  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  take  such  action  as  they 
shall  consider  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of  them, 
and  is  found  by  the  Council,  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by 
international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  that 
party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and  shall  make  no  recommenda- 
tion as  to  its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  y^fljj^asg  under  this  Article  refer  the  dis-  v^ 
pute  to  the  Assembly^TheoTspute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the 
request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute}  provided  that  such  request 
be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute 
to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly,  all  the  provisions  of  this 
Article  and  of  Article  XII  relating  to  the  action  and  powers  of 
the  Council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and  powers  of  the  Assembly, 
provided  that  a  report  made  by  the  Assembly,  if  concurred  in  by 
the  Representatives  of  those  Members  of  the  League  represented 
on  the  Council  and  of  a  majority  of  the  other  Members  of  the 
League,  exclusive  in  each  case  of  the  Representatives  of  the  parties 
to  the  dispute,  shall  have  the  same  force  as  a  report  by  the  Council 
concurred  in  by  all  the  members  thereof  other  than  the  Repre- 
sentatives of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

Article  XVI. 

Should  any  Member  of  the  League  resort  to  war  in  disregard 
of  its  covenants  under  Articles  XII,  XIII,  or  XV,  it  shall  «ps0  facto    «y. 
be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war  against  all  other  Mem-    ^v  <* 
bers  of  the  League,  which  herefey  undertake  Immedlately"to  "Silb^ect  ft*..  I*-    /'^ 

it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition         ^<V*CKV».  C 
ofaTPmtercourse  between  their  nations  and  the  nationals  of  the 
covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial,  com- 
mercial,   or    personal    intercourse    between    the    nationals    of    the 
covenant-breaking    State    and    the    nationals   of   any    other    State, 

j^gmber  of  the^^L^ga^u^^r^noL 
It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  in  such  case  to  recommend 


- 

J   | 
V/»/vV* 


596  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

to  the  several  Governments  concerned  what  effective  military,  naval, 
or  air  force  the  Members  of  the  League  shall  severally  contribute 
to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that  they  will 
mutually  support  one  another  in  the financial  and  economic  meaff- 
mvs  which  are  taken  under  this  Article,  in  order  to  minimize  the 
Toss  and  inconvenience  resulting:  from  the  above  measures,  and  that 
they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special 
measures  aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking 
State,  and  that  they  will  take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage 
through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  Members  of  the 
League  which  are  cooperating  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any  covenant  of 
the  League  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a  Member  of  the 
League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council  concurred  in  by  the  Representa- 
tives of  all  the  other  Members  of  the  League  represented  thereon. 


Article  XVII. 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  Member  of  the  League  and 
a  State  which  is  not  a  Member  of  the  League,  or  between  States 
not  Members  of  the  League,  the  State  or  States,  not  Members  of 
the  League  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  member- 
ship in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such 
conditions  as  the  Council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invitation  is 
accepted,  the  provisions  of  Articles  XII  to  XVI  inclusive  shall  be 
applied  with  such  modifications  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by 
the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Council  shall  immedi- 
ately institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of  the  dispute  and 
recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the 
circumstances. 

(If  a  State  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations  of 
membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  and 
shall  resqrjt  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the  League,  the  provisions 
of  Article  XVI  shall  be  applicable  as  against  the  State  taking 
,-      ,.  * J  c  -p 

such  action. 

iJLboth  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purpose  of 
such  dispute,  the  Council  may  take  such  measures  and  make  such 
recommendations  as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 


APPENDIX  A  597 


Article  XVIII. 


/         yj, 

Every  treaty  or  international  engagement 


. 

after  by  any  Member  of  the  League  shall  be  forthwith  registered 
with*  the  Secretariat  and  shall  as  soon  as  possible  be  published  by  it. 
No  such  treaty  or  international  engagement  shall  be  binding  until 
so  registered. 

Article  XIX. 

The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the  reconsideration 
by  Members  of  the  League  of  treaties  which  have  become  inappli- 
cable and  the  consideration  of  international  conditions  whose  con- 
tinuance might  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Article  XX. 

The  Members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that  this  Covenant 
is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations  or  understandings  inter  se 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  under- 
take that  they  .  .win  TffijlfitSftftSy  enter  into  any  engagements 
inconsistent~with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  any  Member  of  the  League  shall,  before  becoming  a 
Member  of  the  League,  have  undertaken  any  obligations  incon- 
sistent with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such 
Member  to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such 
obligations. 

Article  XXI. 

Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity 
of  international  engagements,  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or 
regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  doctrine,  for  securing  the 
maintenance  of  peace. 

Article  XXII. 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  consequence  of     •3 
the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  States      «. 
which  formerly  governed  them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples    J^  I 

not  vet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions 
of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle  that 
the  well-Tbeing  and  development  of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust 
of  civilization  and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust 
should  be  embodied  in  this  Covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this  principle  is 
that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be  entrusted  to  advanced 


598  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

nations  who  by  reason  of  their  resources,  their  experience  or 
their  geographical  position  can  best  undertake  this  responsi- 
bility, and  who  are  willing  to  accept  it,  and  that  thi§  tutelage 
^hould  be  exercised  by  them  as  Mandatories  on  behalf  of  the 
League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to  the 
stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographical  situation 
of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions,  and  oin^ejyypilar  circum- 
stances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish  Empire 
have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their  existence  as  inde- 
pendent nations  can  be  provisionally  recognized  subject  to  the 
rendering  of  administrative  advice  and  assistance  by  a  Mandatory 
until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes^of 
these  communities  must  be  a  principal  consideration  mtheseiec- 
tion  of  the  Mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at  such 
a  stage  that  the  Mandatory  must  be  responsible  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  territory  under  conditions  which  will  guarantee 
freedom  of  conscience  and  religion,  subject  only  to  the  maintenance 
of  public  order  and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the 
slave  trade,  the,  arms  traffic,  ancTlfre  liquor  traffic,  and  the  preven- 
tion of  the  estabiisnment  of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval 
b  asesr  and .  off  military  t .rjyning'  o|  '  t  Jie,  natives  for^cither  than  police 
purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure  equal 
opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other  Members  of 
the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  ^uth-West  Africa  and  certain 
of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  whicn,  owing  to  the  sparseness  of 
their  population,  or  their  small  size,  or~tlfeir  remoteness  from  the 
centers  of  civilization,  or  their  geographical  contiguity  to  the 
territory  of  the  Mandatory,  and  otner"cir'c,unistaQe^.  can  be  best 
administered  under  the  laws j)f  J:he  Mandatory  as  integral  portions 
of  its  territory,  subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the 
interests  of  the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  Mandatory  shall  render  to  the 
Council  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the  territory  committed 
to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to  be  exer- 
'cised  by  the  Mandatory  shall,  if  not  previously  agreed  upon  by 
the  Members  of  the  League,  be  explicitly  defined  in  each  case  by 
vthe  Council. 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  receive  and 
examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  Mandatories  and  to  advise  the 
Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  observance  of  the  mandates. 


APPENDIX  A  599 

Article  XXIII. 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  interna- 
tional conventions  existing  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the 
Members  of  the  League: 

(a)  will  endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  con- 

ditions of  labor  for  men,  women,  and  children,  both  in 
their  own^co^iiilries  and  in  all  countries  to  which  their 
commercial  and  industrial  relations  extend,  and  for  that 
purpose  will  establish  and  maintain  the  necessary  inter- 
national organizations ; 

(b)  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment  of  the  native  inhabi- 

tants of  territories  under  their  control; 

(c)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision  over 

the  execution  of  agreements  with  regard  to  the  traffic  v/' 
in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic  in  opium  and 
other  dangerous  drugs; 

(d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision  of 

the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the  countries  in 
which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the  com- 
mon interest ; 

(e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of 

communications  and  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment 
for  the  commerce  of  all  Members  of  the  League.     In  this 
connection,  the  special  necessities  of  the 'regions  devas-  i     ^ 
tated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918  shall  be  borne  in  J 
mind; 

(f)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  international 

concern  for  the  prevention  and  control  of  disease. 

Article  XXIV. 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League  all 
international  bureaux  already  established  by  general  treaties  if  the 
parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  All  such  international  bureaux 
and  all  commissions  for  the  regulation  of  matters  of  international 
Interest  hereafter  constituted  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction 
of  the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are  regulated 
by  general  conventions  but  which  are  not  placed  under  the  control 
of  international  bureaux  or  commissions,  the  Secretariat  of  the 
League  shall,  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  ;bounclf  and  ft  desired. 
by  the  parties,  collect  and  distribute  all  relevant  information  and 
shall  render  any  other  assistance  which  may  be  necessary  or 
desirable. 


600  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the  Sec- 
retariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commission  which  is  placed 
under  the  direction  of  the  League. 


Article  XXV. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  to  encourage  and  promote  the 
establishment  and  cooperation  of  duly  authorized  voluntary 
national  Red  Cross  organizations  having  as  purposes  the  improve- 
ment of  health,  the  prevention  of  disease,  and  the  mitigation  of 
suffering  throughout  the  world. 


Article  XXVI. 

Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will  take  effect  when  ratified  by 
the  Members  of  the  League  whose  representatives  compose  the 
Council  and  by  a  majority  of  *the  Members  of  the  League  whose 
Representatives  compose  the  Assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  Member  of  the  League 
which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that  case  it  shall 
cease  to  be  a  Member  of  the  League. 


Annex. 

I.   Original  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  Signatories  of  the 

Treaty  of  Peace. 

United  States  of  America.  Haiti. 

Belgium.  Hedjaz. 

Bolivia.  Honduras. 

Brazil.  Italy. 

British  Empire.  Japan. 

Canada.  Liberia. 

Australia.  Nicaragua. 

South  Africa.  Panama. 

New  Zealand.  Peru. 

India.  Poland. 

China.  Portugal. 

Cuba.  Roumania. 

Ecuador  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State. 

France.  Siam. 

Greece.  Czecho-Slovakia. 

Guatemala.  Uruguay. 


APPENDIX  A  601 

States  Invited  to  Accede  to  the  Covenant. 

Argentine  Republic.  Persia. 

Chile.  Salvador. 

Colombia.  Spain. 

Denmark.  Sweden. 

Netherlands.  Switzerland. 

Norway.  Venezuela. 
Paraguay. 

II.   First  Secretary  General  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  Honorable  Sir  James  Eric  Drummond,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B. 


APPENDIX  B:     BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

It  too  frequently  happens  that  a  bibliography  serves  no  other 
purpose  but  to  enable  others  to  make  further  bibliographies.  The 
compilation  of  book  lists  seem  to  have  become  somewhat  of  a  fad 
in  recent  years,  and  nowhere  more  than  in  the  field  of  interna- 
tional relations,  where  such  work  has  often  been  substituted  for 
more  vital  and  more  effective  research  and  writing.  This  error 
the  writer  desires  to  avoid.  Furthermore,  it  would  be  almost  im- 
possible to  render  a  bibliography  of  this  subject  complete  without 
including  vast  ranges  of  material  upon  all  topics  in  international 
history,  law,  and  diplomacy,  a  thing  out  of  question  here.  The 
titles  found  below  have  been  included,  therefore,  only  because  they 
perform  one  or  more  of  three  functions,  namely,  to  indicate  the 
sources  most  frequently  drawn  upon  for  the  material  used  in  the 
text,  to  indicate  the  scope  of,  and  direction  taken  by,  the  recent 
literature  in  this  field,  and  to  indicate  books  specially  significant 
and  helpful  for  further  study  and  reading.  Books  of  the  third 
type  are  designated  by  asterisks.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to 
list  completely  the  many  articles  to  be  found  in  the  technical 
journals  of  international  law  and  politics,  and  the  general  period- 
icals of  public  events.  For  these  the  student  will  be  better  served 
by  himself  consulting  the  indexes  of  those  journals.  He  will 
readily  be  able  to  amplify  the  lists  of  books  here  given  by  the 
use  of  the  bibliographies  in  Hershey,  Krehbiel,  Satow,  Schiicking, 
and  Stowell. 

Of  all  the  works  cited  the  general  treatises  by  Hershey,  Oppen- 
heim,  and  Satow  deserve  special  mention  for  the  amount  of  atten- 
tion given  to  all  the  institutions  and  practices  of  international 
government. 

Works  are  usually  cited,  in  the  footnotes  above,  by  the  name 
of  the  author  or  by  that  name  and  a  brief  title;  where  special 
abbreviations  are  used  they  are  indicated  below. 

602 


APPENDIX  B  603 

GENERAL. 

a.     Secondary  Materials. 

Alvarez,  A.,  Droit  International  Americain,  Paris,  1910. 

Atherley-Jones,  L.  A.,  Commerce  in  War,  London,  1907. 

Bernard,  M.,  Four  Lectures  on  Diplomacy,  London,  1868. 

Bryce,  Viscount  J.,  Holy  Roman  Empire,  new  ed.,  New  York, 
1919. 

Burns,  C.  D.,  World  of  States,  London,  1917. 

Calvo,  C.,  Droit  International,  5th  ed.,  Paris,  1896. 

Corwin,  E.  S.,  President's  Control  of  Foreign  Relations,  Prince- 
ton, 1917. 

Davis,  H.  W.  C.,  Medieval  Europe,  New  York,  1911. 

Dickinson,  E.  DeW.,  Equality  of  States  in  International  Law, 

Cambridge  (Mass.),  1920. 
*Duggan,  S.  P.,  ed.,  League  of  Nations,  Boston,  1919. 

Duplessix,  E.,  L' Organisation  Internationale,  Paris,  1909. 
•Foster,  J.  W.,  Practice  of  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1906.    Cited: 
Foster. 

Freeman,  E.  A.,  History  of  Federal  Government,  2nd  ed.,  Lon- 
don, 1893. 

Garner,  J.  W.,  International  Law  and  the  World  War,  New  York, 
1920. 

—  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  New  York,  1910. 
Goodnow,  F.  J.,  Principles  of  Administrative  Law  of  the  United 

States,  New  York,  1905. 

Hall,  J.  P.,  Constitutional  Law,  Chicago,  1917. 

Hall,  W.  E.,  Treatise  on  International  Law,  7th  ed.,  Oxford,  1917. 

Hart,  A.  B.,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Federal  Government, 

Boston,  1891. 
*Hershey,  A.   S.,  Essentials  of  Public  International  Law,  New 

York,  1912. 
*Hicks,  F.  C.,  New  World  Order,  New  York,  1920. 

Hill,  D.  J.,  History  of  Diplomacy  in  the  International  Develop- 
ment of  Europe,  New  York,  1905.     Cited :  Hill. 

—  Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy,  New  York,  1919. 
Holland,  T.  E.,  Elements  of  Jurisprudence,  llth  ed.,  Oxford, 

1910. 


604  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Kliiber,  J.  L.,  Droit  des  Gens  Moderne  de  lf Europe,  Ott  ed.,  Paris, 
1874. 

Knox,  P.  C.,  "International  Unity,"  in  International  Concilia- 
tion, No.  28  (March,  1910). 
*Krehbiel,  E.,  Nationalism,  War,  and  Society,  New  York,  1916. 

Laurent,  F.,  Etudes  sur  I'Histoire  de  I'Humanite,  Paris,  1865-. 

Loria,  A.,  Bases  Economiques  de  la  Justice  Internationale,  New 
York,  1912. 

Macy,  J.,  and  Gannaway,  J.  W.,  Comparative  Free  Government, 
New  York,  1915. 

Marriott,  J.  A.  E.,  European  Commonwealth,  Oxford,  1918. 

Martens,  F.  de,  Traite  de  Droit  International  (trans,  by  Leo), 
Paris,  1883-. 

May,  T.  E.,  Law,  Privileges,  Proceedings,  and  Usage  of  Parlia- 
ment, 12th  ed.,  London,  1917. 

Moore,  J.  B.,  "International  Cooperation,"  in  International  Con- 
ciliation, No.  100  (March,  1916). 

Mowrer,  P.  S.,  Balkanized  Europe,  New  York,  1921. 
*Muir,  R.,  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  Boston,  1916. 

Nys,  E.,  Droit  International,  Brussels,  1904. 

—  Origines  de  Droit  International,  Paris,  1894. 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  Governments  of  Europe,  2nd  ed.,  New  York,  1920. 
*0ppenheim,  L.,  International  Law,  3rd  ed.,  London,  1921. 

Phillimore,  Sir  R.,  Commentaries  upon  International  Law,  4th 

ed.,  London,  1879. 

*Phillipson,  C.,  International  Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece 
and  Rome,  London,  1911.    Cited :  Phillipson. 

Pradier-Fodere,  P.  L.  E.,  Traite  de  Droit  International  Public, 
Paris,  1885-. 

Quigley,  H.  S.,  Immunity  of  Private  Property  from  Capture  at 
Sea,  being  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  No.  908, 
Economics  and  Political  Science  Series,  Vol.  9,  No.  2,  Mad- 
ison, 1918. 

*Satow,  Sir  E.,  Guide  to  Diplomatic  Practice,  London,  1917.  Cited: 
Satow. 

Seymour,  C.,  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,  New  Haven, 
1916. 

Sidgwick,  H.,  Development  of  European  Polity,  London,  1913, 


APPENDIX  B  605 

Taft,  W.  H.,  United  States  and  Peace,  New  York,  1914.  ^ 

Thorndike,  L.,  History  of  Medieval  Europe,  New  York,  1917.  ^/    j 
Vattel,  Emmerich  de,  Droit  des  Gens,  1758. 
Walker,  T.  A.,  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  Cambridge  (Eng.),  \/  ' 

1899. 

Wells,  H.  G.,  Salvaging  of  Civilization,  New  York,  1921. 
Wheaton,  H.,  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  New  York,  1845. 
Wilson,  G.  G.,  and  Tucker,  G.  F.,  International  Law,  7th  ed., 

New  York,  1917. 
Woolf,  L.  S.,  International  Government,  New  York,  1916. 


b.    Mixed  Treatises. 

Bishop,  J.  B.,  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  his  Time,  as  told  in  his 
correspondence,  New  York,  1920. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Recommendations  of  Habana  concerning 
International  Organization  Adopted  ~by  the  American  Insti- 
tute of  International  Law,  1917,  with  commentary  by  Scott, 
J.  B.,  New  York,  1917. 

Comite  du  Livre,  Annuaire  Generale  de  la  France  et  de 
I'Etranger,  Paris,  1919-. 

Hamilton,  A.,  Madison,  J.,  and  Jay,  J.,  The  Federalist,  Ford  ed., 
New  York,  1898.  Cited :  The  Federalist. 

Higgins,    A.    P.,    Hague    Conferences,    with    texts,    Cambridge 

(Eng.),  1909. 

*Scott,  J.  B.,  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  with  documents,  Balti- 
more, 1909. 

Shepherd,  W.  R.,  Historical  Atlas,  New  York,  1911. 
*Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  ed.,  History  of  the  Peace  Conference  of 
Paris,  London,  1920-. 

c.    Periodicals. 

American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Publications, 
Philadelphia,  1890-. 

American  Association  for  International  Conciliation,  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  New  York,  1907-. 


606  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

American  Consular  Association,  American  Consular  Bulletin, 
Long  Island  City,  N.  Y.,  1919-. 

American  Historical  Association,  American  Historical  Review, 
New  York,  1896-.  Cited :  Am.  Hist.  Rev. 

American  Political  Science  Association,  American  Political  Sci- 
ence Review,  Baltimore,  1894-.  Cited :  Am.  Pol.  Sci.  Eev. 

American  Society  of  International  Law,  American  Journal  of 
International  Law,  Washington,  1907-.  Cited:  Am.  Jour. 
Int.  Law. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Pamphlet  Series,  Washington,  1914-. 

—  Secretary's  Office,  Tear  Books  of  the  Endowment,  Washington, 
1911-.  Cited:  Carnegie  Endowment  Tear  Books. 

Guaranty  Trust  Company  of  New  York,  Bulletins,  New  York. 

Minnesota  Law  Review,  Minneapolis,  1917-. 

Revue  de  Droit  International  et  de  Legislation  Comparee,  Brus- 
sels, 1869-. 

World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  Boston,  1911-1918. 

World  Peace  Foundation,  League  of  Nations,  Boston,  1919-. 

New  Republic,  New  York,  1914-. 

New  York  Times,  New  York,  1851-. 


d.   Documents. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  compiled  by  Librarian  of 
British  Foreign  Office,  London,  1841-.  Cited:  B.  &  F. 

Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Great  Britain,  Foreign  Office,  Peace  Handbooks,  London,  1920-. 

International  Bureau  of  American  Republics,  American  Constitu- 
tions, comp.  by  Rodriguez,  J.  I.,  Washington,  1906-.  Cited : 
Rodriguez. 

International  Peace  Conference  (First)  at  The  Hague,  1899, 
Conference  Internationale  de  la  Paix,  The  Hague,  1899. 
Cited :  Conference  de  la  Paix. 

International  Peace  Conference  (Second)  at  The  Hague,  1907, 
Deuxieme  Conference  Internationale  de  la  Paix,  The  Hague, 
1908.  Cited:  Deuxieme  Conference. 


APPENDIX  B  607 

State  of  New  York,  Supreme  Court,  Reports  of  cases  decided. 

Cited :  New  York  Reports. 
United  States,  Revised  Statutes.     Cited:  Revised  Statutes. 

—  Statutes  at  Large.    Cited :  U.  S.  S.  L. 

—  Congress,  Congressional  Documents  (Senate  or  House).  Cited: 

Sen.-  (or  Ho.)  Doc.  — ,  —  Cong.,  —  Sess. 

—  Court  of  Claims,  Reports  of  Cases  decided  in  the  Court  of 

Claims.    Cited :  —  Ct.  of  Cls.  — . 

—  Department  of   State,   Diplomatic  Instructions,  Washington, 

1897.    Cited:  U.  S.  Diplomatic  Instructions. 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  1861-. 

Cited:  U.  S.  For.  Eels. 
Outline  of  the  Organization  and  Work  of  the  Department 

of  State,  Washington,  1911.     Cited:  Outline. 

Register,  Washington,  1869-.    Cited :  Register. 

Secret  Statutes  of  the   United  States,  by  D.  H.  Miller, 

Washington,  1918.     Cited:  Miller,  Secret  Statutes. 

—  Federal  Courts,  Reports  of  Cases  decided.     Cited:  Federal 

Reporter. 

—  House  of  Representatives,  Digest  of  International  Law,  by 

Moore,  J.  B.,  being  House  Document  551,  56  Cong.,  2  Sess., 
Washington,  1906.  Cited:  Moore,  Digest. 

—  Senate,  Journal  of  Executive  Proceedings,  Washington,  1828-. 
Treaties  .  .  .  between  the  United  States  and  Other  Powers, 

1776-1909  and  1910-1913,  comp.  by  Malloy,  W.  M.,  and 
Charles  G.,  being  Sen.  Docs.  357,  61st  Congress,  2nd  Session, 
and  1063,  62nd  Congress,  3rd  Session,  Washington,  1910, 
1913.  Cited:  MaUoy,  and  Malloy,  III  (Charles). 

—  Supreme  Court,  Reports  of  Cases  decided  in  the  Supreme 

Court.    Cited  -.  —  U.S.— 
Wilson,  G.  G.,  ed.,  Hague  Arbitration  Cases,  Boston,  1915. 


SPECIAL 

§1 

Terms  and  Principles 
*Krehbiel,  especially  Chaps.  I,  XV,  XXVI. 


608  INTEENATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

§2 

State-Systems  of  Antiquity 

a.     The  State-system. 

Fairbanks,  A.,  Handbook  of  Greek  Religion,  New  York,  1910. 
*Ferguson,  W.  S.,  Greek  Imperialism,  New  York,  1913. 
*Fowler,  W.  W.,  City  State  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  New  York, 

1893. 

Franeotte,  H.,  Polls  Grecque,  Paderborn,  1907. 
*Frank,  T.,  Roman  Imperialism,  New  York,  1914. 
*Freeman,  especially  339-374. 
Greenidge,  A.  H.  J.,  Handbook  of  Greek  Constitutional  History, 

New  York,  1902. 
Huet,   P.  D.,   Histoire  du  Commerce  et  de  la  Navigation  des 

Anciens,  Lyon,  1763. 

*Mahaffy,  J.  P.,  Silver  Age  of  the  Greek  World,  Chicago,  1906. 
Muirhead,  J.,   Historical  Introduction  to  the  Private   Law  of 

Rome,  5th  ed.,  London,  1906. 

Murray,  G.,  Four  Stages  of  Greek  Religion,  New  York,  1912. 
Oliver,  E.  H.,  Roman  Economic  Conditions,  Toronto,  1907. 
Pelham,  H.  F.,  Outlines  of  Roman  History,  4th  ed.,  New  York, 

1907. 

*Phillipson,  especially  II,  Chaps  XVI,  XVII. 
*Shepherd,  10,  14,  26,  30,  34. 

Wendland,  P.,  Helenistisch-Romische  Kultur,  Tubingen,  1907. 
*Zimmern,  A.  E.,  Greek  Commonwealth,  2nd  ed.,  Oxford,  1915. 

b.     Interstate  practices. 

Abbott,  E.  P.,  Roman  Political  Institutions,  Boston,  1901. 
Bouche-Leclercq,  A.,   Manuel   des  Institutions  Romains,   Paris, 

1886. 
Egger,  A.  E.,  Traites  Publics  chez  les  Grecs  et  chez  les  Romains, 

2nd  ed.,  Paris,  1866. 

Monceaux,  P.,  Proxenies  Grecques,  Paris,  1886. 
Raeder,  A.  H.,  Arbitrage  International  chez  les  Hellenes,  New 

York,  1912. 
Scala,  B.  von,  Staatsvertrdge  des  Altherthums,  Leipzig,  1898. 


APPENDIX  B  609 

Tod,  M.  N.,  International  Arbitration  amongst  the  Greeks,  Oxford, 

1913. 
Weiss,  A.,  Droit  Fetial,  Paris,  1883. 

§3 
Medieval  State-Systems 

a.  General. 

Adams,  G.  B.,  Civilization  During  the  Middle  Ages,  New  York, 

1914. 
Carlyle,  E.  W.,  and  A.  J.,  History  of  Medieval  Political  Theory 

in  the  West,  London,  1903-. 
Dante  Alighieri,  De  Monarchia, 
Gierke,   0.,  Political  Theories   of  the  Middle  Ages    (trans,   by 

Maitland),  Cambridge   (Eng.),  1900. 
•Shepherd,  50,  53,  55,  62-63. 
*Thorndike,  in  general. 

b.  Empire. 
*Bryce,  entire. 

Fisher,  H.  A.  L.,  Medieval  Empire,  London,  1898. 
Hartung,  J.  A.,  Lehre  von  der  Weltherrschaft  im  Mittelalter, 
Halle  a.  S.,  1909. 

c.    Feudal  States. 

Seignobos,  C.,  Feudal  Regime  (trans,  and  ed.  by  Dow,  E.),  New 
York,  1902. 

§4 
Rise  of  National  States 

a.  Commercial  Revival. 
*Day,  C.,  History  of  Commerce,  New  York,  1914. 

Heeren,  A.  H.  L.,  Essai  sur  I'lnfluence  des  Croisades,  Paris,  1808. 

b.  Political  Evolution. 

Heeren,  A.  H.  L.,  Manual  of  the  History  of  the  Political  System 

of  Europe,  Oxford,  1834. 
*Hill,  especially  I,  end,  and  II,  in  general. 
Immich,   M.,    Geschichte   des  Europdischen   S t oat ensy stems    von 

1660  bis  1789,  Berlin,  1905. 


610  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

*Muir,  especially  57-80. 

*Thorndike,  as  cited  above,  in  notes  to  Chap.  IV. 

*Walker,  same. 

c.    Modern  States. 

*Bowman,  I.,  The  New  World,  Yonkers-on-Hudson,  1921. 
Statesman's  Year  Book,  London,  1879-. 
Dominian,  L.,  Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationality  in  Europe, 

New  York,  1917. 

Gooch,  G.  P.,  Nationalism,  New  York,  1921. 
Rose,  J.  H.,  Nationality  in  Modern  History,  New  York,  1916. 
Seton- Watson,  R.  W.,  Rise  of  Nationality  in  the  Balkans,  London, 

1916. 
*Goebel,  J.,  Jr.,  Recognition  Policy  of  the  United  States,  New 

York,  1915.     Cited:  Goebel. 

Holdich,  T.  H.,  Political  Frontiers  and  'Boundary  Making,  Lon- 
don, 1916. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Monograph  on  Plebiscites,  by  Wambaugh,  S., 
New  York,  1920. 

*Johns  Hopkins  University,  Studies  in  Historical  and  Political 
Science,  XXXVIII  Series,  No.  iii,  being  Employment  of  the 
Plebiscite  in  the  Determination  of  Sovereignty,  by  Mattern, 
J.,  Baltimore,  1920. 

*United  States,  Department  of  State,  Types  of  Restricted 
Sovereignty  and  of  Colonial  Autonomy,  by  Willoughby, 
W.  W.,  and  Fenwick,  C.  G.,  Washington,  1919.  Cited: 
Willoughby  and  Fenwick. 

* Wardships  in  International  Law,  by  C.  G.  Fenwick,  Wash- 
ington, 1919.  Cited:  Fenwick,  Wardships. 

§5 
Rise  of  Consular  System 

a.     Origins  of  the  Consulate. 

Borel,  F.,  Origine  et  Fonctions  des  Consuls,  St.  Petersburg,  1807. 

Capello,  Comte  M.,  Consulats  et  Bailages  de  Venise,  reprinted 
from  Revue  de  Droit  International  et  de  Legislation  Com- 
paree,  XXIX  (1897).  Brussels,  1897.  Cited:  Capello. 


APPENDIX  B  611 

*Hershey,  §  51. 
Laigue,    L.    de,    Origine    des    Consuls,    reprinted    from    Revue 

d'Histoire  Diplomatique,  IV  (1890),  Paris,  1890. 
Leroy,   P.,   Des   Consulats,  des  Legations,   et  des   Ambassades, 

Paris,  1876. 

*Ravndal,  G.  B.,  "Origin  of  the  Consular  Institution,"  in  Ameri-       / 
can  Consular  Bulletin,  III,  Nos.  2,  3,  4   (April,  May,  and  V 
June,  1921),  p.  11  in  each  case. 
Salles,  G.,  Institution  des  Consulats,  Paris,  1898. 
Schaube,  A.,  Proxenie  au  Moyen  Age,  reprinted  from  Revue  de 
Droit  International   et  de  Legislation   Comparee,  XXVIII 
(1896),  Brussels,  1896.    Cited:  Schaube. 
*Sheppard,  E.  T.,  American  Consular  Service,  Berkely,  1901. 
Warden,  D.  B.,  Origin  of  Consular  Establishments,  Paris,  1813. 

b.     Maritime  Codes. 

Pardessus,  I.  M.,  Us  et  Coutumes  de  la  Her,  Paris,  1847. 

Twiss,  Sir  T.,  ed.,  Black  Book  of  the  Admiralty,  London,  1871-. 


§6 

Consular  Organization  and  Practice 

a.     Scientific  Accounts. 

'American  Civil  Service  Reform  League,  Report  on  the  Foreign 

Service,  New  York,  1919.    Cited:  Report. 
Great  Britain,  Foreign  Office,  Reports  Respecting  the  Consular 

Services  of  Foreign  Countries,  London,  1872. 
*  Jones,  C.  L.,  Consular  Service  of  the  United  States,  Philadelphia, 

1906. 
Le  Deux,  A.  B.,  Caractere  Diplomatique  et  les  Immunites  des 

Consuls,  Chateauroux,  1905. 
Patau,    P.,   Situation   Comparee   des   Agents  Diplomatiques   et 

Consulaires,  Toulouse,  1910. 
*Stowell,  E.  C.,  Le  Consul,  Paris,  1909. 

United  States,  Library  of  Congress,  List  of  References  on  the 
Consular  Service,  compiled  under  the  direction  of  Griffin, 
A.  P.  C.,  Washington,  1905.  Cited:  Griffin,  Consular  Service. 


612  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

b.    Professional  Literature. 

Borel,  F.,  Formulaire  des  Consulats,  St.  Petersburg,  1808. 

Clercq,  A.  de,  and  Vallat,  C.  de,  Guide  Pratique  des  Consulats, 
Paris,  1898. 

Cussy,  F.  de,  Reglements  Consulaires,  Leipzig,  1854. 

Ferguson,  R.  E.,  Manual  of  International  Law  for  the  Use  of 
Navies,  Colonies,  and  Consulates,  London,  1884-.  Cited: 
Ferguson,  Manual. 

McAneny,  G.,  "Organization  of  the  Modern  Consular  Service," 
reprinted  from  the  Century  Magazine,  XXXV,  604  (Feb- 
ruary, 1899). 

Oppenheim,  H.  B.,  Praktisches  Handbuch  der  Consulate  aller 
Lander,  Erlangen,  1854. 

Pillaut,  J.,  Manuel  de  Droit  Consulaire,  Paris,  1910. 

Rosa-Rullo,  G.  de,  Code  des  Consulats,  Naples,  1902-03. 
*Stowell,  E.,  Consular  Cases  and  Opinions,  Washington,  1909. 

Tuson,  E.  W.  A.,  British  Consul's  Manual,  London,  1856. 

United  States,  Department  of  Commerce,  Commerce  Reports, 
Washington,  1880-.  Cited:  U.  S.  Commerce  Reports. 

Consular  Regulations  of  Foreign  Countries,  being  Tariff 

Series,  No.  24,  24a,  24b,  Washington,  1915-17. 

—  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  Diplomatic  and  Con- 
sular Service  of  the  United  States,  1903,  Washington,  1904. 
* —  Department    of    State,    Consular    Regulations,    Washington, 
1896.    Cited:  U.  S.  Consular  Regulations. 

Digest  of  Circular  Instructions  to  Consular  Officers,  Wash- 
ington, 1915. 

Senate,  Reports  from  Consular  Officers  of  the  United  States,  being 
Sen.  Doc.  411,  57  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Washington,  1902. 

§7 
Origin  of  Modern  Diplomacy 

a.     General  Historical  Works. 

Baschet,  A.,  Diplomatic  Venetienne,  Paris,  1862. 
Flassan,  G.  de  R.  de,  Histoire  de  la  Diplomatic  Frangaise,  Paris, 
1811. 


APPENDIX  B  613 

Foster,  J.  W.,  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  Boston,  1911. 

Cited:  Foster,  Century. 
—  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  New  York,  1910. 

*Heatley,  D.  P.,  Diplomacy  and  the  Study  of  International  Rela- 
tions, Oxford,  1919. 
Hertslet,  Sir  E.,  Recollections  of  the  Old  Foreign  Office,  London, 

1901. 

*Hill,  as  cited  above,  in  notes  to  Chap.  VII. 
Krauske,  0.,  Entwickelung  der  Stdndigen  Diplomatic,  Leipzig, 

1886. 
Lohren,    A.,    Geschichte    des    Gesandschaftlichen    Verkehrs    im 

Mittelalter,  Marburg,  1884. 

Mackay,  B.  L.,  Die  Moderne  Diplomatic,  Frankfurt,  1915. 
*Nys,  E.,  Origines  de  la  Diplomatic,  reprinted  from  Revue  de 
Droit  International  et  de  Legislation  Comparee,  XV  and  XVI 
(1883  and  1884).    Brussels,  1884.     Cited:  Nys,  Diplomatic. 
*Walker,  37,  60,  61,  81,  87,  94-96,  131,  135,  143. 

b.    Historic  Treatises. 

Bynershoek,  C.  Van,  De  Foro  Legatorum,  Leyden,  1721. 
Callieres,  F.  de,  De  la  Maniere  de  Negocier,  London,  1750. 
Gentilis,  A.,  De  Legatiombus,  1585. 
Paschal,  C.,  Legatus,  Amsterdam,  1645. 

Wicquefort,  A.,  L'Ambassadeur  et  ses  Fonctions,  The  Hague, 
1680. 

§8 

Diplomatic  Organization  and  Practice 
a.    General  Accounts. 

*Bernard,  Lecture  IV. 
*Foster,  entire. 
Lisboa,  H.  C.  R.,  Fonctions  Diplomatiques,  Santiago  de  Chile, 

1908. 

Murray,  E.  C.  G.,  Embassies  and  Foreign  Courts,  London,  1855. 
Paullin,    C.    0.,    Diplomatic    Negotiations    of   American   Naval 

Officers,  Baltimore,  1912. 
*Report,  in  general. 


614  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

b.     Professional  and  Official  Treatises. 

Alt,  L.,  Handbuch  des  Europdischen  GesandscJiaftsrechtes,  Ber- 
lin, 1870. 

Clercq,  A.  J.  H.  de,  and  Vallat,  C.  de,  Formulaire  des  Chancel- 
leries, Paris,  1890. 

France,  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Annuaire  Diploma- 
tique, Paris. 

Garden,  G.  de,  Traite  Complet  de  Diplomatic,  Paris,  1833. 

Great  Britain,  Foreign  Office,  Foreign  Office  List,  London. 

Martens,  K.  von,  Guide  Diplomatique,  5th  ed.,  Leipzig,  1866. 

Meisel,  A.  H.,  Cours  de  Style  Diplomatique,  Paris,  1827. 

Murray,  E.  C.  G.,  Droits  et  Devoirs  des  Diplomates,  London, 
1853. 

Pradier-Fodere,  P.  L.  E.,  Cours  de  Droit  Diplomatique,  Paris, 

1899. 

*Satow,  in  general. 

*United  States,  Department  of  State,  Diplomatic  Agents  and 
Immunities,  by  A.  S.  Hershey,  Washington,  1919.  Cited: 
Hershey,  Diplomatic  Agents. 

Diplomatic  and  Consular  Service  of  the   United  States, 

Washington,  1920. 

Diplomatic  List,  Washington. 

* Register,  entire. 

§9 

Criticism  of  Diplomacy 

rBrailsford,  H.  N,  War  of  Steel  and  Gold,  New  York,  1915. 
Eller,  G.,  Secret  Diplomacy,  London,  1912. 
Hayward,  C.  W.,  What  is  Diplomacy?,  London,  1916. 
Lippmann,  W.,  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1915. 
*Loreburn,  Earl,  How  the  War  Came,  London,  1919. 
*Myers,  D.  P.,  Control  of  Foreign  Relations,  reprinted  from  Am. 
Pol.  Set.  Rev.,  XI,  No.  1  (February,  1917),  Baltimore,  1917. 
* —  Legislatures  and  Foreign  Relations,  reprinted  from  Am.  Pol. 

Sci.  Rev.,  XI,  No.  4  (November,  1917),  Baltimore,  1917. 
Neilson,  F.,  How  Diplomats  Make  War,  New  York,  1915. 
*Ponsonby,  A.,  Democracy  and  Diplomacy,  London,  1915. 
Young,  G.,  Diplomacy,  Old  and  New,  New  York,  1921. 


APPENDIX  B  615 

§10 

Treaty  Negotiation 

*Crandall,  S.  B.,  Treaties,  Their  Making  and  Enforcement,  2nd. 
ed.,  Washington,  1916. 

*Moore,  Digest,  as  cited,  above,  in  notes  to  Chap.  X. 
Roxburgh,  R.  F.,  International  Conventions  and  Third  States, 
New  York,  1917. 

*Satow,  as  cited,  above,  in  notes  to  Chap.  X. 

*United  States,   Department   of  State,   Treaty-Making  Power  in 
Various  Countries,  Washington,  1919.    Cited:  Treaty  Power. 

* —  Senate,  Ratification  of  Treaties,  being  Sen.  Doc.  26,  66  Cong., 
1  *Sess.,  a  compilation,  Washington,  1919.    Cited :  Ratification 
of  Treaties. 
Weil,  B.,  Mitwirkung  der  Volksvertretung  bei  Staatsvertrdger, 

Strassburg,  1906. 

Wright,  Q.,  Amendments  and  Reservations  to  the  Treaty,  re- 
printed from  Minnesota  Law  Review,  December,  1919,  Minne- 
apolis, 1919.  Cited:  Wright,  Amendments. 

§11 

Modern  Treaty  System 

Argentina,  Coleccioon  de  Tradados  celebrados  por  la  Republica 

Argentina,  Buenos  Aires,  1863. 
Calvo,   C.,  Receuil  Complet  des  Traites  de  tons  les  Etats  de 

I'Amerique  Latine,  Paris,  1862-. 
Chile,  Coleccion  de  Tratados  celebrados  por  la  Republica  de  Chile, 

Santiago,  1857-. 
Clercq,  A.  J.  H.  de,  Receuil  des  Traites  de  la  France,  Paris, 

1864-. 
Du  Mont,  Jean,  Corps  Universel  du  Droit  des  Gens  (see  text, 

Chap.  XI,  for  full  description),  Amsterdam,  1726-. 
Garden,  G.  de,  Histoire  General  des  Traites,  Paris,  1848-. 
Herstlet,  L.,  ed.,  Complete  Collection  of  the  Treaties  and  Con- 
ventions .  .  .  between  Great  Britain  and  Foreign  Powers, 

London,  1840-. 
Koch,  C.  G.,  Histoire  Abregee  des  Traites  de  Paix,  Paris,  1817-. 


616  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Lagemans,  E.  G.,  Receuil  des  Traites  ei  Conventions  conclus  par 

le  Royaume  des  Pays-Bas,  The  Hague,  1858-. 
Lamberty,    G.    de,    Memoires  .  .  .  contenant  .  .  .  Negotiations, 

Traites  et  autres  Documents,  The  Hague,  1724-. 
*Malloy,  entire. 
Martens,  G.  F.  de,  etc.,  Receuil  des  Principaux  Traites,  etc.  (see 

text,  Chap.  XI,  for  full  description),  Gottingen,  etc.,  1791-. 
Oakes,  A.,  and  Mowat,  R.  B.,  Great  European  Treaties  of  the 

Nineteenth  Century,  Oxford,  1918. 
Eymer,  T.,  Foedera,  Conventiones,  Literae,  et.  .  .  .  Acta  Publica 

inter  Reges  Angliae  et  Alios  .  .  .  Reges  .  .  .  et  cetera,  Lon- 
don, 1726-. 

Ribier,  G.  de,  Repertoire  des  Traites  de  Paix,  etc.,  Paris,  1895. 
Tetot,  Repertoire  des  Traites,  Paris,  1866-. 
*United  States,  Department  of  State,  Catalogue  of  Treaties,  1814- 

1918,  Washington,  1919.    Cited:  Catalogue  of  Treaties. 
* Tentative  List  of  Treaty  Collections,  Washington,  1919. 

Cited:  List. 
Wenck,  F.  A.  W.,  Codex  Juris  Gentium  (see  Chap.  XI  for  full 

description),  Leipzig,  1781-. 
Wright,  Q.,  Constitutionality  of  Treaties,  reprinted  from  Am. 

Jour.  Int.  Law,  XIII,  No.  2  (April,  1919),  Washington,  1919. 

Cited:  Wright,  Treaties. 

§12 

Treaties  and  International  Law 

Bergbohm,  C.,  Staatsvertrdge  und  Gesetze  als  Quellen  des 
Volkerrechts,  Dorpat,  1876. 

Bex,  J.,  Essai  sur  V 'Evolution  du  Droit  des  Gens,  Paris,  1910. 

Brie,  S.,  Fortschritte  des  Volkerrechts  seit  dem  Wiener  Congress, 
Breslau,  1890. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Recommendations  on  International  Law  of  the 
Second  Pan  American  Scientific  Congress,  1915-1916,  ed.  by 
Scott,  J.  B.,  New  York,  1916. 

* Resolutions  of  the  Institute  of  International  Law,  ed.  by 

Scott,  J.  B.,  New  York,  1916. 

Chauveau,  E.,  Introduction  au  Droit  des  Gens,  Paris,  1891. 


APPENDIX  B  617 

*Crandall,  in  general. 

*Field,  D.  D.,  Outlines  of  an  International  Code,  New  York,  1876. 

Grotius,  Hugo,  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacis,  1625. 
*Hershey,  §§  16-86. 
*Moore,  Digest,  in  general. 

Nippold,  0.,  Volkerrechtliche  Vertrag,  Bern,  1894. 
Fillet,  A.,  ed.,  Les  Fondateurs  de  Droit  International,  Paris, 

1904. 
*Root,   E.,   " Effect   of   Democracy   on   International   Law,"   in 

International  Conciliation,  No.  117  (August,  1917). 
* —  " Function  of  Private   Codification  in  International  Law," 

reprinted  from  Am.  Jour.  Int.  Law,  V,  577  (July,  1911). 
* —  "Outlook  for  International  Law,"  in  International  Concilia- 
tion, No.  100  (March,  1916). 

*Taft,  W.  H.,  "Treaty  Rights  of  Aliens,"  in  International  Con- 
ciliation, No.  116  (July,  1917). 

United  States,  Department  of  State,  Laws  of  Land  Warfare,  pre- 
pared by  Baker,  J.  R.,  and  Crocker,  H.  G.,  Washington,  1919. 
Cited :  Baker  and  Crocker,  Land  Warfare. 

Laws  of  Maritime  Warfare,  prepared  by  Martin,  H.  H., 

and  Baker,  J.  R.,  Washington,  1918.     Cited:  Martin  and 
Baker,  Maritime  Warfare. 

•Walker,  §§  85-87,  H'3-120,  126-128,  130-134,  141,  142,  144,  148. 
/\  *Wheaton,  entire. 

Whewell,  W.,  ed.  and  trans.,  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacis  of  Grotius, 

q.v.,  Cambridge  (Eng.),  1853. 

*Wright,  Q.,  Enforcement  of  International  Law  through  Munici- 
pal Law  in  the  United  States,  Urbana,  1916.  Cited :  Wright, 
Enforcement. 

§13 

Good  Offices  and  Mediation;  Commissions  of  Inquiry 

a.     General. 
•Hershey,  §§  306-308. 

Kamarowsky,  Count  L.,  Tribunal  International,  Paris,  1887. 
Moore,  J.  B.,  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations  to 
which  the  United  States  has  been  a  Party,  Washington,  1898. 
*Satow,  §§  619-640. 


618  INTEKNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

b.     Good  Offices  and  Mediation. 

*Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Treaties  for  the  Advancement  of  Peace,  with 
introduction  by  Scott,  J.  B.,  New  York,  1920. 
Fourchault,  C.,  De  la  Mediation,  Paris,  1900. 
Melik,  Et,  Mediation  et  les  Sons  Offices,  Paris,  1900. 

c.     Commissions  of  Inquiry. 

Beaucourt,   A.,   Commissions  Internationales  d'Enquete,  Paris, 

1909. 
Bokanowski,  F.,  Commissions  Internationales  d'Enquete,  Paris, 

1908. 

§14 

History  and  Theory  of  Arbitration 

Andre,  A.,  De  I' Arbitrage  Obligatoire,  Paris,  1903. 

Barclay,  T.,  New  Methods  of  Adjusting  International  Disputes, 
London,  1917. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Arbitrations  and  Diplomatic  Settlements  of 
the  United  States,  being  Pamphlet  No.  1  of  the  Division, 
Washington,  1914. 

*Darby,  W.  E.,  International  Arbitration;  International  Tribunals, 
4th  ed.,  London,  1904. 

Desjardins,  A.,  L' 'Arbitrage  International,  Paris,  1892. 

Dreyfus,  P.,  L' Arbitrage  International,  Paris,  1892. 

Dumas,  J.,  Sanctions  de  I1 'Arbitrage,  Paris,  1905. 
*Hershey,  §§  309-312,  318-320. 

Lafontaine,  H.,  Pasicrisie  Internationale;  Histoire  Documentaire 
des  Arbitrages  International,  Berne,  1902. 

Merignhac,  A.,  Traite  Theorique  et  Pratique  de  I' Arbitrage  Inter- 
national, Paris,  1895. 

Moch,  G.,  Histoire  Sommaire  de  I' Arbitrage  Permanent,  Monaco, 

1905. 
*Moore,  Arbitrations,  V,  4825-4851  (translated  from  Merignhac). 

Perla,  L.,  What  is  National  Honor  f,  New  York,  1918. 

Quesada,  P.  E.,  Arbitration  in  Latin  America,  New  York,  1907. 


APPENDIX  B  619 

Kedman,  J.  H.,  Law  of  Arbitrations  and  Awards,  London,  1903. 

*Scott,  Conferences,  I,  188  and  following. 

*United  States,  Library  of  Congress,  List  of  References  on  Inter- 
national Arbitration,  comp.  by  Griffin,  A.  P.  C.,  "Washington,  N/ 
1908.    Cited :  Griffin,  Arbitration. 

*Wilson,  Cases,  entire. 

*World  Peace  Foundation,  International  Arbitral  Law  and  Pro- 
cedure, by  Kalston,  J.  H.,  Boston,  1910. 


§15 

Hague  Arbitration  System 

*Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  The  International  Union  of  the  Hague  Con- 
ferences, by  Schiicking,  W.  (trans,  by  Fenwick,  C.  G.),  New 
York,  1918. 

*Scott,  Conferences,  I,  Chap.  VI  and  Appendix  to  Chap.  VI. 

§16 
Proposed  International  Courts 

Balch,  T.  W.,  A  World  Court  in  the  Light  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,  Philadelphia,  1918. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  An  International  Court  of  Justice,  by  Scott, 
J.  B.,  New  York,  1916. 

Hague  Conventions  and  Declarations  of  1899  and  1907,  ed. 

by  Scott,  J.  B.,  Washington,  1915.     Cited:  Scott,  Conven- 
tions. 

* Problem  of  an  International  Court  of  Justice,  by  Wehberg, 

H.  (trans,  by  Fenwick,  C.  G.),  New  York,  1918. 
* The  Project  of  a  Permanent  Court  of  International  Jus- 
tice and  Resolutions  of  the  Advisory  Committee  of  Jurists, 
by  Scott,  J.  B.,  being  Pamphlet  No.  35  of  the  Division,  Wash- 
ington, 1921. 

Status  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  by  Scott, 

J.  B.,  New  York,  1916. 


620  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

•League  of  Nations,  Advisory  Committee  of  Jurists,  Documents 
Relating  to  Existing  Plans  for  the  Establishment  of  a 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  London,  1921. 

Proces-Verbaux  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Committee,  The 

Hague,  1921. 

—  Council,   Documents    Concerning   the   Action   taken   ~by   the 
Council  under  Article  XIV  of  the  Covenant,  Geneva,  1921. 
•Scott,  J.  B.,  in  Car.  End.,  Tear  Book,  1921,  104-131. 
* —  Conferences,  I,  Chaps.  VII,  IX,  X,  and  Appendices  thereto. 

§17 
Official  International  Unions 

•Sayre,  F.  B.,  Experiments  in  International  Administration,  New 

York,  1919. 
"The  Supreme  War  Council,"  in  A  League  of  Nations,  I,  1-416 

(October,  1918). 
Toll,  Baron  B.  von,  Die  Internationale  Bureaux  der  Allgemeinen 

Volkerrechtverwaltungsvereine,  Tubingen,  1910. 
•World    Peace    Foundation,    Public    International    Unions,    by 
Reinsch,  P.  S.,  Boston,  1911.     Cited:  Reinsch. 

§18 
Private  International  Associations 

Fauchille,  P.,  Manuel  de  la  Croix-Rouge,  Paris,  1908. 
•Hudson,  M.  0.,  "Private  Enterprise  and  War,"  in  New  Republic, 
XXVIII,  No.  363  (16  November,  1921)  Supp.,  26. 

Jordan,  D.  S.,  Unseen  Empire,  Boston,  1912. 
•Krehbiel,  126-140. 

Lange,  C.  L.,  "The  Interparliamentary  Union,"  in  International 
Conciliation,  No.  65  (April,  1913). 

Otlet,  P.,  Constitution  Mondiale  de  la  Societe  des  Nations,  Paris, 
1917. 

Perris,  G.  H.,  The  War  Traders,  London,  1914. 

"Profit  and  Patriotism,  and  Money-Making  and  War,"  in  Inter- 
national Conciliation,  Special  Bulletin,  (May,  1913). 

Streit,  C.  K.,  Where  Iron  is  There  is  the  Fatherland,  New  York, 

1920. 
*Vie  Internationale,  Brussels,  1912-. 


APPENDIX  B  621 

"Who  Makes  War?"  in  International  Conciliation,  Special  Bulle- 
tin, February,  1913. 
•Woolf,  266-326. 

§19 
Modern  Cosmopolitanism 

a.    General. 

*Clark,  G.  N.,  Unifying  the  World,  New  York,  1920.     -/ 

Claveirole,  J.,  L'Internationalisme,  St.  Etienne,  1910. 

Crafts,  W.  F.,  Primer  of  Internationalism,  Washington,  1908. 

Faries,  J.  C.,  Rise  of  Internationalism,  New  York,  1915. 
*Krehbiel,  as  cited,  above,  §  18. 
*La  Vie  Internationale,  in  general. 

Ralston,  J.  H.,  "Forces  Making  for  International  Conciliation  \/ 
and  Peace,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  49   (Decem- 
ber, 1911). 
*Woolf,  as  cited,  above,  §  18. 

b.     Factors  in  Modern  Cosmopolitanism. 

*Butler,  N.  M.,  "The  International  Mind,"  in  International  Con-  ^ 
dilation,  No.  55  (June,  1912). 

—  "Nationality    and   Beyond,"    in    International    Conciliation, 
No.  107  (October,  1916). 

Haldane,   Lord,   "Higher   Nationality,"   in   International   Con-  \y 
ciliation,  No.  72  (November,  1913). 

Merrill,  W.  P.,  Christian  Internationalism,  New  York,  1919. 

Mather,  F.  J.,  Jr.,  "Do  the  Arts  Make  for  Peace?"  in  Inter- 
national Conciliation,  No.  51  (February,  1912). 

Mason,  D.  G.,  "Music  as  an  International  Language,"  in  Inter- 
national Conciliation,  No.  67  (June,  1913). 

Lodge,  0.,  "Science  in  the  Developing  of  International  Good  xx 

Will,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  56  (July,  1912). 
*Pan  American  Scientific  Congress,  2d.,  1915-1916,  Final  Act  and 
Interpretative    Commentary    Thereon,    prepared    by    Scott, 
J.  B.,  Reporter  General  of  the  Congress,  Washington,  1916. 

Showerman,   G.,   "Peace   and  the   Professor,"   in  International 
Conciliation,  No.  25  (December,  1909). 


622  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Wylie,  F.  J.,  "Cecil  Rhodes  and  his  Scholars  as  Factors  in  Inter- 
national Conciliation,'7  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  25 
(December,  1909). 

Lochner,  L.  P.,  "Cosmopolitan  Club  Movement,"  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  No.  61  (December,  1912). 

Gary,  E.,  "Journalism  and  International  Affairs,"  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  No.  21  (August,  1909). 

Deming,  W.  C.,  "The  Press  and  World  Peace,"  in  International 
Conciliation,  No.  66  (May,  1913). 

Constant,  Baron  D'E.  de,  "Woman  and  the  Cause  of  Peace,"  in 
International  Conciliation,  No.  40  (March,  1911). 

Fisk,  G.  M.,  International  Commercial  Policies,  New  York,  1907. 

Johnson,  A.  S.,  "Commerce  and  War,"  in  International  Con- 
ciliation, No.  77  (April,  1914). 

Mussey,  H.  R.,  "Is  Commerce  War?",  in  International  Concilia- 
tion, Special  Bulletin,  January,  1916. 

Osborne,  J.  B.,  "Influence  of  Commerce  in  the  Promotion  of 
International  Peace,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  22 
(September,  1909). 

Pepper,  C.  M.,  "Conciliation  through  Commerce  and  Industry  in 
South  America,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  34  (Sep- 
tember, 1910). 

Pratt,  S.  S.,  and  others,  "Finance  and  Commerce,  Their  Rela- 
tion to  International  Good  Will,"  in  International  Concilia- 
tion, No.  50  (January,  1912). 

Lowe,  B.  E.,  International  Protection  of  Lal)or,  New  York,  1921. 

Postgate,  R.  W.,  Workers'  International,  New  York,  1921. 

Weardale,  Lord,  "First  Universal  Races  Congress,"  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  No.  42  (May,  1911). 


§20 

International  Conferences;  Hague  Conferences 
a.    General. 

*Hershey,  §  §  292-294. 
•Oppenheim,  §§  483-485. 
*Satow,  Sir  E.,  §  §  439-497. 


APPENDIX  B  623 

*Satow,  Sir  E.,  International  Congresses  and  Conferences,  London, 

1921.     Cited:  Satow,  Conferences. 
United  States,  Department  of  State,  Berlin  Congress,  by  H.  F.     / 

Munro,  Washington,  1918.     Cited:  Munro,  Berlin  Congress,  v 
Woodward,  Congress  of  Berlin,  London,  1920. 

b.     The  Hague  Conferences. 

*Camegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Proceedings  of  the  Hague  Peace  Conferences, 
New  York,  1920-21. 

Choate,  J.  H.,  The  Two  Hague  Conferences,  Princeton,  1913.    \^ 
*Hull,  W.  I.,  Two  Hague  Conferences,  Boston,  1908. 
Lawrence,  T.  J.,  International  Problems  and  Hague  Conferences, 

London,  1908. 
*Scott,  Conferences,  I,  Chaps.  II-IV. 

§21 

Peace  Conferences;  Conference  of  Paris 

a.     General. 

Angeberg,  d'  (Chodzko,  L.  J.  B.),  Congres  de  Vienne,  Paris,  1864. 
*Hazen,  C-  D.,  and  others,  Three  Peace  Congresses,  Cambridge 

(Mass.),  1917. 
Phillimore,  Lord,  Three  Centuries  of  Peace  Treaties,  London,  \/ 

1919. 
*Phillipson,  C.,  Termination  of  War  and  Treaties  of  Peace,  New 

York,  1916.    Cited:  Phillipson,  Termination  of  War. 
*Satow,  references  in  §  20. 
United  States,  Department  of  State,  Proceedings  of  the  Brcst- 

Litovsk  Peace  Conference,  Washington,  1919.    Cited:  Procs. 

Brest-Litovsk. 
Texts    of    the   Roumanian   "Peace,"    Washington,    1918. 

Cited:  Roumanian  Peace. 
Texts  of  the  Russian  "Peace,"  Washington,  1918.    Cited: 

Russian  Peace. 
Texts  of  the  Ukraine  "Peace,"  Washington,  1918.    Cited; 

Ukraine  Peace. 
Webster,  C.  K.,  Congress  of  Vienna,  London,  1919, 


624  INTEBNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

b.    Peace  Conference  of  Paris. 

Bartlett,  V.,  Behind  the  Scenes  at  the  Peace  Conference,  Lon- 
don, 1919. 

Dillon,  E.  J.,  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace  Conference,  New  York, 
1920. 

Hansen,  H.,  Adventures  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  New  York,  1919. 

Harris,  H.  W.,  The  Peace  in  the  Making,  New  York,  1919. 

Haskins,  C.  H.,  and  Lord,  R.  H.,  Some  Problems  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  Cambridge,  1920. 

House,  E.  M.,  and  Seymour,  C.,  and  others,  What  Really  Hap- 
pened at  Paris,  New  York,  1921. 

Huddleston,  S.,  Peace-Making  at  Paris,  London,  1919. 
•Lansing,  R.,  Big  Four  and  Others  of  the  Peace  Conference,  New 
York,  1921. 

"Organization  of  the  Peace  Conference,"  in  International  Con- 
ciliation, No.  139  (June,  1919). 

Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  Regulations  governing  the  work  of 

the  Conference,  Paris,  1919. 
'Temperley,  I.,  236-278,  497-504. 

Thompson,  C.  T.,  Peace  Conference  Day  by  Day,  New  York, 
1920. 

§22 
Peace  and  International  Organization 

a.     General. 

*Krehbiel,  Parts  I  and  III,  and  the  elaborate  references  to  further 

literature. 
Marvin,  F.  S.,  Evolution  of  World  Peace,  New  York,  1921. 

b.    The  Peace  Movement. 

Butler,  N.  M.,  "The  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  75  (February, 
1914). 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Secretary's  Office, 
Epitome  of  the  Purpose,  Plans,  and  Methods  of  the  Endow- 
ment, Washington,  1919. 


APPENDIX  B  625 

Fried,  A.  H.,  "Pacifism,"  in  International  Conciliation,  Special 

Bulletins,  March  and  April,  1915. 
•Moritzen,  J.,  Peace  Movement  of  America,  New  York,  1912. 


c.    Neutrality. 

Jacobs,  A.  J.,  Neutrality  versus  Justice,  London,  1917. 

United  States,  Department  of  State,  Neutrality  Proclamations, 
1914-1918,  Washington,  1919.  Cited:  Neutrality  Proclama- 
tions. 

d.    War ;  Means  of  Abolishing  War. 

Amos,  S.,  Political  and  Legal  Remedies  for  War,  New  York,  1880. 

Angell,  N.,  Great  Illusion,  New  York,  1910. 

Anitchkow,  M.,  War  and  Labor,  London,  1900. 

Bloch,  J.  de,  Future  of  War  (trans,  by  Long),  New  York,  1899. 

Boas,  F.,  "Anthropologist's  View  of  War,"  in  International 
Conciliation,  No.  52  (March,  1912). 

Bryce,  J.,  "War  and  Human  Progress,"  in  International  Con- 
ciliation,  No.  108  (November,  1916). 

Clark,  J.  B.,  "Economic  View  of  War  and  Arbitration,"  in  In- 
ternational Conciliation,  No.  32  (July,  1910). 

Collin,  C.  C.,  War  against  War,  with  introduction  by  Archer,  W., 
New  York,  1917. 

Crane,  F.,  War  and  World  Government,  New  York,  1915. 

Crile,  G.  W.,  Mechanistic  View  of  War  and  Peace,  New  York, 
1916. 

Crosby,  0.  T.,  International  War:  Its  Causes  and  Its  Cure,  Lon- 
don, 1919. 

Dickinson,  G.  L.,  Causes  of  International  War,  New  York,  1921. 

Howe,  F.  C.,  Why  Warf,  New  York,  1916. 

Johnson,  A.  S.,  "War  and  the  Interests  of  Labor,"  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  No.  80  (July,  1914). 

Morris,  R.  T.,  Way  out  of  War;  Biology  of  the  Subject,  New 
York,  1918. 

Novikow,  J.,  Luttes  entre  Societes  Humaines,  Paris,  1896.  ^ 

Perris,  G.  H.,  War  and  Peace,  New  York,  1911. 

Powers,  H.  H.,  Things  Men  Fight  For,  New  York,  1916.  V 


626  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

,      Root,  E.,  "Causes  of  War,"  in  International  Conciliation,  No.  18 
V  (May,  1909). 

Russell,  B.  A.  W.,  Why  Men  Fight,  New  York,  1917. 

e.    Peace ;  Means  of  Securing  Peace. 

*Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Future  of  International  Law,  by  Oppenheim, 
L.,  being  Pamphlet  No.  39  of  the  Division,  Washington, 
1921. 

Duplessix,  E.,  Vers  La  Paix,  Paris,  1903. 
Duras,  V.   H.,   Universal  Peace  by  International   Government, 

New  York,  1908. 

Neill,  C.  P.,  "Interest  of  the  Wage-Earner  in  the  Peace  Move- 
ment," in  International  Conciliation,  No.  57  (August,  1912). 
*Taft,  W.  H.,  and  Bryan,  W.  J.,  World  Peace;  A  Written  Debate, 

New  York,  1917. 

Tead,  0.,  People's  Part  in  Peace;  Basis  for  a  Sound  International- 
ism, New  York,  1918. 
*Veblen,  T.  B.,  Nature  of  Peace,  and  Terms  of  its  Perpetuation, 

New  York,  1917. 

*Vestal,  S.  C.,  Maintenance  of  Peace,  New  York,  1921. 
*World  Peace  Foundation,  New  Peace  Movement,  by  Hull,  W.  I., 
Boston,  1912. 

f.    Disarmament. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Documents  Respecting  the  Limitation  of 
Armaments,  being  Pamphlet  No.  22  of  the  Division,  Wash- 
ington, 1916. 

* The  Limitation  of  Armaments,  by  Wehberg,   H.,   being 

Pamphlet  No.  46  of  the  Division,  Washington,  1921. 
Mahan,  A.  T.,  Armaments  and  Arbitration,  New  York,  1912. 
"Washington  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments,"  in 
International  Conciliation,  No.  169  (December,  1921). 

§23 

Juristic  Theory  of  International  Federation 
Brie,  S.,  Theorie  der  Staatenverbindungen,  Stuttgart,  1886. 
Johns  Hopkins  University,   Studies  in  Historical  and  Political 
Science,  XXV  Series,  Nos.  vi-vii,  being  The  State  in  Con- 


APPENDIX  B  627 

stitutional  and  International  Law,  by  Crane,  R.  T.,  Balti- 
more, 1907. 

*Dickinson,  in  general. 
Garner,  Introduction,  Chap.  VIII,  §  iii;  Chap.  V,  §§  vi-vii. 

§24 
Empire;  Alliances;  Balance  Qf  Power 

a.     General. 
Schevill,  F.,  History  of  Modern  Europe,  New  York,  1898. 

b.     Imperial  Organization. 

Adams,  G.  B.,  British  Empire  and  a  League  of  Peace,  New  York, 

1919. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,   Autonomy   and   Federation   within  Empire, 
being  Pamphlet  No.  33  of  the  Division,  Washington,  1920. 
Curtis,  L.,  Problem  of  the  Commonwealth,  London,  1917. 
*Keith,  A.  B.,  Imperial  Unity  and  the  Dominions,  Oxford,  1916. 
*" Present  Problems  of  the  British  Commonwealth  of  Nations," 

in  International  Conciliation,  No.  167   (October,  1921). 
*Smuts,  J.  C.,  "British  Commonwealth  of  Nations,"  in  Interna- 
tional Conciliation,  No.  120   (November,  1917). 

c.    Alliances  and  the  Balance  of  Power. 

•Bernard,  61-109. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  The  Armed  Neutralities  of  1780  and  1800,  ed. 
by  Scott,  J.  B.,  Washington,  1918. 
Donnadieu,  L.,  Theorie  de  I'Equilibre,  Paris,  1900. 
*Dupuis,  C.,  Principe  d'Equilibre  et  le  Concert  Europeen,  Paris, 

1909. 
*Gentz,  F.  von,  Fragments  upon  the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe 

(trans.),  London,  1806. 

Hanotaux,  G.,  Politique  de  I'Equilibre,  Paris,  1914. 
Hassall,  A.,  Balance  of  Power,  1715-1789,  New  York,  1898. 
Hearnshaw,  European  Coalitions,  London,  1920. 


628  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

/       Heeren,  A.  H.  L.,  Political  Consequences  of  the  Reformation, 
Oxford,  1836. 

—  Political  System  of  Europe,  as  cited,  above,  §  4. 
Koumanoudi,  K.,  Traites  d' 'Alliance,  Paris,  1901. 

*Leckie,  G.  F.,  Historical  Research  into  the  Nature  of  the  Balance 
\/  of  Power  in  Europe,  London,  1817. 

*Phillimore,  Commentaries,  Part  IV,  Sec.  ii. 
Stieglitz,  A.   de,  De  I'Equilibre  Politique  .  .  .  et  du  Principe 
des  Nationalites,  Paris,  1893-97. 

§25 

Holy  Alliance  and  Concert  of  Europe;  Obstacles  to,  and  Agencies 
of,  International  Control 

a.    Holy  Alliance. 

Heeren,  A.  H.  L.,  Political  System  of  Europe,  as  cited,  above,  §  4. 
*Phillips,  W.  A.,  Confederation  of  Europe,  London,  1914. 

b.     Concert  of  Europe. 

*Holland,   T.   E.,   European   Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question, 
Oxford,  1885. 

c.    Agencies  of  International  Control. 

Angell,  N.,  The  World's  Highway,  New  York,  1915. 

Bares,  A.,  Le  Blocus  Pacifique,  Paris,  1898. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  The  Consortium,  being  Pamphlet  No.  40  of 
the  Division,  Washington,  1921. 

Engelhardt,  Ed.,  Fleuves  Internationaux,  Paris,  1879. 

—  Histoire  du  Droit  Fluvial  Conventionnel,  Paris,  1889. 
*Hodges,  H.  G.,  Doctrine  of  Intervention,  Princeton,  1915. 
*Hogan,  A.  E.,  Pacific  Blockade,  Oxford,  1908. 

Johns  Hopkins  University,  Studies  in  Historical  and  Political 
Science,  XII  Series,  Nos.  xi-xii,  being  International  Begin- 
nings of  the  Congo  Free  State,  by  Reeves,  J.  S.,  Baltimore, 
1894. 

Keeckenbeck,  G.,  International  Rivers,  London,  1918. 
*Milanovitch,  M.,  Traites  de  Garantie,  Paris,  1888. 
*0gilvie,  P.  M.,  International  Waterways,  New  York,  1920. 


APPENDIX  B  629 

Stowell,  E.  C.,  Intervention  in  International  Law,  Washington, 

1921. 
United   States,    Department   of   State,   The   Danube,   by  J.    P. 

Chamberlain,     Washington,     1918.       Cited:     Chamberlain, 

Danube. 

Whittuck,  E.  A.,  International  Canals,  London,  1920. 
*Wicker,  C.  F.,  Neutralization,  New  York,  1911. 

d.     Imperialism. 

Abbott,  W.  C.,  Expansion  of  Europe,  New  York,  1918. 

Billow,    B.  H.  M.  K.,    Imperial    Germany,    with    foreword    by 

Headlam,  J.  W.,  New  York,  1917. 
Despagnet,  F.,  Essai  sur  les  Protectorats,  Paris,  1896. 
Engelhardt,  E.,  Protectorats,  Paris,  1896. 
Gibbons,  H.  A.,  New  Map  of  Africa,  New  York,  1917. 
Hobson,  J.  A.,  Imperialism,  London,  1905. 
Lair,  M.,  Imperialisme  Allemand,  Paris,  1902. 
Naumann,   F.,   Central  Europe,  with   introduction   by   Ashley, 

W.  J.   (trans,  by  Meredith,  C.  M.),  London,  1916. 
Ramsay,  W.  M.,  Imperial  Peace,  Oxford,  1913. 
Seeley,  J.  R.,  Expansion  of  England,  London,  1883. 
Seillere,  Baron  E.  A.  A.  L.,  Introduction  d  la  Philosophic  de 

rimperialisme,  Paris,  1911. 
Woolf,  L.  S.,  Economic  Imperialism,  New  York,  1921. 

e.    Nationalism  in  the  Nineteenth  Century. 

*Gooch,  Nationalism,  as  cited,  above,  §  4. 
Seton-Watson,    R.    W.,    Nationality    in   the   Balkans,   as   cited,  \/ 

above,  §  4. 
*Toynbee,  A.  J.,  Nationality  and  the  War,  London,  1915. 

f.     Pan-national  Movements. 

Andler,  C.,  Pan-Germanism  (trans,  by  J.  S.),  Paris,  1915. 
Barrett,  J.,  Pan-American  Union:  Peace,  Friendship,  Commerce, 

Washington,  1911. 

Beer,  G.  L.,  The  English  Speaking  Peoples,  New  York,  1917. 
Hart,  A.  R.,  Monroe  Doctrine,  Boston,  1916. 
Kennedy,  S.,  Pan-Angles,  New  York,  1915. 
Leger,  P.  L.  M.,  Panslavisme,  Paris,  1917. 


630  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Powers,  H.  H.,  America  and  Britain,  New  York,  1918. 
Walston,  Sir  C.,  English-Speaking  Brotherhood,  Cambridge,  1919. 
Wilson,  G.  G.,  "Monroe  Doctrine  after  the  War,"  in  A  League  of 
Nations,  I,  253-305  (June,  1918). 

§26 
Projects  for  International  Federation 

a.     General  Theory. 

*Garner,  Introduction,  as  cited,  above,  in  §  23. 
*Hart,  Introduction,  entire. 

b.    Projects  and  Schemes. 

*    Bourgeois,  L.,  Pour  la  Societe  des  Nations,  Paris,  1910. 
*Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Essay  on  a  Congress  of  Nations,  by  Ladd,  W., 
\X         with  introduction  by  Scott,  J.  B.,  containing  a  resume  of 

other  plans,  New  York,  1916. 

Duplessix,  E.,  Loi  des  Nations,  Pro  jet  d'un  Autorite  Interna- 
tionale, Paris,  1906. 

Goldsmith,  R.,  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  New  York,  1917. 
Hooper,  C.  E.,  Need  of  the  Nations,  an  International  Parliament, 

London,  1907. 
^\  Jones,  R.  L.,  International  Arbitration  as  a  Substitute  for  War, 

London,  1908. 

Keen,  F.  N,  World  in  Alliance,  London,  1915. 
La  Fontaine,  H.,  "Existing  Elements  of  a  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  of  the  World,"  an  International  Conciliation, 
V          No.  47  (October,  1911). 

*Minor,  R.  C.,  Republic  of  Nations,  New  York,  1918. 
Nijhoff,  M.,  ed.,  War  Obviated  by  an  International  Police,  The 

Hague,  1915. 

Novikow,  J.,  Federation  de  I'Europe,  Paris,  1901. 
*Phillimore,  Lord,  Schemes  for  Maintaining  General  Peace,  Lon- 
don, 1920. 

Pollard,  A.  F.,  League  of  Nations  in  History,  New  York,  1918. 
Schiicking,  W.,  Organisation  der  Welt,  Tubingen,  1908. 
Ter  Meulen,  J.,   Gedanke  der  Internatwnalen  Organisation  in 
seiner  Entwickelung,  1300-1800,  The  Hague,  1917. 


APPENDIX  B  631 

Trueblood,  B.  F.,  Federation  of  the  World,  New  York,  1899. 
World  Peace  Foundation,    World  Organization,  by  Bridgman, 

R.  L.,  Boston,  1905. 
*York,  E.,  Leagues  of  Nations,  London,  1919. 

c.    Practice  of  Federation  in  the  United  States 
and  Elsewhere. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Debates  in  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787' 
which  Framed   the   Constitution   of   the   United  States  oft 
America,  ed.  by  Hunt,  G.,  and  Scott,  J.  B.,  New  York.  1920. 

—  Judicial  Settlement  of  Controversies  between  States  of  the) 

American  Union:  Cases  Decided  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  ed.  by  Scott,  J.  B.,  New  York,  1918. 

—  The  United  States  of  America:  A  study  in  International  Or- 

ganization, by  Scott,  J.  B.,  Washington,  1920.    Cited:  Scott 

United  States. 
Carnegie  Institution,  Federal  System  of  the  Argentine  Republic, 

by  Howe,  L.  S.,  Washington,  1921.    Cited :  Eowe. 
Egerton,  H.  E.,  Federations  and  Unions  in  the  British  Empire, 

Oxford,  1911. 
Poley,  A.  P.,  Federal  Systems  of  the  United  States  and  the  British 

Empire,  Boston,  1913. 

§27 
The  League  of  Nations,  1919 

a.    Genesis  of  the  War  of  1914-1918. 

"Background  of  the  War,  History  and  Texts,"  in  A  League  of 
Nations,  I,  173-251  (April,  1918). 

Bernhardi,  F.  von,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  New  York,  1914. 
*Bullard,  A.,  Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War,  New  York,  1916.          \f 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating  to  the  Out- 
break of  the  European  War,  New  York,  1916. 

Cramb,  J.  A.,  Germany  and  England,  London,  1914. 
*Davis,  W.  S.,  Roots  of  the  War,  New  York,  1918. 

Dawson,  W.  H.,  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany,  New  York,  1914. 


632  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 


^    * 


V 


*Fried,  A.  H.,  "Fundamental  Causes  of  the  World  War,"  in 

International  Conciliation,  No.  91  (June,  1915). 
Gibbons,  H.  A.,  New  Map  of  Europe,  New  York,  1914. 
*Headlam,  J.  W.,  History  of  Twelve  Days,  London,  1915. 
*Loreburn,  Earl,  How  the  War  Came,  as  cited,  above,  §  9. 
Modern  Germany  in  Relation  to  the  Great  War  (trans,  by  White- 

lock,  W.  W.),  New  York,  1916. 

*Schmitt,  B.  E.,  England  and  Germany,  Princeton,  1916. 
Scott,  J.  B.  (ed.),  President  Wilson's  Foreign  Policy,  New  York, 

1918. 

*Seymour,  entire. 
Stoddard,  T.  L.,  and  Frank,  G.,  Stakes  of  the  War,  New  York, 

1918. 

Stowell,  E.  C.,  Diplomacy  of  the  War  of  1914,  Boston,  1915. 
Woods,  H.  C.,  Cradle  of  the  War:  Near  East  and  Pan-Germanism, 
Boston,  1918. 

b.    Plans  for  the  Settlement  and  a  League  of  Nations. 

Angell,  N.,  America  and  the  New  World  State;  a  Plea  for  Ameri- 

can Leadership  in  International  Organization,  New  York, 

1915. 

Barker,  E.,  Confederation  of  the  Nations,  Oxford,  1918. 
Bassett,  J.  S.,  Lost  Fruits  of  Waterloo,  New  York,  1918. 
Bourne,  R.  S.  (comp.),  Towards  an  Enduring  Peace,  New  York, 

1916. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  A  League  of  Nations,  2nd  ed.,  London,  1917. 
Buxton,  C.  R.  (ed.),  Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement,  London,  1916. 
Bryce,  J.,  and  others,  Proposals  for  the  Prevention  of  Future 

Wars,  London,  1917. 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Division  of  Inter- 

national Law,  Peace  Proposals,  1916-1918,  being  Pamphlet 

No.  31  of  the  Division,  Washington,  1920. 
Clark,  J.  B.,  "Existing  Alliances  and  a  League  of  Peace,"  in 

International  Conciliation,  Special  Bulletin,  (July,  1915). 
Clark  University,  Problems  and  Lessons  of  the  War,  New  York, 

1916. 
Corbett,  J.,  League  of  Nations  and  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  New 

York,  1918. 


APPENDIX  B  633 

Cosmos  (pseud.),  Basis  of  a  Durable  Peace,  New  York,  1917. 
Crozier,  A.  O.,  Nation  of  Nations,  Cincinnati,  1915. 
Dickinson,  G.  L.,  Choice  before  Us,  London,  1917. 

—  (ed.),  Documents  Relating  to  Peace  Proposals  and  War  Aims, 

London,  1919. 

—  The  European  Anarchy,  London,  1916. 

—  (ed.),  Problems  of  the  International  Settlement,  New  York, 

1919. 

Eliot,  C.  W.,  Road  Towards  Peace,  new  ed.,  Boston,  1915. 
Erzberger,  M.,  League  of  Nations  (trans,  by  Maill,  B.),  London, 

1919. 

Fayle,  C.  E.,  The  Great  Settlement,  London,  1915. 
Garvin,  J.  L.,  Economic  Foundations  of  Peace,  London,  1919. 
Giddings,  F.  H.,  "Bases  of  an  Enduring  Peace,"  in  International 

Conciliation,  No.  113  (April,  1917). 

Henderson,  A.,  League  of  Nations  and  Labor,  New  York,  1918. 
Hill,  D.  J.,  Rebuilding  of  Europe,  New  York,  1917. 
Hobson,  J.  A.,  Towards  International  Government,  New  York, 

1916. 

Houston,  H.  S.,  Blocking  New  Wars,  New  York,  1918. 
Jastrow,  M.,  War  and  the  Coming  Peace,  Philadelphia,  1918. 
Kallen,  H.  M.,  Structure  of  Lasting  Peace,  Boston,  1918. 
Lange,  C.  L.,  Conditions  of  a  Lasting  Peace,  Christiania,  1917. 
Lawrence,  T.  J.,  Society  of  Nations,  Past,  Present,  and  Future, 

New  York,  1919. 

Leroy,  M.,  L'Ere  Wilson;  La  Societe  des  Nations,  Paris,  1917. 
Lippman,  W.,  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  as  cited,  above,  §  9. 
Lodge,  H.  C.,  and  Lowell,  A.  L.,  "Joint  Debate  on  the  Covenant 

of  Paris,"  in  A  League  of  Nations,  II,  49  (April,  1919). 
Marburg,  T.   (ed.),  Draft  Convention  for  a  League  of  Nations, 

New  York,  1918. 

Morrow,  D.  W.,  Society  of  Free  States,  New  York,  1919. 
Ollivier,  S.,  League  of  Nations  and  Primitive  Peoples,  New  York, 

1918. 

Otlet,  P.,  Problemes  Internationaux  de  la  Guerre,  Paris,  1916. 
Powers,  H.  H.,  The  Great  Peace,  New  York,  1918. 
Smuts,  J.  C.,  League  of  Nations:  A  Practical  Suggestion,  New 

York,  1918. 
Stallybrass,  W.  T.  S.,  Society  of  States,  New  York,  1919. 


634 

Taft,  W.  H.,  and  others,  "The  Covenanter,"  in  A  League  of 

Nations,  II,  99  (June,  1919). 
Tcheou-Wei,  S.,  Essai  sur  I' Organisation  Juridique  de  la  Societe 

Internationale,  Paris,  1917. 

Toynbee,  A.  J.,  The  New  Europe,  New  York,  1916. 
Wells,  H.  G.,  In  the  Fourth  Year.    Anticipations  of  a  World 

Peace,  New  York,  1918. 
Withers,  H.,  League  of  Nations:  Its  Economic  Aspect,  New  York, 

1918. 

Woolf,  L.  S.,  Framework  of  a  Lasting  Peace,  London,  1917. 
World  Peace  Foundation,  The  Great  Solution,  by  La  Fontaine, 

H.,  Boston,  1916. 

c.     The  League  as  Created  in  1919. 

"Comments  by  the  German   Delegation  on  the   Conditions  of 

Peace,"  in  International   Conciliations,  No.   143    (October, 

1919). 
"Reply  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  to  the  Observations 

of  the  German  Delegation  on  the  Conditions  of  Peace,"  in 

International  Conciliation,  No.  144   (November,  1919). 
*Baker,  E.  S.,  "America  and  the  World  Peace,"  in  New  York 

Times,  1  January,  1922,  and  following  (Sundays  only),  New 

York,  1922. 

—  What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris,  New  York,  1919. 
Brailsford,  H.  N.,  The  Covenant  of  Peace,  New  York,  1919. 
Butler,  Sir  G.,  Handbook  to  the  League  of  Nations,  London,  1919. 
Fayle,  C.  E.,  The  Fourteenth  Point,  London,  1919. 
*Harley,  J.  E.,  League  of  Nations  and  the  New  International  Law, 

New  York,  1921. 

Harris,  H.  W.,  Peace  in  the  Making,  as  cited,  above,  §  21. 
'Institute    of    International    Education,    International    Relations 

Clubs,  Syllabus  No.  1,  being  Outline  of  the  Covenant  of  the 

League  of  Nations,  by  Manley,  L.  K.,  New  York,  1920.  Cited : 

Manley. 

Kallen,  H.  M.,  League  of  Nations,  Boston,  1919. 
Marburg,  T.,  League  of  Nations,  New  York,  1917-1919. 
Pollock,  F.,  The  League  of  Nations,  London,  1920. 
Scott,  A.  P.,  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties,  Chicago,  1920. 


APPENDIX  B  635 

Taft,  W.  H.,  Papers  on  the  League  of  Nations,  ed.  by  Marburg, 

T.,  and  Flack,  H.  E.,  New  York,  1920. 
*Temperley,  II,  21-31. 
United  States,  Senate,  American  Draft  of  the  Covenant  of  the 

League  of  Nations,  being  Sen.  Doc.  70,  66th  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 

Washington,  1919. 
Comparison  of  the  plan  for  the  League  of  Nations  .  .  .  with 

the  Covenant  as  finally  reported  and  adopted  . ' .  .  at  the 

Peace  Conference,  being  Sen.  Doc.  No.  46,  66th  Cong.,  1st 

Sess.,  Washington,  1919. 

Composite  Covenant  made  by  the  legal  advisers  to  the  Com- 
mission on  the  League  of  Nations,  being  Sen.  Doc.  74,  66th 

Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Washington,  1919. 
Report  of  the  conference  between  members  of  the  Committee 

on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  President,  being  Sen.  Doc.  76, 

66th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Washington,  1919. 


§28 

Establishment  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  Resumption 
of  International  Government 

*Fosdick,  E.  B.,  and  others,  League  of  Nations  Starts,  London, 

1920. 
League  of  Nations,  Official  Journal,  London,  1920-. 

—  Treaty  Series,  London,  1920-. 

—  First  Assembly,  Documents,  Geneva,  1920. 

Provisional  Verbatim  Record,  Geneva,  1920. 

Committees,  Proces-Verbaux,  Geneva,  1920. 

* —  Information  Section,  Monthly  Summary,  Geneva,  1921-. 

—  International   Financial    Conference,    1920,   Proceedings   and 

Documents,  Geneva,  1921. 
* —  Secretary-General,  Report  to  the  First  Assembly  on  the  Work 

of  the  Council,  Geneva,  1921. 
*Levermore,  C.  H.,  What  the  League  of  Nations  has  Accomplished 

in  One  Year,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  1921. 
Sweetser,  A.,  First  Year  and  a  Half  of  the  League  of  Nations, 

being  Publication  No.  1534  of  the  American  Academy  of 

Political  and  Social  Science,  Philadelphia,  1921. 


636  INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATION 

Sweetser,  A.,  League  of  Nations  at  Work,  New  York,  1920. 
' '  Three  Months  of  the  League  of  Nations, ' '  in  League  of  Nations, 
III,  1-96  (February-April,  1920). 

§29 

International  Organization  in  1921 

League  of  Nations,  Official  Journal,  ^Monthly  Summary,  and 
Treaty  Series,  as  cited  in  §  28,  above. 

—  Council,  Minutes  of  Sessions  (Twelfth  and  following),  Geneva, 

1921-. 

—  Second  Assembly,  Journal,  Geneva,  1921. 
Provisional  Verbatim  Record,  Geneva,  1921. 

—  Secretary-General,  Report  to  the  Second  Assembly  on  the  Work 

of  the  Council,  Geneva,  1921. 


INDEX 


Adhesion  and,  accession  to  treaty, 
150-151 

Alliances,  device  in  opposition  to  em- 
pire, 401;  definition,  402;  relation 
to  international  federation,  402- 
403;  objects,  403-405;  offensive 
and  defensive,  404-405;  relation 
to  balance  of  power,  405 ;  legal  ob- 
ligations of,  405-406;  membership, 
406;  European  1879-1911,  457- 
458;  competition  produced  World 
War,  458 

Alphabet  and  alternate,  111 

Ambassador — origin   of   term,   89. 

Arbitral  awards,  sources  of  interna- 
tional law,  187 ;  acceptance  pledged 
in  advance,  222;  rejection  rare, 
222-223;  void  for  excess  of  power, 
223 

Arbitral  clause  in  treaties  in  Greece, 
216 

Arbitration,  induced  by  good  offices 
or  mediation,  194;  by  commission 
of  inquiry,  208;  resorted  to  from 
defects  of  mediation,  211-212;  is 
agreed  mediation,  212;  defined, 
212;  is  judicial  settlement,  212- 
213 ;  early  form  of  international 
government,  213;  bases  of  decision 
specified,  213-214;  foundation  is 
consent  of  parties,  214;  tribunal — 
composition,  214;  compromis 
d'arbitrage,  215;  arbitration 
treaty,  215-217;  arbitral  clauste, 
216;  obligatory  arbitration,  217- 
218;  questions  suitable,  218; 
honor  and  vital  interests  excluded, 
218-219;  position  of  third  parties, 
220-221 ;  agreements  for  general 
arbitration,  221 ;  public  and  pri- 
vate questions,  221-222;  no  ap- 
peal, 222 ;  pledge  to  accept  award, 
222;  rejection  of  awards  rare, 
222-223;  award  void  for  excess  of 
power,  223;  history  of,  2:^3-226; 
in  ancient  Greece,  223 ;  in  Eoman 
period,  among  barbarians,  among 
feudal  states,  and  in  Middle  Ages, 
224;  in  renaissance  Italy,  224- 


225;  adopted  in  northern  Europe, 
225;  retarded  1500-1800,  225;  re- 
vival in  nineteenth  century,  225- 
226;  need  of  reorganization  in 
1899,  226-228;  system  set  up  at 
The  Hague,  229,  232-234;  by  sum- 
mary procedure,  233;  nature  of 
opposition  to,  236-237;  by  admin- 
istrative bureaus,  278;  needed  to 
maintain  peace,  368-369;  under 
League  of  Nations,  472 

Arbitration  treaty,  form  of  treaty, 
163;  place  in  arbitration,  215-217; 
in  Greece  and  Borne,  in  Middle 
Ages,  and  in  modern  times,  216; 
general,  216-217;  relation  to 
Hague  court,  234 

Assembly  of  League  of  Nations,  posi- 
tion in  league,  469;  equality  and 
unanimity,  469;  functions,  471; 
position  in  league,  490-491;  delay 
in  calling  in  1920,  491 ;  relations 
to  council  in  1920,  491-493;  com- 
position, sessions,  and  organization 
of  first,  493-494;  publicity  of 
meetings,  494-495;  scope  of  work 
in  1920,  495-496;  election  of  mem- 
bers of  council  in  1920,  500;  elec- 
tion of  new  members  of  league  in 
1920,  496;  verdict  on  work  in  1920, 
496;  activities  in  1921,  503-508; 
organization  in  1921,  503-504;  work 
in  1921,  504-508 ;  suggested  changes 
in  covenant  in  1921,  504-505;  rela- 
tions of  council  in  1921,  505-506; 
ineffectiveness  of  in  1921,  506; 
elections  of  members  of  permanent 
court  of  justice,  506-507;  elections 
of  new  members  of  league  in  1921, 
507;  importance  of  work  in  field 
of  organization  in  1921,  507-508. 

Balance  of  power,  relation  to  alli- 
ances, 405;  definition,  406-407; 
as  law,  as  policy,  and  as  descrip- 
tive science,  407;  forms  of,  408- 
409 ;  general  equilibrium,  409 ; 
history  of,  409-416;  in  Greece  and 
Rome,  410;  in  Middle  Ages,  411; 


637 


638 


INDEX 


renaissance  Italy,  411 ;  modern 
Europe,  412-416;  partition  as  a  de- 
vice for,  414-415 ;  partition  of  Po- 
land, 414-415;  development  into 
holy  alliance  and  concert  of  Eu- 
rope, 415-417,  422-423;  threats 
against  in  1815-1830,  418-419; 
feasibility  of  maintaining,  418- 
421,  424-426 ;  reconciliation  with 
progress,  421-422;  based  on  gen- 
eralization of  interest,  426-428; 
worst  form  of  in  1879-1914,  458; 
not  in  covenant  of  league,  463- 
464 

Barbarians,  invasions,  38 ;  state  sys- 
tem, 38-39;  interstate  practices, 
39 ;  diplomacy  among,  85 ;  arbi- 
tration among,  224 

Calvo  treaty  collection,  159 

Capitulations,  basis  of  consular 
jurisdiction,  67;  basis  of  exterri- 
toriality, 164;  military,  164 

Cipher  writing  as  aid  to  diplomacy, 
92-93 

Collections  of  treaties,  official,  157- 
159;  private,  157-160;  Du  Mont, 
157-158;  Wenck,  Martens,  158- 
159;  Malloy,  Calvo,  special,  159 

Colonial  territorities  opened  to  inter- 
national use,  431 

Commercial  imperialism,  434-435 

Commercial  revival  (1200  and  follow- 
ing), caused  by  crusades,  43; 
character,  44-46. 

Commission  of  inquiry,  theory  of, 
205-206;  a  true  international 
organ,  206;  description  of,  207; 
origin  in  mixed  commission,  207; 
function  of,  207;  leads  to  settle- 
ment on  merits,  207-208 ;  may  act 
as  arbitral  tribunal,  208;  history 
of  organization,  208-209 ;  reorgan- 
ized at  The  Hague,  208-209;  im- 
proved form  used  by  United 
States,  209 

Compromis  d'arbitrage,  form  of 
treaty,  163;  place  in  arbitration, 
215 

Concert  of  Europe,  origin,  422-423; 
history,  423 ;  reasons  for  success 
and  failure,  423-424;  activity  in 
maintaining  equilibrium,  425 ; 
based  on  generalization  of  interest, 
426-428;  means  of  control,  428- 
432;  guarantee  by,  429-430;  crea- 
tion of  status  by,  430-432;  failure 
in  1860-1914  (causes),  432-436, 


456-458;  nationalism  as  obstacle 
to,  433 ;  commercial  imperialism 
as  obstacle  to,  434-435;  democratic 
imperialism  as  obstacle  to,  435; 
pan-nationalism  as  obstacle  to, 
435-436 

Concordats,  167 

Consolate  del  Mare,  origin,  66-67 ; 
character,  67 ;  spread  to  northern 
Europe,  68 

Consular  body   (corps?),  117-118 

Consular    conventions,    77 

Consular   districts,   73 

Consular   fees,   75 

Consular  law,  77-78 

Consular  services  (national),  possible 
union  with  diplomatic,  108;  not 
coordinated  with  diplomatic,  128 

Consular  system  origins,  63-68 ; 
Greek,  63-64;  Mediterranean  city- 
states,  64-68;  Northern  European, 
68;  decline  in  early  modern  times, 
69 ;  modern  significance  of,  83 ;  re- 
sumption of  activity  in  1920,  497; 
expansion  in  1921,  509. 

Consuls,  earliest,  64-68;  elective 
early,  66;  sent  out  from  home,  64, 
65,  68,  69;  universal  use  of,  71; 
stationed  in  commercial  centers, 
72;  qualifications  and  selection  of, 
72;  classes,  72-73;  districts,  73; 
hierarchy  and  control,  73-74 ;  re- 
lations to  diplomats,  74;  paid  by 
salaries,  74-75 ;  fees,  treatment 
(promotion,  retirement,  pensions), 
75;  merchant  consuls  and  native 
consuls,  76;  commission  and  Exe- 
quatur, 77;  law  governing,  77-78; 
duties  and  powers,  78-81 ;  judicial 
work  in  early  times,  65-68;  diplo- 
matic work  in  modern  times,  79-80; 
judicial  work,  80-81 ;  immunities 
and  privileges,  81 ;  literature  (pro- 
fessional), 81-82;  termination  of 
office,  82-83 ;  diplomatic  position 
in  early  times,  90;  work  contrasted 
Avith  diplomacy,  123-124. 

Convention,  treaty  form,  163 ;  ad- 
ministrative union,  281. 
Cosmopolitanism,  definition,  14,  302; 
relations  to  international  organiza- 
tion, 14-16,  302;  relations  to  na- 
tional state,  14-16;  relations  to  em- 
pire, 14-16;  history  of,  16-17,  303- 
307;  future  of,  18-19;  under  Rome, 
31,  302-304,  303,  304-305;  medie- 
val, 17,  302-303,  305;  modern,  302- 
314,  esp.  307-314;  infra-imperial 


INDEX 


639 


type,  303;  Greek,  304;  destruction 
of  in  1250-1550,  305-306;  eight- 
eenth century,  306-307;  religion 
as  basis  today,  307 ;  laws  as  basis 
today,  307-308;  economic  and  sci- 
entific basis,  308-309;  historic 
causes  for  modern,  309;  manifesta- 
tions in  law  and  government,  309- 
313 ;  concurrent  national  legisla- 
tion, 310-311;  capital  and  labor, 
312-313 ;  significance  and  pros- 
pects, 314;  reaction  toward  (from 
nationalism),  433. 

Council  of  League  of  Nations,  posi- 
tions in  league,  469;  equality  and 
unanimity,  469;  functions,  469- 
470;  first  meeting  called  and  held, 
479-484;  significance,  484;  ses- 
sions in  1920,  485;  scope  of  work 
in  1920,  486-490;  work  in  organ- 
ization and  administration  in  1920, 
486-488;  creates  subordinate  bodies 
in  1920,  486-487;  relations  of  or- 
gans to  sections  of  secretariat, 
487;  political  work  in  1920,  488- 
489 ;  significance  and  danger  of 
political  work,  489 ;  humanitarian 
work,  490;  relations  to  assembly 
in  1920,  491-493;  elections  of  ro- 
tating members  in  1920,  500;  ac- 
tivities in  1921,  499-503;  increased 
publicity  in  1921,  and  election  of 
members  in  1921,  500 ;  scope  of 
work  in  1921,  500-502;  verdict 
upon  work  of,  502-503 ;  relations 
to  assembly  in  1921,  505-506;  elec- 
tions of  members  of  permanent 
court  of  justice,  506-507. 

Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,  Draft  Con- 
vention, provided  obligatory  juris- 
diction, 241 ;  composition  of  bench, 
253-255. 

Covenant  of  League  of  Nations,  pro- 
cedure in  drafting,  461-463; 
adopted  (signed  and  ratified),  463; 
balance  of  power,  463-464;  concert 
of  power,  463-464;  main  outlines  of, 
466-476;  variations  from  original 
plans,  472 ;  influence  of  United 
States,  472-473;  penalties  in,  473- 
474;  not  real  test  of  power  of 
league,  475;  comprehensive  system 
of  institutions,  475-476;  proposed 
changes  in  1921,  504-505. 

Credentials,  General,  112;  interna- 
tional conferences,  329 ;  peace  con- 
ferences, 344;  neglected  in  Peace 
Conference  of  Paris,  353. 


Crusades,  stimulated  commercial  re- 
vival, 43 ;  promoted  national  unity, 
53;  produced  consular  system,  64-67. 

Declaration    (treaty    form),    163. 

Democratic  imperialism,  435. 

Diplomacy,  meaning  of  term,  100- 
101,  114;  foreign  policy  and,  101; 
foreign  affairs  (relations)  and, 
101;  foreign  office  and,  101-102; 
methods  of  work,  113;  style 
and  ceremony,  113-114;  document- 
ary composition,  114;  language  of, 
115-116;  criticism  of,  123-137; 
contrast  with  consular  practice, 
123-124;  secrecy  intensifies  criti- 
cism, 124-125;  criticised  for  for- 
eign policies,  125-126;  private  in- 
fluences in,  129,  136;  popular  re- 
sponsibility for,  133-137;  secrecy 
of  and  how  far  necessary,  133-134; 
tendencies  regarding  secrecy,  134; 
public  (results  of),  134-136;  se- 
crecy imperfect,  135-136;  partisan- 
ship in,  137;  failure  produces  in- 
ternational dispute,  193 ;  may  set- 
tle international  dispute,  193 ; 
relation  to  good  offices  and  media- 
tion, 194;  relation  to  international 
conference,  317-318;  carried  for- 
ward under  League  of  Nations, 
471. 

Diplomatic  agents,  immunities  and 
privileges  early,  95-96;  recruit- 
ment, 103-108;  qualifications,  104- 
106;  changing  functions  of,  106; 
rule  of  personal  acceptability,  107; 
aliens  as,  107-108;  classification 
and  ranks,  108-112;  rank  and  its 
significance,  109-110 ;  reciprocity 
of  rank,  110;  tendencies  regarding 
rank,  111 ;  alphabet  and  alternat, 
111;  credentials,  full-powers,  in- 
structions, 112;  functions,  112-113; 
methods  of  work,  113-116;  negoti- 
ation, 113 ;  style  and  formality, 
113-114;  documentary  composition, 
114;  language,  115-116;  diplomatic 
corps,  116-117;  immunities  and 
privileges,  118,  120-121;  agree- 
ments for  exchange  of,  119-120; 
personal  inviolability,  and  basis  of 
immunities,  120;  right  to  grant 
asylum,  120-121 ;  termination  of 
mission,  122;  unrepresentative, 
126;  incompetent,  126-127;  ne- 
gotiate treaties,  143;  full  powers 
to  negotiate  treaties,  143-144. 


640 


INDEX 


Diplomatic  corps,  composition,  dean, 
functions,  116-117. 

Diplomatic  precedence — early  con- 
tentions regarding,  94-95. 

Diplomatic  services  (national),  pos- 
sible union  With  consular,  108; 
badly  organized,  127-128;  reforms 
in  recruitment  possible,  131- 
132. 

Diplomatic  settlements  as  sources  of 
international  law,  187. 

Diplomatic  system,  origin  later  than 
consular,  64;  drew  strength  from 
consuls,  69-70;  Greek  and  Roman, 
and  among  barbarians,  85;  feudal, 
86;  Holy  Eoman  Empire,  86-87; 
Papal,  87-88,  renaissance  Italian, 
88-89;  origins  of  modern,  88-90; 
Northern  Europe  adopts,  89-90; 
causes  for  establishment,  91,  93 ; 
American  experience,  92;  auxiliary 
services,  92-93;  development  in 
1450-1650,  93;  code  of  procedure 
early,  93-95;  early  law  regarding, 
95-96;  development  since  1650,  97- 
99;  of  Louis  XIV,  97;  eighteenth 
century,  98 ;  modern-significance 
of,  98-99,  118;  resumption  of  ac- 
tivity in  1920,  497;  expansion  in 
1921,  509. 

Disarmament,  as  means  of  peace, 
369-370;  relative  effect  on  differ- 
ent states,  370;  unacceptable  to 
states,  370-371;  difficult  to  apply 
in  degrees,  371 ;  means  of  comput- 
ing, 372;  need  of  conference  to 
operate,  373-374. 

Du  Mont  treaty  collection,  157-158. 

Empire,  definition,  14;  relations  to 
international  organization,  to  cos- 
mopolitanism, to  national  state 
14-16;  history,  16-17;  Macedonian, 
27-28;  Eoman,  29-31;  Medieval, 
34-36;  modern  history,  396-401; 
opposed  by  alliances,  401,  412-416; 
reaction  toward  (from  national- 
ism), 433. 

Equality  of  states,  International 
Prize  Court,  243;  Court  of  Arbi- 
tral Justice,  253-255;  comment 
upon,  253-255;  left  unsettled  in 
permanent  Court  of  Justice 
(League),  260-261;  in  interna- 
tional administrative  bureaus,  285- 
287 ;  in  international  conferences, 
332;  Hague  Conferences,  333; 
peace  conferences,  344;  Peace  Con- 


ference of  Paris,  347;  in  Assembly 
and  Council  of  League,  469. 

Exchange  of  ratifications,  150. 

Executive  agreements  (treaty  form), 
164,  165. 

Feudal  state-system,  origin  and  form, 
38,  40;  diplomacy  in,  85;  inter- 
national law  of,  179;  influence  on 
international  law,  182;  arbitration, 
224. 

Final   Act    (treaty   form),    165-166. 

Foreign  affairs  (relations),  relation 
to  diplomacy,  101. 

Foreign  Office,  relation  to  diplomacy, 
101-102;  functions  of,  102-103; 
criticised  for  isolation,  128-129, 
130;  subject  to  private  influence, 
129. 

Foreign  policy,  relation  to  diplomacy, 
101 ;  causes  criticism  of  diplomacy, 
125-126. 

1 '  Full  powers, ' '  given  diplomatic 
agents,  112;  for  treaty  negotia- 
tion, 143-144;  pledge  ratification 
of  treaty,  144;  limit  scope  of 
treaty,  152;  international  confer- 
ences, 329;  peace  conferences,  344. 

General  Conference  (Labor  Organ- 
ization), created,  468;  established, 
480;  first  meeting,  480-481;  meet- 
ings in  1920,  484;  meetings  in 
1921,  499. 

Germany,  Opposition  at  The  Hague 
in  1899  and  1907,  230-236-237; 
requested  mediation  of  United 
States  to  secure  peace  conference 
1918,  345-346;  excluded  from  oral 
discussions  in  Peace  Conference  of 
Paris,  348-350;  development  in 
modern  Eurpoe,  400-401,  457;  mod- 
ern imperialism  in,  434,  436,  457; 
excluded  from  League,  463. 

Good  Offices,  relation  to  diplomacy, 
194;  pave  way  for  arbitration,  194- 
195;  distinguished  from  media- 
tion, 194,  195-196;  occasions  for 
and  objects  of,  195 ;  described, 
196;  international  mandate  exists, 
197;  develop  into  mediation,  197- 
198 ;  organization — history  of,  203- 
205 ;  under  suspicion  early,  203 ; 
recognized  as  legitimate,  203 ;  re- 
organized at  The  Hague,  204-205; 
still  wholly  voluntary,  205. 

Governing1  Body  (Labor  Organiza- 
tion), established,  480-481. 


INDEX 


641 


Great  Schism,  49;  Greece  (ancient), 
state-system,  24-25 ;  interstate 
practices,  25-26;  imperial  move- 
ments in,  26-29;  excessive  "inde- 
pendence of  states,  27-29 ;  Mace- 
donian conquest  of,  28 ;  Roman 
conquest  of,  29 ;  nationalism  in, 
52;  consular  system,  63-64;  diplo- 
macy, 85;  international  law,  179; 
arbitral  clause  and  arbitration 
treaties,  216;  arbitration,  224; 
balance  of  power,  410;  interstate 
federation,  441-442. 

Grotius,  on  diplomatic  representa- 
tion, 96;  position  in  history  of 
international  law,  186. 

Hague  Conferences,  good  offices  and 
mediation  reorganized,  204-205, 
228;  commission  of  inquiry  reor- 
ganized, 208-209;  task  regarding 
arbitration,  228;  system  of  arbi- 
tration created,  229,  232-234; 
failed  to  provide  obligatory  arbi- 
tration in  1899,  229-230;  bureau 
of  arbitral  union,  230-231;  signifi- 
cance of  work  regarding  arbitra- 
tion in  1899,  231;  Second  Confer- 
ence (1907)  plans  of,  231;  Second 
Conference  (work),  232-233;  gen- 
eral, 333-335;  calling,  program, 
members,  scope  of  action,  sessions, 
committee,  experts,  unanimity  re- 
quirement, equality  of  states,  333 ; 
results  put  in  treaty  form,  334; 
significance  of,  334. 

Hague  Court,  creation  of,  229;  bu- 
reau of,  230-231 ;  significance,  in 
1899,  231;  reorganized  in  1907, 
232 ;  procedure  reformed  in  1907, 
232-233 ;  summary  of  the  system, 
233-234;  place  in  history  of  arbi- 
tration, 234-235;  growth  in  power 
1899-1907,  235;  criticism  of,  238- 
240;  attempted  reforms,  240-242; 
connected  with  proposed  Prize 
Court,  244. 

High  Seas,  international  status  of, 
431. 

Holy  Alliance,  origin,  417 ;  criticism, 
417-418;  means  of  control  by,  419- 
421 ;  legitimacy  of  interventions 
by,  421. 

Holy  Eoman  Empire,  creation,  36; 
theory,  37;  struggle  with  the 
church,  46-47;  diplomacy  of,  86- 
87;  mediation  by,  202;  cosmopoli- 
tanism under,  17,  305. 


Interim  commission  (administrative 
union),  281. 

International  administrative  bureau, 
new  type  of  international  institu- 
tion, 269;  theory,  269-270,  282; 
relation  to  private  internationalism, 
270;  bureaus  existing  in  1915,  270; 
history  of  growth,  271-273,  279- 
280;  subjects  dealt  with,  272-273; 
cause  for  creation,  269-270,  273- 
274,  284;  functions,  274-280;  arbi- 
tration by,  278 ;  structure,  280-282 ; 
union  or  confederation,  280;  con- 
vention, interim  commission,  regu- 
lations, 281;  directing  government, 
282;  non-political  character,  283- 
284;  supported  chiefly  by  laymen, 
created  from  private  bodies,  284- 
285;  attitude  of  diplomats  and  lay- 
men, 285;  state  equality  in,  unanim- 
ity requirement,  285-287;  success 
and  failure,  287-288;  to  be  gath- 
ered under  League,  471 ;  resump- 
tion of  activity  in  1920,  497. 

International  administrative  union, 
280. 

International  conference,  importance 
as  an  international  institution,  317, 
334;  definition,  course  of  develop- 
ment, relation  to  diplomacy,  317- 
318;  treaty  concluded  by,  318,  325- 
326,  332-333;  form  of  results,  de- 
velopment into  legislation,  318-319; 
subjects,  319,  323-325;  terms  "con- 
gress" and  "conference,"  319- 
320;  peace  conference  and  confer- 
ence in  time  of  peace,  320;  origin 
and  development  of  conference  in 
time  of  peace,  320-323;  changes  in 
subjects,  323-325;  meet  only  on 
invitation,  327;  advantages  of  state 
calling,  327-329;  organization  and 
methods,  327-333;  attendance  vol- 
untary, 328;  composition,  329;  in- 
ternal organization,  officers,  com- 
mittees, 329-330;  credentials,  full 
powers,  329;  sessions,  330;  debate, 
330-331 ;  voting,  unanimity  require- 
ment, 331-332;  equality  of  states 
in,  332;  results,  significance,  332- 
333;  Hague  Conferences,  333-335; 
peace  conferences,  336-356;  contin- 
uous conference  needed,  367-368; 
meetings  in  1920,  497;  meetings  in 
1921,  509. 

International  dispute,  result  of  fail- 
ure of  diplomacy,  may  be  settled  by 
diplomacy,  193;  causes  need  for 


642 


INDEX 


new  methods,  193-194;  value  of 
war  in  settling,  361-362;  bearing 
of  war  on  merits,  362. 

International  expositions,  296-297. 

International  federation,  leading  type 
of  international  organization,  19; 
plan  of  study,  19;  administrative 
union,  280;  as  foundation  for 
peace,  369;  needed  to  coordinate 
international  institutions,  379-380, 
389;  juristic  problems  involved, 
380;  unanimity  necessary  in  cre- 
ating, 390;  unanimity  not  neces- 
sary in  operation,  391-392;  per- 
manent, 392-395;  permanence  de- 
pendent on  state  sovereignty,  394- 
395 ;  motives  of  opposition,  395 ; 
relation  to  alliances,  402-403; 
plans,  438-441,  451-455;  motives 
for  plans,  438-441,  450,  451,  453; 
history,  441-444;  TJnited  States  ex- 
ample, 442-444;  Theory,  444-451; 
proper  grounds,  444-445;  develops 
gradually,  445-446,  448-449;  stages 
in  development,  446-447;  distribu- 
tion of  powers,  448-449;  conflicts 
of  jurisdiction,  449-450;  amend- 
ment and  withdrawal,  447-448; 
characteristics  of  early  plans,  454; 
bases  of  plans,  451-454;  later  plans 
better  balanced,  455. 

International  institutions,  types,  5-6, 
63 ;  judicial,  5-6 ;  executive,  6 ; 
legislative,  6-7;  personal  agents, 
63 ;  commission  of  inquiry,  205- 
209;  court  of  arbitration,  212-265; 
administrative  bureau,  269-288 ; 
administrative  union,  280;  interim 
commission  (Administrative  un- 
ion), 281;  international  confer- 
ence, 317-356;  conference  in  time 
of  peace,  317-336;  conference  a 
legislative  body,  318;  peace  con- 
ference, 336-356;  need  for  co- 
ordination by  federation,  379-380, 
389;  alliances,  402-406;  all  neces- 
sary types  in  League,  475-476. 

International  intercourse,  defined,  4; 
among  Greek  states,  24-25;  in 
Mediterranean  area  (early),  29. 

Internationalization,  type  of  interna- 
tional status,  431 ;  develops  from 
neutralization,  432. 

International  Labor  Office  and  Di- 
rector, created,  468;  established, 
480-481;  relations  with  Secretary- 
General  and  League,  481 ;  head- 
quarters (London,  Washington  and 


Geneva),  481-484;  activities  in 
1920,  484;  activities  in  1921,  499. 

International  Labor  Organization, 
created  by  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
468;  established  in  June-October, 
1919,  480-481;  Governing  Body, 
General  Conference,  International 
Labor  Office  and  Director,  480;  re- 
lations to  League,  481,  484,  499; 
activities  in  1920,  484;  activities 
in  1921,  499. 

International  Law,  defined,  4;  early 
maritime  codes,  66-67;  consular 
rights  and  duties,  77-78;  early 
diplomatic  law,  95-96;  law  of  mod- 
ern diplomacy,  118-122;  regarding 
treaty  obligations,  152-153;  treaty 
must  conform  to,  153;  seen  in 
treaties,  156-157,  172,  187;  rela- 
tion of  treaties  to,  176-179;  de- 
clared by  legislative  treaties,  177, 
190;  inferable  from  treaties,  177, 
187;  treaties  making  exceptions, 
177-178;  in  Greece  and  Eome,  Me- 
dieval, 179;  origin  and  develop- 
ment, 179-190;  oriental,  180;  in- 
fluences producing  (early),  180- 
181 ;  Eoman  (civil  and  canon)  law 
and  commercial  law  in,  181 ;  his- 
torical sources,  181-183;  feudal 
law  in,  182;  influence  of  state 
practice  (early),  182-183;  justice 
and,  183;  theory  of  sources,  183- 
184;  place  of  state  practice  in, 
184;  philosophical  and  positivist 
schools  184-186;  position  of  Gro- 
tiua,  186;  documentary  sources, 
187;  scope,  187-188;  and  interna- 
tional organization,  188;  codifica- 
tion, 188-190;  official  codes,  private 
codes,  189;  codified  in  interna- 
tional conferences,  189-190;  codi- 
fied by  treaty  negotiation,  190; 
vagueness  kills  Prize  Court  Con- 
vention, 247-249;  difficulty  of  for- 
mulating, 257-258 ;  legislation  by 
conference,  318;  deficiencies  cause 
of  war,  363-364;  binding  force  of, 
386;  regarding  alliances,  406;  on 
intervention,  419-420. 

International  organization,  defined,  3, 
5;  conditions  prerequisite,  7-12; 
relations  to  empire,  to  cosmopoli- 
tanism, to  national  state,  14-16; 
international  federation  and,  19; 
barbarians,  39;  Greek,  25-26,  63- 
64;  national  constitutional  obsta- 
cles, 252;  relation  to  peace,  357- 


INDEX 


643 


375,  esp.  360 ;  Monroe  Doctrine,  re- 
lation to,  436-437;  character  of 
movement  in  1921,  498;  status  at 
end  of  1921  and  relation  to  League 
and  Washington  Conference,  509- 
510. 

International  Prize  Court  Conven- 
tion, provided  obligatory  jurisdic- 
tion, 241;  plan,  243-247;  composi- 
tion of  bench,  243-244;  connected 
with  Hague  Court,  244;  procedure, 
244;  jurisdiction,  244-245;  basis 
of  adjudication,  form  of  decision, 
245;  individuals  before,  246;  fail- 
ure of  ratification,  247-251 ;  loss 
and  gain  by  failure,  250;  protocol 
revising  terms,  251. 

International  rights,  definition  and 
enforcement  as  means  to  peace, 
364;  definition  backward  hereto- 
fore, 364-365 ;  adjudication  back- 
ward heretofore,  365-366;  enforce- 
ment backward  heretofore,  366; 
international  federation  needed  to 
protect,  366-367. 

International  rivers  and  canals, 
status  of,  431. 

Intervention,  principal  agency  of 
Holy  Alliance,  419 ;  legal  status, 
419-420. 

Italy,  primitive  state  system,  29; 
Roman  conquest,  30;  consular  ac- 
tivities of  Medieval  cities,  64-68; 
renaissance  diplomacy,  88-89 ;  ar- 
bitration in  Renaissance  period, 
224-225;  balance  of  power  in  Re- 
naissance period,  411. 

Judicial  settlement,  international, 
forms,  194;  value,  194,  247-249, 
256-258 ;  not  prominent  in  cove- 
nant of  League,  255-256. 

Law-making  treaties,  contrasted  with 
other  treaties,  168-169;  examples, 
169;  increasing  in  number,  169- 
170;  tend  to  be  multilateral,  170; 
make  international  law  directly, 
177,  190;  codifying  international 
law,  190. 

League  of  Nations,  Court  of  Justice, 
258-265;  plans  for,  461;  motives 
for  formation,  456;  need  for,  as  re- 
vealed in  1862-1914,  456-458,  461; 
procedure  in  drafting  covenant, 
461-463;  no  balance  of  power  and 
no  concert  of  power  in,  463-464; 
exclusion  of  states  weakens,  464; 


advisability  of  creating  in  1919, 
464-465 ;  not  wholly  a  league  of 
victors,  465-466;  membership,  466- 
467;  withdrawal,  467-468;  organs, 
International  Labor  Office,  Council 
(structure),  468;  assembly  (struc- 
ture), voting,  secretariat,  469; 
functions  of  council,  469-470;  as- 
sembly (functions),  administrative 
bureaus  and,  471 ;  diplomacy  and 
treaties  under,  471-472;  arbitration 
under,  472;  real  test  of  power  not 
in  Covenant,  474;  equipped  with 
all  essential  institutions,  475-476; 
need  of  constant  reorganization, 
476;  relations  to  International 
Labor  Organization,  481-484 ; 
buildings  and  publications  in 
charge  of  Secretariat,  483 ;  publi- 
cations, 483-484;  election  of  new 
members  in  1920,  496;  status  in 
1921,  498;  election  of  new  mem- 
bers in  1921,  507 ;  status  at  end  of 
1921,  and  relation  to  Washington 
Conference,  509-510. 

Malloy  Treaty  collection,  159. 

Mandate  system  as  type  of  interna- 
tionalization, 431. 

Maritime  codes  (commercial  law), 
origins,  66-67;  contributed  to  form 
international  law,  181. 

Martens  treaty  collection,   158-159. 

Mediation,  induces  arbitration,  194- 
195 ;  distinguished  from  good  of- 
fices, 194,  195-196.;  relation  to 
diplomacy,  194 ;  occasions,  195 ;  ob- 
jects, 195,  203;  described,  196- 
197;  role  of  mediator,  196-197, 
198-203 ;  international  mandate  ex- 
ists, 197;  grows  out  of  good  offices, 
197-198;  grounds  for  action  in  sub- 
stance, 199-200;  no  compulsory 
jurisdiction,  200,  202,  203; 
grounds  for  (formal),  200-203;  by 
request  of  parties,  or  on  initiative 
of  mediator,  201;  in  case  of  civil 
war,  202;  history,  202-205;  object 
peace  rather  than  justice,  203,  210; 
under  suspicion  early,  203 ;  organ- 
ization (history  of),  203-205;  rec- 
ognized as  legitimate,  204;  reor- 
ganized at  The  Hague,  204-205, 
228;  still  wholly  voluntary,  205; 
shortcomings  lead  to  arbitration, 
210-211;  agreed  mediation  is  arbi- 
tration, 212. 

Merchant  consuls,  76. 


644 


INDEX 


Middle  Ages,  state-system,  33,  35-36, 
37,  38-41;  imperial  theory,  34,  36- 
38;  imperial  states,  35-36;  feudal 
states,  38-41;  diplomacy,  86-87; 
international  law,  179;  arbitration 
treaties,  216;  arbitration,  224; 
balance  of  power,  411;  interstate 
federation,  442. 

Mixed  commission,  produced  the  com- 
mission of  inquiry,  207;  arbitrates 
private  claims,  222. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  relation  to  interna- 
tional organization,  436-437. 

National  honor,  question  excluded 
from  arbitration,  219;  decreasing 
sensitiveness  concerning,  219. 

Nationalism,  conflict  with  the  church, 
48-49;  origins,  51-53;  in  antiquity, 
52;  obstacle  to  Concert  of  Europe, 
433;  reaction  against,  433-434; 
part  in  bringing  on  war  in  1914, 
434. 

National  languages  adopted  in  diplo- 
macy, 93. 

National  law,  relation  to  treaties, 
172-176. 

National  Parliaments,  indifferent  to 
international  questions,  130;  badly 
organized  for  control  of  diplomacy, 
131 ;  need  for  watchfulness  by, 
132-133. 

National  sovereignty,  supposed  con- 
flict with  international  federation, 
380;  doctrine  must  be  met  and  sat- 
isfied, 381 ;  not  violated  in  diplo- 
matic settlements,  381-382;  not 
violated  in  treaty  imposed  by  force, 
382-383 ;  considered  intact  by  gen- 
eral opinion,  383,  392;  must  go  to 
source  of  obligation  for  test,  383, 
393 ;  case  of  treaty  previously  con- 
cluded, 383-385;  protected  by  rebus 
sic  stantibus,  384,  392;  violation  of 
treaty  leaves  rights  intact,  385; 
binding  force  of  international  law 
no  violation,  386-387 ;  not  violated 
in  arbitration,  nor  in  international 
administration,  388 ;  not  violated  in 
international  conference,  389 ;  no 
obstacle  to  international  federa- 
tion, 389;  Constitution  of  United 
States,  392;  surrender  distin- 
guished from  violation  or  loss,  393 ; 
not  lost  by  pledge  not  to  make 
peace,  394;  motives  of  supporters, 
395. 

National  states,  definition,  13-14;  re- 


lations to  international  organiza- 
tion, to  empire,  to  cosmopolitanism, 
14-16;  victory  over  the  church,  48- 
49 ;  origins,  50-51 ;  development  of 
in  1200-1500,  53-56;  aided  by  cru- 
sades, 53 ;  later  developments,  56- 
58;  list  of,  as  of  1921,  58-59. 

Native  consuls,   76. 

Negotiation,  nature  of,  113 ;  with  en- 
emy states  excluded  at  Peace  Con- 
ference of  Paris,  354-355. 

Neutralization,  type  of  international 
status,  430-431 ;  becomes  interna- 
tionalization, 432. 

Obligatory  arbitration,  described, 
217-218;  special  agreement  still 
necessary,  217-218;  not  provided 
by  Hague  Conference  in  1899,  229- 
230;  nature  of  opposition  in  1899 
and  1907,  230,  236;  opposition  of 
Allies  in  1920,  237-238;  provided 
in  connection  with  contract  debts, 
240-241 ;  provided  in  plan  for  In- 
ternational Prize  Court,  241,  245, 
251 ;  provided  in  plan  for  Court 
of  Arbitral  Justice,  242 ;  Perma- 
nent Court  of  Justice  (League), 
261-265. 

Organization  Committee  (League), 
created,  479;  work  in  May -Decem- 
ber of  1919,  479-480;  relations  to 
Secretary-General,  479-480. 

Orient,  consular  practice  (early),  65, 
note  1 ;  international  law,  180. 

Partition  of  Poland,  characteristic 
of  eighteenth  century  diplomacy, 
98;  and  balance  of  power,  414-415; 
judgment  upon,  415,  418. 

Pan-nationalism,   435-436. 

Peace,  relation  to  international  or- 
ganization, 357-375,  esp.  360; 
nature  of  and  relation  to  war,  357- 
358;  does  not  exclude  use  of  force, 
358;  negative  type,  357,  358-359; 
defined,  affirmative  type,  360;  rela- 
tion to  termination  of  war,  360- 
361 ;  means  resumption  of  pre-war 
relations,  361,  363;  founded  on 
definition  and  enforcement  of  in- 
ternational rights,  364;  continuous 
conference  necessary,  367-368;  ar- 
bitration by  prior  agreement  neces- 
sary, 368-369;  international  organ- 
ization necessary  for,  369;  possibil- 
ity of  by  disarmament,  369-370; 
literature,  357,  369-370;  conclusion 


INDEX 


645 


regarding  means  of  attaining,  374- 
375. 

Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  1919,  cir- 
cumstances of  meeting,  345-346, 
347-349;  membership,  346;  voting 
power,  346-347 ;  Great  Powers  in, 
346-347 ;  unanimity  requirement, 
equality  of  states,  347;  exclusion 
of  enemy  states  from  oral  discus- 
sions, 348-350;  organization  and 
procedure,  350-353 ;  sessions,  351 ; 
committees,  351-352;  Power  of 
President,  352;  secretariat,  cre- 
dentials neglected,  353 ;  publicity, 
353-354;  "discussions"  with  en- 
emy states,  354 ;  explanation  of  at- 
titude regarding  negotiation,  354- 
355 ;  why  treaty  form  used, 
354-355;  objects  how  accom- 
plished, 355;  verdict  regarding, 
356. 

Peace  conferences,  atmosphere  bad, 
321-322,  340-341,  344,  362;  origin, 
336;  necessity  for,  336-337;  his- 
tory, 337-338;  increase  in  member- 
ship, 338-339 ;  recent  changes  in, 
338-341 ;  increase  in  scope  of  ac- 
tion, 339-340;  decrease  in  number, 
340-341 ;  circumstances  of  meeting, 
341-342;  organization  and  proced- 
ure, 341-345;  membership,  342; 
jurisdiction,  342-343 ;  authority 
over  parties,  342-343 ;  dictated  set- 
tlement, 343 ;  credentials,  full- 
powers,  equality  of  states,  unanim- 
ity ruled,  officials,  sessions,  com 
mittees,  treaty  form  used  for  re- 
sults, 344;  compared  with  confer- 
ences in  time  of  peace,  344-345; 
Peace  Conference  of  Paris  in  1919, 
345-356;  bases  of  decisions,  362- 
363. 

Permanent  Court  of  Justice  (League 
of  Nations),  opposition  to  compul- 
sory jurisdiction,  237-238;  created, 
258-259 ;  composition  of  bench,  259- 
261 ;  equality  of  states  unsettled, 
260-261;  bases  of  decisions,  261; 
jurisdiction,  261-265;  obligatory 
jurisdiction  planned,  262-264;  jur- 
isdiction mainly  voluntary,  264; 
obligatory  jurisdiction  for  some 
states,  265;  comment  on  as  finally 
created,  265;  elections  of  members 
in  1921,  506-507. 

Permanent  embassies,  90,  91,  93,  96. 

Personal  inviolability  of  diplomats, 
among  the  barbarians,  85;  in  feu- 


dal period,  86;  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, 95;  modern,  120. 

Personality  of  law,  relation  to  Con- 
sular system,  66;  disappearance — 
effect  on  consuls,  69 

Philosophical  school  of  jurists,  184- 
186. 

Political  independence,  guarantee  of, 
430. 

Positivist  school  of  jurists,  184-185, 
186. 

Postal  services  as  aid  to  early  diplo- 
macy, 92. 

Private  international  associations, 
general  status  and  numbers,  289; 
history,  289-290;  meetings,  290- 
291;  varieties,  291;  forms,  291- 
293 ;  capitalists  and  laborers,  292- 
293;  interests  and  programs,  294- 
296,  297-301 ;  international  exposi- 
tions, 296-297;  armament  rings, 
298-299;  revival  of  activity  in 
1920-1921,  299-300,  497;  constitute 
modern  cosmopolitanism,  302. 

Protectorates,   436. 

Protocol  (treaty  form),  164. 

Eatification  of  treaty,  treaty  negoti- 
ated subject  to,  143;  pledged  in 
' '  full-powers, ' '  144 ;  universality 
of  practice,  145;  provided  by  na- 
tional constitutions,  145-146;  the- 
ory, 146;  significance  in  control  of 
diplomacy,  146-147 ;  obligation, 
147;  grounds  of  refusal,  147-148; 
provision  for  in  text,  148-149;  res- 
ervations upon,  149-150. 

Eeformation,  effect  on  the  church,  49i 
50. 

Eeservations  to  treaty,  149-150. 

Eight   of   legation,   118-119. 

Eoman  Catholic  Church  (Papacy), 
establishment,  34,  35-36;  theory  of 
(Medieval),  37;  struggle  with  the 
empire,  46-47;  struggle  with  na- 
tional states,  48-49;  Great  Schism, 
49;  reformation,  49-50;  diplomacy, 
87-88;  mediation  by,  202. 

Eoman  law,  contributed  to  form  in- 
ternational law,  181. 

Eome,  conquests  begun,  29-30;  ma- 
turity of  the  Empire,  30-31 ;  state 
autonomy  under,  31;  cosmopolitan- 
ism under,  31 ;  disruption  of  the 
Empire,  31-32;  nationalism  in,  52; 
diplomacy,  85;  international  law, 
179;  mediation  by,  202;  arbitra- 
tion treaties,  216;  arbitration  un- 


646 


INDEX 


der,   224;   balance   of  power,   410; 
interstate   federation,  442. 

Secretariat,  international  conferences, 
329;  peace  conferences,  344;  Peace 
Conference  of  Paris  353 ;  League 
of  Nations.  See  Secretary-Gen- 
eral. 

Secretary-General  (League  Secre- 
tariat), named,  479;  activities  in 
1919,  479-480;  plan  for  sections  in 
Secretariat,  480;  relations  with  In- 
ternational Labor  Office,  481,  484; 
activities  in  1920,  481-482;  sections 
of  Secretariat,  482-483;  staff,  483, 
498-499;  charge  of  building  and 
publications  of  League,  483 ;  status 
in  League  and  expansion  in  1921, 
498-499. 

Sources  of  international  law,  histori- 
cal, 181-183;  philosophical,  183- 
184;  documentary,  187-188. 

State  equality,  see  Equality  of  states. 

State  practice,  early  influence  on  in- 
ternational law,  182-183 ;  true  rela- 
tion to  international  law,  184. 

States,  plurality  of  necessary,  7; 
multiplicity  of  desirable,  7-9; 
equality  desirable,  8,  11;  variety 
among  desirable,  homogeneity 
among  desirable,  9;  stability  of  de- 
sirable, 10-11;  Territorial  posses- 
sions necessary,  11-12;  political 
character  necessary,  12;  contact 
among  necessary,  12-13 ;  excessive 
independence  of  Greek,  27-28, 
29. 

State-system,  Greek,  24-25;  early 
Italian  and  early  Mediterranean, 
29 ;  Medieval,  33-41 ;  barbarians, 
38;  modern — origin,  46-56;  mod- 
ern— development,  56-58 ;  modern 
— form,  58-59. 

Status,  creation  of  as  device  for  in- 
ternational control,  and  varieties, 
430-432;  territorial  integrity,  po- 
litical independence,  430;  neutral- 
ization, 430-431 ;  internationaliza- 
tion, colonial  territories,  mandate 
system,  high  seas,  international 
rivers  and  canals,  431. 

Supreme  Council  (Inter- Allied),  or- 
ganization and  purpose  in  1917, 
348;  work  in  connection  with  armi- 
stice and  Peace  Conference,  348; 
meetings  in  1920,  497;  meetings 
and  loss  of  prestige  in  1921, 
508. 


Territorial  integrity,  guarantee  of, 
430. 

Treaties,  results  of  treaty  negotia- 
tion, 156 ;  exhibit  international 
law,  156-157;  collections,  157-160; 
total  numbers,  157-160;  classifica- 
tion by  form,  160-161,  163-165; 
executive  agreements,  164,  165 ; 
with  native  tribes,  166 ;  concordats, 
167;  classification  by  subject  mat- 
ter, 167-171 ;  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral, 170;  general  treaties  in- 
creasing, 170;  significance  of  treaty 
nexus,  170-171 ;  relation  to  national 
law,  172-176;  need  legislation  for 
effectiveness,  172-173,  174;  need 
application  by  national  officials, 
173-174;  position  in  national  courts, 
174-176;  relation  to  international 
law,  176-179;  declaring  interna- 
tional law,  and  as  evidences  of 
same,  177 ;  creating  exceptions  to 
international  law,  177-178;  parties 
decisive  for  legislative  value,  178- 
179;  codifying  international  law, 
190 ;  arbitral  clause  in,  216 ;  of  al- 
liance, 405. 

Treaty,  objects,  142;  concluded  by 
diplomats,  143 ;  negotiated  ad  ref- 
erendum, 143;  ratification  (see), 
143-149 ;  exchange  of  ratifications, 
150;  effect  on  non-signatories,  150- 
152;  adhesion  and  accession,  150- 
151 ;  scope  must  conform  to  full- 
power,  152;  must  conform  to  inter- 
national law,  153 ;  modes  of  ob- 
solescence, 153-155 ;  fulfillment  of 
terms,  or  expiration  of  period,  153- 
154;  revision  and  renewal,  or  de- 
nunciation, 154;  formal  definition, 
154-155,  renunciation,  155;  analy- 
sis of  text,  160;  procedure  in  con- 
cluding, 161-163 ;  concluded  in 
conference,  318;  form  used  in  re- 
sults of  Hague  Conferences,  334; 
form  used  in  results  of  peace  con- 
ferences, 344;  why  form  used  at 
Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  354- 
355;  basis  of  alliance,  405. 

Treaty-making   power,   concept,   146. 

Treaty  negotiation,  development  from 
personal  diplomacy,  141-142;  ob- 
jects, 142:  approximates  legisla- 
tion, 143 ;  by  diplomatic  agents, 
143 ;  subject  to  ratification,  143 ; 
special  full-powers  for,  143-144;  by 
special  commissioners,  144  145 ; 
scope  of  concept,  145 ;  range  of 


INDEX 


647 


subjects,  146;  duress  and  fraud 
forbidden,  152-153 ;  resultant  treaty 
nexus,  156;  procedure  in  conclud- 
ing, 162-163 ;  codification  of  inter- 
national law,  190;  carried  forward 
under  League  of  Nations,  471 ;  re- 
sumption of  activity  in  1920,  497 ; 
expansion  in  1921,  509. 

Treaty  of  guarantee,  used  by  Con- 
cert of  Europe,  429;  character  and 
value,  429-430;  objects  to  which  ap- 
plied, 430-432. 

Treaty  of  Versailles,  procedure  in 
drafting,  345-355;  Covenant  of 
League  in,  463 ;  International  La- 
bor Organization,  468 ;  ratified  and 
ratifications  exchanged,  479;  effect 
of  delay  in  ratification,  480. 

Unanimity  requirement,  international 
administrative  bureaus,  285-287 ; 
international  conferences,  331-332; 
Hague  Conferences,  333;  peace 
conferences,  344;  Peace  Conference 
of  Paris,  347;  in  creating  interna- 
tional federation,  390-391;  not 
necessary  in  operation  of  same, 
391-392 ;  in  Assembly  and  Council 
of  League,  469. 

United  States,  diplomatic  history,  92; 
personal  acceptability  of  diplo- 
mats, 107;  diplomatic  rank,  111; 
diplomatic  costume,  113 ;  control  of 
diplomatic  appointments,  131;  ad- 
hesion to  rules  of  Declaration  of 
Paris,  151 ;  executive  agreements, 
164-165;  Indian  treaties,  166; 
mediator  between  Germany  and  Al- 
lies, 199;  attitude  on  Prize  Court 
Convention,  249;  mediation  be- 


tween Eussia  and  Japan,  197-198, 
201-202;  resented  mediation  in 
Civil  War,  202;  improved  form  of 
commission  of  inquiry,  209;  aid  to 
development  of  arbitration,  225- 
226;  part  in  convening  Peace  Con- 
ference of  Paris  and  role  in  same, 
345-346 ;  state  sovereignty  and  the 
constitution,  392;  example  of  in- 
terstate federation,  442-444;  in- 
fluence on  Covenant  of  League, 
472-473. 

Vital  interests,  question  excluded 
from  arbitration,  219-220;  decreas- 
ing concern  over,  220. 

War,  nature  and  relation  to  peace, 
357-358;  literature,  359-369;  termi- 
nation of,  relation  to  peace,  360- 
361 ;  value  in  settlement  of  dis- 
putes, 361-362;  legal  status  of, 
361-362;  bearing  on  merits  of  dis- 
pute, 362 ;  causes  and  deficiencies 
of  international  law  as  cause,  363- 
364. 

Washington  Conference  (1921-1922), 
significance  and  relation  to  League 
and  international  organization  in 
general,  509-510. 

Wenck    treaty    collection,    158. 

World  War,  product  of  competition 
of  alliances,  458;  attempts  to  pre- 
vent by  international  reorganiza- 
tion in  1890-1914,  458-459;  stale- 
mate in  1914-1918,  459-460;  United 
States  entry,  460;  conclusion  in 
Allied  success,  460-461;  as  pre- 
lude to  formation  of  League,  461. 


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